The Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the United States of America. It superseded the Articles of Confederation, the nation's first constitution, in 1789. Originally comprising seven articles, it delineates the national frame and constraints of government. Its first three articles embody the doctrine of the separation of powers, whereby the federal government is divided into three branches: the legislative, consisting of the bicameral Congress ; the executive, consisting of the president and subordinate officers ; and the judicial, consisting of the Supreme Court and other federal courts. Article IV, Article V, and Article VI embody concepts of federalism, describing the rights and responsibilities of state governments, the states in relationship to the federal government, and the shared process of constitutional amendment. Article VII establishes the procedure subsequently used by the 13 states to ratify it. The Constitution of the United States is the oldest and longest-standing written and codified national constitution in force in the world today.
The Federalist Papers is a collection of 85 articles and essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the collective pseudonym "Publius" to promote the ratification of the Constitution of the United States. The collection was commonly known as The Federalist until the name The Federalist Papers emerged in the 20th century.
Separation of powers is a political doctrine originating in the writings of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws, in which he argued for a constitutional government with three separate branches, each of which would have defined abilities to check the powers of the others. This philosophy heavily influenced the drafting of the United States Constitution, according to which the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the United States government are kept distinct in order to prevent abuse of power. The American form of separation of powers is associated with a system of checks and balances.
Federalist No. 78 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventy-eighth of The Federalist Papers. Like all of The Federalist papers, it was published under the pseudonym Publius.
Federalist No. 6 is a political essay written by Alexander Hamilton, writing under the pseudonym of Publius, just like James Madison and John Jay in the other Federalist Papers. Published on November 14, 1787, this essay argues for the benefits of a union between the American states. Formally titled "Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States", Federalist No. 6 continues to discuss that the States would devolve into conflict with each other. This discussion is a bastion of Federalist thought in their fight against the Anti-Federalists.
Federalist No. 26, titled "The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered", is an essay written by Alexander Hamilton as the twenty-sixth of The Federalist Papers. It was published on December 22, 1787, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. Federalist No. 26 expands upon the arguments of a federal military Hamilton made in No. 24 and No. 25, and it is directly continued in No. 27 and No. 28.
Federalist No. 64, titled "The Power of the Senate", is an essay published on March 5, 1788 by John Jay as part of the ongoing Federalist Papers. Throughout the Federalist Papers, Madison, Hamilton, and Jay emphasize, the special role in the field of foreign affairs (Golove). However, Federalist No. 64 specifically focuses more deeply on the concept of treaties and how they are formed. This specific essay in the Federalist Papers is very influential; while discussing with the concept of treaties, the mystery behind the author, and the invalidity of the Anti-Federalists' argument.
Federalist No. 41, titled "General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution", is an essay written by James Madison as the forty-first of The Federalist Papers. These essays were published by Alexander Hamilton, with John Jay and James Madison serving as co-authors, under the pseudonym "Publius." No. 41 was published on January 19, 1788 and argues about the necessity of the powers the Constitution vested upon the general government as well as the meaning of the phrase "general welfare".
Federalist No. 66 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixty-sixth of The Federalist Papers. It was published on March 8, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. The title is "Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered".
Federalist No. 67 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixty-seventh of The Federalist Papers. This essay's title is "The Executive Department", and it begins a series of eleven separate papers discussing the powers and limitations of that branch. Federalist No. 67 was published, like the rest of the Federalist Papers, under the pseudonym Publius. It was published in the New York Packet on Tuesday, March 11, 1788.
Federalist No. 68 is the 68th essay of The Federalist Papers, and was published on March 12, 1788. It is probably written by Alexander Hamilton under the pseudonym "Publius", the name under which all of the Federalist Papers were published. Since all of them were written under this pseudonym, who wrote what cannot be verified with certainty. Titled "The Mode of Electing the President", No. 68 describes a perspective on the process of selecting the chief executive of the United States. In writing this essay, the author sought to convince the people of New York of the merits of the proposed constitution. Number 68 is the second in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the executive branch and the only one to describe the method of selecting the president.
Federalist No. 69 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixty-ninth of The Federalist Papers. It was published on March 14, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, under which all The Federalist papers were published. The title is "The Real Character of the Executive", and is the third in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the Executive branch in response to the Anti-Federalist Papers, and in comparison to the King of England's powers.
Federalist No. 70, titled "The Executive Department Further Considered", is an essay written by Alexander Hamilton arguing for a single, robust executive provided for in the United States Constitution. It was originally published on March 15, 1788 in The New York Packet under the pseudonym Publius as part of The Federalist Papers and as the fourth in Hamilton's series of eleven essays discussing executive power.
Federalist No. 71 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventy-first of The Federalist Papers. It was published on March 18, 1788, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. Its title is "The Duration in Office of the Executive", and it is the fifth in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the executive branch.
Federalist No. 72 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventy-second of The Federalist Papers. It was published on March 19, 1788, under the pseudonym Publius. The paper, titled "The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered, discusses executive re-eligibility and is the sixth in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers the Executive branch.
Federalist No. 73 is an essay by the 18th-century American statesman Alexander Hamilton. It is the seventy-third of The Federalist Papers, a collection of articles written to promote the ratification of the United States Constitution. It was published on March 21, 1788, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. Its title is "The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power", and it is the seventh in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the Executive branch of the United States government.
Federalist No. 75 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton and seventy-fifth in the series of The Federalist Papers. It was published on March 26, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. Its title is "The Treaty Making Power of the Executive", and it is the ninth in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the Executive branch.
Federalist No. 76, written by Alexander Hamilton, was published on April 1, 1788. The Federalist Papers are a series of eighty-five essays written to urge the ratification of the United States Constitution. These letters were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the name of Publius in the late 1780s. This paper discusses the arrangement of the power of appointment and the system of checks and balances. The title is "The Appointing Power of the Executive", and is the tenth in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the Executive branch. There are three options for entrusting power: a single individual, a select congregation, or an individual with the unanimity of the assembly. Of all of the options, Hamilton supports bestowing the president with the nominating power and the ratifying power to the senate in order to have a strategy with the least bias.
The unitary executive theory is a theory of United States constitutional law which holds that the President of the United States possesses the power to control the entire federal executive branch. The doctrine is rooted in Article Two of the United States Constitution, which vests "the executive power" of the United States in the President. Although that general principle is widely accepted, there is disagreement about the strength and scope of the doctrine. It can be said that some favor a "strongly unitary" executive, while others favor a "weakly unitary" executive. The former group argue, for example, that Congress's power to interfere with intra-executive decision-making is limited, and that the President can control policy-making by all executive agencies within the limits set for those agencies by Congress. Still others agree that the Constitution requires a unitary executive, but believe this to be harmful, and propose its abolition by constitutional amendment.
The Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution empowers the President of the United States to nominate and, with the advice and consent (confirmation) of the United States Senate, appoint public officials. Although the Senate must confirm certain principal officers, Congress may by law invest the appointment of "inferior" officers to the President alone, or the courts of law, or the heads of departments.
