Foreign policy of Andreas Papandreou

The foreign policies of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou marked a significant shift from previous Greek governments, having a strong character of national populism and non-alignment. While the policies were distinctive, they were often controversial causing polarization in the Greek society and isolating Greece among its allies.

Overview and themes

Papandreou conducted, as PASOK affiliates touted, an "independent" and "multidimensional" foreign policy; however, even his more vigorous supporters admitted later that these characterizations meant "everything or nothing" due to the frequent inconsistencies and U-turns. ^[1]

Papandreou's foreign policy had two facets: international relations and domestic consumption. On the latter, he often utilized foreign policy by exaggerating the (real or not) national dangers to distract the Greeks from a domestic crisis. In the summer of 1982, Papandreou responded to bank employees' general strike "to take into consideration the crucial international crisis facing the nation." ^[2] Later on, PASOK's poor performance in the municipal elections of 1982 prompted Papandreou to make appearances near Greece's borders as if the country was about to be under attack and appealed to Greek citizens living in the cities to "understand that the main issue that the country is facing is at this moment is defending national integrity." ^[2] On the former, foreign politicians recognized his 'pragmatic' approach despite the frustration rising from his radical rhetoric and confrontational tactics.

The rhetoric of Papandreou was that of a Third World populism infused with nationalism aimed against the imperialist forces represented by the United States and the European Union. His statement best represents his nationalism: "Greece belongs to the Greeks." His position sharply contrasted with Karamanlis's assertion that "Greece belongs to the West," because he was unable to challenge Karamanlis' foreign policy directly. ^[3] According to political scientist Takis Pappas, Papandreou saw radical polarization and political extremism as the only way to secure his path to power, believing that inflaming divisions within Greek politics would rally support for his cause. ^[4] Nevertheless, on the most consequential aspects, Papandreou's actions, often contrary to his rhetoric, followed Karamanlis' policy by keeping Greece firmly committed to the NATO alliance and EEC.

The balance between these two facets has made Greece's foreign policy appear "schizophrenic" to an outsider observer. ^{[1] [5]} Historian John Iatrides provided such an example: "while publicly attacking Washington for its interventionist policies, the PASOK government would privately complain that American officials were not sensitive to Greek fears of Turkish intentions concerning Cyprus and the Aegean." Nevertheless, according to Iatrides, Papandreou's nationalistic and confrontational diplomacy had a "therapeutic effect upon the national psyche, as the general [Greek] public came to believe that [Greece's] sovereignty had been restored" since the Greeks largely perceived that their country is pushed around by European Great Powers and now the Americans. ^{[1] [6]}

Papandreou's frequent statements antagonizing Western allies made foreign leaders question his intentions, and Greece became more isolated and vulnerable, which was not helping to solve the Cyprus question. ^{[7] [8]} A notable example was in September 1983, when Papandreou vetoed a formal European Community statement condemning the Soviet government for shooting down the Korean airliner KAL Flight 007, asserting that it was a plane spying for the benefit of the United States, and he added that "if such a plane came into Greece, we would have downed it." ^[7] Papandreou's siding with the Soviet position effectively eliminated any possibility of visiting the White House under the Reagan administration to advance Greek national interests in the foreseeable future. ^[9]

NATO

After being sworn in as prime minister in 1981, Papandreou also assumed the Ministry of Defense (a typical move in times of war), due to fears of another coup, as had occurred in 1967. ^{[10] [11]} This move also made various leaders in the NATO alliance, particularly Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl, uncomfortable in dealing with Papandreou. ^[12] In December 1981, at the NATO Defence Planning Committee, Papandreou demanded, in an acrimonious discussion, NATO guarantees against Turkey, a NATO ally, stating that the true threat for Greece is from the east instead of from the north. The NATO meeting concluded without publishing a press release for the first time. ^[13] While this displeased Greece's allies, Papandreou reinforced his image as a patriot in the eyes of concerned Greek voters and the Greek military wary about their neighbor. ^[14] Despite efforts to appease the military, Papandreou struggled with discipline, as two so-called "readiness exercises" in 1982 and 1983, both followed by forced resignations, were likely failed coup attempts. ^{[15] [16]}

Papandreou maintained high military spending levels, at 6.7% of GDP in 1982, ^[17] pleasing the Greek military at the expense of the economy. In 1985, he bought 40 American F-16 and 40 French Mirage 2000 aircraft ^[18] at the cost of US$2 billion, committing Greece's defense to long-term dependence on French and American technology. ^[19] The purchase size was unusual given the status of the Greek economy, and it was described in the press as the "purchase of the century" (Greek : η αγορά του αιώνα). ^{[20] [21]}

Despite Papandreou's campaign promise to immediately remove U.S. troops and military bases from Greece once in power, the country remained firmly within NATO. This reversal required careful navigation between domestic expectations—shaped by over a decade of anti-American rhetoric—and geopolitical realities, as removing the bases would have elevated Turkey's strategic value within the NATO alliance. In the 1983 agreement, all four U.S. bases established since 1952 remained in Greece for an additional five years, accompanied by some increased military aid—but no guarantees against Turkish aggression. ^[22] Papandreou claimed the deal included a provision for base removal after 1988, granted Greece greater control over foreign bases, and secured U.S. military aid under the 7/10 ratio with Turkey. ^{[23] [24]} All these statements were inaccurate, but the treaty agreement documents were kept away from the public for nearly two months to sideline the opposition. ^[24] Afterward, it was revealed that the agreement was nearly identical to his predecessor's beyond minor symbolic concessions. ^[24]

Arab opening

Papandreou continued Karamanlis's opening to Arab countries as part of diversifying diplomatic partners to secure trade deals and investments from petro-dollars countries. He improved relations with 'radical' Arab nations, such as Muammar Gaddafi's Libya, ^[25] Hafez al-Assad's Syria, and letting Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members stay in Greece, ^[26] antagonizing the United States. Moreover, Papandreou supported the causes of various national liberation movements worldwide and agreed for Greece to host representative offices of many such organizations. ^[26] He also supported the Palestinian liberation cause and advocated the two-state solution while at the same time condemning Israeli policies in the occupied territories. However, inviting 'radical' Arab groups in Greece further fueled the rising terrorism incidents in Greece. ^[27] Morevoer, his frequent radical and combative rhetoric frustrated existing allies and did not bring new allies (Arab states ^[27] or countries from the eastern bloc), leaving Greece more diplomatically isolated and unable to advance a solution on the Cyprus problem. ^{[7] [8]}

Turkey

Papandreou often emphasized that the threat to Greece is coming from the east instead of from the north ^[28] and tried to remind other European members frequently of Turkey's violations of international law and human rights. ^[29] Moreover, he repeatedly blocked EEC credits for Turkey and its candidacy application for EEC membership in 1987. ^[29] At the same time, Papandreou made an effort to improve relations with Turkey in Davos. ^{[30] [31]}

In October 1993, Papandreou announced the "Common Defence Dogma" with the Republic of Cyprus and the intention of expanding the territorial waters to 12 miles (November 1994), which further disturbed Turkey. In response to Papandreou's declaration that Greece intended to expand to 12 miles, in June 1995, the Turkish Parliament voted for a "casus belli" license, meaning the Turkish government could take any necessary action (including military) if Greece exercised its right (according to Law of the Sea) to expand. ^[32] These actions increased the chances for another crisis, as it happened at Imia in January 1996, right after the transition of power from Papandreou to Costas Simitis. ^[33]

Reapprochment with Turkey

Further information: 1987 Aegean crisis

Davos World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 1988 – Handshake between Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal.

Greece and Turkey nearly entered into war over a series of miscommunications in late March 1987; Turkey learned that Greece was about to initiate exploration for the oil drilling in the Aegean Sea near Thasos, a Greek island on the north Aegean. In response, the Turkish survey ship Piri Reis (and later the RV MTA Sismik 1) was sent to the area with an escort of Turkish warships. Papandreou threatened to sink any Turkish ship found in Greek waters. ^[34] Turkey's reaction was exaggerated by hard-liners since Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal was undergoing open heart surgery in Houston, Texas. As the situation escalated, the US (particularly Robert V. Keeley, US ambassador in Athens) and NATO intervened to defuse the crisis. ^[34] Papandreou wanted to hold NATO, and especially the United States, responsible for the Turkish aggressiveness. ^[35] He ordered the suspension of the operation of the NATO communication base in Nea Makri, and he sent the Greek Foreign Minister, Karolos Papoulias, to Warsaw Pact member, Bulgaria, for consultations with President Zhivkov. ^[35] The crisis ended with Greece not pursuing oil drills in the north Aegean Sea and Turkey withdrawing its naval vessels. ^[36]

In January 1988, Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart, Turgut Özal, met at the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, to improve the relations between their two countries. Papandreou described the meeting as "a great event for the two nations" and "a breakthrough" by Özal. Part of the meeting was a 'no war agreement' and establishing a 'hotline' between the two governments, and joint committees were established to work towards closer political and economic relations. ^[31] Papandreou sought this agreement to improve his image as a man of peace, ^[37] while Özal wanted to improve Turkey's image abroad as his country was under evaluation for full membership of the European Community. ^[38]

A week after the Davos meeting, Mitsotakis criticised Papandreou for focusing on bilateral disputes in Davos and effectively "shelving" the Cyprus dispute. Papandreou was forced to denounce the Davos process and famously apologized in Latin ("mea culpa") from the podium of the Greek parliament. ^{[39] [40]} Despite some progress achieved on culture exchange and accident prevention over international waters, however, by the end of 1988, Greece reported 338 Turkish violations of the Greek airspace with 42 mock dogfights, ^[39] vanishing the 'spirit of Davos'. ^[41]

North Macedonia

Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou on official visit with United States President William J. Clinton, Washington, April 1994. Dimitra Liani is in the background on the right.

In February 1994, Papandreou ordered an economic embargo on landlocked North Macedonia due to the ongoing naming dispute regarding the name of the then Republic of Macedonia. ^[42] In April 1994, Papandreou visited the United States to meet with President Clinton, who had recently recognized the new republic, but failed to make any progress. ^[43] Papandreou hoped the embargo would have been a bargaining chip, but it backfired because North Macedonia gained considerable sympathy worldwide at the expense of Greece's reputation. ^{[44] [45]} In September 1995, an interim accord was signed between the two countries to temporarily address the name issue and ending the 18 months embargo. ^[46]

Initiative of the Six

He was co-creator in 1982 of, and subsequently an active participant in, a movement promoted by the Parliamentarians for Global Action, the Initiative of the Six, which included, besides the Greek PM, Mexico's president Miguel de la Madrid, Argentina's president Raúl Alfonsín, Sweden's prime minister Olof Palme, Tanzania's president Julius Nyerere and India's prime minister Indira Gandhi. ^[47] The movement's stated objective was the "promotion of peace and progress for all mankind." Papandreou pledged that Greece would be a nuclear-free country by removing the existing nuclear weapons and initiating diplomatic efforts to turn the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone, but then proceeded to modernize nuclear storage sites in Greece. ^[5] After various initiatives, mostly directed at pressuring the United States and the Soviet Union to stop nuclear testing and reduce the level of nuclear arms, it eventually disbanded after the US-Soviet rapprochement that was taking place independently of international activities. ^{[48] [49]}

Footnotes

1. Rizopoulos 1993, p. 21.
2. Loulis 1984, p. 382.
3. Nafpliotis 2018, p. 516.
4. Pappas 2009, pp. 77–87.
5. Kuniholm 1986, pp. 139–140.
6. Miller 2009, p. 210.
7. Bellou, Couloumbis & Kariotis 2003, p. 100.
8. Loulis 1984, pp. 375–391.
9. Stearns 2021, pp. 115–116.
10. New York Times Oct. 1981.
11. Washington Post Oct. 1981.
12. Kofas 2003, p. 186.
13. Duke 1989, p. 166.
14. New York Times Dec. 1981b.
15. Danopoulos 1985, p. 94.
16. Karakatsanis 1997, p. 294.
17. New York Times Mar. 1982.
18. New York Times Mar. 1985.
19. Melakopides 1987, p. 573.
20. Kathimerini Mar. 1985.
21. Clogg 2013, p. 196.
22. Bellou, Couloumbis & Kariotis 2003, pp. 100–101.
23. Duke 1989, p. 170.
24. Dimitras 1985, pp. 146–147.
25. & Greek Reporter Aug. 2011.
26. New York Times Dec. 1981a.
27. Stergiou 2021, pp. 166–169.
28. Karamouzi & Chourchoulis 2018, pp. 6–7.
29. Close 2014, p. 268.
30. Close 2014, p. 271.
31. Clogg 2013, p. 189.
32. Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, p. 174.
33. Heraclides 2010, pp. 133–134.
34. Heraclides 2010, pp. 121–123.
35. Tsakonas 2015, p. 46.
36. Heraclides 2010, p. 122.
37. Clogg 1993, p. 185.
38. Katsoulas 2021, p. 194.
39. Katsoulas 2021, p. 195.
40. Heraclides 2010, p. 126.
41. Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, p. 168.
42. Washington Post May 1994.
43. Bellou, Couloumbis & Kariotis 2003, p. 102-103.
44. Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, pp. 181–182.
45. Close 2014, p. 277.
46. Bellou, Couloumbis & Kariotis 2003, p. 103.
47. Clogg 1993, p. 188.
48. Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, pp. 188–189.
49. Karamouzi & Chourchoulis 2018, pp. 34–35.

References

Books

• Bellou, Fotini; Couloumbis, Theodore A.; Kariotis, Theodore C., eds. (2003). Greece in the twentieth century. London & New York: Routledge. ISBN   978-0-203-04589-3.
• Clogg, Richard, ed. (1993). Greece, 1981–89: The Populist Decade. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN   978-1-349-23056-3.
• —————— (2013). A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN   978-1-107-65644-4.
• Close, David H. (2014). Greece since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN   978-1-317-88001-1.
• Duke, Simon (1989). United States military forces and installations in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0-19-829132-9.
• Heraclides, Alexis (2010). The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN   978-0-230-28339-8.
• Katsoulas, Spyros (2021). The United States and Greek-Turkish Relations, The Guardian's Dilemma. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN   978-1-000-51433-9.
• Kofas, Jon V. (2003). Under the Eagle's Claw Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S. - Greek Relations. New York: ABC-CLIO. ISBN   978-0-313-07223-9.
• Koliopoulos, John S.; Veremis, Thanos M. [in Greek] (2009). Modern Greece A History Since 1821. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN   978-1-4443-1483-0.
• Miller, James (2009). The United States and the Making of Modern Greece. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. ISBN   978-1-4696-2216-3.
• Pappas, Takis S. (2009). Το χαρισματικό κόμμα: ΠΑΣΟΚ, Παπανδρέου, Εξουσία (in Greek). Athens: Patakis. ISBN   978-960-16-3256-8.
• Stearns, Monteagle (2021). The enigma of Andreas Papandreou. Sterling: Potomac Books. ISBN   978-1-64012-329-8.
• Stergiou, Andreas (2021). Greece's Ostpolitik Dealing With the 'Devil'. Cham: Springer International Publishing. ISBN   978-3-030-61129-3.
• Tsakonas, Panagiotes (2015). The incomplete breakthrough in Greek-Turkish relations: Grasping Greece's socialization strategy. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. ISBN   978-0-230-27807-3.

Journals

• Danopoulos, Constantine (1985). "From balconies to tanks: post-junta civil-military relations in Greece". Journal of Political & Military Sociology. 13 (1): 83–98. JSTOR   45371219.
• Dimitras, Panayote E. (1985). "Greece: A New Danger". Foreign Policy. 58 (58): 134–150. doi:10.2307/1148656. JSTOR   1148656.
• Karakatsanis, Niovi (1997). "Do Attitudes Matter? The Military and Democratic Consolidation in Greece". Armed Forces & Society. 24 (2): 289–313. doi:10.1177/0095327X9702400205. JSTOR   45346811.
• Karamouzi, Eirini; Chourchoulis, Dionisios (2018). "Troublemaker or peacemaker? Andreas Papandreou, the Euromissile Crisis, and the policy of peace, 1981–86" . Cold War History. 19 (1): 39–61. doi:10.1080/14682745.2018.1497014.
• Kuniholm, Bruce R. (1986). "Rhetoric and Reality in the Aegean: US Policy Options toward Greece and Turkey". SAIS Review. 6 (1): 137–157. doi:10.1353/sais.1986.0044. JSTOR   45349337.
• Loulis, John C. (1984). "Papandreou's Foreign Policy". Foreign Affairs. 63 (2): 375–391. doi:10.2307/20042189. JSTOR   20042189.
• Melakopides, Constatine (1987). "The logic of Papandreou's foreign policy". International Journal. 42 (3): 559–584. doi:10.1177/002070208704200306. JSTOR   40202471.
• Nafpliotis, Alexandros (2018). "From radicalism to pragmatism via Europe: PASOK's stance vis-à-vis the EEC, 1977–1981". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 18 (4): 509–528. doi: 10.1080/14683857.2018.1519686 .
• Rizopoulos, Nicholas X. (1993). "Pride, Prejudice, and Myopia: Greek Foreign Policy in a Time Warp". World Policy Journal. 10 (3): 17–28. JSTOR   40209315.

Newspapers and magazines

• "Greece grants diplomatic status to P.L.O. Office". The New York Times. 17 December 1981. p. 6.
• "Greece obstructs NATO communique". The New York Times. 10 December 1981.
• Loren Jenkins (21 October 1981). "Papandreou takes over, warns the military". Washington Post.
• Marvine Howe (22 October 1981). "Papandreou at swearing-in calls for change". The New York Times.
• "Greece seeks weapons and an arms industry". The New York Times. 3 March 1982.
• "New issues raised for US on Greece". The New York Times. 11 March 1985.
• "Θεαματική εξαγγελία της αγορά του αιώνα" (in Greek). Kathimerini. 6 March 1985.
• Steve Vogel (25 May 1994). "Greek blockade, U.N. embargo threaten Macedonia's future". Washington Post.
• Emmanouela Seiradaki (24 August 2011). "Colonel Gadhafi Greek bonds". Greek Reporter.