The Aegean crisis of March 1987 was a confrontation between Turkey and Greece arising from a miscommunication over the Greek intentions to conduct oil exploration in the Aegean Sea, near the Greek island Thasos.
Greece sought to prevent oil companies from drilling beyond its territorial waters, however, Turkey misinterpreted this action as an indication that Greece intended to expand its oil exploration beyond those waters. The lack of direct communication channels between the two governments amplified the tension. In response, a Turkish survey vessel was sent to the area with an escort of two Turkish warships, which led both nations to put their military forces on high alert. The situation alarmed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as both countries were members of the alliance.
Seasoned diplomats intervened and successfully resolved the misunderstanding with Turkey withdrawing its naval vessels under the condition that Greece would not pursue oil drills in the north Aegean Sea beyond its territorial waters. While the crisis lasted for a few days, it brought both countries at the brink of war and reignited the Aegean dispute.
Background on the contemporary Greek–Turkish relations
The invasion followed a coup backed by the Greek junta (1967–1974), which sought Enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece.[2] Turkey's military intervention led to the occupation of the northern 37% of the island, the displacement of a significant Cypriot population, and the enduring division of Cyprus.[3] This outcome created lasting friction between the two NATO allies. Diplomatic relations deteriorated sharply, and the dispute over sovereignty and exploration rights in the Aegean sea soon emerged as another flash point.[4]
In August 1976, Turkey conducted seismic surveys,[i] escorted by a Turkish warship, west of Greek island Lesbos in the Aegean sea, considered by Greece as part of the "Greek continental shelf."[5] The tension escalated when Turkish representatives stated that the islands in the eastern Aegean sea should have been Turkish, prompting Greek statements that a forceful response is forthcoming and the Greek army was in full alert, potentially bringing the two countries to the brink of war.[5] Subsequently, Greece appealed to the U.N. Security Council and International Court of Justice, giving sufficient time for the crisis to be defused through diplomatic efforts.[6] The Bern Agreement signed later that year aimed to freeze unilateral exploration activities, however, mutual suspicion persisted.[7][8][9]
Events
Pre-crisis
In 1981, Andreas Papandreou became Prime Minister of Greece and his government considered the November 1976 Berne Agreement's drilling ban east of Thasos void, since Aegean talks had stalled. However, his government was also entangled in legal disputes in attempt to control oil firms, which wanted to expand exploration beyond Greek waters.[10] The predominant Greek view at the time was that most of the Aegean continental shelf was Greek and so oil companies had seek permission from the Greek state.[11]
Miscommunication
Tensions started to rise on 19 February 1987, when Greece announced plans to buy majority shares in the foreign companies drilling near Thasos, citing the area's "strategic importance."[11][12] It was followed by an announcement by Denison Mines, a Canadian company, of plans to drill eight to ten miles east of Thasos, which was beyond Greece's sovereign space (six miles), but within its claimed space (twelve miles),[ii] angering the Greek government.[11][12] However, Turkey viewed the company's public statement and Greek share purchase as confirmation of Greek intentions and, amid its own bid for European Economic Community membership, grew alarmed.[11]
Turkish ambassador Nazmi Akıman[tr] sought assurances from Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Kapsis that Greece had no intentions of drilling beyond its territory. Kapsis, however, bluntly asserted Greece's sovereign right to drill anywhere on its continental shelf, even though it was not Greece's immediate plan.[11][12] Akıman interpreted this as intent to drill beyond six miles, and Ankara warned that any activity in disputed areas would prompt a Turkish response. Greece refused to back down, announcing Aegean military exercises on 19 March.[11] On the same day, the Turkish survey vessel Piri Reis was sent to the area[iii] with an escort of two Turkish warships, and both nations put their military forces on high alert.[10][13]
Crisis peaked
Tensions peaked following strong statements from both prime ministers. Papandreou ordered to sink any ship if it was found in Greek waters.[13] In similar tone, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal said that Turkey would respond if Greece interferes with its vessels, and cautioned to wait for any Greek initiative.[14] With Özal abroad for heart surgery and no direct communication channel in place, hard-liners in Ankara drove Turkey's overreaction, undermining Özal's efforts to ease the strained relations.[11] On 26 March, the Turkish Council of Ministers, while Özal still in the U.S., scheduled the survey vessel, RV MTA Sismik 1,[i] to go the disputed waters with the escort of another two[iv] Turkish warships.[15] In the meantime, the Greek government ordered the mobilization of its naval vessels and personnel, and by March 27, a significant deployment of ships had been observed in areas deemed strategically important in the event of armed conflict.[15] As the situation escalated, the U.S. (particularly Robert V. Keeley, U.S. ambassador in Athens) and Britain's Lord Carrington, the Secretary General of NATO, urged Greece and Turkey to avoid the use of force and offered to act as mediators.[16][17][14] Both of them met with Özal upon his return to Ankara via London.[16]
Papandreou wanted to hold NATO, and especially the United States, responsible for the Turkish aggressiveness.[18] He ordered the suspension of the operation of the NATO communication base in Nea Makri, and he sent the Greek Foreign Minister, Karolos Papoulias, to Bulgaria, a Warsaw Pact member, for consultations with President Zhivkov.[18][19]
Diplomatic solution
In the meantime, Yiannis Boutos, a former minister and friend of Papandreou, learned of the escalating situation during a meeting with Turkish ambassador Akıman.[20] Boutos rushed to Papandreou's home to brief Papandreou, who was unaware of the Kapsis–Akıman exchange. Acting on the prime minister's behalf, Boutos assured Akıman that Greece's share purchase aimed to stop, not extend, drilling east of Thasos.[20] Reassured, Akıman confirmed this with Kapsis and informed his government. The crisis ended on 28 March 1987, when Özal declared that Turkey would withdraw its vessels as long as Greece refrained from drilling beyond its territorial waters.[20][21]
Aftermath
Davos World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 1988 – Handshake between Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal.
A day after the crisis ended, Papandreou communicated with Özal via their respective ambassadors over "secret talking points" diffusing the tense atmosphere.[20]
In January 1988, Papandreou and Özal met at the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, to improve the relations between their two countries. Papandreou described the meeting as "a great event for the two nations" and "a breakthrough" by Özal. Part of the meeting was a 'no war agreement,' establishing a 'hotline' between the two governments, and joint committees were established to work towards closer political and economic relations.[22] Progress also achieved on culture exchange and accident prevention over international waters. Papandreou sought this agreement to improve his image as a man of peace,[23] while Özal wanted to improve Turkey's image abroad as his country was under evaluation for full membership of the European Community.[24]
Internal pressure in both countries tarnished the Davos agreement. Papandreou was criticized by the opposition for focusing on bilateral disputes and "shelving" the Cyprus dispute, forcing him later to denounce the Davos process and apologized from the podium of the parliament.[25] By the end of 1988, Greece reported 338 Turkish violations of the Greek airspace with 42 mock dogfights,[25] vanishing the 'spirit of Davos'.[26]
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