Fowler Report

Last updated

The Fowler Report, released on March 14, 2000, is a United Nations report detailing how various companies, African and European governments, including that of Angola and the political wing of UNITA, violated the Lusaka Protocol as well as UN-imposed sanctions. Robert Fowler, Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, headed the commission that compiled the report, [1] which raised widespread international concern by highlighting the strong link between the illicit diamond trade and third world conflicts. [2]

Contents

UN sanctions

Following the resumption of the Angolan civil war by UNITA, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1173 and Resolution 1176 in 1998, which sought to bring an end to the conflict by imposing sanctions against the UNITA movement, specifically targeting its ability to finance the war through the sale of blood diamonds. [3]

Sanctions-breaking diamond trade

Despite the sanctions imposed against UNITA, the organisation was able to continue financing the conflict; [4] the UN therefore passed United Nations Security Council Resolution 1237, which gave Robert Fowler's panel of experts a mandate to investigate how the sanctions were being circumvented. According to the Fowler Report, UNITA used a number of channels to sell or barter diamonds for cash or weapons. In one of the schemes that was identified, Joe de Deker, a former stockholder in De Beers, worked with the government of Zaire to supply military equipment to UNITA from 1993 to 1997. [5] De Deker's brother, Ronnie, was an arms dealer who allegedly travelled with him from South Africa to Angola, directing weapons originating in Eastern Europe. In return, UNITA gave Ronnie bushels of diamonds worth US$6 million. De Deker sent the diamonds to De Beer's buying office in Antwerp, Belgium. De Beers openly acknowledges spending $500 million on legal and illegal Angolan diamonds in 1992 alone. The United Nations estimates Angolans made between three and four billion dollars through the diamond trade between 1992 and 1998. [6] [7] The UN also estimates that out of that sum, UNITA made at least $3.72 billion, or 93% of all diamond sales, despite international sanctions. [8]

Support for UNITA

Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma allowed UNITA to use Togo as a base of operations. He gave money to relatives of Jonas Savimbi and shipped arms to UNITA militants. The report condemned Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré for sending fuel to UNITA and maintaining a stronger alliance with UNITA than all other African leaders. The Rwandan and Gabonese governments refueled UNITA airplanes and sent fuel to Angola. The governments of South Africa, Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco and Belgium did not enforce the UN-travel ban on UNITA officials while France, Portugal, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States allowed UNITA to maintain offices in their respective countries. [1]

Impact

The UN had no powers to enforce compliance with the sanctions, so the report instead set out to name and shame the countries, companies and individuals involved, [9] and thereby led directly to the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1295 and the subsequent establishment of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Kimberly Process Authority Chairman Is Determined by Member voting [10] (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56).

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Blood diamond</span> Diamonds mined in a war zone and sold to finance conflict

Blood diamonds are diamonds mined in a war zone and sold to finance an insurgency, an invading army's war efforts, terrorism, or a warlord's activity. The term is used to highlight the negative consequences of the diamond trade in certain areas, or to label an individual diamond as having come from such an area. Diamonds mined during the 20th–21st century civil wars in Angola, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau have been given the label. The term conflict resource refers to analogous situations involving other natural resources. Blood diamonds can also be smuggled by organized crime syndicates so that they could be sold on the black market.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">UNITA</span> Angolan political party

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola is the second-largest political party in Angola. Founded in 1966, UNITA fought alongside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the Angolan War for Independence (1961–1975) and then against the MPLA in the ensuing civil war (1975–2002). The war was one of the most prominent Cold War proxy wars, with UNITA receiving military aid initially from the People's Republic of China from 1966 until October 1975 and later from the United States and apartheid South Africa while the MPLA received support from the Soviet Union and its allies, especially Cuba.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kimberley Process Certification Scheme</span> To certify the origin of rough diamonds

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is the process established in 2003 to prevent "conflict diamonds" from entering the mainstream rough diamond market by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 following recommendations in the Fowler Report. The process was set up "to ensure that diamond purchases were not financing violence by rebel movements and their allies seeking to undermine legitimate governments".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Angolan Civil War</span> Armed conflict in Angola between 1975 and 2002

The Angolan Civil War was a civil war in Angola, beginning in 1975 and continuing, with interludes, until 2002. The war began immediately after Angola became independent from Portugal in November 1975. It was a power struggle between two former anti-colonial guerrilla movements, the communist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the anti-communist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1173</span> United Nations resolution adopted in 1998

United Nations Security Council resolution 1173, adopted unanimously on 12 June 1998, after reaffirming Resolution 696 (1991) and all subsequent resolutions on Angola, particularly Resolution 1127 (1997), the council announced its intention to impose further sanctions against UNITA for non-compliance, unless it co-operated to extend state administration throughout the country.

The Lusaka Protocol, initialed in Lusaka, Zambia on 31 October 1994, attempted to end the Angolan Civil War by integrating and disarming UNITA and starting national reconciliation. Both sides signed a truce as part of the protocol on 15 November 1994, and the treaty was signed on 20 November 1994.

The Agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa granted independence to Namibia from South Africa and ended the direct involvement of foreign troops in the Angolan Civil War. The accords were signed on 22 December 1988 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City by the Foreign Ministers of People's Republic of Angola, Republic of Cuba and Republic of South Africa.

The 2000s in Angola saw the end of a 27-year-long civil war (1975–2002) and economic growth as foreign nations began to invest in Angola's untapped petroleum reserves. The government continues to resettle internally displaced persons as its economy recovers and expands.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Angola–South Africa relations</span> Bilateral relations

Relations between Angola and South Africa in the post-apartheid era are quite strong as the ruling parties in both states, the African National Congress in South Africa and the MPLA in Angola, fought together during the Angolan Civil War and South African Border War. They fought against UNITA rebels, based in Angola, and the apartheid-era government in South Africa which supported them. Nelson Mandela mediated between the MPLA and UNITA during the final years of the Angolan Civil War. Although South Africa was preponderant in terms of relative capabilities during the late twentieth century, the recent growth of Angola has led to a more balanced relation.

In the 1990s in Angola, the last decade of the Angolan Civil War (1975–2002), the Angolan government transitioned from a nominally communist state to a nominally democratic one, a move made possible by political changes abroad and military victories at home. Namibia's declaration of independence, internationally recognized on April 1, eliminated the southwestern front of combat as South African forces withdrew to the east. The MPLA abolished the one-party system in June and rejected Marxist-Leninism at the MPLA's third Congress in December, formally changing the party's name from the MPLA-PT to the MPLA. The National Assembly passed law 12/91 in May 1991, coinciding with the withdrawal of the last Cuban troops, defining Angola as a "democratic state based on the rule of law" with a multi-party system.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Robert Fowler (diplomat)</span> Canadian diplomat

Robert R. Fowler is a Canadian diplomat and was the special envoy of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to Niger from mid-2008 to 2009, to find a solution to the conflict in Agadez region.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 864</span> United Nations resolution adopted in 1993

United Nations Security Council resolution 864, adopted unanimously on 15 September 1993, after reaffirming resolutions 696 (1991), 747 (1992), 785 (1992), 793 (1992), 804 (1993), 811 (1993), 823 (1993), 834 (1993) and 851 (1993), the Council noted the continuing situation in Angola and went on to condemn and place international sanctions on UNITA.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1295</span> United Nations resolution adopted in 2000

United Nations Security Council resolution 1295, adopted unanimously on 18 April 2000, after reaffirming Resolution 864 (1993) and all subsequent resolutions on Angola, particularly resolutions 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998) and 1237 (1999), the Council authorised a tightening of sanctions against UNITA and established a panel of experts to investigation violations of Security Council resolutions imposing measures against UNITA.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1237</span> United Nations resolution adopted in 1999

United Nations Security Council resolution 1237, adopted unanimously on 7 May 1999, after reaffirming Resolution 696 (1991) and all subsequent resolutions on Angola, particularly resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998) and 1229 (1999), the council established expert panels to investigate violations of measures imposed against UNITA.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1176</span> United Nations resolution adopted in 1998

United Nations Security Council resolution 1176, adopted unanimously on 24 June 1998, after reaffirming Resolution 696 (1991) and all subsequent resolutions on Angola, particularly Resolution 1173 (1998), the Council suspended its intention to impose further sanctions against UNITA for non-compliance until 1 July 1998.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1135</span> United Nations resolution adopted in 1997

United Nations Security Council resolution 1135, adopted unanimously on 29 October 1997, after reaffirming Resolution 696 (1991) and all subsequent resolutions on Angola, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) until 30 January 1998 and urged UNITA to comply with previous resolutions, particularly as sanctions were due to come into effect.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1202</span> United Nations resolution adopted in 1998

United Nations Security Council resolution 1202 was adopted unanimously on 15 October 1998, after reaffirming Resolution 696 (1991) and all subsequent resolutions on Angola, including Resolution 1196 (1998) on Africa. The council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) until 3 December 1998.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1213</span> United Nations resolution adopted in 1998

United Nations Security Council resolution 1213, adopted unanimously on 3 December 1998, after reaffirming Resolution 696 (1991) and all subsequent resolutions on Angola, including resolutions 846 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998), the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) for a final time until 26 February 1999.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1306</span> United Nations resolution adopted in 2000

United Nations Security Council resolution 1306, adopted on 5 July 2000, after recalling all previous resolutions on the situation in Sierra Leone, particularly resolutions 1132 (1997), 1171 (1998) and 1299 (2000), the Council decided to prohibit the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from the country. The rebel Revolutionary United Front controlled 90% of the diamond-producing areas in Sierra Leone and was using diamonds to finance its operations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1448</span> United Nations Security Council resolution

United Nations Security Council resolution 1448, adopted unanimously on 9 December 2002, after reaffirming Resolution 864 (1993) and all subsequent resolutions on Angola, particularly resolutions 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998), 1237 (1999), 1295 (2000), 1336 (2001), 1348 (2001), 1374 (2001), 1404 (2002), 1412 (2002), 1432 (2002), 1434 (2002) and 1439 (2002), the Council noted progress in the country and lifted remaining sanctions against UNITA, including an arms embargo, travel restrictions and the freezing of assets.

References

  1. 1 2 W. Martin, James (2004). Historical Dictionary of Angola. p. 58.
  2. ↑ Arthur V. Levy (2003). Diamonds and Conflict: Problems and Solutions. Nova Publishers. pp. 5–6. ISBN   1-59033-715-8.
  3. ↑ Anna Frangipani Campino (2001-03-21). "Conflict Diamonds". United Nations. Archived from the original on 2000-10-20. Retrieved 2010-03-22.
  4. ↑ "Unisa Latin American report". 15–18. UNISA Centre for Latin American Studies. 1999: 29.{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  5. ↑ Robert Fowler (2000-03-10). "Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts ("The "Fowler Report")". Global Policy Forum. Retrieved 2010-03-20.
  6. ↑ Roberts, Janine (2003). Glitter & Greed: The Secret World of the Diamond Empire. pp. 223–224.
  7. ↑ Arms Project (1994). Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections: Sumário Em Portugués. Human Rights Watch. p. 3.
  8. ↑ Arnold, Guy (2000). The New South Africa . pp.  131. ISBN   9780312235178.
  9. ↑ "Sanctions in Angola". Global Policy Forum. Retrieved 2010-03-21.
  10. ↑ Paul Collier (2003). Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank. p. 142. ISBN   0-8213-5481-7.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.