Geneva Declaration (1918)

Last updated

Geneva Declaration
Geneve Palais Wilson 2011-07-29 12 55 33 PICT3624.JPG
The declaration was negotiated in present-day Palais Wilson (then Hôtel National)
Created9 November 1918
Location Geneva, Switzerland
Signatories Nikola Pašić for the Kingdom of Serbia; Milorad Drašković, Marko Trifković, and Vojislav Marinković for the Serbian parliamentary opposition; Anton Korošec, Gregor Žerjav, and Melko Čingrija for the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs; Ante Trumbić, Jovan Banjanin, Gustav Gregorin  [ sl ], Nikola Stojanović, and Dušan Vasiljević for the Yugoslav Committee
PurposeDetermination of the system of government in the process of creation of Yugoslavia

The Geneva Declaration, Geneva Agreement, or Geneva Pact [lower-alpha 1] was a statement of political agreement on the provisional political system in the future union of the South Slavs living in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and Kingdom of Serbia. It was agreed by Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić on behalf of Serbia, representatives of Serbian parliamentary opposition, representatives of the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs which recently seceded from Austria-Hungary, and representatives of the Yugoslav Committee. The talks held in Geneva, Switzerland on 6–9 November 1918 built upon and were intended to supersede the 1917 Corfu Declaration agreed by Pašić and Yugoslav Committee president Ante Trumbić. The basis for the talks was provided by the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos on behalf of the Supreme War Council of the Triple Entente. The talks were necessary in the process of creation of Yugoslavia as a means to demonstrate to the Entente powers that various governments and interests groups could cooperate on the project to establish a viable state.

Contents

Trumbić and Anton Korošec leading delegations of the Yugoslav Committee and the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs respectively generally conducted the negotiations from a common platform. The Serbian opposition sided with the Yugoslav Committee aiming to undermine Pašić's hold on power. Trumbić's proposal to establish a confederal system of government was adopted. It envisaged a common government having foreign affairs, defence, common finances, communications and transport, as well as several other departments. The proposal also specified retaining the Serbian government and the National Council as the executive in the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to manage affairs relevant for the two states separately. Pašić also agreed to recognise the National Council as a legitimate government and to ask the Entente to do the same. Pašić accepted the Geneva Declaration only after President of France Raymond Poincaré personally intervened telling him to agree with the Yugoslav Committee.

The Serbian government first accepted the declaration, and only days later reversed the course when Pašić suggested in a message to his finance minister Stojan Protić that the Prince Regent Alexander might use his prerogative to reshuffle the government. The government rejected the Geneva Declaration and resigned—only to be replaced two days later by a coalition government led by Pašić and including the former opposition in its ranks. In the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, the leader of the largest political party, the Croat-Serb Coalition Svetozar Pribićević, rejected the Geneva Declaration as well. Faced with internal unrest caused by the Green Cadres, peasant revolts, and mutinies in the military, as well as the approaching Italian Army enforcing Italian territorial claims under the Treaty of London following the Armistice of Villa Giusti, the National Council dispatched a delegation to seek urgent unification from Prince Regent Alexander—leading to establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1 December 1918.

Background

Corfu Declaration

During World War I, the government of Serbia, led by Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, met with the ad-hoc interest group Yugoslav Committee. The committee, partially funded by Serbia, was chaired by Ante Trumbić and claimed to represent the South Slavs living in Austria-Hungary. The conference was convened in 1917 on the Greek island of Corfu to discuss the system of government in a future union of Serbia and South Slavic-populated Habsburg lands. [11]

The meeting was meant to recapture initiative for Yugoslavist ideas on the unification of South Slavs, and to preserve chances for achieving the expansionist Serbian war aims set out in the Niš Declaration. Both were thought to be in jeopardy following a trialist reform proposed in the May Declaration of the Yugoslav Club of South Slavic representatives in the Austrian Imperial Council, led by Anton Korošec, while Serbia's allies in the Triple Entente were still supporting the preservation of Austria-Hungary. [12] Deprived of Russian backing since the February Revolution, Pašić felt compelled to negotiate with the Yugoslav Committee. [13]

Yugoslav Committee members learned that the Entente, under the 1915 Treaty of London, had promised Italy parts of Austro-Hungarian territory inhabited by South Slavs to entice Italy to join the Entente. [14] Most of the committee members saw that as a threat that could only be checked with help from Serbia, [15] prompting them to accept Pašić's invitation to Corfu. [16] Frano Supilo, the co-founder of the ruling Croat-Serb Coalition (HSK) in Croatia-Slavonia and the most prominent member of the Yugoslav Committee and advocate of a South Slavic federation, resigned his committee membership in protest. [16] Supilo resigned because his caution against discussions without determining Serbian intentions first were ignored. [14]

The Corfu conference revealed a conflict between Pašić and Trumbić, as the former advocated a centralised state while the latter wanted a federal system of government, fearing a hegemony of the Serbs as the most populous ethnic group in the proposed state. [17] In response to Trumbić's demands, Pašić said that if the Croats insisted on a federation, the Serbian government would abandon the unification project in favour of creation of a Greater Serbia. [18] No agreement on the system of government was reached and the adopted Corfu Declaration left the matter for the future Constituent Assembly to decide by an unspecified qualified majority. [17]

Pašić–Trumbić conflict

Ante Trumbic led the Yugoslav Committee in the run-up to creation of Yugoslavia. Portrait of Ante Trumbic.jpg
Ante Trumbić led the Yugoslav Committee in the run-up to creation of Yugoslavia.

It was apparent in the aftermath of the Corfu conference, relations between Pašić and Trumbić worsened and kept deteriorating throughout 1918. The two openly disagreed on several issues advocated by Trumbić including the matter of recognition of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes living in Austria Hungary as allied peoples, recognition of the Yugoslav Committee as the representative of those peoples and the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes Volunteer Corps as an allied force drawn from Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes living in Austria-Hungary. Unable to achieve those goals on his own, Trumbić wanted Pašić to help persuade the Entente powers to grant Trumbić's requests. Their relations remained tense, but despite ignored pleas to Pašić, they remained in contact until the end of the war. Pašić and Trumbić met again on 30 October in Paris. Pašić rejected Trumbić once again, but this time, Trumbić asked the remainder of the Yugoslav Committee to authorise him to seek fulfilment of his earlier requests from the Entente powers directly, bypassing Pašić. The Yugoslav Committee agreed the next day. [19]

Besides the rejection of Trumbić's demands, friction was caused by Pašić's response to the Entente regarding potential preservation of Austria-Hungary. [20] The United Kingdom, France, and the United States pursued separate peace with Austria-Hungary detaching it from Germany until early 1918. [21] This position was not affected by Niš or Corfu declarations. In January 1918, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Lloyd George confirmed his support to survival of Austria-Hungary. The President of the United States Woodrow Wilson agreed in his Fourteen Points speech by advocating autonomy for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. [22] In April, this prompted Pašić to direct Serbian ambassador to the United States to investigate if Serbia could receive Bosnia and Herzegovina as the minimum addition to its pre-war territory. [21]

On 15 October, Lloyd George and Pašić met in London to discuss creation of a unified South Slavic state with or without Serbia – in the latter case potentially within reformed Austria-Hungary. On Pašić's insistence that any South Slavic state created without Serbia makes its losses meaningless, Lloyd George replied that everything depended on circumstances at the end of the war: He pointed out that if the Serbian Army occupied desired territory before an armistice Serbia could annex it. Otherwise, there would be negotiations to consider wishes of affected populations. [23] On 12–17 October, Pašić gave several interviews to the British press. Accused of imperialism, Pašić replied that Serbia was liberating the Croats and the Slovenes who will be given the chance to choose to join Serbia or establish own states. He mentioned no possibility of establishment of a South Slavic political union of equals. [24]

Supported by British historians Wickham Steed and Arthur Evans, Trumbić unsuccessfully asked Wilson to deploy US troops to Croatia-Slavonia to quell disorder associated with the Green Cadres and stem the tide of Bolshevism. Trumbić specifically asked not to allow Italian or Serbian troops into the territory. [25] Relations between Pašić and Trumbić deteriorated to political and even personal animosity. By the end of 1918, Trumbić thought that Pašić should be toppled from power as an oligarch. [26]

National Council becomes involved

Anton Korosec presided over the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 1918 Bundesarchiv Bild 183-2010-0420-501, Anton Korosec.jpg
Anton Korošec presided over the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 1918

On 5–6 October, representatives of Austro-Hungarian Croat, Serb, and Slovene political parties organised the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to work to independence. On 18 October, the body declared itself the central organ of the newly proclaimed State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs encompassing the Slovene Lands, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. [27] The National Council elected Korošec its president. It had two vice presidents. One was Svetozar Pribičević – a co-founder of the ruling HSK and the coalition's sole leader since Supilo's death in 1917. Another vice president was Ante Pavelić, the leader of the Mile Starčević faction of the Party of Rights. [28]

On 26 October, the National Council decided to authorise the Yugoslav Committee to speak on behalf of the council. On the same day, Korošec met Austrian Minister-President Heinrich Lammasch in Vienna and proceeded with Yugoslav Club secretary Gregor Žerjav to Switzerland where they were met by Melko Čingrija, another former Yugoslav Club member, [29] on 29 October. Korošec was tasked by the National Council to "reconnoiter the international situation and establish contact with the Yugoslav Committee". [30] The same day, the Croatian Sabor declared the end of ties with Austria-Hungary and elected Korošec the president of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Pavelić and Pribićević were elected vice presidents. [27]

Upon learning of Korošec's arrival, Pašić and Trumbić both reached out to him. Trumbić wrote to Korošec on 31 October outlining his talks with Pašić and asking for recognition of the Yugoslav Committee as a body representing interests of peoples living in the newly declared state. Pašić saw Korošec as a potential alternative to Trumbić having legitimacy of being an elected representative. He prepared to travel with Serbian opposition representatives Milorad Drašković and Marko Trifković to Switzerland to meet Korošec. [31] On 1 November, Korošec invited Trumbić and Pašić to separate talks in Geneva. [32] Korošec could not travel to Paris because he was issued visa for the neutral Switzerland only. [33]

November conference

Paris talks

Nikola Pasic negotiated the Geneva Declaration with representatives of the Yugoslav Committee, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and the Serbian opposition. Nikola Pasic 1.jpg
Nikola Pašić negotiated the Geneva Declaration with representatives of the Yugoslav Committee, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and the Serbian opposition.

Trumbić wrote to Pašić on 11 October 1918 proposing to reconvene parties to the Corfu Declaration and representatives of the Montenegrin Committee for Unification  [ sr ] in Paris in two weeks to ensure, facilitate, and expedite unification. Even though Pašić wrote back on 25 October inviting Trumbić to visit him in Paris, Pašić ignored the 11 October proposal. [19] On 1 November, in a report to the Prince Regent, Pašić requested a message to be forwarded to Pribičević through Serbian Army liaison officer in Zagreb, Lieutenant Colonel Dušan Simović. In the message, Pašić asked Pribičević to cooperate with him on urgent unification to defend against Italian irredentism. In response, Pribičević provided regular information on political situation to Simović. [34]

According to Trumbić, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour was willing to recognise South Slavic population of Austria-Hungary as an allied nation on that day, but the recognition was withheld on request of French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon until the British and the French agreed on the matter. [35] On 29 October, the Supreme War Council met in Versailles, a day after Austria-Hungary requested armistice. While the terms were discussed, the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau promised Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando no Balkan Slavic state would be recognised before the terms of the armistice were implemented. The Entente allies also declined to recognise the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs or the Serbian claim of being the central unifying force among the South Slavs like Piedmont in Italian unification. The Supreme War Council also decided not to recognise any formal role of Yugoslav Committee deeming South Slavic unification unrealistic until the parties demonstrate their ability to come to an agreement. [36] Serbia added its opposition to recognition of any official role of the Yugoslav Committee. [37] Armistice of Villa Giusti, ending the war for Austria-Hungary was signed on 3 November. [38] By that time, Serbian Army and the rest of the Allied Army of the Orient reached Sava and Danube rivers in Belgrade – the prewar Austro-Hungarian border. [39] [40]

On 3 November, Lloyd George and Balfour informed the Serbian government and opposition, as well as Trumbić and Korošec through Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and the secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council Edvard Beneš that no South Slavic union would be considered unless they worked together towards that objective. [41] Venizelos proposed to the Serbian ambassador to London, on behalf of the Entente, recognition of the Yugoslav Committee, establishment of a coalition government in Serbia involving the current opposition, and establishment of a five-strong joint war cabinet consisting of the presiding foreign minister, two ministers drawn from the Serbian government, and two members of the Yugoslav Committee. He said the war cabinet was to be tasked with conducting foreign and associated affairs, without elaborating any further. [42] Beneš talked to Čingrija in Geneva and told him that Lloyd George, Balfour, and Clemenceau wanted a unified South Slavic position to help Orlando overcome opposition from his foreign minister Sydney Sonnino. Beneš advised Čingrija to insist on democratic principles and avoid details and told him that Pašić would be included in the war cabinet. Beneš suggested there should be a joint ministry established consisting of eight members drawn from Serbia and as many from other lands. Such body would then represent the future union at the upcoming peace conference. Credibility of the messages was reinforced by publication of the same position in semiofficial Le Temps newspaper on 3 and 4 November. [42]

Pašić, Drašković and Trumbić met on 4 November in Paris prompted by the Entente pressure to come to an agreement. They discussed the suggested establishment and role of the war cabinet and drafted an agreement whereby the Serbian government would be reshuffled, the Yugoslav Committee would admit new members drawn from the National Council, and a common body would be established within the meaning of the proposal put forward by Venizelos. However, Pašić refused to sign the draft abandoning the agreement at the last moment. [43]

Geneva talks

Eleutherios Benizelos (cropped).jpg
Edvard Benes.jpg
Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos (left) and the Czechoslovak National Council Secretary Edvard Beneš (right) relayed information from the Supreme War Council to Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and representatives of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs negotiating in November 1918.

Pašić, Serbian opposition leaders, and Trumbić moved to Hôtel National in Geneva on 6 November where they met with the National Council delegation. The Entente powers wanted them to come to an agreement to demonstrate that a South Slavic union is possible at all. Trumbić and Korošec quickly agreed with each other – forming a joint negotiating bloc. [44] [45] Pašić alone represented the Serbian government. Serbian opposition leaders Drašković and Trifković were joined by Vojislav Marinković. The National Council was represented by Čingrija and Žerjav besides Korošec. Trumbić was joined by Yugoslav Committee members Jovan Banjanin, Gustav Gregorin  [ sl ], Nikola Stojanović, and Dušan Vasiljević. [45] Even though Korošec asserted himself as a head of a state by asking Pašić if he agreed to have Trumbić present for the talks, Korošec recognised that he needed Trumbić as a person with far better relations with the Entente powers and the Serbian opposition. [46] Being amid a cabinet crisis, [47] the Serbian opposition negotiated from a position of hostility towards Pašić who was left isolated in his views regarding the matter of composition and responsibilities of the war cabinet following suggestions of the British government published by Le Temps. [44]

The war cabinet was acceptable to everyone involved, but opinions differed on its capacity and status. Pašić preferred it to be an ad hoc body without specifying who would be represented by the body – the future union as a whole or Serbia and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs individually. Korošec and Trumbić advocated the latter solution, arguing that each state should delegate members on its own. Korošec saw the proposed war cabinet as a means of fulfilment of his objective of gaining recognition of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Conversely, Pašić did not rush to an agreement because Serbia was the only internationally recognised entity involved in the unification process and he would not surrender this advantage. [48] On the first day of the Geneva talks, Pašić proposed to delegate certain executive tasks to a joint commission to conduct foreign policy and defence until the end of the war. According to his plan, four members would be appointed by Serbia, and three by the National Council. [49]

On 7 November, Drašković proposed a modification of the Venizelos plan involving a five-member war cabinet and 17-strong government retaining the departmental divisions of the current Serbian government. It would be appointed by the Serbian Parliament on one side and the Yugoslav Committee and the National Council on the other. The new government would replace the Serbian government and the National Council in its executive role – transforming the latter to a legislative body only. Unlike the model proposed by Pašić, this meant establishment of a union by establishment of a common government. While Trumbić was reserved on the proposal fearing it allowed excessive centralisation of the union, and Pašić refused it. [49] Later that day, Trumbić proposed establishment of a common government for common affairs – cooperating with the government of Serbia and the National Council. The government of Serbia and the National Council would remain in place with ministries of affairs kept within the competences of Serbia and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs respectively. The common ministry would be competent for foreign affairs, military, communications and transport, common finances, navy, prisoners of war and disabled. [50] The ministers appointed by Serbia would swear an oath to the King of Serbia, but those appointed by the National Council would swear an oath to the council. [51]

Acceptance and signing

Raymond Poincare sent a message to Nikola Pasic during the Geneva conference asking him to agree with the Yugoslav Committee. Raymond Poincare officiel (cropped).jpg
Raymond Poincaré sent a message to Nikola Pašić during the Geneva conference asking him to agree with the Yugoslav Committee.

Despite insistence by the Yugoslav Committee representatives and threats by Drašković and Trifković that the Serbian opposition would join the Yugoslav Committee and work against the Serbian government, Pašić seemed determined not to compromise. This changed on 7 November when a coded message was received from Serbian embassy in Paris stating that the President of France Raymond Poincaré wishes Pašić to come to an agreement with the representatives of the National Council. [52] After receiving the news of Poincaré's intervention, Pašić accepted Trumbić's plan. [53] Furthermore, on Korošec's proposal, he also accepted the request for Serbia to recognise the National Council as lawful government of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs living in the territory formerly ruled by Austria-Hungary and to ask its allies to recognise the National Council as the government, and to recognise the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs living in the territory of former Austria-Hungary as allies and the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes Volunteer Corps as their military. Thus, the issues at the centre of Pašić–Trumbić dispute were resolved, [54] and a confederal solution was agreed upon for the future union – resembling the dual monarchy system employed by Austria-Hungary. On insistence of Trumbić and the Serbian opposition supported by Korošec, Pašić renounced his participation in the common government. [48] The accepted solution was meant to supersede the Corfu Declaration. [4]

At the conference, Montenegro was invited to join the new union. [4] Conference participants welcomed the prospect of Montenegro joining the common state and expressed fear of violence perpetrated by Serbian volunteers which were moving into Montenegro at the time. [55] The Conference authorised Korošec, Čingrija, and Žerjav to talk to Montenegrin government minister Milo Vujović. The four met on 8 November and Vujović said it would be possible to discuss Montenegrin accession to the union in about two weeks. [56]

Pašić suddenly announced he was leaving Geneva trying to avoid signing any agreement. In response, the remaining conference participants quickly drafted a declaration containing the agreement reached for Pašić to sign. [57] The document set the number of common ministries to twelve, [4] and also specified that the arrangement was provisional until a constitutional assembly determines the system of government in the new union through a new constitution. [58] One of the ministries foreseen by the final document was tasked with preparation of the constituent assembly. [59] Six out of twelve ministers were appointed – three by Serbia and three by the National Council. The former group consisted of Ljubomir Davidović, Mihailo Gavrilović, and Dragoljub Pavlović. The National Council appointed ministers were Janko Brejc  [ sl ], Čingrija, and Vasiljević. The remaining ministers were to be appointed later. The declaration was signed on 9 November by all twelve conference participants. [60] While signing the declaration, Pašić said he had reservations or doubts about it. [61]

Aftermath

Repudiation of the agreement

Address of the delegation of the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to the Prince Regent Alexander. SHS 1918 adresa Aleksandru.jpg
Address of the delegation of the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to the Prince Regent Alexander.

Pašić notified the Prince Regent Alexander and the finance minister Stojan Protić about the course and results of the talks by telegraph on 7 November. In the telegram, Pašić asked the Prince Regent to recognise the National Council as agreed by him. Protić reported back consent with Pašić's acceptance of the Trumbić's proposal on behalf of the Government on 10 November, adding that the Prince Regent will certainly approve. On 11 November, Protić received another telegram – sent by Pašić on 9 November. Shortly afterwards, Protić rescinded his approval for the Geneva Declaration. [51]

In the second telegram, Pašić specified little additional information expanding on his initial message, but he complained that other conference participants exhibited inadequate trust in him and incorrectly claimed that the common ministers would swear oaths to both the king and the National Council. Pašić concluded his message with a note that he turns attention to the Prince Regent that he may use his prerogative and look for other advisors and ministers. Protić understood this as a cryptic instruction to the government to resign – which he did on 12 November. [62] According to Sabrina P. Ramet, Pašić was compelled by the Prince Regent to resign, [2] while Ivo Banac assessed acceptance of the declaration and subsequent resignation as Pašić's tactic designed to commit the National Council and the Yugoslav Committee to speedy unification while relying on Pribičević to undermine Korošec's authority. [63] In his reply to Pašić, Protić wrote he though it inappropriate for ministers to swear oath to anyone except the king and that he understood the role of the common government differently from the initial message and that the second message clarified it to him – even though the second telegram contained very little relevant new information. In his message Protić wrote that further negotiations with Trumbić and Korošec were not acceptable and informed Pašić there were others in the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs who disagreed with Trumbić, [62] referring to Pribičević and his HSK having greatest influence in the National Council. [64] On 25 November, Pribičević informed Pašić by telegraph that he did not feel bound by the Geneva Declaration. [65]

On 14 November, Pašić informed Trumbić and Korošec that the solution agreed upon by them in Geneva was rejected by the Serbian government and by the Prince Regent because the war cabinet would not swear an oath to the Serbian king, and it would not answer to him. Pašić offered them a single government for the entire country, or a committee attached to the Serbian government. [66] [67] Korošec and Trumbić protested, but they were incapable of preserving the Geneva Declaration. [63] The Serbian opposition abandoned Trumbić and negotiated with Pašić establishment of a coalition government on 16 November. [68]

Unification

The National Council was facing pressure from several sides. There was increasing looting associated with a peasant revolt, rebelling former Austro-Hungarian troops, violence by the Green Cadres suspected of promoting Bolshevism, and a reported coup d'état conspiracy. There was intra-ethnic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the National Council requested Serbian Army to help quell the violence. The Italian Army was advancing from the west, seizing Rijeka and approaching Ljubljana. [69] Having no legal means to stop Italian advance which was authorised by the Supreme War Council or forces sufficient to stop it, the National Council feared that the Italian presence on the eastern shores of the Adriatic would become permanent. [66] Pressed by the combined threats, the National Council dispatched a delegation to Prince Regent to arrange urgent unification in a federation. The delegation ignored the instructions when it addressed the Prince Regent on 1 December. The Prince Regent accepted the unification offer on behalf of Peter I of Serbia, [70] and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established without any agreement on the conditions of the union. [71]

The new kingdom had no constitution for more than two years – until the Vidovdan Constitution was adopted in 1921, defining the kingdom as a centralised state. [72] Whenever there was any discussion about revising the constitution in the interwar period, the model proposed by the Geneva Declaration was proposed as an interim solution. [7] In 1932, three years after introduction of the 6 January Dictatorship, Trumbić drafted the Zagreb Points – a political declaration against Serb hegemony. In the text, Trumbić called to "returning to the point of origin" of the state. [73] In subsequent legal proceedings, authorities accused declaration signatories, pointing to that phrase, that they were plotting to introduce the political system envisaged by the Geneva Declaration. One of the signatories, the Croatian Peasant Party leader Vladko Maček defended himself before the court arguing that he did not approve of the principles of the Geneva Declaration, but elsewhere claimed that the "Geneva Pact would be quite suitable". [74]

Notes

  1. ↑ Title of the document reads Zapisnik Konferencije održane 6.–9. 1918. u Genevi, Hotel National which means "Record of the Conference Held in the Hotel National in Geneva on 6–9 1918". [1] In contemporary and later sources including those published in Yugoslavia, Croatia and Serbia, the document is normally referred to as the Geneva Declaration (Ženevska deklaracija), [2] [3] [4] [5] or the Geneva Agreement (Ženevski sporazum), [6] [7] [8] [9] but also as the Geneva Pact (Ženevski pakt). [10]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kingdom of Yugoslavia</span> Country in southeastern Europe, 1918–1941

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a country in Southeast and Central Europe that existed from 1918 until 1941. From 1918 to 1929, it was officially called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but the term "Yugoslavia" was its colloquial name due to its origins. The official name of the state was changed to "Kingdom of Yugoslavia" by King Alexander I on 3 October 1929.

The Treaty of Rapallo was an agreement between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the aftermath of the First World War. It was intended to settle the Adriatic question, i.e. Italian claims over territories promised to the country, in return for its entry into the war, against Austria-Hungary; claims that were made on the basis of the 1915 Treaty of London. The wartime pact promised Italy large areas of the eastern Adriatic. The treaty, signed on 12 November 1920 in Rapallo, Italy, generally redeemed the promises of territorial gains in the former Austrian Littoral by awarding Italy territories generally corresponding to the peninsula of Istria and the former Princely County of Gorizia and Gradisca, with the addition of the Snežnik Plateau, in addition to what was promised by the London treaty. The articles regarding Dalmatia were largely ignored. There Italy received the city of Zadar and several islands. Other provisions of the treaty contained safeguards for the rights of Italian nationals remaining in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and provisions for commissions to demarcate the new border, and facilitate economic and educational cooperation. The treaty also established the Free State of Fiume, the city-state consisting of the former Austro-Hungarian Corpus Separatum that consisted of Rijeka and a strip of coast giving the new state a land border with Italy at Istria.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs</span> 1918 unrecognised pan-Slavic state in Southeast Europe

The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was a political entity that was constituted in October 1918, at the end of World War I, by Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (Prečani) residing in what were the southernmost parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Although internationally unrecognised, this was the first incarnation of a Yugoslav state founded on the Pan-Slavic ideology. Thirty-three days after it was proclaimed, the state joined the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro to form the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corfu Declaration</span> 1917 manifesto on unification of South Slavs

The Corfu Declaration was an agreement between the prime minister of Serbia, Nikola Pašić, and the president of the Yugoslav Committee, Ante Trumbić, concluded on the Greek island of Corfu on 20 July 1917. Its purpose was to establish the method of unifying a future common state of the South Slavs living in Serbia, Montenegro and Austria-Hungary after the First World War. Russia's decision to withdraw diplomatic support for Serbia following the February Revolution, as well as the Yugoslav Committee's sidelining by the trialist reform initiatives launched in Austria-Hungary, motivated both sides to attempt to reach an agreement.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Yugoslav Committee</span> South Slavic unification ad-hoc body

The Yugoslav Committee was a World War I-era, unelected, ad-hoc committee that largely consisting of émigré Croat, Slovene, and Bosnian Serb politicians and political activists, whose aim was the detachment of Austro-Hungarian lands inhabited by South Slavs and unification of those lands with the Kingdom of Serbia. The group was formally established in 1915 and it last met in 1919, shortly after the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was later renamed Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Committee was led by it president the Croat lawyer Ante Trumbić and, until 1916, by Croat politician Frano Supilo as its vice president.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ante Trumbić</span> Croatian politician

Ante Trumbić was a Yugoslav and Croatian lawyer and politician in the early 20th century.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Treaty of London (1915)</span> World War I treaty between Italy and the Triple Entente

The Treaty of London or the Pact of London was a secret agreement concluded on 26 April 1915 by the United Kingdom, France, and Russia on the one part, and Italy on the other, in order to entice the latter to enter World War I on the side of the Triple Entente. The agreement involved promises of Italian territorial expansion against Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and in Africa where it was promised enlargement of its colonies. The Entente countries hoped to force the Central Powers – particularly Germany and Austria-Hungary – to divert some of their forces away from existing battlefields. The Entente also hoped that Romania and Bulgaria would be encouraged to join them after Italy did the same.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Svetozar Pribićević</span> Croatian Serb politician

Svetozar Pribićević was a Croatian Serb politician in Austria-Hungary and later Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He was one of the main proponents of Yugoslavism and a federalized South Slavic state which would later turn out to be Yugoslavia. However, he later became a bitter opponent of the same policy that was promoted by King Alexander I.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Anton Korošec</span> Yugoslav politician

Anton Korošec was a Yugoslav politician, a prominent member of the conservative People's Party, a Roman Catholic priest and a noted orator.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Creation of Yugoslavia</span> Overview of the creation of Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia was a state concept among the South Slavic intelligentsia and later popular masses from the 19th to early 20th centuries that culminated in its realization after the 1918 collapse of Austria-Hungary at the end of World War I and the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. However, the kingdom was better known colloquially as Yugoslavia ; in 1929 it was formally renamed the "Kingdom of Yugoslavia".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Yugoslavism</span> South Slavic unification ideology

Yugoslavism, Yugoslavdom, or Yugoslav nationalism is an ideology supporting the notion that the South Slavs, namely the Bosniaks, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes, but also Bulgarians, belong to a single Yugoslav nation separated by diverging historical circumstances, forms of speech, and religious divides. During the interwar period, Yugoslavism became predominant in, and then the official ideology of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. There were two major forms of Yugoslavism in the period: the regime favoured integral Yugoslavism promoting unitarism, centralisation, and unification of the country's ethnic groups into a single Yugoslav nation, by coercion if necessary. The approach was also applied to languages spoken in the Kingdom. The main alternative was federalist Yugoslavism which advocated the autonomy of the historical lands in the form of a federation and gradual unification without outside pressure. Both agreed on the concept of National Oneness developed as an expression of the strategic alliance of South Slavs in Austria-Hungary in the early 20th century. The concept was meant as a notion that the South Slavs belong to a single "race", were of "one blood", and had shared language. It was considered neutral regarding the choice of centralism or federalism.

The Green Cadres, or sometimes referred to as; Green Brigades or Green Guards, were originally groups of Austro-Hungarian Army deserters in the First World War. They were later joined by peasants discontented with wartime requisitioning, taxation, and poverty. A substantial number of desertions to the Green Cadres occurred as early as 1914, with their numbers peaking in the summer of 1918. They were present in nearly all areas of Austria-Hungary, but particularly large numbers were found in Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia, Western Slovakia and Moravia, as well as in Galicia. The Green Cadres had no centralised structure and relied on peasants and banditry for food and shelter. As Austria-Hungary fell apart in October 1918, violent outbreaks associated with the Green Cadres peaked. These occurrences were particularly severe in Croatia-Slavonia, Slovakia and Galicia.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">May Declaration</span> Proposal for administrative reform of Austria-Hungary

The May Declaration was a manifesto of political demands for unification of South Slav-inhabited territories within Austria-Hungary put forward to the Imperial Council in Vienna on 30 May 1917. It was authored by Anton Korošec, the leader of the Slovene People's Party. The document was signed by Korošec and thirty-two other council delegates representing South-Slavic lands within the Cisleithanian part of the dual monarchy – the Slovene Lands, the Dalmatia, Istria, and the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The delegates who signed the declaration were known as the Yugoslav Club.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs</span>

The National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was a group of political representatives of South Slavs living in Austria-Hungary and subsequently in the short-lived State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs formed in the wake of dissolution of Austria-Hungary. It was established in Zagreb on 8 October 1918, largely composed of members of various representative bodies operating in Habsburg crown lands inhabited by South Slavs. Founding of the National Council was fulfilment of the Zagreb Resolution on concentration of South Slavic political forces adopted earlier that year on the initiative of the Yugoslav Club. The council elected its central committee and the presidency led by Anton Korošec as the president and by Svetozar Pribičević and Ante Pavelić as vice-presidents.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Niš Declaration</span> Statement of Serbian objectives in the World War I

The Niš Declaration was a document issued on 7 December 1914, in the midst of World War I, in which the government of the Kingdom of Serbia formally declared its wartime objectives. Published during the Battle of Kolubara as a defensive declaration seeking to attract support from the South Slavs living in Austria-Hungary, it contained a promise to work for the liberation of South Slavs from foreign rule and the establishment of a common South Slavic state after the war. As the Serbian government had withdrawn from Belgrade earlier in the conflict, the declaration was adopted in the temporary Serbian capital of Niš.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Lipošćak affair</span> Alleged coup détat conspiracy in the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 1918

The Lipošćak affair was an alleged conspiracy led by the former Austro-Hungarian Army General of the Infantry Anton Lipošćak to seize power in the recently proclaimed State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs at the end of the First World War. The majority view of the allegations is that they were fabricated by allies of the Croat-Serb Coalition leader Svetozar Pribičević. Lipošćak was arrested on 22 November 1918 under suspicion of treason. He was accused of plotting to establish councils composed of workers, peasants and soldiers in place of the existing authorities with the aim of reviving the Habsburg monarchy, or working on behalf of foreign powers or the Bolsheviks.

The Zagreb Resolution was a political declaration on the need for political unification of the Croats, the Slovenes and the Serbs living in Austria-Hungary. It was adopted by representatives of opposition political parties in the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia presided by Ante Pavelić in a meeting held in Zagreb on 2–3 March 1918. The declaration relied on the right of self-determination and called for establishment of an independent democratic state respecting rights of individuals and historically established polities joining the political union. It also called for ensuring cultural and religious equality in such a union. The Zagreb Resolution established a preparatory committee tasked with establishment of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs intended to implement the resolution. The National Council was established on 5 October in proceedings described by Pavelić as a continuation of the Zagreb conference that March.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1918 protest in Zagreb</span> Event in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

On 5 December 1918, the National Guards and Sokol volunteers suppressed a protest and engaged in an armed clash against the soldiers of the 25th Regiment of the Royal Croatian Home Guard and the 53rd Regiment of the former Austro-Hungarian Common Army on 5 December 1918, four days after the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. National Guardsmen stopped the soldiers at the Ban Jelačić Square in Zagreb.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1918 occupation of Međimurje</span> Conflict between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Hungary

In the immediate aftermath of World War I, the region of Međimurje was occupied by forces loyal to the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, one of the predecessor states to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in November and December 1918. Predominantly inhabited by Croats, this territory was a part of the Kingdom of Hungary until it was captured by Yugoslav forces. The region was annexed by Yugoslavia, which was awarded it at the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920).

Nikola Stojanović was a lawyer and Bosnian Serb and Yugoslavian politician. As a student, he wrote the article Serbs and Croats, printed in the Serbian Literary Herald, applying Social Darwinism and claiming that Serbs as 'superior people' would eventually assimilate the Croats. In the text, Stojanović announced war to extermination of either Serbs or Croats and the text has been cited as the blueprint for ethnic cleansing by Croatian writers. Following a politically-motivated reprint of the article in Srbobran, the newspaper of the Serb Independent Party in Zagreb, it led to 1902 riots targeting Serb businesses and homes in the city, involving a crowd of about 20,000.

References

  1. ↑ Štambuk-Škalić & Matijević 2008, p. 190.
  2. 1 2 Ramet 2006, p. 43.
  3. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 258.
  4. 1 2 3 4 Biondich 2000, p. 137.
  5. ↑ Matijević 2008, p. 39.
  6. ↑ Banac 1984, p. 137.
  7. 1 2 Janković 1964, p. 260.
  8. ↑ Pavlowitch 2003, p. 37.
  9. ↑ Matijević 2008, p. 57.
  10. ↑ Janković 1964, nn. 120–121.
  11. ↑ Ramet 2006, pp. 41–43.
  12. ↑ Pavlowitch 2003, pp. 29–35.
  13. ↑ Banac 1984, p. 123.
  14. 1 2 Ramet 2006, pp. 41–42.
  15. ↑ Pavlowitch 2003, p. 31.
  16. 1 2 Ramet 2006, p. 42.
  17. 1 2 Pavlowitch 2003, pp. 33–34.
  18. ↑ Šepić 1968, p. 38.
  19. 1 2 Janković 1964, pp. 229–230.
  20. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 229.
  21. 1 2 Jelavich & Jelavich 2000, p. 300.
  22. ↑ Sovilj 2018, p. 1344.
  23. ↑ Sovilj 2018, pp. 1347–1349.
  24. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 230–231.
  25. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 228.
  26. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 238–239.
  27. 1 2 Ramet 2006, pp. 42–43.
  28. ↑ Matijević 2008, pp. 47–48.
  29. ↑ Matijević 2008, p. 50.
  30. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 231.
  31. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 231–232.
  32. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 232–233.
  33. ↑ Janković 1964, n. 22.
  34. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 254–255.
  35. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 235.
  36. ↑ Pavlović 2019, pp. 272–273.
  37. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 236.
  38. ↑ Tucker 1998, p. 172.
  39. ↑ Bataković 2019, p. 41.
  40. ↑ Tucker 1998, p. 173.
  41. ↑ Pavlović 2019, p. 273.
  42. 1 2 Janković 1964, pp. 233–234.
  43. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 234–235.
  44. 1 2 Pavlović 2019, pp. 273–274.
  45. 1 2 Štambuk-Škalić & Matijević 2008, p. 189.
  46. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 236–237.
  47. ↑ Banac 1984, p. 135.
  48. 1 2 Pavlović 2019, p. 274.
  49. 1 2 Janković 1964, pp. 240–241.
  50. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 242–244.
  51. 1 2 Janković 1964, p. 249.
  52. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 246–247.
  53. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 244.
  54. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 242–243.
  55. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 242.
  56. ↑ Janković 1964, n. 57.
  57. ↑ Janković 1964, n. 66.
  58. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 259.
  59. ↑ Štambuk-Škalić & Matijević 2008, p. 191.
  60. ↑ Štambuk-Škalić & Matijević 2008, pp. 192–193.
  61. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 245.
  62. 1 2 Janković 1964, pp. 249–250.
  63. 1 2 Banac 1984, pp. 134–135.
  64. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 251–252.
  65. ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 255–256.
  66. 1 2 Pavlović 2019, p. 275.
  67. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 257.
  68. ↑ Janković 1964, p. 256.
  69. ↑ Ramet 2006, p. 44.
  70. ↑ Ramet 2006, pp. 44–45.
  71. ↑ Pavlović 2019, p. 276.
  72. ↑ Ramet 2006, pp. 55–57.
  73. ↑ Ramet 2006, pp. 86–87.
  74. ↑ Janković 1964, n. 121.

Sources

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.