Grievous bodily harm

Last updated

Assault occasioning grievous bodily harm (often abbreviated to GBH) is a term used in English criminal law to describe the severest forms of battery. It refers to two offences that are created by sections 18 and 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The distinction between these two sections is the requirement of specific intent for section 18; the offence under section 18 is variously referred to as "wounding with intent" or "causing grievous bodily harm with intent", [1] whereas the offence under section 20 is variously referred to as "unlawful wounding", [1] "malicious wounding" [2] or "inflicting grievous bodily harm". [1]

Contents

Statute

Section 18

This section now reads:

Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to any person, ... with intent, ... to do some ... grievous bodily harm to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable ... to be kept in penal servitude for life ...

The words omitted in the first to third places specifically included shooting or attempting to shoot, and included some words considered redundant; they were repealed by section 10(2) of, and Part III of Schedule 3 to, the Criminal Law Act 1967.

The words omitted in the penultimate place ("at the discretion of the court") were repealed by the Statute Law Revision (No. 2) Act 1893.

The words omitted at the end were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1892 (words limiting penal servitude to at least three years, or imprisonment to at most two years, and removing mention of hard labour) and the Statute Law Revision (No. 2) Act 1893 (words prescribing imprisonment as an alternative to penal servitude).

This section replaces section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1837, which in turn replaced section 12 of the Offences against the Person Act 1828, which in turn replaced section 1 of Lord Ellenborough's Act (1803).

Section 20

In England and Wales, section 20 now reads:

Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable ... to be kept in penal servitude ...

The words omitted were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1892, as for section 18.

In Northern Ireland, it reads:

Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years.

This was subject to the same omissions as in England; the Criminal Justice (No. 2) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 enacted the other amendments.

Interpretation

Felony

The distinction between felony and misdemeanor was abolished by the Criminal Law Act 1967. Accordingly, "guilty of felony" is to be read as "guilty of an offence". The Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 provided the same for Northern Ireland, until the 1861 Act was amended in 2004 to update the formulation.

Penal servitude

Penal servitude was abolished by the Criminal Justice Act 1948 and the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1953. Accordingly, the phrase "penal servitude" is to be read as "imprisonment".

The offences

None of the words used in these sections are defined elsewhere in the Act, but they have been defined by case law. [3]

Wound

For this purpose, a wound is an injury that breaks the continuity of the skin. [4] There must be a division of the whole skin and not merely a division of the cuticle or upper layer. [5]

A single drop of blood is sufficient, but it must fall outside the body: see JJC (a minor) v. Eisenhower (1984) 78 Cr App R 48. In this case, a pellet gun was fired at the victim. The bullet ruptured blood vessels above his eye, causing his eye to fill with fluid. Lord Justice Robert Goff said the rupturing of blood vessels is an internal wound; only the breaking of whole skin would warrant a wounding charge.

A bruise or internal rupturing of blood vessels is not a wound, [6] and neither is a broken bone. [7]

Wounding does not imply the use of a weapon; a kick may be wounding.

Grievous bodily harm means "really serious bodily harm": DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290, HL; R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566, HL; R v Brown (A) [1994] 1 AC 212, HL; R v Brown and Stratton [1998] Crim LR 485, CA. It encompasses a range of injuries: R v Woodland (2007) 48 MVR 360.

However, R v Saunders [1985] Crim LR 230, [1985] LS Gaz R 1005, allows "serious injury" as a sufficient direction to the jury. It is for the judge to decide whether the word "really" needs to be used in their direction to the jury: R v Janjua and Choudhury [1999] 1 Cr App R 91, The Times, 8 May 1998, CA (in this case, as a knife with a blade at least 5+1⁄2 inches long had been used, it was not possible that something less than really serious harm was intended).

Inflict and cause

In R v Martin, shortly before the conclusion of a performance at a theatre, the defendant put out the lights on a staircase which a large number of persons had to descend in order to leave the theatre, and he also obstructed the exit by placing an iron bar across a doorway which they had in leaving to pass, and upon the lights being thus extinguished, a large proportion of the audience were seized by panic and rushed in fright down the staircase forcing those in front against the iron bar; he "inflicted" injuries which resulted by reason of the pressure and struggling of the crowd thus created on the staircase. [8]

David Ormerod said that the effect of the decision in R v Gibbins and Proctor [9] appears to be that the offence of causing grievous bodily harm under section 18 can be committed by an omission. [10]

In R v Mandair, [11] Lord Mackay of Clashfern LC said, with the agreement of the majority of the House of Lords, "In my opinion ... the word 'cause' is wider or at least not narrower than the word 'inflict'". [12]

In R v Burstow, R v Ireland , [13] it was held that an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm under section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 can be committed where no physical violence is applied directly or indirectly to the body of the victim. [14]

Lord Hope of Craighead said "the word 'inflict' implies that the consequence of the act is something which the victim is likely to find unpleasant or harmful." He said that, in the context of a criminal act, the words "cause" and "inflict" may be taken to be interchangeable.

Lord Steyn described the actions of Burstow as follows: "During an eight-month period in 1995 covered by the indictment he continued his campaign of harassment. He made some silent telephone calls to her. He also made abusive calls to her. He distributed offensive cards in the street where she lived. He was frequently, and unnecessarily, at her home and place of work. He surreptitiously took photographs of the victim and her family. He sent her a note which was intended to be menacing, and was so understood."

Neither offence requires that a common assault be committed.

1983 to 1997

In R v Wilson, R v Jenkins, [15] Lord Roskill said:

In our opinion, grievous bodily harm may be inflicted ... either where the accused has directly and violently "inflicted" it by assaulting the victim, or where the accused has "inflicted" it by doing something, intentionally, which, although it is not itself a direct application of force to the body of the victim, does directly result in force being applied violently to the body of the victim, so that he suffers grievous bodily harm.

Before 1983

In R v Clarence, [16] it appeared that at a time when the prisoner knew, but his wife did not know, that he was suffering from gonorrhoea, he had "connection" with her; that the result was that the disease was communicated to her, and that had she been aware of the prisoner's condition she would not have submitted to the intercourse.

Clarence's conviction under section 20 was quashed by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved by a majority of 9 to 4. Wills, [17] A. L. Smith, [18] and Stephen [19] JJ specifically said that they thought the disease had not been inflicted within the meaning of the word "inflict" in section 20. Mathew J [20] said that he agreed with Stephen. Stephen [21] said that he had been informed that Grantham J agreed with him. Huddleston B [22] said that he thoroughly agreed with Stephen. Lord Coleridge CJ [23] said that he agreed with all or almost all of what Wills and Stephen said. Hawkins J [24] specifically said that he thought it had been inflicted within the meaning of the word "inflict" in section 20.

Wills J said (footnotes have been included in the body of the text, indicated by "(1)"):

But I think the section clearly points to the infliction of direct and intentional violence, whether with a weapon, or the fist, or the foot, or any other part of the person or in any other way not involving the use of the weapon, as for instance by creating a panic at a theatre whereby people trampled on one another: Reg. v. Martin. (1) 8 Q. B. D. 54 The prisoner in that case did what was certain to make people crush one another, perhaps to death, and the grievous bodily harm was as truly inficted by him as if he had hurled a stone at someone's head. Take also the illustration of my brother Stephen, of a man who digs a pit for another to fall into, whereby that other is injured. I do not think that this section was ever intended to apply to the administration of poison, and most of the arguments I have used to shew that sexual offences were not intended to be dealt with in s. 47 apply with equal force to s. 20. The Court for the consideration of Crown Cases Reserved in Reg. v. Taylor (1) Law Rep. 1 C. c. R. 194. decided that in the offence of "unlawfully and maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm", an assault is necessarily included. So far as the decision is concerned, the same question may be said to arise under s. 20 as under s. 47. But I think the argument is even stronger here, for the context seems to me to shew that direct personal violence of some kind was intended, so that even if the constructive assault contended for by those who support a conviction under s. 47 were established, a conviction under this section would still be wrong. [25]

Stephen J said:

But is there an "infliction of bodily harm either with or without any weapon or instrument"? I think not for the following reasons. The words appear to me to mean the direct causing of some grievous injury to the body itself with a weapon, as by a cut with a knife, or without a weapon, as by a blow with the fist, or by pushing a person down. Indeed, though the word "assault" is not used in the section, I think the words imply an assault and battery of which a wound or grievous bodily harm is the manifest immediate and obvious result. [26]

A. L. Smith J said "it appears to me that this offence cannot be committed unless an assault has in fact been committed, and indeed this has been so held". [27]

Hawkins J said that he thought that the contention that bodily harm cannot be legally said to be "inflicted" unless it has been brought about by some act amounting to an assault was untenable. [28]

Maliciously

In R v Mowatt [29] Lord Diplock said:

In the offence under section 20 ... the word "maliciously" does import upon the part of the person who unlawfully inflicts the wound or other grievous bodily harm an awareness that his act may have the consequence of causing some physical harm to some other person ... It is quite unnecessary that the accused should have foreseen that his unlawful act might cause physical harm of the gravity described in the section, i.e. a wound or serious physical injury. It is enough that he should have foreseen that some physical harm to some person, albeit of a minor character, might result.

Therefore, the defendant must at least be reckless as to whether some harm, albeit not necessarily serious harm, is likely to be caused (see R v Savage, DPP v Parmenter [30] ), but a mere intention to frighten is not enough (see R v Sullivan).

In R v Sullivan [1981] Crim LR 46, CA, the appellant was tried on charges of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and inflicting grievous bodily harm. The victim said that the appellant and a companion were drunk. He said that while he was in a street that was eight feet wide and had a narrow pavement, the appellant drove a car through that street at twenty-five to thirty miles an hour, mounted the pavement and injured him. The appellant denied that he was the driver of the car in a written statement to the police and said he could add nothing to that statement in an unsworn statement from the dock. However, during his closing speech, counsel for the defence suggested that all the appellant intended to do was frighten the victim and no more. The jury were directed that if there was an intention to frighten, and injury took place as a result, the appellant was guilty of an offence under section 20. The appellant was acquitted of the offence under section 18, but convicted of offences under section 20. The Court of Appeal held that an intention to frighten was not enough to constitute the necessary mens rea for section 20, and that the direction to the contrary effect was a misdirection. However, they dismissed the appellant's appeal. They said that a properly directed jury could not in the circumstances have come to any other conclusion than that the appellant must have been aware that what he was doing was likely to cause physical injury to the victim.

In practice, malice in the case of these offences means no more than foresight of the risk of bodily harm: R v Barnes [2005] 1 Cr App R 30.

Specific intent

Section 18 has two separate mens rea requirements and is therefore an offence of specific rather than basic intent. R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741, CA, confirmed that references to mere foresight or recklessness that harm was likely to result are sufficient for the element "unlawfully and maliciously inflict/cause" for the basic intent in both sections 18 and 20 but insufficient for the specific element. The intention either to cause or to resist arrest must be proved subjectively, say, in the charge "malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm".

The Crown Prosecution Service said that the following factors may indicate the specific intent: "a repeated or planned attack; deliberate selection of a weapon or adaptation of an article to cause injury, such as breaking a glass before an attack; making prior threats; and using an offensive weapon against, or kicking the victim's head". [31]

Alternative verdicts

Sections 20 and 47 are offences of basic intent and can be an alternative charge to section 18, and/or section 47 is a lesser included offence.

Consent is only an allowed defence to either section if there is considered to be a good reason. This may include medical operations, sport, body modifications (even if carried out by someone who is not trained), [32] and, occasionally, "horseplay". [33]

R v Brown (Anthony) [34] however ruled that sadomasochistic sexual acts are not a good reason to allow a defence of consent.

Mode of trial

In England and Wales, the offence under section 18 is an indictable-only offence, while the offence under section 20 is triable either way. [35]

Sentence

Section 18

In England and Wales, an offence under section 18 is punishable with imprisonment for life or for any shorter term. [36]

See the Crown Prosecution Service Sentencing Manual for case law on sentencing of section 18 Archived 11 December 2008 at the Wayback Machine . Relevant cases are:

In Northern Ireland, an offence under section 18 is punishable with imprisonment for life or for any shorter term. [37]

Section 20

In England and Wales, a person guilty of an offence under section 20 is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, [38] or on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding the prescribed sum, or to both. [39]

Where a person is convicted on indictment of an offence under section 20, other than an offence for which the sentence falls to be imposed under section 227 or 228 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the court, if not precluded from sentencing an offender by its exercise of some other power, may impose a fine instead of or in addition to dealing with him in any other way in which the court has power to deal with him, subject however to any enactment requiring the offender to be dealt with in a particular way. [40]

An offence under section 20 is a specified offence for the purposes of chapter 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 because it is a specified violent offence. [41] It is not a serious offence for the purposes of that Chapter because it is not, apart from section 225, punishable in the case of a person aged 18 or over by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for a determinate period of ten years or more. [42] This means that sections 227 and 228 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (which relate to extended sentences) apply where a person is convicted of an offence under section 20, committed after the commencement of section 227 or 228 (as the case may be) and the court considers that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further specified offences. [43]

See the Crown Prosecution Service Sentencing Manual for case law on sentencing of section 20 Archived 11 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine

The following cases are relevant to section 20:

In Northern Ireland, a person guilty of an offence under section 20 is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years, [44] or on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or to a fine not exceeding the prescribed sum, or to both. [45]

Racially or religiously aggravated offence

In England and Wales, section 29(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c 37) creates the distinct offence of racially or religiously aggravated wounding or infliction of bodily harm. This is an aggravated version of the offence under section 20.

See also

Related Research Articles

Bodily harm is a legal term of art used in the definition of both statutory and common law offences in Australia, Canada, England and Wales and other common law jurisdictions. It is a synonym for injury or bodily injury and similar expressions, though it may be used with a precise and limited meaning in any given jurisdiction. The expression grievous bodily harm first appeared in a statute in Lord Ellenborough's Act (1803).

In criminal law, incitement is the encouragement of another person to commit a crime. Depending on the jurisdiction, some or all types of incitement may be illegal. Where illegal, it is known as an inchoate offense, where harm is intended but may or may not have actually occurred.

Malice is a legal term which refers to a party's intention to do injury to another party. Malice is either expressed or implied. For example, malice is expressed when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a human being. Malice is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. Malice, in a legal sense, may be inferred from the evidence and imputed to the defendant, depending on the nature of the case.

Assault occasioning actual bodily harm is a statutory offence of aggravated assault in England and Wales, Northern Ireland, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Hong Kong and the Solomon Islands. It has been abolished in the Republic of Ireland and in South Australia, but replaced with a similar offence.

<i>R v Brown</i> UK House of Lords case

R v Brown[1993] UKHL 19, [1994] 1 AC 212 is a House of Lords judgment which re-affirmed the conviction of five men for their involvement in consensual unusually severe sadomasochistic sexual acts over a 10-year period. They were convicted of a count of unlawful and malicious wounding and a count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The key issue facing the Court was whether consent was a valid defence to assault in these circumstances, to which the Court answered in the negative. The acts involved included the nailing of a part of the body to a board, but not so as to necessitate, strictly, medical treatment.

Common assault is an offence in English law. It is committed by a person who causes another person to apprehend the immediate use of unlawful violence by the defendant. In England and Wales, the penalty and mode of trial for this offence is provided by section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

In criminal law, consent may be used as an excuse and prevent the defendant from incurring liability for what was done.

Murder is an offence under the common law legal system of England and Wales. It is considered the most serious form of homicide, in which one person kills another with the intention to unlawfully cause either death or serious injury. The element of intentionality was originally termed malice aforethought, although it required neither malice nor premeditation. Baker states that many killings done with a high degree of subjective recklessness were treated as murder from the 12th century right through until the 1974 decision in DPP v Hyam.

In English law, diminished responsibility is one of the partial defenses that reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter if successful. This allows the judge sentencing discretion, e.g. to impose a hospital order under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to ensure treatment rather than punishment in appropriate cases. Thus, when the actus reus of death is accompanied by an objective or constructive version of mens rea, the subjective evidence that the defendant did intend to kill or cause grievous bodily harm because of a mental incapacity will partially excuse his conduct. Under s.2(2) of the Homicide Act 1957 the burden of proof is on the defendant to the balance of probabilities. The M'Naghten Rules lack a volitional limb of "irresistible impulse"; diminished responsibility is the volitional mental condition defense in English criminal law.

In the English law of homicide, manslaughter is a less serious offence than murder, the differential being between levels of fault based on the mens rea or by reason of a partial defence. In England and Wales, a common practice is to prefer a charge of murder, with the judge or defence able to introduce manslaughter as an option. The jury then decides whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of either murder or manslaughter. On conviction for manslaughter, sentencing is at the judge's discretion, whereas a sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory on conviction for murder. Manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary, depending on whether the accused has the required mens rea for murder.

Conspiracy to defraud is an offence under the common law of England and Wales and Northern Ireland.

Defamatory libel was originally an offence under the common law of England. It has been established in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. It was or is a form of criminal libel, a term with which it is synonymous.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">English criminal law</span> Legal system of England and Wales relating to crime

English criminal law concerns offences, their prevention and the consequences, in England and Wales. Criminal conduct is considered to be a wrong against the whole of a community, rather than just the private individuals affected. The state, in addition to certain international organisations, has responsibility for crime prevention, for bringing the culprits to justice, and for dealing with convicted offenders. The police, the criminal courts and prisons are all publicly funded services, though the main focus of criminal law concerns the role of the courts, how they apply criminal statutes and common law, and why some forms of behaviour are considered criminal. The fundamentals of a crime are a guilty act and a guilty mental state. The traditional view is that moral culpability requires that a defendant should have recognised or intended that they were acting wrongly, although in modern regulation a large number of offences relating to road traffic, environmental damage, financial services and corporations, create strict liability that can be proven simply by the guilty act.

In United Kingdom law, dangerous driving is a statutory offence related to aggressive driving. It is also a term of art used in the definition of the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. It replaces the former offence of reckless driving. Canada's Criminal Code has equivalent provisions covering dangerous driving.

Child destruction is the name of a statutory offence in England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Hong Kong and in some parts of Australia.

Polygamous marriages may not be performed in the United Kingdom, and if a polygamous marriage is performed, the already-married person may be guilty of the crime of bigamy under section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

Burglary is a statutory offence in England and Wales.

Causing bodily harm by wanton or furious driving is a statutory offence in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. It has been abolished in the Republic of Ireland.

Conspiracy to murder is a statutory offence defined by the intent to commit murder.

Non-fatal offences against the person, under English law, are generally taken to mean offences which take the form of an attack directed at another person, that do not result in the death of any person. Such offences where death occurs are considered homicide, whilst sexual offences are generally considered separately, since they differ substantially from other offences against the person in theoretical basis and composition. Non-fatal offences against the person mainly derive from the Offences against the Person Act 1861, although no definition of assault or battery is given there.

References

  1. 1 2 3 Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 1999, paragraph 19-201 at page 1614
  2. ↑ The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 29(1)(a)
  3. ↑ "Grievous Bodily Harm and Wounding". IPSA LOQUITUR. Retrieved 23 October 2019.
  4. ↑ Rex v Wood and M'Mahon (1830) 1 Mood CC 278; Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC J79(Exch) , High Court (England and Wales); C & P 684; Rex v Beckett (1836) 1 Mood & R 526; See also R v Shepherd [2003] NSWCCA 351 (28 November 2003), Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW,Australia).
  5. ↑ Reg v M'Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635; C (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331 (1984) 78 Cr App R 48
  6. ↑ C (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331 (1984) 78 Cr App R 48
  7. ↑ Reg v M'Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635
  8. ↑ R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54; (1881) 51 LJMC 36; (1881) 45 LT 444; (1881) 46 JP 228; (1881) 30 WR 106; (1881) 14 Cox CC 375.
  9. ↑ R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App R 134, (1918) 82 JP 287, CCA
  10. ↑ Ormerod, David. Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law. Thirteenth Edition. Oxford University Press. 2011. p. 69
  11. ↑ [1994] 2 All ER 715, [1995] 1 AC 208, 99 Cr App R 250, [1994] 2 WLR 700, HL
  12. ↑ R v Mandair [1995] 1 AC 208 at 215, HL
  13. ↑ R v Ireland, R v Burstow [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 177, [1997] 3 WLR 534, [1998] AC 147, [1997] 4 All ER 225, HL (24 July 1997)
  14. ↑ This is the point of law that the Court of Appeal certified as being of general importance.
  15. ↑ R v Wilson, R v Jenkins [1984] AC 242, [1983] 3 WLR 686, 77 Cr App R 319, [1983] Crim LR 36, HL, reversing [1983] 1 WLR 356
  16. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23, (1888) 16 Cox CC 511, (1888) 5 TLR 61, (1888) 53 JP 149, CCR
  17. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 36 to 37, CCR
  18. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 37 to 38, CCR
  19. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 41 to 42, CCR
  20. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 38, CCR
  21. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 46, CCR
  22. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 56, CCR
  23. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 66, CCR
  24. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 47 to 50, CCR
  25. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 36 to 37, CCR
  26. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 41, CCR
  27. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 37 to 38, CCR
  28. ↑ R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 47, CCR
  29. ↑ [1967] 3 WLR 1192, [1967] EWCA Crim 1, [1968] 1 QB 421, 51 Cr App Rep 402, 131 JP 463, [1969] 3 All ER 47
  30. ↑ [1992] 1 AC 699, [1991] 3 WLR 914, [1991] 4 All ER 698, (1991) 94 Cr App R 193, [1992] Crim LR 288, HL
  31. ↑ Crown Prosecution Service. "Offences against the Person, incorporating the Charging Standard". Government of the United Kingdom.
  32. ↑ R v Wilson (A) [1996] 2 Cr App R 241, [1996] 3 WLR 125, CA (involved a husband branding his wife's buttocks)
  33. ↑ R v Aitken [1992] 1 WLR 1006, 95 Cr App R 304, [1992] 4 All ER 541, Ct-MAC (RAF officers set fire to one of their number inflicting severe burns)
  34. ↑ R v Brown (Anthony) [1993] 2 WLR 556, HL
  35. ↑ The Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c.43), section 17(1) and Schedule 1, paragraph 5(b)
  36. ↑ The Offences against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict c 100), section 18; the Criminal Justice Act 1948 (11 & 12 Geo 6 c 58), section 1(1)
  37. ↑ The Offences against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict c 100), section 18; the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1953, section 1(1)
  38. ↑ The Offences against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict c 100), section 20; the Penal Servitude Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 69), section 1(1); the Criminal Justice Act 1948 (11 & 12 Geo 6 c 58), section 1(1)
  39. ↑ The Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c 43), section 32(1)
  40. ↑ The Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 163; this power was previously created by section 30(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 and then by section 127 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000
  41. ↑ The Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 224(1) as read with section 224(3) and paragraph 7 Part 1 of Schedule 15 (where the offence is described as "malicious wounding")
  42. ↑ The Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 224(2)
  43. ↑ The Criminal Justice Act 2003, sections 227(1) and 228(1)(a) and (b)(i)
  44. ↑ The Offences against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict c 100), section 20; as amended by the Criminal Justice (No.2) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 (SI 2004/1991 (NI 15)), article 4(1)
  45. ↑ The Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (No 1675 (NI 26)), article 46(4)

Further reading

Crown Prosecution Service

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.