Grievous bodily harm (often abbreviated to GBH) is a term used in English criminal law to describe the severest forms of battery. It refers to two offences that are respectively created by sections 18 and 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The distinction between these two sections is the requirement of specific intent for section 18; the offence under section 18 is variously referred to as "wounding with intent" or "causing grievous bodily harm with intent",whereas the offence under section 20 is variously referred to as "unlawful wounding", "malicious wounding" or "inflicting grievous bodily harm".
This section now reads:
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to any person, ... with intent, ... to do some ... grievous bodily harm to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable ... to be kept in penal servitude for life ...
The words from "or shoot" to "some other", except the words "with intent to do some" were repealed by section 10(2) of, and Part III of Schedule 3 to, the Criminal Law Act 1967.
The words omitted in the penultimate place were repealed by the Statute Law Revision (No. 2) Act 1893.
The words omitted at the end were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1892 and the Statute Law Revision (No. 2) Act 1893.
This section replaces section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1837, which in turn replaced section 12 of the Offences against the Person Act 1828, which in turn replaced section 1 of Lord Ellenborough's Act (1803).
A felony See the Criminal Law Act 1967 and the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967.
See the Criminal Justice Act 1948 and the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1953.
In England and Wales, section 20 now reads:
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable ... to be kept in penal servitude ...
The words omitted were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1892.
See the Criminal Law Act 1967.
See the Penal Servitude Act 1891 and the Criminal Justice Act 1948.
None of the words used in these sections are defined elsewhere in the Act, but they have been defined by case law.
For this purpose, a wound is an injury that breaks the continuity of the skin.There must be a division of the whole skin and not merely a division of the cuticle or upper layer.
A single drop of blood is sufficient, but it must fall outside the body: see JJC (a minor) v. Eisenhower (1984) 78 Cr App R 48. In this case, a pellet gun was fired at the victim. The bullet ruptured blood vessels above his eye, causing his eye to fill with fluid. Lord Justice Robert Goff said the rupturing of blood vessels is an internal wound; only the breaking of whole skin would warrant a wounding charge.
A bruise or internal rupturing of blood vessels is not a wound,and neither is a broken bone.
Wounding does not imply the use of a weapon; a kick may be wounding.
Grievous bodily harm means "really serious bodily harm": DPP v Smith  AC 290, HL; R v Cunningham  AC 566, HL; R v Brown (A)  1 AC 212, HL; R v Brown and Stratton  Crim LR 485, CA. It encompasses a range of injuries: R v Woodland (2007) 48 MVR 360.
However, R v Saunders  Crim LR 230,  LS Gaz R 1005, allows "serious injury" as a sufficient direction to the jury. It is for the judge to decide whether the word "really" needs to be used in their direction to the jury: R v Janjua and Choudhury  1 Cr App R 91, The Times, 8 May 1998, CA (in this case, as a knife with a blade at least 5 1⁄2 inches long had been used, it was not possible that something less than really serious harm was intended).
Where, shortly before the conclusion of a performance at a theatre, the defendant put out the lights on a staircase which a large number of persons had to descend in order to leave the theatre, and he also obstructed the exit by placing an iron bar across a doorway which they had in leaving to pass, and upon the lights being thus extinguished, a large proportion of the audience were seized by panic and rushed in fright down the staircase forcing those in front against the iron bar, he "inflicted" injuries which resulted by reason of the pressure and struggling of the crowd thus created on the staircase.
David Ormerod said that the effect of the decision in R v Gibbins and Proctorappears to be that the offence of causing grievous bodily harm under section 18 can be committed by an omission.
In R v Mandair, ... the word 'cause' is wider or at least not narrower than the word 'inflict'".Lord Mackay of Clashfern LC. said, with the agreement of the majority of the House of Lords, "In my opinion
In R v Burstow, R v Ireland,it was held that an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm under section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 can be committed where no physical violence is applied directly or indirectly to the body of the victim.
Lord Hope of Craighead said "the word "inflict" implies that the consequence of the act is something which the victim is likely to find unpleasant or harmful." He said that, in the context of a criminal act, the words "cause" and "inflict" may be taken to be interchangeable.
Lord Steyn described the actions of Burstow as follows: "During an eight-month period in 1995 covered by the indictment he continued his campaign of harassment. He made some silent telephone calls to her. He also made abusive calls to her. He distributed offensive cards in the street where she lived. He was frequently, and unnecessarily, at her home and place of work. He surreptitiously took photographs of the victim and her family. He sent her a note which was intended to be menacing, and was so understood."
Neither offence requires that a common assault be committed.
In R v Wilson, R v Jenkins,Lord Roskill said:
In our opinion, grievous bodily harm may be inflicted … either where the accused has directly and violently "inflicted" it by assaulting the victim, or where the accused has "inflicted" it by doing something, intentionally, which, although it is not itself a direct application of force to the body of the victim, does directly result in force being applied violently to the body of the victim, so that he suffers grievous bodily harm.
In R v Clarence,it appeared that at a time when the prisoner knew, but his wife did not know, that he was suffering from gonorrhoea, he had "connection" with her; that the result was that the disease was communicated to her, and that had she been aware of the prisoner's condition she would not have submitted to the intercourse.
Clarence's conviction under section 20 was quashed by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved by a majority of 9 to 4. Wills,A L Smith and Stephen JJ. specifically said that they thought the disease had not been inflicted within the meaning of the word "inflict" in section 20. Mathew J. said that he agreed with Stephen. Stephen said that he had been informed that Grantham J. agreed with him. Huddleston B. said that he thoroughly agreed with Stephen. Lord Coleridge CJ. said that he agreed with all or almost all of what Wills and Stephen said. Hawkins J. specifically said that he thought it had been inflicted within the meaning of the word "inflict" in section 20.
Wills J said (footnotes have been included in the body of the text, indicated by "(1)"):
But I think the section clearly points to the infliction of direct and intentional violence, whether with a weapon, or the fist, or the foot, or any other part of the person or in any other way not involving the use of the weapon, as for instance by creating a panic at a theatre whereby people trampled on one another: Reg. v. Martin. (1) 8 Q. B. D. 54 The prisoner in that case did what was certain to make people crush one another, perhaps to death, and the grievous bodily harm was as truly inficted by him as if he had hurled a stone at someone's head. Take also the illustration of my brother Stephen, of a man who digs a pit for another to fall into, whereby that other is injured. I do not think that this section was ever intended to apply to the administration of poison, and most of the arguments I have used to shew that sexual offences were not intended to be dealt with in s. 47 apply with equal force to s. 20. The Court for the consideration of Crown Cases Reserved in Reg. v. Taylor (1) Law Rep. 1 C. c. R. 194. decided that in the offence of "unlawfully and maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm", an assault is necessarily included. So far as the decision is concerned, the same question may be said to arise under s. 20 as under s. 47. But I think the argument is even stronger here, for the context seems to me to shew that direct personal violence of some kind was intended, so that even if the constructive assault contended for by those who support a conviction under s. 47 were established, a conviction under this section would still be wrong.
Stephen J said:
But is there an "infliction of bodily harm either with or without any weapon or instrument"? I think not for the following reasons. The words appear to me to mean the direct causing of some grievous injury to the body itself with a weapon, as by a cut with a knife, or without a weapon, as by a blow with the fist, or by pushing a person down. Indeed, though the word "assault" is not used in the section, I think the words imply an assault and battery of which a wound or grievous bodily harm is the manifest immediate and obvious result.
A L Smith J. said "it appears to me that this offence cannot be committed unless an assault has in fact been committed, and indeed this has been so held".
Hawkins J. said that he thought that the contention that bodily harm cannot be legally said to be "inflicted" unless it has been brought about by some act amounting to an assault was untenable.
In R v MowattLord Diplock said:
In the offence under section 20 ... the word "maliciously" does import upon the part of the person who unlawfully inflicts the wound or other grievous bodily harm an awareness that his act may have the consequence of causing some physical harm to some other person ... It is quite unnecessary that the accused should have foreseen that his unlawful act might cause physical harm of the gravity described in the section, i.e. a wound or serious physical injury. It is enough that he should have foreseen that some physical harm to some person, albeit of a minor character, might result.
Therefore, the defendant must at least be reckless as to whether some harm, albeit not necessarily serious harm, is likely to be caused (see R v Savage, DPP v Parmenter), but a mere intention to frighten is not enough (see R v Sullivan).
In R v Sullivan  Crim LR 46, CA, the appellant was tried on charges of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and inflicting grievous bodily harm. The victim said that the appellant and a companion were drunk. He said that while he was in a street that was eight feet wide and had a narrow pavement, the appellant drove a car through that street at twenty five to thirty miles an hour, mounted the pavement and injured him. The appellant denied that he was the driver of the car in a written statement to the police and said he could add nothing to that statement in an unsworn statement from the dock. However, during his closing speech, counsel for the defence suggested that all the appellant intended to do was frighten the victim and no more. The jury were directed that if there was an intention to frighten, and injury took place as a result, the appellant was guilty of an offence under section 20. The appellant was acquitted of the offence under section 18, but convicted of offences under section 20. The Court of Appeal held that an intention to frighten was not enough to constitute the necessary mens rea for section 20, and that the direction to the contrary effect was a misdirection. However, they dismissed the appellant's appeal. They said that a properly directed jury could not in the circumstances have come to any other conclusion than that the appellant must have been aware that what he was doing was likely to cause physical injury to the victim.
In practice, malice in the case of these offences means no more than foresight of the risk of bodily harm: R v Barnes  1 Cr App R 30.
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Section 18 has two separate mens rea requirements and is therefore an offence of specific rather than basic intent. R v Belfon  1 WLR 741, CA, confirmed that references to mere foresight or recklessness that harm was likely to result are sufficient for the element "unlawfully and maliciously inflict/cause" for the basic intent in both sections 18 and 20 but insufficient for the specific element. The intention either to cause or to resist arrest must be proved subjectively, say, in the charge "malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm".
The Crown Prosecution Service said that the following factors may indicate the specific intent: "a repeated or planned attack; deliberate selection of a weapon or adaptation of an article to cause injury, such as breaking a glass before an attack; making prior threats; and using an offensive weapon against, or kicking the victim's head".
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Sections 20 and 47 are offences of basic intent and can be an alternative charge to section 18, and/or section 47 is a lesser included offence.
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Consent is only an allowed defence to either section if there is considered to be a good reason. This may include medical operations, sport, body modifications (even if carried out by someone who is not trained),and, occasionally, "horseplay".
R v Brown (Anthony)however ruled that sadomasochistic sexual acts are not a good reason to allow a defence of consent.
In England and Wales, the offence under section 18 is an indictable-only offence, while the offence under section 20 is triable either way.
In England and Wales, an offence under section 18 is punishable with imprisonment for life or for any shorter term.
See the Crown Prosecution Service Sentencing Manual for case law on sentencing of section 18 . Relevant cases are:
In Northern Ireland, an offence under section 18 is punishable with imprisonment for life or for any shorter term.
In England and Wales, a person guilty of an offence under section 20 is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years,or on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding the prescribed sum, or to both.
Where a person is convicted on indictment of an offence under section 20, other than an offence for which the sentence falls to be imposed under section 227 or 228 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the court, if not precluded from sentencing an offender by its exercise of some other power, may impose a fine instead of or in addition to dealing with him in any other way in which the court has power to deal with him, subject however to any enactment requiring the offender to be dealt with in a particular way.
An offence under section 20 is a specified offence for the purposes of chapter 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 because it is a specified violent offence.It is not a serious offence for the purposes of that Chapter because it is not, apart from section 225, punishable in the case of a person aged 18 or over by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for a determinate period of ten years or more. This means that sections 227 and 228 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (which relate to extended sentences) apply where a person is convicted of an offence under section 20, committed after the commencement of section 227 or 228 (as the case may be) and the court considers that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further specified offences.
See the Crown Prosecution Service Sentencing Manual for case law on sentencing of section 20
The following cases are relevant to section 20:
In Northern Ireland, a person guilty of an offence under section 20 is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years,or on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or to a fine not exceeding the prescribed sum, or to both.
In England and Wales, section 29(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c 37) creates the distinct offence of racially or religiously aggravated wounding or infliction of bodily harm. This is an aggravated version of the offence under section 20.
An assault is the act of inflicting physical harm or unwanted physical contact upon a person or, in some specific legal definitions, a threat or attempt to commit such an action. It is both a crime and a tort and, therefore, may result in criminal prosecution, civil liability, or both. Generally, the common law definition is the same in criminal and tort law.
Bodily harm is a legal term of art used in the definition of both statutory and common law offences in Australia, Canada, England and Wales and other common law jurisdictions. It is a synonym for injury or bodily injury and similar expressions, though it may be used with a precise and limited meaning in any given jurisdiction. The expression grievous bodily harm first appeared in a statute in Lord Ellenborough's Act (1803).
Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take anything of value by force, threat of force, or by putting the victim in fear. According to common law, robbery is defined as taking the property of another, with the intent to permanently deprive the person of that property, by means of force or fear; that is, it is a larceny or theft accomplished by an assault. Precise definitions of the offence may vary between jurisdictions. Robbery is differentiated from other forms of theft by its inherently violent nature ; whereas many lesser forms of theft are punished as misdemeanors, robbery is always a felony in jurisdictions that distinguish between the two. Under English law, most forms of theft are triable either way, whereas robbery is triable only on indictment. The word "rob" came via French from Late Latin words of Germanic origin, from Common Germanic raub "theft".
Transferred intent is a legal doctrine that holds that, when the intention to harm one individual inadvertently causes a second person to be hurt instead, the perpetrator is still held responsible. To be held legally responsible under the law, usually the court must demonstrate that the person has criminal intent, that is, that the person knew another would be harmed by his or her actions and wanted this harm to occur. If a murderer intends to kill John, but accidentally kills George instead, the intent is transferred from John to George, and the killer is held to have had criminal intent.
In criminal law, incitement is the encouragement of another person to commit a crime. Depending on the jurisdiction, some or all types of incitement may be illegal. Where illegal, it is known as an inchoate offense, where harm is intended but may or may not have actually occurred.
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm is a statutory offence of aggravated assault in England and Wales, Northern Ireland, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Hong Kong and the Solomon Islands. It has been abolished in the Republic of Ireland and in South Australia, but replaced with a similar offence.
R v Brown UKHL 19,  1 AC 212 is a House of Lords judgment which re-affirmed the conviction of five men for their involvement in consensual unusually severe sadomasochistic sexual acts over a 10-year period. They were convicted of a count of unlawful and malicious wounding and a count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The key issue facing the Court was whether consent was a valid defence to assault in these circumstances, to which the Court answered in the negative. The acts involved included the nailing of part of the body to a board, but not so as to necessitate, strictly, medical treatment.
In criminal law and in the law of tort, recklessness may be defined as the state of mind where a person deliberately and unjustifiably pursues a course of action while consciously disregarding any risks flowing from such action. Recklessness is less culpable than intentional wickedness, but is more blameworthy than careless behaviour.
Common assault is an offence in English law. It is committed by a person who causes another person to apprehend the immediate use of unlawful violence by the defendant. In England and Wales, the penalty and mode of trial for this offence is provided by section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
In criminal law, consent may be used as an excuse and prevent the defendant from incurring liability for what was done.
Murder is an offence under the common law of England and Wales. It is considered the most serious form of homicide, in which one person kills another with the intention to cause either death or serious injury unlawfully. The element of intentionality was originally termed malice aforethought, although it required neither malice nor premeditation. Baker, chapter 14 states that many killings done with a high degree of subjective recklessness were treated as murder from the 12th century right through until the 1974 decision in DPP v Hyam.
In the English law of homicide, manslaughter is a less serious offence than murder, the differential being between levels of fault based on the mens rea or by reason of a partial defence. In England and Wales, a common practice is to prefer a charge of murder, with the judge or defence able to introduce manslaughter as an option. The jury then decides whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of either murder or manslaughter. On conviction for manslaughter, sentencing is at the judge's discretion, whereas a sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory on conviction for murder. Manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary, depending on whether the accused has the required mens rea for murder.
Defamatory libel was originally an offence under the common law of England. It has been established in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. It was or is a form of criminal libel, a term with which it is synonymous.
English criminal law concerns offences, their prevention and the consequences, in England and Wales. Criminal conduct is considered to be a wrong against the whole of a community, rather than just the private individuals affected. The state, in addition to certain international organisations, has responsibility for crime prevention, for bringing the culprits to justice, and for dealing with convicted offenders. The police, the criminal courts and prisons are all publicly funded services, though the main focus of criminal law concerns the role of the courts, how they apply criminal statutes and common law, and why some forms of behaviour are considered criminal. The fundamentals of a crime are a guilty act and a guilty mental state. The traditional view is that moral culpability requires that a defendant should have recognised or intended that they were acting wrongly, although in modern regulation a large number of offences relating to road traffic, environmental damage, financial services and corporations, create strict liability that can be proven simply by the guilty act.
In United Kingdom law, dangerous driving is a statutory offence. It is also a term of art used in the definition of the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. It replaces the former offence of reckless driving. Canada's Criminal Code has equivalent provisions covering dangerous driving.
Burglary is a statutory offence in England and Wales.
Causing bodily harm by wanton or furious driving is a statutory offence in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. It has been abolished in the Republic of Ireland.
Soliciting to murder is a statutory offence of incitement in England and Wales and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
Conspiracy to murder is a statutory offence defined by the intent to commit murder.
Non-fatal offences against the person, under English law, are generally taken to mean offences which take the form of an attack directed at another person, that do not result in the death of any person. Such offences where death occurs are considered homicide, whilst sexual offences are generally considered separately, since they differ substantially from other offences against the person in theoretical basis and composition. Non-fatal offences against the person mainly derive from the Offences against the Person Act 1861, although no definition of assault or battery is given there.
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