Background
In 1989, an 86-year-old woman was beaten, raped, and robbed in her home in South Carolina, and died the following year of complications stemming from her injuries. After a four-day jury trial in York County Circuit Court in 1993, Bobby Lee Holmes was convicted of the crime and sentenced to death. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, [4] and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. [5] Holmes was granted a new trial, however, upon state postconviction review.
At the second trial, [6] the prosecution relied heavily on forensic evidence that Holmes' palm print and fibers consistent with his clothing were found at the scene, that the victim's DNA was found in Holmes' underwear and her blood was found on his tank top. The prosecution also introduced evidence that Holmes had been seen near the victim's home within an hour of when the prosecutor believed the attack took place.
As a major part of his defense, Holmes presented expert witnesses who claimed that the forensic evidence was contaminated by poor handling procedures, and that the palm print was planted by police who Holmes asserted were trying to frame him. Holmes also tried to introduce proof that another man, Jimmy McCaw White, had actually attacked the victim. At a pretrial hearing, Holmes had presented several witnesses who placed White in the victim's neighborhood on the morning of the attack, and four other witnesses who testified that White had admitted to committing the crime, or at least acknowledged that Holmes was innocent. White testified at the pretrial hearing and denied making the incriminating statements. He also provided an alibi for the time of the crime, but this was refuted by another witness.
The trial court excluded Holmes' third-party guilt evidence based on State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532 (S.C. 1941), in which the South Carolina Supreme Court had held that such evidence is only admissible if it "raises a reasonable inference or presumption as to [the defendant's] own innocence." Holmes was subsequently convicted again. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, [7] citing to both Gregory and its later decision in State v. Gay 541 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. 2001). The State Supreme Court held that "where there is strong evidence of an appellant's guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a third party's alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to the appellant's own innocence." [8] Applying this standard, the court held that petitioner could not "overcome the forensic evidence against him to raise a reasonable inference of his own innocence." The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. [9]
Opinion of the Court
In a unanimous decision by Justice Samuel Alito, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court. [10] The Court ruled that the South Carolina rule of evidence did not rationally serve the interest of "excluding evidence that has only a very weak logical connection to the central issues", because it was illogical to determine the weakness of a defendant's evidence by the strength of the prosecution's case.
Though state and federal rulemakers have broad constitutional latitude to establish rules of evidence in criminal trials, this is limited by the guarantee that criminal defendants have "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense", a right protected by both the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [11] This right is violated by rules of evidence that "infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused" and are arbitrary or "disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve". The Court had struck several such arbitrary rules as unconstitutional in prior decisions. [12]
Well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude defense evidence if its probative value is outweighed by its unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. The Court noted that it had elaborated on this standard by permitting the exclusion of evidence that is "repetitive, only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues". (Internal marks and citations omitted.) Rules regulating the admissibility of third-party guilt apply this principle, because this evidence is often too speculative or remotely associated with the crime. The Court observed that these rules are widely accepted, [13] and were not in and of themselves being challenged in this case.
The Court believed the rule adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Gregory to be of this kind, and to have been adapted from a rule presented in Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence . [14] However, the Court considered the later decision in State v. Gay and the instant case to represent a radical change and extension of the Gregory rule. In Gay, the South Carolina Supreme Court had ruled that the defendant's evidence could not raise a "reasonable inference" of his innocence "in view of the strong evidence" of his guilt, particularly the forensic evidence. [15] Similarly, in the present case, the court applied the rule that "where there is strong evidence of [a defendant's] guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a third party's alleged guilt" may (or perhaps must) be excluded. [16]
This rule was in error, the Court wrote, because it required the trial judge to focus on the strength of the prosecution's case instead of the probative value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the defense evidence of third-party guilt. The Court also believed that, as applied in this case, the rule did not seem to require any substantial examination of the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses or the reliability of its evidence. Holmes had argued that the forensic evidence was so unreliable that it should not have been admitted, yet in its evaluation of the "strength" of that evidence, the South Carolina Supreme Court made no mention of these defense challenges.
The Court stated that the rule was no more logical than if it were to instead exclude the prosecutor's evidence of the defendant's guilt if the defendant were able to present evidence that, if believed, strongly supported a not guilty verdict. "The point is that, by evaluating the strength of only one party's evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt." The Court therefore found the rule to be "arbitrary" and in violation of a criminal defendant's right to have "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense".
In United States law, an Alford plea, also called a Kennedy plea in West Virginia, an Alford guilty plea, and the Alford doctrine, is a guilty plea in criminal court, whereby a defendant in a criminal case does not admit to the criminal act and asserts innocence, but accepts imposition of a sentence. This plea is allowed even if the evidence to be presented by the prosecution would be likely to persuade a judge or jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This can be caused by circumstantial evidence and testimony favoring the prosecution, and difficulty finding evidence and witnesses that would aid the defense.
In the United States, the Miranda warning is a type of notification customarily given by police to criminal suspects in police custody advising them of their right to silence and, in effect, protection from self-incrimination; that is, their right to refuse to answer questions or provide information to law enforcement or other officials. Named for the U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision Miranda v. Arizona, these rights are often referred to as Miranda rights. The purpose of such notification is to preserve the admissibility of their statements made during custodial interrogation in later criminal proceedings. The idea came from law professor Yale Kamisar, who subsequently was dubbed "the father of Miranda."
Nolo contendere is a type of legal plea used in some jurisdictions in the United States. It is also referred to as a plea of no contest or no defense. It is a plea where the defendant neither admits nor disputes a charge, serving as an alternative to a pleading of guilty or not guilty. A no-contest plea, while not technically a guilty plea, typically has the same immediate effect as a guilty plea and is often offered as a part of a plea bargain. The plea is recognized in United States federal criminal courts, and many state criminal courts. In many jurisdictions, a plea of nolo contendere is not a typical right and carries various restrictions on its use.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth rights related to criminal prosecutions. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has applied all but one of this amendment's protections to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a legal dispute, one party has the burden of proof to show that they are correct, while the other party has no such burden and is presumed to be correct. The burden of proof requires a party to produce evidence to establish the truth of facts needed to satisfy all the required legal elements of the dispute.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that relies on an inference to connect it to a conclusion of fact—such as a fingerprint at the scene of a crime. By contrast, direct evidence supports the truth of an assertion directly—i.e., without need for any additional evidence or inference.
The presumption of innocence is a legal principle that every person accused of any crime is considered innocent until proven guilty. Under the presumption of innocence, the legal burden of proof is thus on the prosecution, which must present compelling evidence to the trier of fact. If the prosecution does not prove the charges true, then the person is acquitted of the charges. The prosecution must in most cases prove that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If reasonable doubt remains, the accused must be acquitted. The opposite system is a presumption of guilt.
In law, a verdict is the formal finding of fact made by a jury on matters or questions submitted to the jury by a judge. In a bench trial, the judge's decision near the end of the trial is simply referred to as a finding. In England and Wales, a coroner's findings used to be called verdicts but are, since 2009, called conclusions.
In the legal system of the United States, a Brady disclosure consists of exculpatory or impeaching information and evidence that is material to the guilt or innocence or to the punishment of a defendant. The term comes from the 1963 U.S. Supreme Court case Brady v. Maryland, in which the Supreme Court ruled that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to a defendant who has requested it violates due process.
Mistaken identity is a defense in criminal law which claims the actual innocence of the criminal defendant, and attempts to undermine evidence of guilt by asserting that any eyewitness to the crime incorrectly thought that they saw the defendant, when in fact the person seen by the witness was someone else. The defendant may question both the memory of the witness, and the perception of the witness.
Actual innocence is a special standard of review in legal cases to prove that a charged defendant did not commit the crimes that they were accused of, which is often applied by appellate courts to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
United States criminal procedure derives from several sources of law: the baseline protections of the United States Constitution; federal and state statutes; federal and state rules of criminal procedure ; and state and federal case law. Criminal procedures are distinct from civil procedures in the US.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled, by a 6–2 vote, that it is a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights for the prosecutor to comment to the jury on the defendant's declining to testify, or for the judge to instruct the jury that such silence is evidence of guilt.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation for a prosecutor to submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the person who performed the test. While the court ruled that the then-common practice of submitting these reports without testimony was unconstitutional, it also held that so called "notice-and-demand" statutes are constitutional. A state would not violate the Constitution through a "notice-and-demand" statute by both putting the defendant on notice that the prosecution would submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the scientist and also giving the defendant sufficient time to raise an objection.
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the constitutionality of shackling a prisoner during the sentencing phase of a trial. In a 7–2 opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the court held that it is against due process, a right prescribed by the 5th and 14th Amendments, to shackle a defendant in the sentencing portion of a trial unless the shackling relates to a specific defendant and certain state interests.
The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure.
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), is a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that defense witnesses can be prevented from testifying under certain circumstances, even if that hurts the defense's case. Taylor was the first case to hold that there is no absolute bar to blocking the testimony of a surprise witness, even if that is an essential witness for the defendant, a limitation of the broad right to present a defense recognized in Washington v. Texas (1967).
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), is a United States Supreme Court decision that clarified both the scope of the protection against double jeopardy provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the limits of an appellate court's discretion to fashion a remedy under section 2106 of Title 28 to the United States Code. It established the constitutional rule that where an appellate court reverses a criminal conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Double Jeopardy Clause shields the defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense. Notwithstanding the power that appellate courts have under section 2106 to "remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances," a court that reverses a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence may not allow the lower court a choice on remand between acquitting the defendant and ordering a new trial. The "only 'just' remedy" in this situation, the Court held, is to order an acquittal.
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), was a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that clarified the relationship of the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to other constitutional rights in criminal procedure. In this case, evidence against the defendant was probably seized illegally, violating the Fourth Amendment, but he lost the chance to argue that point due to his lawyer's ineffectiveness. The prosecution argued that the defendant's attempt to make a Sixth Amendment argument via a habeas corpus petition was really a way to sneak his Fourth Amendment argument in through the back door. The Court unanimously disagreed, and held that the Fourth Amendment issue and the Sixth Amendment issue represented different constitutional values, and had different requirements for prevailing in court, and therefore were to be treated separately by rules of procedure. Therefore, the habeas corpus petition could go forward. In its opinion, the Court also gave guidance on how to apply its decisions in Stone v. Powell and Strickland v. Washington.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that a federal "harmless error" rule must apply, instead of equivalent state rules, for reviewing trials where federally-protected rights had been violated.
