Keir Giles

Last updated

Keir Giles (born 26 January 1968) is a British writer who is considered an expert on the Russian military. He has written multiple books on the geopolitical conflict between the West and Russia such as NATO's Handbook of Russian Information Warfare published through NATO Defense College. Giles has commented extensively on the Serdyukov reforms§, Russian disinformation§, and the Russo-Ukrainian war§.

Contents

Career

Giles has written on security issues affecting Russia and on the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. He wrote for the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom's Advanced Research and Assessment Group, is a research director with the Conflict Studies Research Centre, which is a group of subject matter experts in Eurasian security, and is a senior consulting fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House. He was educated at Orley Farm School, Winchester College and UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies. Before his academic career, he underwent pilot training in the Royal Air Force, and briefly worked as a stand-up comedian and actor, [1] appearing in A Captive in the Land and other productions by Gorky Film Studio. Giles also worked for the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, the BBC Monitoring service, and Ernst & Young in Moscow. He is the author of multiple books about the Russian approach to warfare and related security issues affecting Russia and the Russian Armed Forces. [2] [3] [4]

In June 2019, Giles became suspicious of and helped to undercover Katie Jones, a supposed expert of American politics that did not exist but was an AI-generated face, and was part of "a vast army of phantom profiles lurking on the professional networking site Linkedin" in the words of the Associated Press. [5] [6] In his works, such as Russia's War on Everybody (2022), [7] [8] which is based on interviews with forty people across a dozen countries, [9] Giles argued that for years Russia has been waging "a clandestine war against the West". [10] In Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West (2019), [11] he argued that leaders of the Western world repeated the same mistakes in their relations with Russia, and pushed forward a series of recommendations that gives the book its title. [12] He is also the author of a NATO report on Russia's information warfare. [13]

Commentary and analysis

Giles is considered an expert on the Russian military, [14] [15] [16] and has extensively commented on Russian-related issues, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, [17] [18] [19] and its developments, [20] [21] [22] such as Russia's offensive in eastern Ukraine, [23] the United States sending a Patriot missile defense system to Ukraine, [24] and the West's plan to send tanks to Ukraine. [25] He has also discussed hybrid warfare and sees the threat of sabotage against submarine communications cables as a possible further vector of aggression by Russia against NATO. He said that the capabilities of the former are "well-developed ... not just to locate and interfere with cables, but also to tap into them for espionage purposes." [26]

Russian Armed Forces

In April 2014, Giles said that "this is a very different Russian army from that seen during the Georgia war of 2008". [27] Despite victory in the Russo-Georgian War, Russia's military performance was underwhelming, and he said that this "was a post-Soviet army, not much changed from the 1980s, and designed for a very different form of combat". [27] Even before the reforms of 2008, modernisation plans had been under way. Giles commented: "Serious lessons were learnt in terms of organisation, command and control, equipment, and especially inter-service co-operation. Communications between ground and air units were a major problem, due to a lack of effective forward air controllers properly embedded with ground units, and several of the Russian air losses were apparently shot down by their own side." [27] In December 2014, about the war in Georgia, he said: "The Georgia war was seen by the West as a setback for Moscow, but by the Russians as a success. Mr Putin has secured the Russian information space and has now set up an alternative reality which is gaining some modest traction, even in the West." [28] In September 2017, about the Russian Zapad military exercise in Belarus, he said that "previous Russian exercises on this scale have prepositioned troops for undertaking military operations, against Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine in 2014, and both of those moves were precipitated by an immediate political crisis – currently absent in Europe. And there have been plenty of other major Russian exercises in between, which did not end up with somebody getting invaded." [29]

Improvements were noted in the units employed during the takeover of Crimea in 2014. Giles said: "In the last couple of years, there have been indications, even in military parades in Moscow, that this is a more Western-looking army. New load-carrying equipment for ordinary soldiers and a wider distribution of personal radios – until recently the preserve of platoon commanders at best – are simple and obvious indications of how the Russian army has invested in improving and modernising its equipment overall." [27] Despite shortcomings, Giles stated that "today the Russian military is vastly more capable than it was in 2008 and much more capable than certainly the Ukrainians – and superior to the forces currently deployed on the territory of all of its Western neighbours". [27] He expressed his belief that Russia could sustain their military threat to Ukraine for some considerable time, saying: "The Russian units deployed on Ukraine's eastern border can probably remain in the field longer than many Western planners assume. Russia is not much concerned at inconvenience or short-term financial costs if it makes long-term strategic gains. Many indicators and warnings of preparation for a possible invasion are in place, including logistics, food supplies, medical services, and interior troops which would be used for control of occupied areas. But this is not necessarily an indication that Russia will invade, simply that Russia wishes to be prepared to do so given the opportunity or the perceived necessity." [27] He argued that Moscow went to considerable lengths to be in a position to act, stating: "Prior to the crisis coming to a head, every major amphibious assault ship Russia had in Europe was pre-positioned in the Black Sea, with units moved thousands of miles from both the Baltic and the Northern Fleets." [27]

Russian disinformation

In September 2014, Giles said that the Federal Security Service, Russia's principal security agency, had been given new internet surveillance powers since American whistleblower Edward Snowden exposed the scale of secret United States monitoring of internet traffic. [30] In October 2015, about the possibility of Russian submarines cutting off the internet, he said: "I very much doubt that anyone would think of cutting off the US. It is only going to work in locations where the internet geography is going to create a vulnerability in communications." [31] He added that other countries might consider it viable to do so, and said that "Internet infrastructure needs the same kind of protection at times of crises as other strategically important infrastructure." [31] About Ukraine's telecoms providers reporting disruptions during Russia's 2014 military activity in the Crimean peninsula, which is mentioned as an incident in a Chatham House report on Russian information war tactics that was published in 2016, he said: "They can interfere with internet infrastructure in order to gain [complete] control of [the information available in] specific regions. It does make sense given the intense programme of submarine building, including some very specialised vessels. It wouldn't be surprising that they would want to do this." [31]

In March 2017, Giles said that techniques of information warfare and non-military intervention in the early decades of the 21st century showed new features. He commented: "At various stages in the first and second Chechen wars, the war with Georgia in 2008, Russia found it was not able to influence global opinion or the opinion of its adversaries at an operational or strategic level, and made significant changes to its information warfare apparatus as a result." [32] According to Giles, Russia "is becoming less and less interested in covering its tracks". [32] About the Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections, he argued that it was more or less overt, and said that Russia was happy to permit a dozen Western journalists to report on a notorious Saint Petersburg troll farm "partly because of a sense of urgency that the next conflict is coming". [32]

Russo-Ukrainian War

For broader coverage of this topic, see Russo-Ukrainian War.See also: Russia–Ukraine relations and Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

In June 2017, Giles dismissed the view that Russia's militarisation and preparations for conflict were a response to NATO doing the same. He said: "Russia's enormously expensive reorganisation and rearmament programme was already in full swing well before the crisis over Ukraine, while NATO nations were still winding down their militaries. As late as 2013, the US withdrew all its armour from Europe – while Russia was already busy investing billions in upgrading its forces." [33] In a December 2021 interview to the Italian news agency AGI, he defined the Kremlin's list of requests to NATO as a "Christmas list". [34] In January 2022, Giles said that the British warning was a sign of "the U.K. effectively taking the lead of a strong NATO and European response to Russia's threats to Ukraine". [35] He added: "With the U.S. apparently willing to engage with Russia's demands on Moscow's terms, and the EU irrelevant and asleep at the wheel, it has fallen to the U.K. to deal with the challenge both in terms of rhetoric ... and in terms of direct action, raising the likely cost of a Russian incursion in Ukraine by providing direct shipments of defensive munitions." [35]

In October 2020, Giles said that a stronger Russian military presence in Belarus would alter the geopolitics of Europe. He said: "The presence of Russian forces in Belarus — along with the air and missile forces they could be expected to bring with them — would substantially alter the security situation for a wide area of Central Europe. Popular scenarios for Russian military adventures such as a move on the Suwałki gap — the strip of Polish-Lithuanian border separating the exclave of Kaliningrad from the rest of Russia — would no longer be several geopolitical steps away." [36] In January 2022, citing long-range missile attacks or cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure due to Ukraine's weaker anti-missile defences, Giles said: "The different scenarios for how exactly Russia might seek to persuade the West to meet its (security) demands by punishing Kyiv don't even necessarily include a land incursion." [37]

In February 2022, amid the military buildup to the invasion of Ukraine, Giles stated that Russia is "swift to label its adversaries and victims in Europe as Nazis. We have seen this not only in Ukraine, but also in Russia's vilification of the Baltic states." [13] In March 2022, a week after Russia invaded Ukraine, he said that the Russian campaign was rapidly developing in ways he described as "eerily familiar" to Putin's deadly battle of Grozny (1999–2000) during the Second Chechen War. He stated: "We need to prepare for a humanitarian catastrophe now. We have to assist Ukraine in holding out as long as possible, but with eyes wide open to what this will mean for the Ukrainian population." [38] In June 2022, about the possibility of a ceasefire on the Russian side, Giles said: "This is a ploy which could be used by Russia at any time, if it wants to capitalise on European pressure on Ukraine to surrender and give up territory in exchange for notional peace." [39]

In September 2022, days before the 2022 Russian mobilisation was announced, Giles argued that declaring mobilisation would be unpopular; he also said that this would require declaring the military operation a war, which would be an admission that the invasion was not going as planned and that they are not winning. [40] In December 2022, Giles stated that predictions or denials of a new offensive were based on "whether people are applying Western standards of readiness" to Putin's military. [41] He added: "Russia has undertaken one wave of mobilization and is quite capable of undertaking more. We would be more likely to see a better organized, even if low-tech, offensive from Russia in the early stages of next year." [41]

In March 2023, about Russia–China relations within the context of the war in Ukraine, Giles said: "So far, China has had the luxury of being able to sit back and watch the war to see who comes out on top." [42] He cited a number of possible outcomes from Xi Jinping's trip to Russia, including definitive moves that could point to two directions, such as direct support for Putin in the conflict or explicitly calling on him to end it. [42] He said that both would be "an indication that China has reached a decision on how the war will affect the balance of power between Russia and the West in the long term. It could be that neither of those will happen, and we'll continue to hear words of partnership not backed up by visible action." [42] About the May 2023 Russian withdrawal from the CFE Treaty, Giles said it is "only a formality", and added: "It is only a show. In reality, it has no impact. Russia stopped following the treaty in 2007 and stopped inspections in 2015." [43] In September 2023, about the possibility of joint military exercises between Russia and North Korea, he said: "Just as you can tell a person by their friends, you can tell a country by the company it keeps. In Russia's case, that company now consists largely of fellow rogue states." [44]

Russian assassinations

In March 2018, about the early stages of investigation into the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, Giles stated: "We can't make assumptions at this stage, but Russian involvement seems the most likely explanation. It fits the pattern of increasingly brazen attacks, trying to eliminate people who have either embarrassed the leadership or cost them money." [45] About other Russian attempted and successful assassinations, he commented: "Let's not forget that these assassinations are well into double digits, and there are probably others we'll never find out about. What Russia has been learning through all of this is that there are no costs or consequences. Nobody cares enough to actually respond to Russia, so they continue." [45] About the then foreign secretary Boris Johnson's comments and the possibility of Britain rethinking its involvement in the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, he said: "My assumption is that it'll be fairly swiftly forgotten. Unless it's finally reached a point where it is sufficiently blatant that even the British government can't pretend it's not happening." [45]

In August 2023, Giles urged caution about the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in the 2023 Wagner Group plane crash. [46] In September 2023, he further cautioned that while there may be discontent among the elites who are close to Putin and support him, Wagner and Prigozhin posed a specific threat that Putin would not allow to occur again. [47] He said: "Unlike anybody in Putin's inner circle, Wagner was a disruptive element from outside the pyramid of power. Anybody else who is considering challenging Putin is unlikely to be in the same position because nobody else outside the inner power structures has access to the kind of resources that Prigozhin did." [47] He added that many possible challengers to Putin have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo in order to preserve their fortunes and safety, saying: "Anybody that might have been considering standing against Moscow will have rapidly reassessed their risk calculus on seeing what happened to Prigozhin." [47]

Yaroslav Hunka scandal

On 2 October 2023, Giles published an opinion piece on the Politico website titled "Fighting against the USSR didn’t necessarily make you a Nazi", in which he wrote that being a member of the Waffen-SS did not necessarily mean that somebody was guilty of war crimes. This was a response to the scandal surrounding the House of Commons of Canada's standing ovation for Yaroslav Hunka, a Ukrainian-Canadian World War II veteran of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician). Giles cited investigations that had concluded that no war crimes or atrocities had been committed by Hunka's unit. Giles wrote that Hunka should not have been invited to the Canadian Parliament, not because he himself might be guilty of a war crime, but because the resulting scandal fuelled Russian propaganda. [48]

Criticising Giles' opinion piece, Caspar Shaller, the media editor of Die Tageszeitung , commented that such an analysis –based on what he called "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" doctrine –when applied to ex-Waffen-SS members, trivialised Nazi atrocities, and itself only served to further Russian propaganda aims. Shaller criticised Giles for observing that Hunka and his unit had never been charged with war crimes, and claimed instead that the Nuremberg trials had ruled that all volunteer members of the Waffen-SS were guilty of war crimes. He rebuked the German publishing house Axel Springer SE, which fully owns Politico, for publishing the opinion piece. [49]

Works

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Vladimir Putin</span> President of Russia (1999–2008, 2012–present)

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is a Russian politician and former intelligence officer who has served as President of Russia since 2012, having previously served from 2000 to 2008. Putin also served as Prime Minister of Russia from 1999 to 2000 and again from 2008 to 2012. At 25 years and 16 days, he is the longest-serving Russian or Soviet leader since the 30-year tenure of Joseph Stalin.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sergei Shoigu</span> Russian politician (born 1955)

Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu is a Russian politician and military officer who has served as secretary of the Security Council since 2024. He served as Minister of Defence of Russia from 2012 to 2024. Shoigu has served as the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Defense of the Commonwealth of Independent States since 2012.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nikolai Patrushev</span> Russian politician and security officer (born 1951)

Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev is a Russian politician, security officer and former intelligence officer who served as the secretary of the Security Council of Russia from 2008 to 2024. He previously served as the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) from 1999 to 2008. Belonging to the siloviki faction of president Vladimir Putin's inner circle, Patrushev is believed to be one of the closest advisors to Putin and a leading figure behind Russia's national security affairs. He played a key role in the decisions to seize and then annex Crimea in 2014 and to invade Ukraine in 2022.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russia–United States relations</span> Bilateral relations

The United States and Russia maintain one of the most important, critical, and strategic foreign relations in the world. Both nations have shared interests in nuclear safety and security, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and space exploration.

The foreign policy of Vladimir Putin concerns the policies of the Russian Federation's president Vladimir Putin with respect to other nations. He has held the office of the President previously from 2000 to 2008, and reassumed power again in 2012 and has been President since.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ukraine–NATO relations</span> Bilateral relations

Relations between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started in 1991 following Ukraine's independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ukraine-NATO ties gradually strengthened during the 1990s and 2000s, and Ukraine aimed to eventually join the alliance. Although co-operating with NATO, Ukraine remained a neutral country. After it was attacked by Russia in 2014, Ukraine has increasingly sought NATO membership.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russia–NATO relations</span> Bilateral relations

Relations between the NATO military alliance and the Russian Federation were established in 1991 within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace program, and on 27 May 1997, the NATO–Russia Founding Act (NRFA) was signed at the 1997 Paris NATO Summit in France, enabling the creation of the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (NRPJC). Through the early part of 2010s NATO and Russia signed several additional agreements on cooperation. The NRPJC was replaced in 2002 by the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which was established in an effort to partner on security issues and joint projects together.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Opposition to Vladimir Putin in Russia</span> Movement aiming to remove Vladimir Putin from his offices

Opposition to the government of President Vladimir Putin in Russia, commonly referred to as the Russian opposition, can be divided between the parliamentary opposition parties in the State Duma and the various non-systemic opposition organizations. While the former are largely viewed as being more or less loyal to the government and Putin, the latter oppose the government and are mostly unrepresented in government bodies. According to Russian NGO Levada Center, about 15% of the Russian population disapproved of Putin in the beginning of 2023.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russo-Ukrainian War</span> Armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2014

The Russo-Ukrainian War began in February 2014. Following Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea from Ukraine and supported pro-Russian separatists fighting the Ukrainian military in the Donbas War. These first eight years of conflict also included naval incidents and cyberwarfare. In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and began occupying more of the country, starting the biggest conflict in Europe since World War II. The war has resulted in a refugee crisis and tens of thousands of deaths.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Yevgeny Prigozhin</span> Russian oligarch and mercenary leader (1961–2023)

Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin was a Russian mercenary leader and oligarch. He led the Wagner Group, a private military company, and was a close confidant of Russian president Vladimir Putin until launching a rebellion in June 2023. Prigozhin was sometimes referred to as "Putin's chef" because he owned restaurants and catering businesses that provided services to the Kremlin. Once a convict in the Soviet Union, Prigozhin controlled a network of influential companies whose operations, according to a 2020 investigation, were "tightly integrated with Russia's Defence Ministry and its intelligence arm, the GRU".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Wagner Group</span> Russian private military company

The Wagner Group, officially known as PMC Wagner, is a Russian state-funded private military company (PMC) controlled until 2023 by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former close ally of Russia's president Vladimir Putin, and since then by Pavel Prigozhin. The Wagner Group has used infrastructure of the Russian Armed Forces. Evidence suggests that Wagner has been used as a proxy by the Russian government, allowing it to have plausible deniability for military operations abroad, and hiding the true casualties of Russia's foreign interventions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine</span> Period of escalating tension between Russia and Ukraine

In March and April 2021, prior to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces began massing thousands of personnel and military equipment near Russia's border with Ukraine and in Crimea, representing the largest mobilisation since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. This precipitated an international crisis due to concerns over a potential invasion. Satellite imagery showed movements of armour, missiles, and heavy weaponry towards the border. The troops were partially withdrawn by June 2021, though the infrastructure was left in place. A second build-up began in October 2021, this time with more soldiers and with deployments on new fronts; by December over 100,000 Russian troops were massed around Ukraine on three sides, including Belarus from the north and Crimea from the south. Despite the Russian military build-ups, Russian officials from November 2021 to 20 February 2022 repeatedly denied that Russia had plans to invade Ukraine.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine</span>

As part of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian state and state-controlled media have spread disinformation in their information war against Ukraine. Ukrainian media and politicians have also been accused of using propaganda and deception, although such efforts have been described as more limited than the Russian disinformation campaign.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russian invasion of Ukraine</span> Ongoing armed conflict in Eastern Europe

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which started in 2014. The invasion, the largest and deadliest conflict in Europe since World War II, has caused hundreds of thousands of military casualties and tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilian casualties. As of 2024, Russian troops occupy about 20% of Ukraine. From a population of 41 million, about 8 million Ukrainians had been internally displaced and more than 8.2 million had fled the country by April 2023, creating Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">On conducting a special military operation</span> 2022 speech by Russian president Vladimir Putin

"On conducting a special military operation" was a televised broadcast by Russian president Vladimir Putin on 24 February 2022, announcing the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

There have been several rounds of peace talks to halt the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022–present) and end the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014–present). The first meeting was held four days after the start of the invasion, on 28 February 2022, in Belarus. It concluded without result. A second and third round of talks took place on 3 and 7 March 2022 on the Belarus–Ukraine border. A fourth and fifth round of talks were held on 10 and 14 March in Antalya, Turkey.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Yevgeny Popov (journalist)</span> Russian politician and journalist (born 1978)

Evgeny Georgievich Popov is a Russian politician, journalist and a deputy of the 8th State Duma.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russian 2022 war censorship laws</span> Group of Russian federal laws

On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Articles 31 and 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation is a group of federal laws promulgated by the Russian government during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These laws establish administrative and criminal punishments for "discrediting" or dissemination of "unreliable information" about the Russian Armed Forces, other Russian state bodies and their operations, and the activity of volunteers aiding the Russian Armed Forces, and for calls to impose sanctions against Russia, Russian organizations and citizens. These laws are an extension of Russian fake news laws and are sometimes referred to as the fakes laws.

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, several senior Russian politicians, including president Vladimir Putin, former president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, and foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, have made a number of statements widely seen as nuclear blackmail. The possibility of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons, and the risk of broader nuclear escalation, has been widely discussed by commentators and in the media. By 2024, many of the Russian government's "red lines" had been crossed without nuclear weapons being used in response. As well as nuclear weapons threats, the Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has led to a crisis over the safety of the plant and the risk of a nuclear disaster.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Wagner Group rebellion</span> 2023 Russian factional conflict

On 23 June 2023, the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, staged an uprising against the Russian government. It marked the climax of the Wagner Group–Ministry of Defense conflict, which had begun about six months earlier. Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, who had been leading Wagner Group activities in Ukraine, stood down after reaching an agreement a day later.

References

  1. ↑ "Humour in online information warfare: Case study on Russia's war on Ukraine" (PDF). The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. November 2023. Archived (PDF) from the original on 9 November 2023. Retrieved 9 November 2023.
  2. ↑ "Keir Giles". The Guardian. April 2014. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  3. ↑ "Keir Giles". Chatham House. 7 July 2023. Archived from the original on 3 September 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  4. ↑ De Michetti, Flavia (24 August 2023). "La morte di Evgenij Prigožin. L'esperto Keir Giles, 'Non sorprendiamoci se a breve apparirà in un nuovo video dall'Africa'". QuotidianoWeb (in Italian). Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023– via Gazzetta dell'Emilia.
  5. ↑ Satter, Raphael (13 June 2019). "Experts: Spy used AI-generated face to connect with targets". AP News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  6. ↑ Oggiano, Francesco (12 July 2019). "Questa stimata professionista su LinkedIn in realtà non esiste". Wired Italia (in Italian). Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  7. ↑ Seskuria, Natia (March 2023). "Russia's war on everybody and what it means for you; The Russia conundrum: how the West fell for Putin's power gambit—and how to fix it". International Affairs. 99 (2): 872–873. doi:10.1093/ia/iiad038 . Retrieved 5 October 2023.
  8. ↑ Wood, Alan (June 2023). "Book Review: Keir Giles: Russia's War on Everybody: And What it Means for You". Journal of European Studies. 53 (2): 199–201. doi:10.1177/00472441231170054a. ISSN   0047-2441. S2CID   259287872. Archived from the original on 5 October 2023. Retrieved 5 October 2023.
  9. ↑ Belouizdad, Skander (2 February 2023). "An armchair discussion with Keir Giles, author of Russia's War on Everybody: And What it Means for You". Macdonald-Laurier Institute. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  10. ↑ Edele, Mark (21 February 2023). "Essentialising 'Russia' won't end the war against Ukraine. Might 'real and credible' force be the answer?". The Conversation. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023. Review of Russia's War on Everybody by Giles.
  11. ↑ Pita, Adrianna (20 March 2019). "Russia's challenge to the West". Brookings. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  12. ↑ "The 'Moscow Rules': Ten Principles for Working with Russia". ICDS. 29 July 2019. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  13. 1 2 Devlin, Kayleen; Robinson, Olga (23 February 2022). "Ukraine crisis: Is Russia waging an information war?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  14. ↑ "Russia boosts military might despite sanctions". BBC News. 7 May 2015. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  15. ↑ McGee, Luke (16 January 2023). "Europe's warm winter is robbing Putin of a trump card". CNN. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  16. ↑ Abdul, Geneva; Aratani, Lauren; Badshah, Nadeem; Clayton, Abené; Fulton, Adam; Livingstone, Helen; Moloney, Charlie; Vernon, Hayden (25 June 2023). "Mercenary troops withdraw from Rostov as Prigozhin calls off rebellion – as it happened". The Guardian. ISSN   0261-3077. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  17. ↑ Boss, Annie (7 February 2023). "Russia-Watcher Keir Giles on The Other War". Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  18. ↑ "Ukraine marks Independence Day as Russia strikes civilian targets". PBS NewsHour. 24 August 2023. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  19. ↑ Stavljanin, Dragan (30 August 2023). "Interview: Russia's Wagner 'Decapitated' Since Mutiny, But 'That's Not The Same As Being Disbanded Altogether'". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  20. ↑ Clementson, Laura; Common, David (27 August 2022). "After 6 months of war, weapons from the West remain vital to Ukraine". CBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  21. ↑ Picheta, Rob (14 October 2022). "Russia is bruised as winter approaches. Can Ukraine land another blow?". CNN. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  22. ↑ Picheta, Rob (5 August 2023). "Ukrainian drone strikes are bringing the war home to Russia. What does it mean for the conflict?". CNN. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  23. ↑ Smith, Patrick (14 April 2022). "Why Russia's looming offensive in eastern Ukraine might be different — and decisive". NBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  24. ↑ Smith, Patrick (14 December 2022). "What the U.S. sending a Patriot missile defense system to Ukraine could mean for Putin's war". NBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  25. ↑ Smith, Patrick (26 January 2023). "What the West's plan to send tanks to Ukraine means for the war against Russia". NBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  26. ↑ Noone, Greg (2 March 2023). "Could undersea cables be the next casualty of hybrid warfare?". Tech Monitor. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  27. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Marcus, Jonathan (8 April 2014). "Ukraine crisis: Is Russia ready to move into eastern Ukraine?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  28. ↑ Marcus, Jonathan (1 December 2014). "Putin problem gives Nato headache". BBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  29. ↑ Marcus, Jonathan (11 September 2017). "Russian Zapad military exercise in Belarus raises tension". BBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  30. ↑ "Russia plans state controls in case of internet crisis". BBC News. 22 September 2014. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  31. 1 2 3 Baranuik, Chris (26 October 2015). "Could Russian submarines cut off the internet?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  32. 1 2 3 Branford, Becky (30 March 2017). "Information warfare: Is Russia really interfering in European states?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  33. ↑ Marcus, Jonathan (29 June 2017). "How much of a threat does Russia pose, and to whom?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  34. ↑ Vita, Lorenzo (18 December 2021). "Cosa rivelano le richieste di Putin all'Occidente". InsideOver (in Italian). Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  35. 1 2 Heintz, Jim; Lawless, Jill (23 January 2022). "Russia denies plot to replace Ukraine leader. US orders families home". Christian Science Monitor. ISSN   0882-7729. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  36. ↑ Wesolowsky, Tony (4 October 2020). "Russian Military Creep In Belarus Raises Security Alarms". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  37. ↑ Balmforth, Tom (14 January 2022). "'Keep the defender guessing': Russia's military options on Ukraine". Reuters. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  38. ↑ Rettman, Andrew (2 March 2022). "[Analysis] Covert operations may be needed, as Ukraine death toll mounts". EUobserver. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  39. ↑ Landale, James (3 June 2022). "Ukraine war: Five ways Russia's invasion may play out". BBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  40. ↑ Cole, Brendan (17 September 2022). "Russia is Running Out of Options to Recruit More Soldiers". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  41. 1 2 Brockling, Marie; Smith, Patrick (21 December 2022). "Zelenskyy heads to the U.S. as Ukraine warns Putin plans a major new offensive". NBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  42. 1 2 3 Jett, Jennifer (20 March 2023). "Xi arrives in Russia to show solidarity with Putin amid Ukraine war and ICC arrest warrant". NBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  43. ↑ "Is a new Cold War dawning as Russia backs out of a 1990 arms treaty?". Euronews. 22 May 2023. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  44. ↑ "US says North Korea will 'pay a price' for any weapons supplies to Russia". Reuters. 6 September 2023. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  45. 1 2 3 Shackle, Samira (6 March 2018). "Russian ex-spy fights for his life in Britain". DW News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  46. ↑ Litvinova, Dasha (23 August 2023). "Mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin is presumed dead in a plane crash outside Moscow". ABC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  47. 1 2 3 Smith, Patrick (2 September 2023). "Prigozhin's dead, but is Putin's authority strengthened after plane crash?". NBC News. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  48. ↑ Shaller, Caspar (3 October 2023). "Nach Würdigung von SS-Mann in Kanada: Holocaustverharmlosung bei Springer". Die Tageszeitung (in German). ISSN   0931-9085. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2023.
  49. ↑ Martens, René (4 October 2023). "Kolumne: Das Altpapier am 4. Oktober 2023 – Wird's im Himmel besser als in der Jauchegrube? – Altpapierkorb (ein Springer-Medium, das die SS verharmlost; eine ausnahmsweise pseudo-wissenschaftliche 'Sendung mit der Maus'; zwei Hörspiele, die den Untergang des Radios ausmalen; ein Musikjournalist, der die Welt erklärte)". Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (in German). Archived from the original on 5 October 2023. Retrieved 5 October 2023.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.