Lopez v. Davis | |
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Argued October 30, 2000 Decided January 10, 2001 | |
Full case name | Christopher A. Lopez, Petitioner v. Randy J. Davis, Warden, et al. |
Citations | 531 U.S. 230 ( more ) 121 S. Ct. 714; 148 L. Ed. 2d 635 |
Prior history | Affirmed, 186 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 2000) |
Holding | |
The Bureau of Prisons regulation does not require consideration of the non-violent nature of the underlying conviction. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Ginsburg, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Breyer |
Dissent | Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy |
Laws applied | |
Bureau of Prisons Regulations |
Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court case decided in 2001. The case concerned the validity of a Bureau of Prisons regulation which lowered prisoners' sentences for completion of a substance abuse program. The statute however restricted this credit to those who did not engage in a felony aided by a firearm. The Court upheld the regulation over the dissent of three Justices.
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) is the highest court in the federal judiciary of the United States. Established pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, it has original jurisdiction over a narrow range of cases, including suits between two or more states and those involving ambassadors. It also has ultimate appellate jurisdiction over all federal court and state court cases that involve a point of federal constitutional or statutory law. The Court has the power of judicial review, the ability to invalidate a statute for violating a provision of the Constitution or an executive act for being unlawful. However, it may act only within the context of a case in an area of law over which it has jurisdiction. The court may decide cases having political overtones, but it has ruled that it does not have power to decide nonjusticiable political questions. Each year it agrees to hear about one hundred to one hundred fifty of the more than seven thousand cases that it is asked to review.
In 1995, the Bureau of Prisons published a rule to implement "early release incentives". [1] Only prisoners who did not commit a "crime of violence" would be eligible for the program. The Bureau defined this to include a drug trafficking conviction which received a sentence increase due to the use of a weapon during the commission of that crime. [1] After split decisions by circuit Courts of Appeal over the vagueness of the regulation, the Bureau published a revised one in 1997. This gave broader discretion to the Director of the Bureau to grant these term reductions.
Christopher A. Lopez applied for the program but was rejected. Lopez had been convicted of possession with intent to distribute while possessing a firearm at the time of his offense. [2] The Bureau of Prisons defined this a "crime of violence".
The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota reversed a decision by the Bureau of Prisons that Lopez would not be subject to term reductions. [2] Finding that underlying convictions that were "nonviolent" should be reconsidered for the program by the Bureau of Prisons, the District Court reasoned Lopez was a candidate for term reductions. [2] The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, and Lopez appealed.
The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota is the United States District Court or the Federal district court, whose jurisdiction for issues pertaining to federal law or diversity for the state of South Dakota. The court is based in Sioux Falls with other courthouses in Rapid City, Pierre, and Aberdeen. The district was created in 1889, when the Dakota Territory was divided into North and South Dakota.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the Eighth Circuit and finding Lopez ineligible for the program. Justice Ginsburg framed the question as whether the Bureau has "discretion to delineate...those whose current offense is a felony involving a firearm". [3]
Ruth Bader Ginsburg is an American lawyer and jurist who is an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Ginsburg was appointed by President Bill Clinton and took the oath of office on August 10, 1993. She is the second female justice of four to be confirmed to the court. Following O'Connor's retirement, and until Sotomayor joined the court, Ginsburg was the only female justice on the Supreme Court. During that time, Ginsburg became more forceful with her dissents, which were noted by legal observers and in popular culture. She is generally viewed as belonging to the liberal wing of the court. Ginsburg has authored notable majority opinions, including United States v. Virginia, Olmstead v. L.C., and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.
Ginsburg argued that the statutory language provided the Director of the Bureau of Prisons the authority to make these sentence distinctions as the text used the word "may" consider rather than "shall". Further, the argument advanced by Lopez would restrict the new 1997 regulation, which was intended to provide broader authority to the Director. [3]
Having held the Bureau's interpretation of the statute as proper, the Court concluded by finding that Lopez was not eligible for the program.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Anthony Kennedy. Stevens argued that the phrasing of "may be reduced" was a command by Congress for the Director of Prisons to consider cases where the underlying conviction was not violent. [4] He concluded that the Bureau was free to make these distinctions, so long as it held to Congress's intent which he saw as aiding Lopez's arguments.
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