Northern Combat Area Command

Northern Combat Area Command
Northern Combat Area Command
	US equipped Chinese Army marching in Ramgarh, India
Active	1942–1945
Country	Republic of China ; United States
Branch	National Revolutionary Army ; United States Army
Type	Regional Command
Nickname(s)	"NCAC"
Commanders
Notable; commanders	Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell ; Daniel Sultan ; Sun Li-jen

Last updated March 13, 2024

The Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) was a subcommand of the Allied South East Asia Command (SEAC) during World War II. It controlled Allied ground operations in northern Burma. For most of its existence, NCAC was commanded by United States Army General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell (who concurrently held more senior command positions). In 1945 after Stilwell was recalled, his deputy, Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan, was promoted to and assumed command.

Composition

In 1942, Northern Combat Area Command was formed at Ramgarh Cantonment, in India, from X Force: units (including the 22nd and 38th Divisions), which had retreated out of Burma. After its arrival in India, X Force was reinforced – eventually becoming the New 1st Army – a corps-level formation. It was re-equipped at British expense and re-trained by US Army instructors.

For the campaigning season of early 1944, NCAC was augmented with Merrill's Marauders – a brigade-sized formation created by the US Army for commando -type operations in Burma. During 1944, NCAC forced the Japanese 18th Division to retreat out of northern Burma and US Army engineering battalions, assisted by Indian laborers built the Ledo Road – which joined the northern end of the Burma Road and reestablished communications between India and China. Towards the end of 1944, NCAC was reinforced by the British 36th Infantry Division.

In 1945, under Sultan's command, NCAC – which now included the Chinese New 6th Army – aided in the drive to retake the rest of Burma.

Campaigns

The main combat power of NCAC, at least in terms of numbers, were its Chinese divisions. When British and Chinese forces had been forced out of Burma at the start of 1942, some Chinese forces had been obliged to retreat to India, rather than to China. It was from these formations that NCAC was created.

Many times during World War II, British and American commanders in India were frustrated by their Chinese allies. A combination of fickleness and over-centralisation by the Chinese generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek and the limited training of the Chinese forces meant that they often failed to live up to their potential. However, the Chinese forces in NCAC were considerably better than their contemporaries in China itself. Greater access to American equipment and training and less influence from the Chinese leadership meant the four Chinese divisions in NCAC could be trusted a great deal more in combat.

However, it was not only from NCAC's divisions that trouble sprang. Its first commander was an extremely controversial character. Stilwell had first been posted to China as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek. However, as the campaign in Burma developed, he also took on a role there. The US Army established the China Burma India Theater (CBI Theater), and placed Stilwell in command. The CBI Theater was not supposed to be an operational headquarters: it was merely supposed to be in charge of the administration of the American military formations in China, Burma and India. However, Stilwell often broke the chain of command and communicated directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on operational matters, when all such communications were supposed to go to Admiral Lord Mountbatten the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia and also on taking operational control of NCAC through General George Giffard commander of 11th Army Group.

The initial idea was that as General Stilwell would be commanding several Chinese divisions which would attack out of India from the West and with the large but amorphous Yunnan armies attacking out of China from the East, he would be commanding a large army. So his command should be placed under 11th Army Group at the same level as the Fourteenth which was under the command of General William Slim. The attacks could then be coordinated at Army Group level.

Stilwell, however bitterly resisted [being under Giffard's command]. To watch Stilwell, when hard pressed, shift his opposition from one of the several strong-points he held by virtue of his numerous Allied, American and Chinese offices, to another was a lesson in mobile offensive-defence.
— William Slim.^[1]

At a meeting to sort out the operational chain of command for the three fronts in Burma, Stilwell astonished everyone by saying "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing".^[2] Rather than sack him, Mountbatten reluctantly agreed to this, but it was a dangerous compromise. It created a complicated chain of command where Slim theoretically had to report to two different commanders: Giffard for Fourteenth Army actions, and Mountbatten for Stilwell's formations. Under a general less gifted than Slim this could have caused serious problems, if Slim had not been able to command Stilwell at an operational level without disagreement (which given Stilwell's proven record was more than likely). But at an operational level Slim was able to work with Stilwell and "this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well".^[2]

The reason why it was essential that there was one operational commander for the three fronts, North, Central and Southern, was so that the intended attacks in late 1944 could be coordinated to prevent the Japanese concentrating large numbers of reserves for a counterattack on any one front.

Stilwell thus had four different jobs to perform, which required him to be in different places at once. For example, as Chief of Staff to Chiang, he was often needed in Chongqing, the Chinese capital, and as Deputy Allied Supreme Commander he was needed at HQ South East Asia Command at Kandy in Ceylon and as NCAC commander he was required to be relatively near the frontline in Burma. His personality also caused problems. Stilwell clashed frequently with the commander of the 11th Army Group, General Giffard, and would not accept being under his command, instead insisting that NCAC came directly under the Supreme Commander. As Deputy Allied Supreme Commander he was Giffard's superior but as operational commander of NCAC Giffard was his superior. As the two men did not get on this inevitably led to conflict and confusion.

NCAC's first months were frustrating, as the time was for all Allied formations in the theater. Its first real success did not come until the 1943-44 campaigning season. The Chindits had been dropped behind enemy lines after the end of the 1943 monsoon to cause havoc by cutting communications. This they did, but the original operational plan failed for a number of reasons. In the end, they were sent northwards into NCAC's area of operations.

At the time, NCAC's main job was to capture the town of Myitkyina, as a prelude to connecting the Ledo Road to the Burma Road and reestablishing land communications to China. During the offensive, NCAC intelligence staff serving under General Stilwell repeatedly underestimated Japanese troop strength in Burma.^[3]^[4] A thrust from the northwest by NCAC was meeting with some success, but Stilwell also needed to use the Chindits in his plan. However, he not only used them but misused them. The Chindits were designed as a light raiding force, not as conventional infantry. They had negligible artillery support and were much smaller in number than equivalent conventional formations. However, Stilwell insisted on using them as conventional infantry. He assigned them the task of capturing Mogaung south of Myitkyina, which was strongly held by the Japanese. The Chindits succeeded in their task but suffered horrendous casualties. Even then Stilwell was not finished. He demanded still further miracles from the Chindits and their commander Brigadier Lentaigne. Reduced to the equivalent of less than a battalion, the Chindits assisted in the final assault on Myitkyina before finally being flown out to India as a completely broken force. The American equivalent of the Chindits, Merrill's Marauders also suffered from the same treatment during the campaign, consistently being asked to perform missions that were beyond their power without superhuman effort.

After the fall of Myitkyina, only a small area of Japanese territory separated NCAC from the Chinese forces. As the 1944 monsoon ended, NCAC opened an offensive. It had been reinforced with the British 36th Infantry Division, which gave it a considerably increased punch. However, the Japanese 33rd Army under General Masaki Honda performed a very creditable delaying action against the forces attacking them. The Japanese were outnumbered several times but still managed to hold the Chinese forces at bay for several months. In the end, it was events on the main front further south that forced them to withdraw, as they were in danger of being cut off from their supply lines. 36th Division was used to support the left wing of the Fourteenth Army under Lieutenant General William Slim.

In October 1944, due to personal disagreements with Chiang, Stilwell was recalled to the United States by President Roosevelt. His former role was split as was the CBI Theater:

Lieutenant General Raymond Wheeler became Deputy Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia.
Major General Albert Wedemeyer became Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and commander of the U.S. Forces, China Theater (USFCT).
Lieutenant General Daniel Isom Sultan was promoted from deputy commander of CBI to become commander of the U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater (USFIBT) and commander of the NCAC.

His replacements were not only less abrasive characters but as they each concentrated on one area there was less institutional conflict and confusion.

NCAC's main role in the last few months of the war was to support the British main offensive further south and to further improve the Burma Road to allow more supplies to get into China.

After the war, NCAC was quickly disbanded. It had achieved its objectives, but the route to those objectives was strewn with command problems and missed opportunities.

Among attached United States Army Air Forces units was the 5th Liaison Squadron (August 1944).

Notes

↑ Slim 1956, p. 205.
1 2 Slim 1956, p. 207.
↑ George 1981, p. 492.
↑ Tuchman 2001, p. 450.

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Joseph Stilwell</span> United States Army general (1883–1946)

Joseph Warren "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell was a United States Army general who served in the China Burma India Theater during World War II. An early American popular hero of the war for leading a column walking out of Burma pursued by the victorious Imperial Japanese Armed Forces, his implacable demands for units debilitated by disease to be sent into heavy combat resulted in Merrill's Marauders becoming disenchanted with him. Infuriated by the 1944 fall of Changsha to a Japanese offensive, Stilwell threatened the Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, that lend-lease aid to China would be cut off, which made Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley decide that Stilwell had to be replaced. Chiang had been intent on keeping Lend-Lease supplies to fight the Chinese Communist Party, but Stilwell had been obeying his instructions to get the Communists and the Nationalists to co-operate against Japan.

The Cairo Conference also known as the First Cairo Conference, was one of the 14 summit meetings during World War II that occurred on November 22–26, 1943. The Conference was held at Cairo in Egypt between China, the United Kingdom and the United States. It outlined the Allied position against the Empire of Japan during World War II and made decisions about post-war Asia. The conference was attended by Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The Chindits, officially known as Long Range Penetration Groups, were special operations units of the British and Indian armies which saw action in 1943–1944 during the Burma Campaign of World War II.

Supreme Allied Commander is the title held by the most senior commander within certain multinational military alliances. It originated as a term used by the Allies during World War I, and is currently used only within NATO for Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

The 11th Army Group was the main British Army force in Southeast Asia during the Second World War. Although a nominally British formation, it also included large numbers of troops and formations from the British Indian Army and from British African colonies, and also Nationalist Chinese and United States units.

Merrill’s Marauders (named after Frank Merrill) or Unit Galahad, officially named the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), was a United States Army long range penetration special operations jungle warfare unit, which fought in the Southeast Asian theater of World War II, or China-Burma-India Theater (CBI). The unit became famous for its deep-penetration missions behind Japanese lines, often engaging Japanese forces superior in number.

The British Fourteenth Army was a multi-national force comprising units from Commonwealth countries during the Second World War. As well as British Army units, many of its units were from the Indian Army and there were also significant contributions from the British Army's West and East African divisions. It was often referred to as the "Forgotten Army" because its operations in the Burma campaign were overlooked by the contemporary press, and remained more obscure than those of the corresponding formations in Europe for long after the war. For most of the Army's existence, it was commanded by Lieutenant-General William Slim.

South East Asia Command (SEAC) was the body set up to be in overall charge of Allied operations in the South-East Asian Theatre during the Second World War.

The Burma campaign was a series of battles fought in the British colony of Burma. It was part of the South-East Asian theatre of World War II and primarily involved forces of the Allies against the invading forces of the Empire of Japan. Imperial Japan was supported by the Thai Phayap Army, as well as two collaborationist independence movements and armies. Nominally independent puppet states were established in the conquered areas and some territories were annexed by Thailand. In 1942 and 1943, the international Allied force in British India launched several failed offensives to retake lost territories. Fighting intensified in 1944, and British Empire forces peaked at around 1 million land and air forces. These forces were drawn primarily from British India, with British Army forces, 100,000 East and West African colonial troops, and smaller numbers of land and air forces from several other Dominions and Colonies. These additional forces allowed the Allied recapture of Burma in 1945.

The South-East Asian Theatre of World War II consisted of the campaigns of the Pacific War in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Indochina, Burma, India, Malaya and Singapore between 1941 and 1945.

China Burma India Theater (CBI) was the United States military designation during World War II for the China and Southeast Asian or India–Burma (IBT) theaters. Operational command of Allied forces in the CBI was officially the responsibility of the Supreme Commanders for South East Asia or China. In practice, U.S. forces were usually overseen by General Joseph Stilwell, the Deputy Allied Commander in China; the term "CBI" was significant in logistical, material and personnel matters; it was and is commonly used within the US for these theaters.

The Ledo Road was an overland connection between British India and China, built during World War II to enable the Western Allies to deliver supplies to China and aid the war effort against Japan. After the Japanese cut off the Burma Road in 1942 an alternative was required, hence the construction of the Ledo Road. It was renamed the Stilwell Road, after General Joseph Stilwell of the U.S. Army, in early 1945 at the suggestion of Chiang Kai-shek. It passes through the Burmese towns of Shingbwiyang, Myitkyina and Bhamo in Kachin state. Of the 1,726 kilometres (1,072 mi) long road, 1,033 kilometres (642 mi) are in Burma and 632 kilometres (393 mi) in China with the remainder 61 km was in India. The road had the Ledo-Pangsau Pass-Tanai (Danai)-Myitkyina--Bhamo-Mansi-Namhkam-Kunming route.

General Sir George James Giffard, was a British military officer, who had a distinguished career in command of African troops in the First World War, rising to command an Army Group in South East Asia in the Second World War.

The Chinese Expeditionary Force was an expeditionary unit of China's National Revolutionary Army that was dispatched to Burma and India in support of the Allied efforts against the Imperial Japanese Army during the Japanese invasion and occupation of Burma in the South-East Asian theatre of the Second World War.

The Burma campaign in the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II took place over four years from 1942 to 1945. During the first year of the campaign, the Imperial Japanese Army with aid from Burmese insurgents had driven British forces and Chinese forces out of Burma, and occupied most of the country. From May to December 1942, most active campaigning ceased as the monsoon rains made tactical movement almost impossible in the forested and mountainous border between India and Burma, and both the Allies and Japanese faced severe logistical constraints.

The fighting in the Burma campaign in 1944 was among the most severe in the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II. It took place along the borders between Burma and India, and Burma and China, and involved the British Commonwealth, Chinese and United States forces, against the forces of Imperial Japan and the Indian National Army. British Commonwealth land forces were drawn primarily from the United Kingdom, British India and Africa.

The Burma campaign in the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II was fought primarily by British Commonwealth, Chinese and United States forces against the forces of Imperial Japan, who were assisted by the Burmese National Army, the Indian National Army, and to some degree by Thailand. The British Commonwealth land forces were drawn primarily from the United Kingdom, British India and Africa.

Y Force was the South East Asia Command designation given to Chinese National Revolutionary Army forces that re-entered Burma from Yunnan in 1944 as one of the Allies fighting in Burma Campaign of World War II. It consisted of 175,000 troops divided into 15 divisions.

The siege of Myitkyina was an engagement during the Burma campaign of World War II. The Allied victory was part of the larger Battle of Northern Burma and Western Yunnan which succeeded in opening the Ledo Road.

The Battle of Mogaung was a series of engagements that was fought in the Burma Campaign of World War II between 6 and 26 June 1944 at the Burmese town of Mogaung. In brutal fighting, the 77th 'Chindit' Brigade under Brigadier Michael Calvert, later assisted by Chinese forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, fought for and captured the town from the occupying forces of Imperial Japan.

References

George, John (1981), Shots Fired In Anger, NRA Press
Slim, William (1956), Defeat into Victory, London: Cassell
Tuchman, Barbara W. (2001). Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45, Grove Press, ISBN 0-8021-3852-7, ISBN 978-0-8021-3852-1, p. 450
Tuchman, Barbara W. (2001), Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45, Grove Press, ISBN 978-0-8021-3852-1

Northern Combat Area Command

Contents

Composition

Campaigns

See also

Notes

Related Research Articles

References

Further reading