The Raven Forward Air Controllers, also known as The Ravens, were fighter pilots (special operations capable) unit used as forward air controllers (FACs) in a clandestine and covert operation in conjunction with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Laos during America's Vietnam War. The Ravens pinpointed targets for most of the air strikes against communist Lao People's Liberation Army and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) infiltrators in support of the Laotian Hmong guerrilla army. [1]
On 23 July 1962, the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) signed the Geneva Accords guaranteeing the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos. One of the provisions of the accords called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laotian soil. North Vietnam had troops still remaining in Laos from the end of the First Indochina War. The United States had a small contingent of advisors which it withdrew from the country. [2]
The North Vietnamese deliberately ignored the accords because they were intent on keeping their supply corridor, the Ho Chi Minh trail, to continue their war against South Vietnam. North Vietnam's representatives repeatedly stated they had "no military presence in Laos", even though they had at least 4,000 troops stationed there from the end of the First Indochina War on. [3] : 13
Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister of Laos, asked for US help to stop North Vietnamese incursions. To avoid the appearance of unilaterally violating the accords, US President John F. Kennedy directed the United States Air Force (USAF) to initiate clandestine and covert operations in Laos to help the Lao fight the North Vietnamese communists. [4]
As USAF tactical air strikes began in Laos, it became apparent that, for the safety of noncombatants, some means of control was necessary. [5] : xvi–xvii, 3 Beginning at least as early as July 1964, the absence of a close air support control system caused a variety of enterprising individuals to improvise procedures for marking ground targets. At various times, ground markers, including bamboo arrows and dropped smoke grenades, were used. Those marking targets often had little or no training in close air support (CAS). They varied in nationality, being Thai, Lao, or Hmong, as well as American. [5] : 28, 37, 55, 80 Both Continental Air Services, Inc and Air America pilots would sometimes serve as ad hoc forward air controllers. [5] : 103, 121
To begin operations, the USAF originally assigned four sergeants from Combat Control Teams in 1963. These sergeants turned in their uniforms and military identification and were supplied with false identification so they could work in civilian clothing. This process was designed to preserve the fiction of US non-involvement. Once "civilianized", these "Butterflies", as they were known, flew in the right (co-pilot's) seat in Air America Helio Couriers and Pilatus Porters. They were often accompanied by a Lao or Thai interpreter in the back seat. The Air Commando sergeants directed the air strikes according to USAF doctrine, using the radio call sign "Butterfly".[ citation needed ]
Two of the Butterfly US Combat Control Teams (CCT) were Master Sergeant Charles Larimore Jones, soon joined by Technical Sergeant James J. Stanford. [6] : 29 Another of the Butterflies was Major John J. Garrity, Jr., who in future would spend several years as the éminence grise of the US Embassy in Laos. [7] : 109 They, and their successors, controlled air strikes without notice or objection until General William Momyer discovered that enlisted men were directing air strikes. At that point, he ordered their replacement with rated fighter pilots. By that time, the number of Butterflies had increased to six. [6] : 29, 113–114 In April 1966, General Momyer put an end to both the impromptu efforts to control air strikes and the Butterfly effort. [5] : 2, 3
Development of rules of engagement by the embassy placed more emphasis on increased control over in-country close air support. So did the introduction of an integrated close air support system for Southeast Asia. [5] : 5 Beginning in April 1966, as part of its effort to better direct air strikes, the USAF installed four Tactical air navigation systems in Laos to guide US air strikes. One of these was emplaced on a mountain top at Lima Site 85, aimed across the border at Hanoi. [8] : 26–27
A successor operation, code-named Palace Dog, began replacing the original Butterfly effort in 1966. [4] : 86 CIA's agent James William Lair recommended the use of Lao interpreters flying in the rear seat of light aircraft flown by US pilots, thus establishing the Ravens. [9] The Ravens were fighter pilots in unarmed light aircraft who flew observation missions, marked enemy targets with smoke rockets, directed air strikes onto them, and observed and reported bomb damage assessments post strike. [7] : 12–14 They were based in five Lao towns: Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Pakse, Savannakhet, and Long Tieng. [4] : 86
Recruiting for the Ravens began when air force personnel reported for duty assignments in Vietnam. Forward air controllers beginning a tour in Southeast Asia were told as part of their orientation briefing that halfway through their year's tour of duty in Vietnam, they were eligible to volunteer for special duty via the "Steve Canyon Program". To be accepted for Steve Canyon, a pilot had to have a minimum of four months combat duty, including at least 60 days' service as a FAC, at least 100 hours' flight time as a fighter pilot or FAC, at least 750 hours flying time overall, and six months or more time remaining on his tour in Southeast Asia. Those who volunteered for the program did so with no knowledge of their destination. After screening by the 56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, they received temporary duty orders, and were sent to the US Embassy, Vientiane, Laos. There they were stripped of all military identification and gear, supplied with USAID identification, and garbed in civilian clothing to be worn at all times. The screening system tended to select experienced and aggressive FACs. [7] : 7–9 [6] : 113–114
The Ravens belonged only tangentially to the US Air Force. By presidential directive, the ambassador controlled all US military activity in Laos. [8] : 106 The Ravens performed their duties under direction of the air attaché who in turn reported to the ambassador. The air force kept the Ravens' records and paid them, but had no operational control over them, although 7/13th Air Force was formed in an attempt to regain control of their pilots. Generals William Westmoreland and William Momyer both wanted to gain control of the outfit and the war in Laos. However, Ambassador William Sullivan, and his successor, G. McMurtrie Godley, continued to oversee air strikes in Laos. This was intolerable to the air force. In some cases, individual Ravens received poor ratings and slow promotions due to their participation in the program. [3] [6] : 113–114 The Ravens, however, liked the ambiguity of the situation because it left them free to coordinate air strikes with the CIA operatives running the local ground troops. [7] : 39–40
In November 1964, Roy Dalton was the first rated officer to augment the Butterflies. He was stationed at LS 36, a dirt air strip near Na Khang, Laos; he directed air strikes by the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) while riding in Air America helicopters, or from observation posts on mountaintops. [6] : 12–13
The Raven program was officially founded on 5 May 1966. It began with two pilots on 90 days' temporary duty, working out of aircraft borrowed from Air America. Lieutenants Jim F. Lemon and Truman Young had been directing air strikes on either side of the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (VDZ). Upon their return to Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, they were told that their unauthorized aerobatics and drunken transgressions would be forgotten if they volunteered for a secret program—the Ravens. [10] Joined by a third Raven, they began 90-day TDY tours flying support for the Royal Lao Army. [6] : 115
In December, 1966, they acquired the use of an O-1 Bird Dog assigned to the Royal Lao Air Force at Savannakhet. Unlike the borrowed Air America planes, the O-1 had additional radios and smoke rocket tubes for improved communications and target marking. A de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver and a Helio Courier were also acquired, but seemed not to be used for directing air strikes.
By August 1967, the three Raven FACs on duty in Laos were augmented by three more Ravens stationed with Detachment 1, 606th Air Commando Squadron at Nakhon Phanom. At about the same time, the air attaché in Vientiane requested O-1s unmarked by national insignia be supplied by 7/13th Air Force, on the grounds that the Ravens needed their own airplanes instead of riding with civilian pilots. The O-1s were supplied. By November 1967, the Raven head count had increased to eight. [6] : 115 The number of Ravens would increase in a futile attempt to keep up with the swelling tide of air strikes Laos, but they would never number more than 22 assigned at one time. [7] : 64
The chronic shortage of Ravens meant that they often spent long stretches flying combat missions. Raven John Mansur recalled flying as long as 11 hours, 45 minutes in a day. Ron Rinehart exceeded that, logging a 14-hour flight day. Incoming air strikes arrived en masse, with as many as six flights of fighter-bombers stacked up at various altitudes awaiting their turn to bomb. Rinehart would remain on station until his marking rockets were expended, all windows on his O-1 slathered in grease-penciled notes of air strikes, and his fuel tank empty. On three occasions, he landed dead stick back at base when he ran out of gas. In a single month, he directed over 1,000 tactical air strikes, flying over 280 combat hours. If President Lyndon B. Johnson’s March 1968 partial bombing halt diverted a steady stream of air power from Vietnam into Laos, his 1 November 1968 moratorium flooded the kingdom with US air power and overwhelmed the four Ravens stationed in northeastern Laos. [7] : 61, 88–89, 94–95
Tactical air power was allocated at a conference by 7/13th Air Force in Saigon. Air Attaché Colonel Robert Tyrell came away from this with 60% of all tactical air strikes in Southeast Asia scheduled for attacks within Laos. The position of Head Raven was created to serve as a de facto Air Liaison Officer, and the number of Ravens in-country doubled to handle the new work load. [7] : 188–190 General Vang Pao, the ground commander of the CIA's clandestine army of Hmong hill tribesmen, used tactical air as airborne artillery. His combat operations became dependent upon it. [7] : 181–182
Both the O-1s and the later-supplied U-17s had severe maintenance problems in the beginning. Maintenance was spotty. It was performed by pilots, poorly trained Lao mechanics, or USAF technicians. The piston engines were tuned for optimum performance at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base's low elevation. They would run raggedly in the highlands of Laos. Adding to the woes were high power settings needed for maximum weight takeoffs, toting maximal loads, or short-field takeoffs. Engine life in O-1s fell from 1,800 hours to 400 hours flight time. [6] : 119–120
Engine failures became epidemic. Eighteen engine failures occurred during the last quarter of 1968. Karl Polifka (call sign Raven 45) reported 26 in a month, apparently February 1969. The upcountry USAF technicians were then replaced by Air America mechanics. The chief mechanic at Pakse was Stan Wilson and at Long Tieng was Dan Williams.
This led to all the O-1s being cycled through Udorn to have their fuel tanks cleaned out. Some of them had 18 years of crud and mud contaminating the tanks. Radio wiring, engine re-timing, and fuel system cleaning were accomplished on each aircraft and by May 1969 engine problems dropped drastically after that. [6] : 119–120
Anti-aircraft fire could be intense and accurate. Some Raven aircraft were known to take up to 50 rounds in battle damage on a single sortie. [7] : 247
Working as a Raven FAC was an exhausting, high-risk, high-stress job. The casualty rate among them ran about 50% wounded and killed; one calculation by a participating Raven at his end of tour was that 90% of the Raven planes had been hit by ground fire during their tours of duty; 60% had been downed by enemy action at some point; 30% had been killed in action. [7] : 335–336 Note: Craig Duehring, who made this calculation, later became an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. The roster of 161 Ravens includes the Butterfly FACs, none of whom were killed in action, as well as an army attaché, who was. Twenty-three of the Air Force Ravens died during the Secret War; Army Attaché Joseph Bush was the 24th. Robbins lists all Ravens deceased prior to the publication of his book. [7] : 447–448 USAF Ravens are not listed in the 1988 directory of names of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, although they do appear on the wall.
Laos became the most bombed nation in history, largely due to the Raven FACs. Approximately the same tonnage of bombs were dropped on Laos as were dropped by the US in the entirety of World War II. Approximately 20% of the Laotian populace became refugees, largely relocating because of bombing. [5] : 7 As of 2020, Laos is still plagued by unexploded ordnance.[ citation needed ]
The Laotian Civil War was waged between the Communist Pathet Lao and the Royal Lao Government from 23 May 1959 to 2 December 1975. The Kingdom of Laos was a covert theater during the Vietnam War with both sides receiving heavy external support in a proxy war between the global Cold War superpowers. The fighting also involved the North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, American and Thai armies, both directly and through irregular proxies. The war is known as the Secret War among the American CIA Special Activities Center, and Hmong and Mien veterans of the conflict.
The Royal Lao Air Force, best known to the Americans by its English acronym RLAF, was the air force component of the Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR), the official military of the Royal Lao Government and the Kingdom of Laos during the Laotian Civil War between 1960 and 1975.
The United States Air Force (USAF) deployed combat aircraft to Thailand from 1960 to 1975 during the Vietnam War. Today, US military units train with other Asian militaries in Thailand. Royal Thai Air Force Bases are an important element in the Pentagon's "forward positioning" strategy.
The South Vietnam Air Force, officially the Republic of Vietnam Air Force, was the aerial branch of the Republic of Vietnam Military Forces, the official military of the Republic of Vietnam from 1955 to 1975.
The Battle of Lima Site 85, also called Battle of Phou Pha Thi, was fought as part of a military campaign waged during the Vietnam War and Laotian Civil War by the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the Pathet Lao, against airmen of the United States Air Force (USAF)'s 1st Combat Evaluation Group, elements of the Royal Lao Army, Royal Thai Border Patrol Police, and the CIA-led Hmong Clandestine Army. The battle was fought on Phou Pha Thi mountain in Houaphanh Province, Laos, on 10 March 1968, and derives its name from the mountaintop where it was fought or from the designation of a 700-foot (210 m) landing strip in the valley below, and was the largest single ground combat loss of USAF members during the Vietnam War.
Operation Barrel Roll was a covert U.S. Air Force 2nd Air Division and U.S. Navy Task Force 77, interdiction and close air support campaign conducted in the Kingdom of Laos between 5 March 1964 and 29 March 1973 concurrent with the Vietnam War. The operation resulted in 260 million bombs being dropped on Laos.
Operation Niagara was a U.S. Seventh Air Force close air support campaign carried out from January through March 1968, during the Vietnam War. Its purpose was to serve as an aerial umbrella for the defense of the U.S. Marine Corps Khe Sanh Combat Base on the Khe Sanh Plateau, in western Quang Tri Province of the Republic of Vietnam. The base was under siege by an estimated three-divisional force of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN).
Palace Dog was a United States Air Force covert operation to support the Royal Laotian Government in its military operations during the Laotian Civil War portion of the Vietnam War. Palace Dog, Project 404, and the Raven FACs principal task was the supply of forward air controllers for close air support to the Royal Lao Army (RLA).
Forward air controllers (FACs) played a significant part in the Vietnam War from the very start. Largely relegated to airborne duty by the constraints of jungled terrain, FACs began operations as early as 1962. Using makeshift propeller-driven aircraft and inadequate radio nets, they became so essential to air operations that the overall need for FACs would not be completely satisfied until 1969. The FAC's expertise as an air strike controller also made him an intelligence source, munitions expert, communication specialist, and above all, the on-scene commander of the strike forces and the start of any subsequent combat search and rescue if necessary.
The 19th Weapons Squadron is a United States Air Force unit assigned to the USAF Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada.
Operation Off Balance was a hastily planned offensive operation of the Laotian Civil War; it happened between 1 and 15 July 1969 on the Plain of Jars in the Kingdom of Laos. The Royal Lao Government forces in Military Region 1 of Laos had just been evicted from the crucial all-weather airfield at Muang Soui, as well as most of the Plain, on 28 June 1969. Hmong General Vang Pao planned a quick counter-offensive to recapture the airfield from his communist foe; it would kick off on 1 July, supported by 60 sorties per day of tactical air strikes from Operation Barrel Roll.
Senior Master Sergeant James J. "Jim" Stanford instituted forward air control techniques for directing air strikes during the Vietnam War and the Laotian Civil War. Despite his Combat Controller activities being restricted by his lack of a pilot's license, no access to military aircraft, and a ban on using rocketry to mark targets for strikes, Stanford flew 218 combat missions in Laos. Although his duties were abruptly ended by a decision by General William W. Momyer, Stanford had demonstrated the necessity for forward air control in Laos; his successors were the Raven Forward Air Controllers. The resulting air campaigns would drop about the same tonnage of bombs on Laos as were dropped during the entirety of World War II. After serving 24 years in the U.S. Air Force, Stanford transitioned to an allied civilian job in airfield management for a further 20-year career. He died on 25 August 2012 as a result of surgery.
Charles Larimore Jones, also known as Charlie Jones, was an architect of the U.S. Air Force's forward air control doctrine, as well as one of its early practitioners during the Laotian Civil War. He was trained in forward air control techniques as a Combat Controller in 1954. In 1962, he was one of the Operation Jungle Jim volunteers who reestablished the Air Commandos. He was the first Combat Controller committed solely to support the U.S. Army Special Forces. Based on his experience, in 1963 he was assigned to Hurlburt Field to write the field manual on forward air control while expanding the Combat Controller curriculum.
Operation Junction City Jr. was a major Laotian offensive of the Vietnam War; initially aimed at temporary disruption of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, it was extended into an attempt to isolate the major North Vietnamese communist transshipment point at Tchepone from the units it was supposed to supply.
Operation Maeng Da was a Royal Lao Government military offensive aimed at disrupting the crucial communist supply route of the Second Indochina War, the Ho Chi Minh trail. Launched from a rendezvous point near Vang Tai, Laos, on 2 July 1970 as a three-battalion assault on the major People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) transshipment center at Tchepone, Laos, it ran into stiff resistance from the PAVN 9th Regiment from 11–15 July. An attempt on 16 July to reinforce the Royalist Blue, Black, and Mobile 1 battalions by White Battalion was thwarted by PAVN ground fire and hazardously heavy air traffic over the battlefield. On 17 July, the worst hit Royalist unit, Black Battalion, was airlifted back out of battle. The other two Royalist battalions exfiltrated away from the PAVN troops. In the process, the commander of Mobile 1 was killed; the battalion lost all combat discipline. Both retreating battalions regrouped at the operation's start point. Although ancillary follow-up operations occurred in the vicinity throughout September, the Maeng Da offensive would not resume. However, the Central Intelligence Agency, which had trained and supported the Royalist guerrilla battalions, prepared the Tchepone Operation to follow it.
Project Waterpump was a secretive support operation by the U.S. Air Force to train and nurture into existence the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF). The United States had decided to covertly support the Kingdom of Laos in the Laotian Civil War as the Lao fended off a North Vietnamese invasion. The nascent RLAF was seen as a force multiplier but needed pilots and technicians. The 40-man Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando Wing, code named Waterpump, was forwarded to Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base for this training duty in March 1964. They would remain on duty through the truce of 21 February 1973. Their first hasty assignment was transition training to the T-28 Trojan for American civilian pilots; the resulting A Team would exist through 1967. The Air Commandos also conducted final training for Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) mercenary pilots; the resultant B Team would serve until 1970. Besides putting a polish on graduate pilots, the Waterpump detachment trained Lao pilots from scratch. The RLAF's high pilot casualty rate made bringing the RLAF rosters up to strength a long grind.
Campaign 74B was a major combined arms offensive by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) during the Laotian Civil War. The Communist offensive, if successful, would knock the last remaining fighting troops of the Kingdom of Laos out of the war, ensuring the Vietnamese conquest of Laos. The PAVN 316th Division—reinforced by artillery, tanks, and sappers—attacked during a period of slackened tactical air support for General Vang Pao's guerrilla army; Operation Lam Son 719 was being waged at the same time. Having captured the highly strategic Plain of Jars during Operation 74B, the Communists attackers managed to penetrate deeply enough to fire upon the main guerrilla base at Long Tieng.
Operation Thao La was a Royal Lao Government (RLG) dry season offensive during the Laotian Civil War, aimed at severing the Ho Chi Minh Trail and retrieving the Lao Bolaven Plateau from the grip of the People's Army of Vietnam. Its objectives were the use of recently captured Salavan as a jumpoff point for occupying Tha Theng and Ban Phong. Key to the plan was a prearranged daily allotment of supportive tactical air power.
Operation Phou Phiang III was the final offensive of the Laotian Civil War by the Royal Lao Army's L'Armée Clandestine. Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored Hmong guerrillas and Thai mercenaries formed three attacking task forces in an attempt to clear the People's Army of Vietnam from positions near the Royalist guerrillas' headquarters on the Plain of Jars. All three columns failed to move the Vietnamese invaders before the ceasefire of 21 February 1973 ended the war.
The Battles of Nakhang were fought between Royalist forces and North Vietnamese invaders for control of the northern base of Nakhang, Laos. The Lima Site 36 airstrip at Nakhang was capable of handling aircraft up to the size of C-123 cargo carriers; its location and length made it a vital component of the Royalist defense. Lima Site 36 was the airhead for their guerrillas' movements and resupply, as well as a staging point for U.S. combat search and rescue helicopters.
As information about the Laotian Civil War is being declassified and publicly released, historians will continue to write additional reliable texts published by mainstream media. In the meantime, there has been a flurry of self-published texts on the subject, generally by participants. The self-published texts below do not meet Wikipedia standards as reliable sources. However, they contain a sizeable body of information unprocessed by historians, and are useful and interesting further reading for those wishing more insight into the subject.