Although the Ottomans achieved a limited tactical victory at the Battle of Katia in April 1916, their larger offensive was halted at the Battle of Romani in August. British defenses, reinforced by ANZAC troops, inflicted a defeat that forced the Ottomans to retreat to the El Arish line. The campaign failed to inspire an Egyptian uprising and coincided with the beginning of the Arab Revolt, which further strained Ottoman resources and contributed to the strategic failure of the expedition.
Background
Cemal Pasha, as the first step for the Second Suez Expedition, established a desert command in Ibin under the leadership of Kress von Kressentein. Thus, both harassment operations against the Canal would be managed, and the preparations to be made in the desert would be secured. Continuing his work, Cemal Pasha prepared a lengthy report consisting of twenty-six items on June 14/15, 1915, to be sent to the General Headquarters. The report summarized the necessary conditions for launching a new canal operation as follows;[1]
The Egyptian mobile army has been regulated in accordance with the military order, and according to this regulation, the mobile army consists of 57 infantry battalions, 20 machine gun companies, 8 cavalry or camel-mounted companies, and 23 batteries.
The occupation force of Syria and Palestine must be arranged as follows:
9 battalions and 1 division each for the Aleppo and Adana regions
1 division with 6 battalions for the Lebanon region
1 corps with two divisions for the Palestine region (each division with 9 battalions)
An additional division as reserve
The fact that the British did not attack Syria and Palestine during the First Canal Operation does not prove that they will not attack during the Second Canal Operation. On the contrary, it is likely they may attack to seize the Egyptian railway, which is very close to the coast. Therefore, a fully equipped Turkish division is essential.
It is essential to ensure that the army, which will remain longer in front of the Canal, receives its daily provisions regularly from the last railway station to the Canal and that one month's reserve supplies are stocked in desert depots before the operation starts. Accordingly, two Desert Supply Inspectorates will be established in Beersheba and Ibin.
According to the first and third articles, the required numbers of carts and camels for transporting supplies and ammunition from both the operational area and the desert depots have been determined as follows.
In addition to the existing materials, new supplies must be delivered from the capital to Beersheba by 14 November 1915 (1 Teşrin-i sâni 1331).
For urgent transport, automobile companies consisting of 120 cars each must be established. Along with these automobiles, fuel and repair teams must also be sent. Of the previously requested 4,656 carts, I now request 4,156 by deducting 500.
The water supply needs in the desert will be met through the supply organization. Additionally, the required materials for water transport must arrive in Damascus by 14 October 1915 (1 Teşrin-i evvel 1331).
The equipment and supplies to be sent from Germany must also reach Damascus by 14 October 1915 (1 Teşrin-i evvel 1331).
I kindly request that the aviation detachment and wireless-telegraph personnel be carefully selected from among the Germans.
Due to the special importance of the Egyptian Expedition, I consider it essential to add the following command staff to the army.
The army headquarters is extremely deficient.
It is highly probable that the army will remain in front of the Suez Canal for weeks during the operation.
I consider it essential that the commanders of the Second Canal Operation be chosen from among those who participated in the First Canal Operation. Based on this, I find it necessary to appoint Fahri Pasha as Commander of the Syrian Mobile Force, (Mersinli) Cemal Pasha as Commander of the Palestinian Defense Force of the 8th Army, and Von Kress Bey as Commander of the 1st Expeditionary Force.
The core of all preparations is the camel issue. I request that funds be sent to fulfill this requirement. Additionally, medical supplies, medical officers, and veterinarians must be sent.
The points I have presented are the minimum requirements to ensure the execution of the Egyptian Expedition.
Figures from Cemal Pasha's report submitted to the General Headquarters[2]
Carts
Camels
For desert personnel
_____
4,460
For water transport
_____
9,392
For food transport
4,786
14,667
For ammunition transport
1,533
4,509
To be stationed at various points within the desert
_____
3,000
10% reserve arrangement
_____
3,603
5% reserve arrangement
316
_____
Total
6,635
39,631
Cemal Pasha continued his efforts with great diligence, yet the demands outlined in his previous report remained unmet. Consequently, on 21 July 1915, he submitted another report to Enver Pasha reiterating his requests regarding the shortage of camels, funds, narrow-gauge railway materials, and water supply infrastructure. During this time, he was residing at his summer residence in Ayınsofar.
In additional reports dated 27 July – 4 August addressed to Enver Pasha, he provided further details about desert logistics, aviation, wireless and telegraph detachments, personnel numbers, and one-week supply estimates. Given the state of the Ottoman government at the time, fulfilling all these requirements seemed highly challenging. Cemal Pasha believed that without assistance from the Central Powers, particularly Germany, the expedition would not be feasible. Yet he insisted that Germany stood to gain more strategically from its success.
In a telegram to the General Headquarters dated 28 August 1915, Cemal Pasha stated: > "...Considering that Britain's possession of Egypt is contrary to Germany's strategic interests, and that Egypt may lead the British to unpredictable results, I am confident Germany will not refrain from major financial sacrifices."
Following this message, Enver Pasha sent Von Kressenstein to Germany to secure the required funds and supplies. While German enthusiasm had declined due to the previous failure, they still contributed to the operation, which they referred to as the "Pasha Expedition."
According to reports submitted by Cemal Pasha, German aid included:[3]
One aviation detachment, eight machine gun detachments, a 15 cm howitzer battery, a 10 cm artillery battery, a 21 cm mortar battery, and four mobile anti-aircraft units.
Two field hospitals under German officers.
140 officers and 1,500 soldiers.
1:250,000 scale German maps titled "For Cemal Pasha" depicting the Suez Canal region.
Ottoman maneuvers near El Arish, 1916
Another significant initiative by Cemal Pasha was the construction of railways for troop and supply transport. A new project, the "Hejaz Railway Egyptian Branch," was launched on 19 January 1915, aiming to extend from Mesudiye Station through Ramla, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Beersheba, Hafir el-Auja, and finally to Ismailia on the Suez Canal. The lead engineer was German Heinrich August Meissner (Meissner Pasha).[4]
By October 1915, the line reached Beersheba. The Minister of Foundations and the Sheikh al-Islam praised Cemal Pasha for constructing 159 km of railway in under 10 months. His logistical expertise played a key role in this rapid completion. Although construction continued steadily toward Ismailia, it was halted roughly 25 km short due to the outbreak of the Arab Revolt.
Cemal Pasha also initiated the construction of a 600 km highway to Habra, opened desert wells, laid 38 km of water pipes, and installed telegraph lines throughout the region. He revived volunteer recruitment by commissioning Emir Shakib Arslan to form tribal auxiliaries and later established the First Expeditionary Force.[5]
On 14 October 1915, Cemal Pasha moved his headquarters to Jerusalem. Toward the end of the month, he traveled to Aleppo, and then planned to go to Istanbul to discuss both the deportation of Armenians and secure support for railway construction across the Taurus Mountains. However, upon reaching Pozantı, he was ordered by Enver Pasha to return. A week later, Enver summoned him again.
During his trip, Cemal Pasha witnessed deported Armenians and reportedly said, "People in Istanbul act so carefree because they do not see what is happening." On 5 December 1915, at a meeting at the Ministry of War, Enver Pasha promised to shift focus to Egypt now that the Gallipoli campaign had ended. Cemal Pasha requested 650,000 lira for the operation, but received no clear commitment. Later he was received by Sultan Mehmed Reşad and visited the Red Crescent Hospital.
Following his visit to Istanbul, Cemal Pasha concluded that a grand campaign in Egypt was no longer viable. Instead, the new plan aimed to position forces on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal for artillery harassment. This shift followed the 17 November 1915 meeting between Enver Pasha and Erich von Falkenhayn, in which Germany indicated it could not meet all Ottoman requests.
Meanwhile, the British anticipated a renewed Ottoman offensive after Gallipoli. General Maxwell warned of a 250,000-strong Ottoman force (though real numbers were around 200,000) and requested reinforcements.[6]Archibald Murray was appointed to command in Egypt, and the British began fortifying the eastern approaches to the canal.[7]
In February 1916, Enver Pasha visited the front to observe preparations. He was impressed and told Cemal Pasha, "I never imagined the desert could be transformed like this." Afterward, they visited Mecca and Medina and met with Sharif Hussein.[8]
On 2 June 1916, Cemal Pasha issued a personal directive to the First Expeditionary Force in Turkish and French, highlighting the estimated 200,000 British troops and outlining measures for stopping enemy advances. He emphasized that any withdrawal could only be ordered by the Fourth Army command. The directive also aimed to curb Von Kressenstein's unauthorized initiatives, as tensions between the two had escalated. Cemal Pasha even sent a sharp telegram on 16 July 1916, reminding Von Kressenstein of the chain of command and stating:
> "If you have forgotten that you are solely responsible to me, I hereby remind you..."
Cemal Pasha worked tirelessly up to the start of the expedition in August 1916. In a telegram to Enver Pasha on 21 July 1916, he wrote:
> "For a year and a half, I have labored endlessly to make this campaign possible. Now I am working even harder to sustain it."
He also urged the immediate delivery of ammunition and requested that his sacrifices not go unacknowledged.[9]
In early March, Enver Pasha instructed Cemal Pasha via official orders to initiate preparations aimed at threatening the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the British had shifted their defense lines to the eastern bank of the canal.
At the behest of both Enver and Cemal Pasha, the 1st Expeditionary Force under Von Kressenstein launched a reconnaissance assault on April 23, successfully engaging British forces at Katya. Enver Pasha congratulated Cemal Pasha, commander of the Fourth Army, for this achievement.
The Battle of Katya profoundly influenced Cemal Pasha, convincing him of the critical importance of aviation units and the necessity of establishing a submarine base along the Syrian-Palestinian coast. In his memoirs, he claimed that he approved the assault on the Canal at Von Kressenstein's suggestion—though in truth, the operation was primarily his own initiative.
As early as July 15, 1916, he telegraphed Enver Pasha from Damascus, emphasizing his preference for the Canal Operation over the crisis in the Hejaz, despite the Arab Revolt. The new plan, orchestrated by Cemal Pasha, involved a renewed assault on Romani by Von Kressenstein's force of approximately 10,000 men on August 2. However, due to heavy British artillery fire and well-fortified enemy lines, Ottoman forces were compelled to retreat to the Sinai on August 3–4.
Cemal Pasha attributed the defeat at Romani to British defensive superiority, intense artillery fire, and the outbreak of the Arab Revolt. Nevertheless, he argued that the defeat underscored the growing importance of the Fourth Army and requested reinforcements.
German Chief of Staff Von Frankenberg, blamed the Romani failure on the operation's lack of clear objectives, stating: > "The operation achieved little for German or Ottoman interests because it was poorly planned from the beginning. Objectives and resources were never aligned."
Von Kressenstein, for his part, criticized the timing—arguing that the operation should have occurred in spring rather than the sweltering summer—and noted logistical challenges due to locust infestations and the Arab Revolt.
Journalist and Cemal Pasha confidant Falih Rıfkı Atay summarized the defeat as: > "A step-by-step retreat before overwhelming enemy forces."
After the defeat, Cemal Pasha withdrew to the El Arish–Nekhl line and planned a winter campaign in the Hejaz. However, this plan was vetoed by Enver Pasha.
Meanwhile, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, appointed on December 7, 1916, ordered a renewed offensive to expel the Ottomans from the Sinai. On December 21, British troops captured El Arish. Cemal Pasha had no choice but to evacuate the area. Three weeks later, the British advanced toward Gaza but were repelled in the First Battle of Gaza.
In the Second Battle of Gaza (April 17–20, 1917), Ottoman forces again defeated the British. Cemal Pasha declared this victory, along with Gallipoli, as another blow to British arrogance. In recognition of his leadership, the Ottoman government awarded Cemal Pasha the "Order of Osmanieh with Diamonds."[10]
↑ The Ottoman IV Army underwent a process of reorganisation from 1916 onwards. Contrary to General Maxwell's claims, as of June, Army IV's overall strength was as follows: 199,850 men, 24,500 livestock, 19,375 camels, 101,850 small arms (39,189 of these weapons were bluzers, 19,859 Russian rifles, 21,000 Martins, 24,816 old guns and 58,000 old guns), 75 Gatling guns and 244 cannons. These figures are taken from the reports prepared by Cemal Pasha himself. ATASE Archive, K. 168, D. 730, F. 30, 2 June 1332 (15 June 1916). In the same year, the monthly expenditure of Army IV had reached 350.000 Lira. However, due to the economic difficulties, it was forced to be contented with an appropriation of 40.000 Lira. BOA, DH.ŞFR,65/88, 65/104, 13/15 June 1332 (26/28 June 1916).
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