Trade-off talking rational economic person (TOTREP) is one term, among others, used to denote, in the field of choice analysis, the rational, human agent of economic decisions.
The term was first used notably in David M. Kreps' Notes on the Theory of Choice (1988). [1] Kreps, in his preface, acknowledges Mike Harrison for first using the acronym Totrep. In his work on the theory of choice, Michael Allingham characterizes the notion "denoted by TOTREP" as something "both to admire and worry about". [2] Studies of the concept of the Trade-off Talking Rational Economic Person are now routinely conducted in the related fields of theory of choice, the mathematics of decision making, [3] etc.
Totrep denotes an agent of economic decisions with strict preferences. The setting of the preference relations presumes [4] that
In attempts to legitimatize economic theory as ethical, the question was asked about how to "teach or preach to economists or ethicists how to become more ethical". [5] In this, social scientist Kjell Hausken posits the notion that, "if acting virtuously contributes to a character or personality which subsequently and indirectly influences economic [agent]'s reputation beneficially in the long run, then this action is to be recommended if the long-term benefit of the beneficial reputation outweighs the short-term benefit of a more deceitful or vicious action." [5] Hausken observes that, the "ethical economic [agent]" is actually "a trade-off talking rational economic person", who constantly carries out "a cost–benefit analysis where reputation is a relevant input, constantly focusing on her real interests in a broad sense, and constantly thinking long term." [5]
Empirical research, from the 1970s onwards (research that eventually established the field of behavioral economics), showed that the Totrep model of rationality cannot be safely considered as representative of real-life human affairs.
Kreps himself initially describes the models of choice presented in his book as both normative and descriptive but, in the final chapter of his book, where he briefly outlines the paradoxes of Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961), ultimately acknowledges that Totrep modelling should be presumed to be merely normative, since the "evidence [shows] individuals are very poor intuitive statisticians" and "use heuristic procedures which sometimes bias their choices in ways that the standard models don't capture." [1]
Rational choice theory refers to a set of guidelines that help understand economic and social behaviour. The theory originated in the eighteenth century and can be traced back to the political economist and philosopher Adam Smith. The theory postulates that an individual will perform a cost–benefit analysis to determine whether an option is right for them. Rational choice theory looks at three concepts: rational actors, self interest and the invisible hand.
In economics, utility is a measure of the satisfaction that a certain person has from a certain state of the world. Over time, the term has been used in at least two different meanings.
Public choice, or public choice theory, is "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science." It includes the study of political behavior. In political science, it is the subset of positive political theory that studies self-interested agents and their interactions, which can be represented in a number of ways—using standard constrained utility maximization, game theory, or decision theory. It is the origin and intellectual foundation of contemporary work in political economy.
Rationality is the quality of being guided by or based on reason. In this regard, a person acts rationally if they have a good reason for what they do, or a belief is rational if it is based on strong evidence. This quality can apply to an ability, as in a rational animal, to a psychological process, like reasoning, to mental states, such as beliefs and intentions, or to persons who possess these other forms of rationality. A thing that lacks rationality is either arational, if it is outside the domain of rational evaluation, or irrational, if it belongs to this domain but does not fulfill its standards.
Bounded rationality is the idea that rationality is limited when individuals make decisions, and under these limitations, rational individuals will select a decision that is satisfactory rather than optimal.
The term Homo economicus, or economic man, is the portrayal of humans as agents who are consistently rational and narrowly self-interested, and who pursue their subjectively defined ends optimally. It is a wordplay on Homo sapiens, used in some economic theories and in pedagogy.
In welfare economics and social choice theory, a social welfare function—also called a socialordering, ranking, utility, or choicefunction—is a function that ranks a set of social states by their desirability. Each person's preferences are combined in some way to determine which outcome is considered better by society as a whole. It can be seen as mathematically formalizing Rousseau's idea of a general will.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is a major axiom of decision theory which codifies the intuition that a choice between and should not depend on the quality of a third, unrelated outcome . There are several different variations of this axiom, which are generally equivalent under mild conditions. As a result of its importance, the axiom has been independently rediscovered in various forms across a wide variety of fields, including economics, cognitive science, social choice, fair division, rational choice, artificial intelligence, probability, and game theory. It is closely tied to many of the most important theorems in these fields, including Arrow's impossibility theorem, the Balinski-Young theorem, and the money pump arguments.
Decision theory or the theory of rational choice is a branch of probability, economics, and analytic philosophy that uses the tools of expected utility and probability to model how individuals should behave rationally under uncertainty. It differs from the cognitive and behavioral sciences in that it is prescriptive and concerned with identifying optimal decisions for a rational agent, rather than describing how people really do make decisions. Despite this, the field is extremely important to the study of real human behavior by social scientists, as it lays the foundations for the rational agent models used to mathematically model and analyze individuals in fields such as sociology, economics, criminology, cognitive science, and political science.
The expected utility hypothesis is a foundational assumption in mathematical economics concerning decision making under uncertainty. It postulates that rational agents maximize utility, meaning the subjective desirability of their actions. Rational choice theory, a cornerstone of microeconomics, builds this postulate to model aggregate social behaviour.
A rational agent or rational being is a person or entity that always aims to perform optimal actions based on given premises and information. A rational agent can be anything that makes decisions, typically a person, firm, machine, or software.
In decision theory, the Ellsberg paradox is a paradox in which people's decisions are inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory. John Maynard Keynes published a version of the paradox in 1921. Daniel Ellsberg popularized the paradox in his 1961 paper, "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms". It is generally taken to be evidence of ambiguity aversion, in which a person tends to prefer choices with quantifiable risks over those with unknown, incalculable risks.
Revealed preference theory, pioneered by economist Paul Anthony Samuelson in 1938, is a method of analyzing choices made by individuals, mostly used for comparing the influence of policies on consumer behavior. Revealed preference models assume that the preferences of consumers can be revealed by their purchasing habits.
The Allais paradox is a choice problem designed by Maurice Allais to show an inconsistency of actual observed choices with the predictions of expected utility theory. The Allais paradox demonstrates that individuals rarely make rational decisions consistently when required to do so immediately. The independence axiom of expected utility theory, which requires that the preferences of an individual should not change when altering two lotteries by equal proportions, was proven to be violated by the paradox.
In decision theory, the von Neumann–Morgenstern (VNM) utility theorem demonstrates that rational choice under uncertainty involves making decisions that take the form of maximizing the expected value of some cardinal utility function. This function is known as the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. The theorem forms the foundation of expected utility theory.
In economics, and in other social sciences, preference refers to an order by which an agent, while in search of an "optimal choice", ranks alternatives based on their respective utility. Preferences are evaluations that concern matters of value, in relation to practical reasoning. Individual preferences are determined by taste, need, ..., as opposed to price, availability or personal income. Classical economics assumes that people act in their best (rational) interest. In this context, rationality would dictate that, when given a choice, an individual will select an option that maximizes their self-interest. But preferences are not always transitive, both because real humans are far from always being rational and because in some situations preferences can form cycles, in which case there exists no well-defined optimal choice. An example of this is Efron dice.
In psychology, economics and philosophy, preference is a technical term usually used in relation to choosing between alternatives. For example, someone prefers A over B if they would rather choose A than B. Preferences are central to decision theory because of this relation to behavior. Some methods such as Ordinal Priority Approach use preference relation for decision-making. As connative states, they are closely related to desires. The difference between the two is that desires are directed at one object while preferences concern a comparison between two alternatives, of which one is preferred to the other.
Ecological rationality is a particular account of practical rationality, which in turn specifies the norms of rational action – what one ought to do in order to act rationally. The presently dominant account of practical rationality in the social and behavioral sciences such as economics and psychology, rational choice theory, maintains that practical rationality consists in making decisions in accordance with some fixed rules, irrespective of context. Ecological rationality, in contrast, claims that the rationality of a decision depends on the circumstances in which it takes place, so as to achieve one's goals in this particular context. What is considered rational under the rational choice account thus might not always be considered rational under the ecological rationality account. Overall, rational choice theory puts a premium on internal logical consistency whereas ecological rationality targets external performance in the world. The term ecologically rational is only etymologically similar to the biological science of ecology.
Behavioral game theory seeks to examine how people's strategic decision-making behavior is shaped by social preferences, social utility and other psychological factors. Behavioral game theory analyzes interactive strategic decisions and behavior using the methods of game theory, experimental economics, and experimental psychology. Experiments include testing deviations from typical simplifications of economic theory such as the independence axiom and neglect of altruism, fairness, and framing effects. As a research program, the subject is a development of the last three decades.
Economic ethics is the combination of economics and ethics that judges from both disciplines to predict, analyze, and model economic phenomena.