Younger v. Harris | |
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Argued April 1, 1969 Reargued April 29, 1970 Reargued November 16, 1970 Decided February 23, 1971 | |
Full case name | Evelle J. Younger, District Attorney of Los Angeles County v. John Harris, Jr., Jim Dan, Diane Hirsch, and Farrel Broslawsky |
Citations | 401 U.S. 37 ( more ) 91 S. Ct. 746; 27 L. Ed. 2d 669; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 136 |
Case history | |
Prior | Judgment for plaintiffs, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968); probable jurisdiction noted, 393 U.S. 1013(1969). |
Holding | |
The possible unconstitutionality of a state statute is not grounds for a federal court to enjoin state court criminal proceedings brought pursuant to that statute. District Court for the Central District of California reversed and remanded. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Black, joined by Burger, Harlan, Stewart, Blackmun |
Concurrence | Stewart, joined by Harlan |
Concurrence | Brennan, joined by White, Marshall |
Dissent | Douglas |
Laws applied | |
28 U.S.C. § 2283 |
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that United States federal courts were required to abstain from hearing any civil rights tort claims brought by a person who is currently being prosecuted for a matter arising from that claim. [1]
In 1966, several months after the Watts riots and in response to the killing of Leonard Deadwiler (a Black man shot by police while driving his pregnant wife to the hospital), John Harris, Jr., was arrested while handing out leaflets which said, among other things, "Wanted for the murder of Leonard Deadwiler, Bobo the cop." [2]
Harris, a member of the Progressive Labor Party, was indicted on two violations of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, §§11400 and 11401. These statutes prohibited advocating "unlawful acts of force or violence [to] effect political change." Harris faced 14 years on each count. [2]
While prosecution was pending, Harris sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to get an injunction preventing District Attorney Evelle J. Younger from enforcing the law on the grounds that it violated the free speech guarantee. He was joined in this action by Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch, members of the PLP, and Farrel Broslawsky, a history instructor. In Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968), the district court found the Act unconstitutional, enjoining the state from further prosecution of Harris. [3] Younger appealed.
In an 8–1 decision, the Court held that federal courts may not hear the case until the person is convicted or found not guilty of the crime unless the defendant will suffer an irreparable injury that is "both great and immediate." Merely having to endure a criminal prosecution is no such irreparable harm.
There are three exceptions to Younger abstention:
In dissent, Justice Douglas noted,
If the ‘advocacy’ which Harris used was an attempt at persuasion through the use of bullets, bombs, and arson, we would have a different case. But Harris is charged only with distributing leaflets advocating political action toward his objective...
The eternal temptation, of course, has been to arrest the speaker rather than to correct the conditions about which he complains. I see no reason why these appellees should be made to walk the treacherous ground of these statutes. They, like other citizens, need the umbrella of the First Amendment as they study, analyze, discuss, and debate the troubles of these days. When criminal prosecutions can be leveled against them because they express unpopular views, the society of the dialogue is in danger.
The doctrine was later extended to situations where the state is seeking to execute a civil fine against someone, or has jailed a person for contempt of court. The doctrine applies even where the state does not bring an action until after the person has filed a lawsuit in federal court, provided that the federal court has not yet taken any action on the suit. Moreover, the principle of abstention applies to some state administrative proceedings.
In regard to the exceptions which the Younger Court articulated, later decisions make it clear that these are highly difficult to meet.
In law, standing or locus standi is a condition that a party seeking a legal remedy must show they have, by demonstrating to the court, sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. A party has standing in the following situations:
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