City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York | |
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Argued January 11, 2005 Decided March 29, 2005 | |
Full case name | City of Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, et al. |
Docket no. | 03-855 |
Citations | 544 U.S. 197 ( more ) |
Case history | |
Prior | Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2003) |
Subsequent | Rehearing denied, 544 U.S. 1057(2005), on remand sub nom. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 401 F. Supp. 2d 219 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), motion to amend denied, 235 F.R.D. 559 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 605 F.3d 149 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 459 (2010), vacated and remanded sub nom. Madison Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (per curiam) |
Holding | |
Reversed and remanded. Held that repurchase of traditional tribal lands did not restore tribal sovereignty to that land. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Ginsburg, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer |
Concurrence | Souter (in judgment) |
Dissent | Stevens |
Laws applied | |
25 U.S.C. § 465 |
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), was a Supreme Court of the United States case in which the Court held that repurchase of traditional tribal lands 200 years later did not restore tribal sovereignty to that land. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion. [1]
The Oneida Indian Nation (OIN) originally possessed approximately 6,000,000 acres (9,400 sq mi; 24,000 km2) in what is now known as Central New York. [2] The OIN entered three treaties with the United States: Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1784; The Treaty of Fort Harmar of 1789; and the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794. [2] These treaties were codified into federal law in the Non-intercourse Act of 1790. [2] The Act also prohibited transacting any sale of Indian Territory without US Congressional consent and ratification. [2]
In 1788, New York State and the OIN entered into a treaty where the tribe ceded approximately 5,000,000 acres (7,800 sq mi; 20,000 km2), reserving only 300,000 acres (470 sq mi; 1,200 km2) to the OIN. [1] [2] The OIN and the state entered into another land transaction where the OIN ceded some of their 300,000-acre reservation to the state. [2] The treaty was known as the Treaty of Fort Schuyler. [1] Over the next 200 years, the state continued to purchase OIN land without seeking US Congressional consent and ratification. [1] By 1920, the OIN reservation was only 32 acres (0.050 sq mi; 0.13 km2). [1] These transactions forced part of the OIN to move to western lands, e.g. the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin; and the Stockbridge–Munsee and the Brothertown Indians, who also moved from land they owned in New York to Wisconsin. [1]
In 1997 and 1998, the OIN purchased land on the open market that had been part of their aboriginal reservation lands. The city of Sherrill sought to impose property taxes on the land. [1] The OIN claimed that because the land fell within its aboriginal lands, the OIN could exert its tribal sovereignty of the same; rendering the property tax exempt. [1] The county of Madison filed a similar suit, Oneida Indian Nation of NY v Madison County. [3]
While Sherrill sought relief through eviction proceedings in state court, the OIN sought injunctive relief in federal court. [1] The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York enjoined the city of Sherrill and Madison County from taxing the tribal property. [4] [5] Both the city of Sherrill and Madison County appealed the decision to the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court affirmed, holding that the lands at issue fell within the federal definition of Indian Territory and not subject to state or local taxes. [1] [6] The defendants appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. [1] [7]
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, reversing and remanding. [1]
The Second Circuit found that the land qualified as Indian Territory, which meant it was exempt from state and local taxation. [1] Justice Ginsburg's decision never overturned that finding. Instead, Justice Ginsburg held that the OIN purchase of the land did not revive its tribal sovereignty over the land because almost 200 years lapsed where the land was not under OIN control. [1] During this 200-year period, the lands came under state, county, and local jurisdiction. This meant the lands were taxable for property taxes. [1] The municipalities, the counties, and the state relied on that land's taxable revenue for 200 years. [1] Justice Ginsburg also noted that during this 200-year span, the OIN did not attempt to regain title (ownership) over the land until recently; and even then only a small portion of its original 6,000,000-acre reservation. [1] Because of this, the Court opined that 200 years was too long to be out of OIN ownership. [1] Therefore, OIN could not reassert its tribal immunity over those lands as an automatic mechanism. [1]
In further support of the decision to overturn, Ginsburg noted that to affirm the lower courts' holdings would cause too much upheaval for the city, the county, and the state who exerted jurisdiction over the land for 200 years without notice that it was not validly done. [1] Affirming the injunctive relief the OIN sought did not consider the loss of tax revenue to the city. [1] Additionally, Ginsburg opined that because the lands were non-contiguous with existing reservation lands, affirming the injunctive relief would create a "checkerboard" of jurisdictional conflict between the OIN, the state, the city of Sherrill, and Madison County. [1]
These justifications provided by Justice Ginsburg were meant to help those not familiar with the case history to rationalize her decision. The Doctrine of Discovery was cited in the opinion's first footnote as follows:
"Under the “doctrine of discovery,” County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 234 (1985) (Oneida II), “fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign—first the discovering European nation and later the original States and the United States,” Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 667 (1974) (Oneida I)." [1]
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the proper way for the Oneida Nation to reassert its immunity over those re-acquired lands was to place the land in US trust under the Department of the Interior, as authorized by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. [1] Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the mechanisms behind the IRA would address issues of jurisdiction, tax revenue loss, and other pertinent issues. [1] Shortly after the Court published this decision, in April 2005, the OIN applied to the US Interior Department to place 13,000 acres (20 sq mi; 53 km2) into trust.
Justice Souter issued a concurring opinion stating that the amount of time involved from the original transactions to the time of the lawsuit acted as a bar to the tribe from restoring sovereignty to the land in question. [1]
Justice Stevens dissented, noting that the majority opinion did not overrule the Second Circuit's determination that the subject land was Indian Territory. [1] Justice Stevens opined that because the land is within the boundaries of its historical reservation, it was "Indian Country". [1] Therefore, the city had no jurisdiction to tax that property. [1]
Indigenous sovereigntists and scholars have criticized Ginsburg's decision, pointing to her citation of the doctrine of discovery, emphasis on the time that had passed before the Oneida Indian Nation sought judicial relief, and argument that exercising their sovereign rights by not paying taxes to the City of Sherrill would be too "disruptive." [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] Michael Leroy Oberg, a professor at SUNY Geneseo, described the decision as "cowardly and cynical." [11] Students at the University of Alberta Faculty of Law suggested that Ginsburg's decision "provided the Doctrine of Discovery a dangerous injection of life." [10] Villanova University professor Dana Lloyd argues that Ginsburg treats colonialism as a single event, located in an ancient past, rather than a structure, and points out the contradiction in requiring Indigenous nations to seek recognition of injustices done to them by colonizing nations. [8] Steven Newcomb, a member of the Shawnee and Lenape nations, author, documentary producer, and co-founder of the Indigenous Law Institute, reads in Ginsburg's memoir a rhetorical commitment to human dignity that the Sherrill decision did not uphold. [9]
In 2023, when the Vatican formally repudiated the doctrine of discovery, Ginsburg's Sherrill decision was widely cited as the most recent example of the legal concept being cited. [13] [14] [15] [16]
Sherrill held only that the local governments could tax OIN-owned property that was part of the original reservation but reacquired on the open market, not that the local governments could collect. In 2010, in Oneida Indian Nation of New York v Madison County, NY, the Second Circuit held that tribal sovereign immunity barred a tax foreclosure suit against the tribe for unpaid taxes. [17] As urged by concurring judges José A. Cabranes and Peter W. Hall, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. [18] Following a tribal declaration and ordinance waiving sovereign immunity, the Court vacated and remanded. [19]
Tribal sovereignty in the United States is the concept of the inherent authority of indigenous tribes to govern themselves within the borders of the United States.
An Indian reservation is an area of land held and governed by a U.S. federal government-recognized Native American tribal nation, whose government is semi-sovereign, subject to regulations passed by the United States Congress and administered by the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, and not to the U.S. state government in which it is located. Some of the country's 574 federally recognized tribes govern more than one of the 326 Indian reservations in the United States, while some share reservations, and others have no reservation at all. Historical piecemeal land allocations under the Dawes Act facilitated sales to non–Native Americans, resulting in some reservations becoming severely fragmented, with pieces of tribal and privately held land being treated as separate enclaves. This jumble of private and public real estate creates significant administrative, political, and legal difficulties.
The Nonintercourse Act is the collective name given to six statutes passed by the Congress in 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834 to set Amerindian boundaries of reservations. The various Acts were also intended to regulate commerce between settlers and the natives. The most notable provisions of the Act regulate the inalienability of aboriginal title in the United States, a continuing source of litigation for almost 200 years. The prohibition on purchases of Indian lands without the approval of the federal government has its origins in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783.
Turning Stone Resort Casino is a Native American resort casino owned and operated by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (OIN) in Verona, New York.
The Cayuga Nation of New York is a federally recognized tribe of Cayuga people, based in New York, United States. Other organized tribes with Cayuga members are the federally recognized Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma and the Canadian-recognized Six Nations of the Grand River First Nation in Ontario, Canada.
The Oneida Indian Nation (OIN) or Oneida Nation is a federally recognized tribe of Oneida people in the United States. The tribe is headquartered in Verona, New York, where the tribe originated and held territory prior to European colonialism, and continues to hold territory today. They are Iroquoian-speaking people, and one of the Five Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, or Haudenosaunee. Three other federally recognized Oneida tribes operate in locations where they migrated or were removed to during and after the American Revolutionary War: one in Wisconsin in the United States, and two in Ontario, Canada.
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), also written M‘Intosh, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that held that private citizens could not purchase lands from Native Americans. As the facts were recited by Chief Justice John Marshall, the successor in interest to a private purchase from the Piankeshaw attempted to maintain an action of ejectment against the holder of a federal land patent.
The Oneida Nation is a federally recognized tribe of Oneida people in Wisconsin. The tribe's reservation spans parts of two counties west of the Green Bay metropolitan area. The reservation was established by treaty in 1838, and was allotted to individual New York Oneida tribal members as part of an agreement with the U.S. government. The land was individually owned until the tribe was formed under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
The discovery doctrine, or doctrine of discovery, is a disputed interpretation of international law during the Age of Discovery, introduced into United States municipal law by the US Supreme Court Justice John Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh (1823). In Marshall's formulation of the doctrine, discovery of territory previously unknown to Europeans gave the discovering nation title to that territory against all other European nations, and this title could be perfected by possession. A number of legal scholars have criticized Marshall's interpretation of the relevant international law. In recent decades, advocates for Indigenous rights have campaigned against the doctrine. In 2023, the Vatican formally repudiated the doctrine.
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Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974), is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court concerning aboriginal title in the United States. The original suit in this matter was the first modern-day Native American land claim litigated in the federal court system rather than before the Indian Claims Commission. It was also the first to go to final judgement.
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226 (1985), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case concerning aboriginal title in the United States. The case, sometimes referred to as Oneida II, was "the first Indian land claim case won on the basis of the Nonintercourse Act."
Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy, 162 U.S. 283 (1896), was the first litigation of aboriginal title in the United States by a tribal plaintiff in the Supreme Court of the United States since Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831). It was the first such litigation by an indigenous plaintiff since Fellows v. Blacksmith (1857) and its companion case of New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble (1858). The New York courts held that the 1788 Phelps and Gorham Purchase did not violate the Nonintercourse Act, one of the provisions of which prohibits purchases of Indian lands without the approval of the federal government, and that the Seneca Nation of New York was barred by the state statute of limitations from challenging the transfer of title. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the merits of lower court ruling because of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine.
Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, is an important precedent in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the litigation of aboriginal title in the United States. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York (2005), a divided panel held that the equitable doctrine of laches bars all tribal land claims sounding in ejectment or trespass, for both tribal plaintiffs and the federal government as plaintiff-intervenor.
Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. 366 (1857), is a United States Supreme Court decision involving Native American law. John Blacksmith, a Tonawanda Seneca, sued agents of the Ogden Land Company for common law claims of trespass, assault, and battery after he was forcibly evicted from his sawmill by the Company's agents. The Court affirmed a judgement in Blacksmith's favor, notwithstanding the fact that the Seneca had executed an Indian removal treaty and the Company held the exclusive right to purchase to the land by virtue of an interstate compact ratified by Congress.
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