New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble | |
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Decided December 30, 1858 | |
Full case name | People of State of New York ex rel. Asa Cutler, John Underhill, and Arza Underhill v. Edgar C. Dibble, County Judge of Genesee County |
Citations | 62 U.S. 366 ( more ) |
Case history | |
Prior | 18 Barb. 412 (N.Y. Sup. Gen. Term 1854), aff'd,16 N.Y. (2 E.P. Smith) 203 (1854) |
Holding | |
The New York nonintercourse act does not violate the Indian Commerce Clause, the federal Nonintercourse Act or the Treaty of Buffalo Creek | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinion | |
Majority | Grier |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Nonintercourse Act; Treaty of Buffalo Creek |
New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 366 (1858), was a companion case to the more well-known Fellows v. Blacksmith (1857). At the time Fellows was decided, this case had reached the U.S. Supreme Court but had not yet been argued. [1]
Members of the Seneca tribe had obtained a writ from the New York courts, under New York's state nonintercourse act, expelling the Ogden Land Company and their grantees. The defendants, before the Court, unsuccessfully challenged the state statute under the Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, the federal Nonintercourse Act and the Treaty of Buffalo Creek between the federal government and the Senecas. Because the Senecas relied on state law, and the defendants relied on federal law, the case is essentially the inverse of the litigation of aboriginal title in the United States over the next 150 years.
The Treaty of Buffalo Creek (1838) provided for the removal of the Senecas to modern-day Kansas, with their land to pass to the Ogden Land Company. The Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians on the Tonawanda Reservation condemned the treaty, arguing that no sachem from their Band had signed. Prominent Seneca Ely S. Parker had retained lawyer John H. Martindale, who had brought four lawsuits against the Ogden Land Company and their grantees. The first two failed in the New York Supreme Court and New York Court of Appeals, respectively. The third, Fellows v. Blacksmith (1857), prevailed in the Court of Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court. In the fourth, New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, a divided Court of Appeals had sided with the Seneca and the U.S. Supreme Court had agreed to hear the case at the time Fellows was decided.
The district attorney of Genesee County, New York brought suit on behalf of the Senecas against Asa Cutler, John Underhill, and Arza Underhill under a March 31, 1821 New York statute prohibiting non-Indians from settling or residing on lands belonging to or occupied by Indians. [2] The statute provided that the county court should issue a warrant directing the sheriff to remove such persons: [2] Specifically, the statute provided:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person or persons, other than Indians, to settle or reside upon any lands belonging to or occupied by any nation or tribe of Indians within this state; and that all leases, contracts and agreements made by any Indians, whereby any person or persons, other than Indians, shall be permitted to reside upon such lands, shall be absolutely void; and if any person or persons shall settle or reside on any such lands, contrary to this act, it shall be the duty of any judge of any court of Common Pleas of the county within which such lands shall be situated, on complaint made to him, and on due proof of the fact of such settlement or residence, to issue his warrant, under his hand and seal, directed to the sheriff of such county, commanding him, within ten days after the receipt thereof, to remove such person or persons so settling or residing, with his, her or their families, from such lands. [3]
The defendants claimed title from the Treaty of Buffalo creek and requested a jury trial. [4] The county court sided with the Seneca and the proceedings were removed to the New York Supreme Court by certiorari. [4]
The New York Supreme Court heard voluminous testimony and evidence, and held that "the Seneca nation had not duly granted and conveyed the reserve in question to Ogden and Fellows," but the U.S. Supreme Court did not reach this question, noting that it was not "material to our inquiry." [4]
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the 1821 New York statute did not violate the New York Constitution, and thus that the defendants had not acquired any property rights entitling them to a jury trial. [5]
The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of error. [2]
Justice Robert Cooper Grier delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, affirming the judgement of the New York Court of appeals, with costs. The Court limited itself to examining whether the state statute and proceedings had violated any federal law, whether the Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, the federal Nonintercourse Act or the Treaty of Buffalo Creek between the federal government and the Senecas. [6]
The Court held that the state statute was a constitutional exercise of the state's police power:
The statute in question is a police regulation for the protection of the Indians from intrusion of the white people, and to preserve the peace. It is the dictate of a prudent and just policy. Notwithstanding the peculiar relation which these Indian nations hold to the Government of the United States, the State of New York had the power of a sovereign over their persons and property, so far as it was necessary to preserve the peace of the Commonwealth, and protect these feeble and helpless bands from imposition and intrusion. The power of a State to make such regulations to preserve the peace of the community is absolute, and has never been surrendered. The act is therefore not contrary to the Constitution of the United States. [7]
The Court also held that the state statute did not violate any federal statute because "no law of Congress can be found which authorizes white men to intrude on the possessions of Indians." [7]
Finally, the Court held that the state statute did not violate the treaty because, pursuant to the Court's prior holding in Fellows v. Blacksmith (1856), the Seneca's removal was enforceable only by, and at the discretion of the federal government:
If the treaty of 1842 had been executed; if the United States, in their character of sovereign guardian of this nation, had delivered up the possession to these purchasers, then this statute of New York, when applied to them, would clearly be in conflict with their rights acquired under the treaty. But, by the case, it is admitted that the Indians have not been removed by the United States. The Tonawanda band is in peaceable possession of its reserve, and has hitherto refused to surrender it. Unless, therefore, these persons claiming under Ogden and Fellows have by the treaty a right of entry into these lands, and, as a consequence, to forcibly oust the possessors or turn them out by action of ejectment, they cannot allege that this summary removal by authority of the statute of New York is in conflict with the treaty, or any rights secured to the purchasers under it. This proceeding does not affect their title. The question of the validity of this treaty to bind the Tonawanda band is one to be decided, not by the courts, but by the political power which acted for and with the Indians. So far as the statute of New York is concerned, it only requires that the Indians be in possession; they are not bound to show that they are owners. They may invoke the aid of the statute against all white intruders, so long as they remain in the peaceable possession of their lands. [8]
The Court reiterated the importance of the trust relationship between the federal government and the tribes from the Fellows precedent (the only case law cited in the opinion):
The Indians are to be removed to their new homes by their guardians, the United States, and cannot be expelled by irregular force or violence of the individuals who claim to have purchased their lands, nor even by the intervention of the courts of justice. Until such removal and surrender of possession by the intervention of the Government of the United States, the Indians and their possessions are protected, by the laws of New York, from the intrusion of their white neighbors. [9]
Oil Springs Reservation or Oil Spring Reservation is an Indian reservation of the federally recognized Seneca Nation that is located in southwestern New York, United States. As of the 2010 census, the Indian reservation had one resident; in 2005 no tribal members had lived on the property. The reservation covers about one square mile (2.6 km2), divided between the present-day counties of Allegany and Cattaraugus. The reservation is northwest of the village of Cuba. It is bordered by the Town of Cuba and the Town of Ischua.
The Nonintercourse Act is the collective name given to six statutes passed by the Congress in 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834 to set Amerindian boundaries of reservations. The various Acts were also intended to regulate commerce between settlers and the natives. The most notable provisions of the Act regulate the inalienability of aboriginal title in the United States, a continuing source of litigation for almost 200 years. The prohibition on purchases of Indian lands without the approval of the federal government has its origins in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783.
There are four treaties of Buffalo Creek, named for the Buffalo River in New York. The Second Treaty of Buffalo Creek, also known as the Treaty with the New York Indians, 1838, was signed on January 15, 1838 between the Seneca Nation, Mohawk nation, Cayuga nation, Oneida Indian Nation, Onondaga (tribe), Tuscarora (tribe) and the United States. It covered land sales of tribal reservations under the U.S. Indian Removal program, by which they planned to move most eastern tribes to Kansas Territory west of the Mississippi River.
The Tonawanda Seneca Nation is a federally recognized tribe in the State of New York. They have maintained the traditional form of government led by sachems selected by clan mothers. The Seneca are one of the original Five Nations of the Haudenosaunee or Iroquois Confederacy. Their people speak the Seneca language, an Iroquoian language.
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), was a United States Supreme Court case deciding whether the federal government's law prohibiting liquor on the land of Santa Clara Pueblo impermissibly infringed on the State of New Mexico's police power under the equal footing doctrine. In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the law and Congress's ability to recognize and regulate tribes. Citing broad congressional authority in Kagama, recognition of tribes subject to the guardianship of the federal government falls on Congress, not the Court, as long as recognition is not "arbitrary" and actually reflects "distinctly Indian communities."
The United States was the first jurisdiction to acknowledge the common law doctrine of aboriginal title. Native American tribes and nations establish aboriginal title by actual, continuous, and exclusive use and occupancy for a "long time." Individuals may also establish aboriginal title, if their ancestors held title as individuals. Unlike other jurisdictions, the content of aboriginal title is not limited to historical or traditional land uses. Aboriginal title may not be alienated, except to the federal government or with the approval of Congress. Aboriginal title is distinct from the lands Native Americans own in fee simple and occupy under federal trust.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974), is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court concerning aboriginal title in the United States. The original suit in this matter was the first modern-day Native American land claim litigated in the federal court system rather than before the Indian Claims Commission. It was also the first to go to final judgement.
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226 (1985), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case concerning aboriginal title in the United States. The case, sometimes referred to as Oneida II, was "the first Indian land claim case won on the basis of the Nonintercourse Act."
Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy, 162 U.S. 283 (1896), was the first litigation of aboriginal title in the United States by a tribal plaintiff in the Supreme Court of the United States since Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831). It was the first such litigation by an indigenous plaintiff since Fellows v. Blacksmith (1857) and its companion case of New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble (1858). The New York courts held that the 1788 Phelps and Gorham Purchase did not violate the Nonintercourse Act, one of the provisions of which prohibits purchases of Indian lands without the approval of the federal government, and that the Seneca Nation of New York was barred by the state statute of limitations from challenging the transfer of title. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the merits of lower court ruling because of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine.
The Marshall Court (1801–1835) issued some of the earliest and most influential opinions by the Supreme Court of the United States on the status of aboriginal title in the United States, several of them written by Chief Justice John Marshall himself. However, without exception, the remarks of the Court on aboriginal title during this period are dicta. Only one indigenous litigant ever appeared before the Marshall Court, and there, Marshall dismissed the case for lack of original jurisdiction.
The Narragansett land claim was one of the first litigations of aboriginal title in the United States in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida (1974), or Oneida I, decision. The Narragansett claimed a few thousand acres of land in and around Charlestown, Rhode Island, challenging a variety of early 19th century land transfers as violations of the Nonintercourse Act, suing both the state and private land owners.
Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. 366 (1857), is a United States Supreme Court decision involving Native American law. John Blacksmith, a Tonawanda Seneca, sued agents of the Ogden Land Company for common law claims of trespass, assault, and battery after he was forcibly evicted from his sawmill by the Company's agents. The Court affirmed a judgement in Blacksmith's favor, notwithstanding the fact that the Seneca had executed an Indian removal treaty and the Company held the exclusive right to purchase to the land by virtue of an interstate compact ratified by Congress.
Aboriginal title in New York refers to treaties, purchases, laws and litigation associated with land titles of aboriginal peoples of New York, in particular, to dispossession of those lands by actions of European Americans. The European purchase of lands from indigenous populations dates back to the legendary Dutch purchase of Manhattan in 1626, "the most famous land transaction of all." More than any other state, New York disregarded the Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783 and the follow-on Nonintercourse Acts, purchasing the majority of the state directly from the Iroquois nations without federal involvement or ratification.
South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986), is an important U.S. Supreme Court precedent for aboriginal title in the United States decided in the wake of County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State (1985). Distinguishing Oneida II, the Court held that federal policy did not preclude the application of a state statute of limitations to the land claim of a tribe that had been terminated, such as the Catawba tribe.
Aboriginal title in California refers to the aboriginal title land rights of the indigenous peoples of California. The state is unique in that no Native American tribe in California is the counterparty to a ratified federal treaty. Therefore, all the Indian reservations in the state were created by federal statute or executive order.
Aboriginal land title in New Mexico is unique among aboriginal title in the United States. Congressional legislation was passed to define such title after the United States acquired this territory following war with Mexico (1846-1848). But the Supreme Court of the New Mexico Territory and the United States Supreme Court held that the Nonintercourse Act did not restrict the alienability of Pueblo lands.
The Supreme Court of the United States, under Chief Justice Roger B. Taney (1836–1864), issued several important decisions on the status of aboriginal title in the United States, building on the opinions of aboriginal title in the Marshall Court.
James Clark Strong was a breveted American Civil War general and prominent New York attorney in the post-war period. An advocate for Native Americans, he litigated That Portion of the Cayuga Indians Residing in Canada v. State and Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy on behalf of the Cayuga and Seneca, respectively, two of the earliest litigations of aboriginal title in New York.
The Third Treaty of Buffalo Creek or Treaty with the Seneca of 1842 signed by the U.S. and the Seneca Nation modified the Second Treaty of Buffalo Creek. This reflected that the Ogden Company had purchased only two of the four Seneca reservations, the Buffalo Creek and Tonawanda reservations, that the Senecas had agreed to sell in the Second Treaty; it thus restored native title to the Allegany, Cattaraugus and Oil Springs reservations.
The Fourth Treaty of Buffalo Creek or Treaty with the Seneca, Tonawanda Band is a modification of the Second Treaty of Buffalo Creek and Third Treaty of Buffalo Creek.