1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran

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1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran
Part of Consolidation of the Iranian Revolution, Iran-Iraq War, and Kurdish separatism in Iran [1]
Map of Iranian Kurdistan.png
The epicenter of insurrection
DateMarch 1979–1983 [2] /1984-1989 [3] 1989-1996
Location
Result

Iranian victory

  • Iranian forces mostly diverted to the Iran–Iraq War front since late 1980
  • Pockets of KDPI resistance remained until 1996 [3]
Belligerents

Flag of Iran (1964).svg Interim Government and Council of the Islamic Revolution (1979−80)

Contents


Flag of Iran.svg Islamic Republic of Iran (1980−83)

Flag of Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistana Irane.png KDP-I
Flag of Komala.png Komala
Flag of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (Red).svg IPFG [4]
Flag of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (Red).svg OIPFG (Minority) [5] [3]
Sipay Rizgari [6]


Supported by:

Flag of Iraq (1963-1991); Flag of Syria (1963-1972).svg Iraq [7]
Commanders and leaders

Flag of Iran.svg Ruhollah Khomeini
Flag of Iran.svg Mehdi Bazargan
Flag of Iran.svg Abulhassan Banisadr
Flag of Iran.svg Mohammad-Ali Rajai
Flag of Iran.svg Mohammad-Javad Bahonar
Flag of Iran.svg Mostafa Chamran
Flag of Iran.svg Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani
Flag of Iran.svg Ali Khamenei
Flag of Iran.svg Mir-Hossein Mousavi

Flag of Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistana Irane.png Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou
Flag of Komala.png Foad Mostafa Soltani  
Flag of Komala.png Abdullah Mohtadi
Flag of Komala.png Sedigh Kamangar
Flag of Komala.png Jafar Shafiyi

Flag of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (Red).svg Ashraf Dehghani [4]
Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din [6]
Units involved

IRI Army

Revolutionary Guards
Peshmerga
Strength
5,000 Revolutionary Guards in Kurdistan province (August 23, 1979); 200,000 by 1982 100,000 armed Kurdish Peshmerga (August 1979), including 2,000 in Paveh, 2,000 in Saqqiz, 20,000 in Mahabad, 10,000 near Sardasht, and 5,000 Kurds of Turkey. [2]
Artillery included a few captured tanks, light artillery pieces, recoilless guns, and machine guns. [9]
Casualties and losses
3,960 Kurdish democrat rebels killed (shehid.com claim) [2] 1980-1984 25,000 civilians have died including 2,500 Kurdish rebels 5,000 killed (Iranian Government claim) [2]

45,000 total casualties [2]
12 Iranian officers executed for refusing to fight [2]

Total: 10,000 [10] -45,000 killed [11]

The 1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran was one of the largest nationwide uprisings in the country against the new state following the Iranian Revolution. The Kurdish rebellion began in mid-March, just two months after the Revolution ended, and was one of the most intense Kurdish rebellions in modern Iran. [2]

Kurdish groups initially tried to align with Iran's new government in an attempt to emphasize their own Muslim identity and to seek common ground with other Iranians. The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), who strongly campaigned for political autonomy, briefly identified as a non-separatist organization, even criticizing those calling for independence from the state. [1] However, following a number of attacks on Iranian army barracks in the Kurdistan province by militant groups, relations quickly deteriorated. Though Shīʿa Kurds and some Sunni tribal leaders approved of the Shīʿa Islamic State, most Sunni Kurdish leftists and communists continued to push for the independence of Kurdistan. [1] A portion of the Naqshbandi order also opposed the new state, aligning with the Iraqi army and forming the Sipay Rizgari militant group, under the guidance of Sheikh Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din. [6]

Kurdish militants, primarily from the KDPI, initially made territorial gains in Mahabad and temporarily ousted Iranian troops from the region, but a large-scale offensive in spring 1980 by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reversed the course of the conflict. The start of the Iran–Iraq War in September 1980 saw the Iranian government increasing efforts to snuff the Kurdish rebellion, the only 1979 uprising that remained, in part due to the province's proximity to the Iraqi border. By 1981, the Iranian police and the Revolutionary Guard had ousted the Kurdish militants from their strongholds, but small groups continued to execute sporadic attacks against Iranian militia. Clashes in the area continued until 1983.

About 10,000 people were killed over the course of the rebellion, including 1,200 Kurdish political prisoners executed by the Iranian government. [2] There was a resurgence in conflict in 1989 following the assassination of KDPI leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou.

Background

After failed rebellions in 1946 and 1967, Kurdish political organizations continued to push for revolution against the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a move that brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power in February 1979. Tensions remained between the Kurdish people and the government, even with the new leader installed. Many Iraqi Kurds fled to Kurdistan following Saddam Hussein's crackdown on Kurdish revolts, though they continued their campaign for their right to independence in their new home. [12] In the past, Iran had supported Kurdish fighters in clashes with Iraq. The Kurds were exploited by foreign powers looking to destabilize the young republic.[ clarification needed ]

Unlike others in the country, Iranian Sunni Kurds abstained from voting to endorse the creation of an Islamic Republic in March 1979. That referendum garnered 99.20% approval of the Islamic Republic from Kurdistan, compared to 99.31% nationwide. [13] KDPI leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was barred from joining the Assembly of Experts, the group responsible for writing the new constitution in 1979, despite winning a seat with 34.9% of the vote. The rejection came after Ghassemlou refused the government's request to disarm the KDPI and turn their weapons in to the military. [14] [15]

Rebellion

Beginning

A wave of nationalism engulfed eastern Kurdistan after the fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty. A series of anti-revolutionary revolts were cropping up across the country, including in Khuzestan and Iranian Baluchestan. In March 1979, the KDPI announced an eight-point plan for Kurdish independence, [7] which was met with opposition from other Kurdish leaders such as Ahmad Moftizadeh who disapproved of the militarism and separatism proposed. [12] In mid-March, Kurdish factions took control of police headquarters, army bases, and parts of army barracks in Sanandaj, killing 21 soldiers when they refused to surrender the barracks to the militants. [16] [2]

BBC reported that the revolt began when Kurdish tribesmen overpowered Iranian militiamen in Paveh. [17] Unrest was then alleged to have spread to other Kurdish-dominated regions such as Divan Darreh, Saqqez, and Mahabad as Kurds took over towns and army garrisons to keep the Iranian military at bay. [17] [2] Many Kurdish leaders went into hiding after Khomeini ordered their arrest and execution. At this point, Iranian newspapers were estimating 600 casualties. [17]

Two groups formed in Sanandaj at this time: one was led by Ahmad Moftizadeh and another by the leader of the city's hussainiya, Safdari. [16] The Iranian government sent a delegate to Sanandaj to meet with representatives of the militant groups. Negotiations resulted in an agreement to end conflict. Afterwards, Brayim Younisi was temporarily appointed governor of Kurdistan by the Ministry of Interior. A number of Kurdish groups rejected his appointment and the peace agreement was voided. [16] Armed conflict broke out again in April, initially between Kurdish forces such as the KDPI and Komala against the revolutionary government's forces, [18] but later between Kurdish militants and area Azerbaijani factions, including the Qarapapaq tribe, as well. This resulted in the death of hundreds of Azeris and Kurds. [2]

Fighting campaigns and politics

In mid-August, the Revolutionary Guard ambushed Paveh in defiance of the army's advice. Since they were unprepared for battle, they were overpowered and encircled by Kurdish militants. [2] [19] The situation prompted Khomeini to meet with the heads of the government and army. In his statement on August 17, he announced a jihad against Kurdish separatists and declared key Kurdish nationalist figures, including Ghassemlou, enemies of the state. [7] A three-week campaign to clear out rebel strongholds in Saqqez and Mahabad followed. A week after the ill-advised siege on Paveh, the city was captured by the Revolutionary Guard after the Kurdish withdrew. This marked the beginning of the Iranian counteroffensive. [19]

By August 20, the Iranian army had begun attacking Mahabad; they managed to completely surround it by August 30. Three days of negotiations began but ultimately failed, and Iranian forces launched another onslaught of the city on September 3. [20] Using F-4 fighter jets, artillery, and more than 100 tanks, they managed to seize control of Mahabad after just a few hours. Iranian forces continued pushing forward and took the town of Baneh. More than 500 people were killed during the siege. [21] [20] By the end of the campaign, Iranian forces had also recaptured Marivan, Bastam, Sardasht, Bukan, and Saqqez. The Kurdish Peshmerga retreated into the mountains during the attacks and resumed their offensive six weeks later, returning to Mahabad and using Molotov cocktails and rocket-propelled grenades to fight the Iranian troops. At the end of November, while the Iranian government was occupied with other events in the country such as the American Embassy hostage crisis, the Kurds sieged Sanandaj, Saqqez, and other captured cities and towns. [2]

In a Radio Tehran speech on December 17, Khomeini said that ethnic minorities were contrary to Islamic doctrines and that those against the union of Muslim countries were at fault for creating the issue of nationalism within these minority groups. [18] In late January, after President Banisadr took office, Revolutionary Guard units and government-aligned Kurds unsuccessfully attacked rebels in the region, resulting in a stalemate that lasted until spring. By May 1980, Kurds still controlled most of Kurdistan's roads and rural areas and held Mahabad as their capital. The KDPI claimed to have more than 7,000 fighters at this time.

Spring 1980 Iranian offensive

In the spring of 1980, government forces under the command of President Banisadr once again captured most of the Kurdish cities through a massive military campaign, sending in mechanized military divisions to Kurdish cities including Sanandaj,[ citation needed ] Pawe, and Marivan.[ citation needed ] Neighbourhoods of some villages and towns were destroyed as a result of the fighting between Kurdish rebels and government forces. [22] Ayatollah Khalkhali sentenced thousands of Kurds to execution after summary trials.[ citation needed ] The Kurds continued to control Mahabad as the summer fighting diminished. Iranian-Iraqi tensions grew amid Iraqi attacks on Qasr-e Shirin and Sarpol-e Zahab, prompting Iran to move its army to the border. [2] [23] [24]

Autumn 1980 Iranian operations

Mahabad remained under Kurdish control for another five months until the Iran-Iraq War bled into the Kurdistan province. Following this invasion, President Banisadr ordered a ceasefire, but the Revolutionary Guard ignored him and continued their campaign. [2] The situation was further complicated by Iranian Kurds receiving Iraqi support for the insurgency. [7] It was initially assumed that Iraqi and Iranian Kurds would cooperate to exploit weaknesses on both sides. Neither Baghdad nor Tehran were willing to accept that outcome and both sides insisted on organizing special loyalist Kurdish military units to participate in the war and to demonstrate allegiance to their respective states. [7]

Prior to June 1980, the KDPI requested an official allegiance with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, resulting in the signing of a seven-point agreement in Kirkuk. According to Ghassemlou, Iraq provided the Kurdish forces with ammunition and anti-aircraft missiles taken from the Iranian army. [25] Despite this alliance, however, Ghassemlou still pursued neutrality against Iraqi Kurdish factions, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and served as an intermediary in negotiations between these groups and Baghdad. [26]

The alliance with Iraq created divides within the KDPI. In late May, Ghani Bulurian and six other central committee members renounced their party membership and published Ghassemlou's private correspondence with the Iraqis, including information about a meeting between him and Iraqi vice president Taha Yasin Ramadan. [18]

Final stage

In January 1981, the Iraqi army successfully established a supply line to KDPI strongholds through Nowdesheh and Qasr-e Shirin, and began sending military equipment their way. This allowed the KDPI to cut off the Baghdad-Tehran highway, blocking Iranian forces from using this main thoroughfare. By late 1981, however, a counteroffensive from the Iranian forces pushed Iraqi forces back over the border, debilitating the KDPI and rendering them a marginal military factor for the rest of the war. [27] More than 10,000 Kurdish forces were alleged to have been killed.[ citation needed ]

Despite the KDPI's military defeat, armed remnants of the group continued to shelter in northern Iraq [28] and engage in low-level campaigns against Iranian forces. This lasted until 1983, when more Iranian forces were diverted to the Iraqi front amid escalation of the Iran-Iraq War. [17] Komala militants also moved their military bases to Iraqi Kurdistan following Iranian operations on the border. [12]

Aftermath

While most of KDPI's military and political activity in Iran was greatly reduced after the 1979-1981 rebellion, they continued their opposition activities throughout the 1980s. Starting in 1985, military conflict broke out between the KDPI and Komala inside northern Iraq, leading to hundreds of deaths among the two rebel groups. [28] In 1989, the KDPI resumed its military activities against the government. Following a political and military crackdown in 1996, the conflict between KDPI and the Iranian government mainly shifted to political opposition abroad rather than violence within the country. Insurgency was renewed in 2004 by the Kurdistan Free Life Party, a militant group affiliated with the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Kurdistan Communities Union.

Timeline of events in 1979

February 1979

March 1979

April 1979

June 1979

July 1979

August 1979

September 1979

October 1979

November 1979

December 1979

In media

In 2006, Ettela'at photographer Jahangir Razmi released 27 photos he had taken of the 1979 firing squad execution of eleven Kurdish prisoners. At the time of the execution, a state-owned holding company seized Ettela'at after one of these photos ran across six columns of the paper a few weeks later. Razmi won a Pulitzer Prize for these photos in 1980. [29]

The 2014 film Che won a number of awards, including two Crystal Simorghs in the fields of best editing and best visual effects. [30] The film detailed the experiences of Mostafa Chamran during the battle for Paveh. [31]

See also

Notes

1. ^ "Free to discuss its political views, the KDPI came out of thirty years of clandestine existence and made public claims for political autonomy"; "Despite its criticisms of the regime, in its early post-revolutionary public discourses the KDPI called itself an authentically national and Iranian party." (Denise, pp. 144-145)
2. ^ "Instead of creating a cohesive Kurdish nationalist movement, some Kurdish leaders such as Husayni's brother Shaykh Jalal accepted Iraqi military assistance and formed a Sunni militia opposed to the Iranian government and Kurdish nationalist parties. Qasimlu differentiated his real Kurdish nationalist party from traitors within the KDPI. Others, such as the prominent Ghani Bolourian, tried to negotiate with the central government. After the revolution, some Shi'a Kurds from Ilam, Kermanshah and West Azerbaijan turned away from Kurdish nationalists and towards non-Kurdish Shi'a communities. Sunni Kurdish leftists continued to direct the nationalist project in their enclave in Kurdistan Province, having marginal influence over Shi'a Kurds in other regions." (Denise, pp. 1945)
3. ^ "Sending in Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) rather than regular army troops, and dispatching the Ayatollah Sadiq Khalkhali—the "Hanging Judge"—resulted in the deaths of nearly 10,000 Kurds in the 1979–82 period alone, many in mass executions ordered by Khalkhali." (Smith, p. 19)

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Further reading