ARP4761

Last updated • 5 min readFrom Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia
Guidelines for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Aircraft, Systems, and Equipment
SAE International logo.svg
AbbreviationARP4761A
Latest versionA
December 2023 (2023-12)
Organization SAE International
DomainAviation Safety
Website www.sae.org/standards/content/arp4761a/

ARP4761, Guidelines for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Aircraft, Systems, and Equipment is an Aerospace Recommended Practice from SAE International. [1] In conjunction with ARP4754, ARP4761 is used to demonstrate compliance with 14 CFR 25.1309 in the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness regulations for transport category aircraft, and also harmonized international airworthiness regulations such as European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) CS25.1309.

Contents

This Recommended Practice defines a process for using common modeling techniques to assess the safety of a system being put together. The first 30 pages of the document covers that process. The next 140 pages give an overview of the modeling techniques and how they should be applied. The last 160 pages give an example of the process in action.

Some of the methods covered:

Safety life cycle

The general flow of the safety life cycle under ARP4761 is:

  1. Perform the aircraft level FHA in parallel with development of aircraft level requirements.
  2. Perform the system level FHA in parallel with allocation of aircraft functions to system functions, and initiate the CCA.
  3. Perform the PSSA in parallel with system architecture development, and update the CCA.
  4. Iterate the CCA and PSSA as the system is allocated into hardware and software components.
  5. Perform the SSA in parallel with system implementation, and complete the CCA.
  6. Feed the results into the certification process.

The Functional Safety process is focused on identifying functional failure conditions leading to hazards. Functional Hazard Analyses / Assessments are central to determining hazards. FHA is performed early in aircraft design, first as an Aircraft Functional Hazard Analysis (AFHA) and then as a System Functional Hazard Analysis (SFHA). Using qualitative assessment, aircraft functions and subsequently aircraft system functions are systematically analyzed for failure conditions, and each failure condition is assigned a hazard classification. Hazard classifications are closely related to Development Assurance Levels (DALs) and are aligned between ARP4761 and related aviation safety documents such as ARP4754A, 14 CFR 25.1309, and Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) standards DO-254 and DO-178B.

Hazard ClassificationDevelopment Assurance LevelMaximum Probability per Flight Hour
CatastrophicA10−9
HazardousB10−7
MajorC10−5
MinorD--
No EffectE--

FHA results are normally shown in spreadsheet form, with columns identifying function, failure condition, phase of flight, effect, hazard classification, DAL, means of detection, aircrew response, and related information. Each hazard is assigned a unique identifier that is tracked throughout the entire safety life cycle. One approach is to identify systems by their ATA system codes and the corresponding hazards by derivative identifiers. For example, the thrust reverser system could be identified by its ATA code 78-30. Untimely deployment of thrust reverser would be a hazard, which could be assigned an identifier based on ATA code 78-30.

FHA results are coordinated with the system design process as aircraft functions are allocated to aircraft systems. The FHA also feeds into the PSSA, which is prepared while the system architecture is developed.

The PSSA may contain qualitative FTA, which can be used to identify systems requiring redundancy so that catastrophic events do not result from a single failure (or dual failure where one is latent). A fault tree is prepared for each SFHA hazard rated hazardous or catastrophic. Fault trees may be performed for major hazards if warranted. DALs and specific safety design requirements are imposed on the subsystems. The safety design requirements are captured and traced. These may include preventive or mitigation strategies selected for particular subsystems. The PSSA and CCA generate separation requirements to identify and eliminate common mode failures. Subsystem failure rate budgets are assigned so that hazard probability limits can be met.

The CCA consists of three separate types of analyses which are designed to uncover hazards not created by a specific subsystem component failure. The CCA may be many separate documents, may be one CCA document, or may be included as sections in the SSA document. The Particular Risk Analysis (PRA) looks for external events which can create a hazard such as a birdstrike or engine turbine burst. The Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA) looks at each compartment on the aircraft and looks for hazards that can affect every component in that compartment, such as loss of cooling air or a fluid line bursting. The Common Mode Analysis (CMA) looks at the redundant critical components to find failure modes which can cause all to fail at about the same time. Software is always included in this analysis as well as looking for manufacturing errors or "bad lot" components. A failure such as a bad resistor in all flight control computers would be addressed here. The mitigations for CMA discoveries is often DO-254 or DO-178B components.

The SSA includes quantitative FMEA, which is summarized into FMES. Normally FMES probabilities are used in quantitative FTA to demonstrate that the hazard probability limits are in fact met. Cutset analysis of the fault trees demonstrates that no single failure condition will result in a hazardous or catastrophic event. The SSA may include the results of all safety analysis and be one document or may be many documents. An FTA is only one method for performing the SSA. Other methods include dependence diagram or reliability block diagram and Markov Analysis.

The PSSA and CCA often result in recommendations or design requirements to improve the system. The SSA summarizes the residual risks remaining in the system and should show all hazards meet the 1309 failure rates.

The ARP4761 analyses also feed into Crew Alerting System (CAS) message selection and the development of critical maintenance tasks under ATA MSG3.

Future changes

In 2004, SAE Standard Committee S-18 began working on Revision A to ARP4761. When released, EUROCAE plans to jointly issue the document as ED135.

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Safety engineering</span> Engineering discipline which assures that engineered systems provide acceptable levels of safety

Safety engineering is an engineering discipline which assures that engineered systems provide acceptable levels of safety. It is strongly related to industrial engineering/systems engineering, and the subset system safety engineering. Safety engineering assures that a life-critical system behaves as needed, even when components fail.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fault tree analysis</span> Failure analysis system used in safety engineering and reliability engineering

Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a type of failure analysis in which an undesired state of a system is examined. This analysis method is mainly used in safety engineering and reliability engineering to understand how systems can fail, to identify the best ways to reduce risk and to determine event rates of a safety accident or a particular system level (functional) failure. FTA is used in the aerospace, nuclear power, chemical and process, pharmaceutical, petrochemical and other high-hazard industries; but is also used in fields as diverse as risk factor identification relating to social service system failure. FTA is also used in software engineering for debugging purposes and is closely related to cause-elimination technique used to detect bugs.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Safety-critical system</span> System whose failure would be serious

A safety-critical system or life-critical system is a system whose failure or malfunction may result in one of the following outcomes:

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Failure mode and effects analysis</span> Analysis of potential system failures

Failure mode and effects analysis is the process of reviewing as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as possible to identify potential failure modes in a system and their causes and effects. For each component, the failure modes and their resulting effects on the rest of the system are recorded in a specific FMEA worksheet. There are numerous variations of such worksheets. An FMEA can be a qualitative analysis, but may be put on a quantitative basis when mathematical failure rate models are combined with a statistical failure mode ratio database. It was one of the first highly structured, systematic techniques for failure analysis. It was developed by reliability engineers in the late 1950s to study problems that might arise from malfunctions of military systems. An FMEA is often the first step of a system reliability study.

Reliability engineering is a sub-discipline of systems engineering that emphasizes the ability of equipment to function without failure. Reliability describes the ability of a system or component to function under stated conditions for a specified period. Reliability is closely related to availability, which is typically described as the ability of a component or system to function at a specified moment or interval of time.

DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification is a guideline dealing with the safety of safety-critical software used in certain airborne systems. It was jointly developed by the safety-critical working group RTCA SC-167 of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and WG-12 of the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE). RTCA published the document as RTCA/DO-178B, while EUROCAE published the document as ED-12B. Although technically a guideline, it was a de facto standard for developing avionics software systems until it was replaced in 2012 by DO-178C.

A hazard analysis is one of many methods that may be used to assess risk. At its core, the process entails describing a system object that intends to conduct some activity. During the performance of that activity, an adverse event may be encountered that could cause or contribute to an occurrence. Finally, that occurrence will result in some outcome that may be measured in terms of the degree of loss or harm. This outcome may be measured on a continuous scale, such as an amount of monetary loss, or the outcomes may be categorized into various levels of severity.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">ARP4754</span> Aerospace Practice

ARP4754, Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) ARP4754B, is a guideline from SAE International, dealing with the development processes which support certification of Aircraft systems, addressing "the complete aircraft development cycle, from systems requirements through systems verification." Revision A was released in December 2010. It was recognized by the FAA through Advisory Circular AC 20-174 published November 2011. EUROCAE jointly issues the document as ED–79.

RTCA DO-254 / EUROCAE ED-80, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware is a document providing guidance for the development of airborne electronic hardware, published by RTCA, Incorporated and EUROCAE. The DO-254/ED-80 standard was formally recognized by the FAA in 2005 via AC 20-152 as a means of compliance for the design assurance of electronic hardware in airborne systems. The guidance in this document is applicable, but not limited, to such electronic hardware items as

Failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is an extension of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).

IEC 61508 is an international standard published by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) consisting of methods on how to apply, design, deploy and maintain automatic protection systems called safety-related systems. It is titled Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems.

In software engineering, software system safety optimizes system safety in the design, development, use, and maintenance of software systems and their integration with safety-critical hardware systems in an operational environment.

The system safety concept calls for a risk management strategy based on identification, analysis of hazards and application of remedial controls using a systems-based approach. This is different from traditional safety strategies which rely on control of conditions and causes of an accident based either on the epidemiological analysis or as a result of investigation of individual past accidents. The concept of system safety is useful in demonstrating adequacy of technologies when difficulties are faced with probabilistic risk analysis. The underlying principle is one of synergy: a whole is more than sum of its parts. Systems-based approach to safety requires the application of scientific, technical and managerial skills to hazard identification, hazard analysis, and elimination, control, or management of hazards throughout the life-cycle of a system, program, project or an activity or a product. "Hazop" is one of several techniques available for identification of hazards.

Functional safety is the part of the overall safety of a system or piece of equipment that depends on automatic protection operating correctly in response to its inputs or failure in a predictable manner (fail-safe). The automatic protection system should be designed to properly handle likely systematic errors, hardware failures and operational/environmental stress.

ISO 26262, titled "Road vehicles – Functional safety", is an international standard for functional safety of electrical and/or electronic systems that are installed in serial production road vehicles, defined by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in 2011, and revised in 2018.

DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification is the primary document by which the certification authorities such as FAA, EASA and Transport Canada approve all commercial software-based aerospace systems. The document is published by RTCA, Incorporated, in a joint effort with EUROC and replaces DO-178B. The new document is called DO-178C/ED-12C and was completed in November 2011 and approved by the RTCA in December 2011. It became available for sale and use in January 2012.

Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA) is one of three analytical methods which, taken together, form a Common Cause Analysis (CCA) in aircraft safety engineering under SAE ARP4761. The other two methods are Particular Risks Analysis (PRA) and Common Mode Analysis (CMA). Aircraft system safety requires the independence of failure conditions for multiple systems. Independent failures, represented by an AND gate in a fault tree analysis, have a low probability of occurring in the same flight. Common causes result in the loss of independence, which dramatically increases probability of failure. CCA and ZSA are used to find and eliminate or mitigate common causes for multiple failures.

Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) is a risk classification scheme defined by the ISO 26262 - Functional Safety for Road Vehicles standard. This is an adaptation of the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) used in IEC 61508 for the automotive industry. This classification helps defining the safety requirements necessary to be in line with the ISO 26262 standard. The ASIL is established by performing a risk analysis of a potential hazard by looking at the Severity, Exposure and Controllability of the vehicle operating scenario. The safety goal for that hazard in turn carries the ASIL requirements.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">AC 25.1309-1</span> American aviation regulatory document

AC 25.1309–1 is an FAA Advisory Circular (AC) that identifies acceptable means for showing compliance with the airworthiness requirements of § 25.1309 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. Revision A was released in 1988. In 2002, work was done on Revision B, but it was not formally released; the result is the Rulemaking Advisory Committee-recommended revision B-Arsenal Draft (2002). The Arsenal Draft is "considered to exist as a relatively mature draft". The FAA and EASA have subsequently accepted proposals by type certificate applicants to use the Arsenal Draft on development programs.

Failure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis (FMEDA) is a systematic analysis technique to obtain subsystem / product level failure rates, failure modes and diagnostic capability. The FMEDA technique considers:

References

  1. S18 (1996). Guidelines and methods for conducting the safety assessment process on civil airborne systems and equipment. SAE International. ARP4761.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)