Andreas Ortmann | |
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Born | 28 January 1953 |
Nationality | German |
Academic career | |
Institution | UNSW Business School (2009-present) CERGE-EI (2000-2008) Colby College (2000-2001) Bowdoin College (1991-1999) |
Field | Experimental economics, Behavioural economics, Game theory, Industrial organisation, Public economics, History of economic thought |
Alma mater |
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Doctoral advisor | Steven N. Wiggins Raymond C. Battalio [1] |
Andreas Ortmann (born 28 January 1953 in Oerlinghausen, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany) is a German-born economist and Professor of Experimental and Behavioural Economics at the UNSW Business School. [2] He is best known for his work on experimental methodology in social sciences, heuristics and coordination games. Vernon L. Smith, in the acknowledgement to his A Life in Experimental Economics, described Ortmann as an "economic theorist, experimentalist, and intellectual historian par excellence in all". [3]
Ortmann was born on 28 January 1953, in Oerlinghausen, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. He obtained his BA in Political Economics and Mathematics from the Bielefeld University in 1980, his MS in economics from the University of Georgia under the advisory of Donald C. Keenan, Martin Hillenbrand and Janet C. Hunt in 1987, and his PhD in economics from the Texas A&M University in 1991 with a dissertation titled "Essays on Quality Uncertainty, Information, and Institutional Choice", under the advisory of Steven N. Wiggins and Raymond C. Battalio. [1] He also completed his habilitation in Economics from the Charles University in 2003. [4]
Ortmann took up his current position as Professor of Experimental and Behavioural Economics in the School of Economics at UNSW Business School in 2009, after having previously worked at the Bowdoin College as an Assistant Professor of Economics from 1991 to 1999, at the Colby College as a Faculty Fellow from 2000 to 2001, and at CERGE-EI (a joint workplace of Charles University and the Czech Academy of Sciences) as an assistant professor from 2000 to 2004, Associate Professor from 2004 to 2005 and Professor from 2005 to 2009. He also had spells as visiting scholar at the Yale University and Harvard Business School, and worked at the Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research and at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. [4]
His research interests include experimental economics, behavioural economics, game theory, industrial organisation, public economics and history of economic thought. [5] [2] Ortmann's notable co-authors include Gerd Gigerenzer, Daniel Goldstein, Reinhard Selten, Werner Güth, Giovanna Devetag, Pavlo Blavatskyy, Elisabet Rutström, John Van Huyck, Ralph Hertwig, Peter M. Todd, Andreas Blume, Valentyn Panchenko, Dmitry Ryvkin, Leonidas Spiliopoulos, Le (Lyla) Zhang, Dirk Engelmann, and Ben R. Newell. [6] He was nominated for the Ig Nobel Prize for his work (with Berhard Borges, Daniel Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer) on heuristics in financial markets. [7]
A cognitive bias is a systematic pattern of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment. Individuals create their own "subjective reality" from their perception of the input. An individual's construction of reality, not the objective input, may dictate their behavior in the world. Thus, cognitive biases may sometimes lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, and irrationality.
A heuristic, or heuristic technique, is any approach to problem solving that employs a practical method that is not fully optimized, perfected, or rationalized, but is nevertheless sufficient for reaching an immediate, short-term goal or approximation. Where finding an optimal solution is impossible or impractical, heuristic methods can be used to speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution. Heuristics can be mental shortcuts that ease the cognitive load of making a decision.
Bounded rationality is the idea that rationality is limited when individuals make decisions, and under these limitations, rational individuals will select a decision that is satisfactory rather than optimal.
Vernon Lomax Smith is an American economist and professor of business economics and law at Chapman University. He was formerly a professor of economics at the University of Arizona, professor of economics and law at George Mason University, and a board member of the Mercatus Center. Along with Daniel Kahneman, Smith shared the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to behavioral economics and his work in the field of experimental economics. He worked to establish 'laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms'.
Behavioral economics is the study of the psychological, cognitive, emotional, cultural and social factors involved in the decisions of individuals or institutions, and how these decisions deviate from those implied by classical economic theory.
Reinhard Justus Reginald Selten was a German economist, who won the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. He is also well known for his work in bounded rationality and can be considered one of the founding fathers of experimental economics.
Experimental economics is the application of experimental methods to study economic questions. Data collected in experiments are used to estimate effect size, test the validity of economic theories, and illuminate market mechanisms. Economic experiments usually use cash to motivate subjects, in order to mimic real-world incentives. Experiments are used to help understand how and why markets and other exchange systems function as they do. Experimental economics have also expanded to understand institutions and the law.
The conjunction fallacy is an inference that a conjoint set of two or more specific conclusions is likelier than any single member of that same set, in violation of the laws of probability. It is a type of formal fallacy.
The recognition heuristic, originally termed the recognition principle, has been used as a model in the psychology of judgment and decision making and as a heuristic in artificial intelligence. The goal is to make inferences about a criterion that is not directly accessible to the decision maker, based on recognition retrieved from memory. This is possible if recognition of alternatives has relevance to the criterion. For two alternatives, the heuristic is defined as:
If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.
Gerd Gigerenzer is a German psychologist who has studied the use of bounded rationality and heuristics in decision making. Gigerenzer is director emeritus of the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and director of the Harding Center for Risk Literacy, both in Berlin.
Daniel G. Goldstein is an American cognitive psychologist known for the specification and testing of heuristics and models of bounded rationality in the field of judgment and decision making. He is an honorary research fellow at London Business School and works with Microsoft Research as a principal researcher.
In psychology, the take-the-best heuristic is a heuristic which decides between two alternatives by choosing based on the first cue that discriminates them, where cues are ordered by cue validity. In the original formulation, the cues were assumed to have binary values or have an unknown value. The logic of the heuristic is that it bases its choice on the best cue (reason) only and ignores the rest.
The economics of religion concerns both the application of the techniques of economics to the study of religion and the relationship between economic and religious behaviours. Contemporary writers on the subject trace it back to Adam Smith (1776).
Heuristics is the process by which humans use mental shortcuts to arrive at decisions. Heuristics are simple strategies that humans, animals, organizations, and even machines use to quickly form judgments, make decisions, and find solutions to complex problems. Often this involves focusing on the most relevant aspects of a problem or situation to formulate a solution. While heuristic processes are used to find the answers and solutions that are most likely to work or be correct, they are not always right or the most accurate. Judgments and decisions based on heuristics are simply good enough to satisfy a pressing need in situations of uncertainty, where information is incomplete. In that sense they can differ from answers given by logic and probability.
Social heuristics are simple decision making strategies that guide people's behavior and decisions in the social environment when time, information, or cognitive resources are scarce. Social environments tend to be characterised by complexity and uncertainty, and in order to simplify the decision-making process, people may use heuristics, which are decision making strategies that involve ignoring some information or relying on simple rules of thumb.
Ecological rationality is a particular account of practical rationality, which in turn specifies the norms of rational action – what one ought to do in order to act rationally. The presently dominant account of practical rationality in the social and behavioral sciences such as economics and psychology, rational choice theory, maintains that practical rationality consists in making decisions in accordance with some fixed rules, irrespective of context. Ecological rationality, in contrast, claims that the rationality of a decision depends on the circumstances in which it takes place, so as to achieve one's goals in this particular context. What is considered rational under the rational choice account thus might not always be considered rational under the ecological rationality account. Overall, rational choice theory puts a premium on internal logical consistency whereas ecological rationality targets external performance in the world. The term ecologically rational is only etymologically similar to the biological science of ecology.
In behavioural sciences, social rationality is a type of decision strategy used in social contexts, in which a set of simple rules is applied in complex and uncertain situations.
The priority heuristic is a simple, lexicographic decision strategy that helps decide for a good option.
Ralph Hertwig is a German psychologist whose work focuses on the psychology of human judgment and decision making. Hertwig is Director of the Center for Adaptive Rationality at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, Germany. He grew up with his brothers Steffen Hertwig and Michael Hertwig in Talheim, Heilbronn.
Alexander N. Poddiakov, born on March 21, 1962, in Moscow, is a Russian psychologist, doctor of psychology and professor.