The Bombing of Manado (Indonesian: Pengeboman Manado) was a retaliatory attack by the Indonesian National Armed Forces against the proclamation of a rebellion movement in Sulawesi, known as Permesta. The B-25 Mitchell squadron carried out the aerial bombing in Manado. During the bombing, Permesta's main posts including the radio station and officers' houses, as well as a hospital on Mount Maria were destroyed. The bombing had an impact on Alexander Evert Kawilarang's decision to join Permesta and the start of a bloody rebellion in Sulawesi.
The PRRI rebellion in the west and the Permesta rebellion in the east arose for a combination of reasons. Foremost was that certain ethnic groups in Sulawesi and central Sumatra felt that government policies from Jakarta were stagnating their local economies, which in turn limited any opportunities for regional development.[1] There was some animosity towards the Javanese ethnic group, who were the most numerous and influential in the newly-created unitary state of Indonesia.[2] The country's political arena was centered on the island of Java and yet the country's economic resources mostly came from other islands in the archipelago.[3][4][5] In effect the conflict was less about secession from the Indonesian state and more about a fair division of economic and political power in Indonesia.[6][7]
Efforts before the declaration
In early 1957, both civil and military leaders from Makassar visited Jakarta. In January 1957, Lt. Col. Muhammad Saleh Lahade and Major Andi Mohammad Jusuf Amir met with Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, General Abdul Haris Nasution.[8] At that time, Lahade was Chief of Staff of the South and Southeast Sulawesi Security Command (Ko-DPSST or Komando Pengamanan Sulawesi Selatan Tenggara), while Jusuf was the commander of the Hasanuddin Infantry Regiment (RI-Hasanuddin).[9] Then in February, Sulawesi Governor Andi Pangerang Pettarani met with Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and Minister of Home Affairs R. Sunarjo.[10][11] Pangerang urged the central government to strive to provide greater autonomy for the local regions in eastern Indonesia. In addition to greater autonomy at the regional level, a greater share of government revenue should be given to the regions for the implementation of local development projects.[12] Meanwhile, Lahede and Jusuf tried to urge the leadership of the Indonesian Army to similarly support greater regional autonomy and revenue sharing that would be used for local regional development. In addition, they also requested that the Ko-DPSST, which was under the direct auspices of army headquarters rather than under the Army and Territorium VII (TT-VII or Tentara dan Territorium VII) headquartered in Makassar, to be replaced with a Regional Military Command (KDM or Komando Daerah Militer).[8]
At the end of February 1957, Andi Burhanuddin and Henk Rondonuwu left for Jakarta representing the Sulawesi provincial government as a last effort to urge the central government on the matters discussed in the previous meetings. Apart from them, the commander of TT-VII, Lt. Col. Ventje Sumual, also visited Jakarta for the same purpose and met with sympathetic officers in the military.[11] On 1 March 1957, Sumual together with Burhanuddin and Rondonuwu returned to Makassar, because their efforts were unsuccessful. The civil and military leadership in Makassar met a few days before on 25 February 1957 to plan the declaration of Permesta in the event that there was no concrete response from the central government.[13]
Permesta proclamation
At 3:00 am on 2 March 1957 at the governor's residence in Makassar and in front of about 50 attendees, Sumual proclaimed a state of war for the entire TT-VII region, which encompassed the entire territory of eastern Indonesia.[14] After the proclamation, Lahade read the Universal Struggle Charter or Permesta Charter.[15] The end of the charter stated that "first of all by convincing all leaders and layers of society, that we are not breaking away from the Republic of Indonesia, and are merely fighting for the betterment of the fate of the Indonesian people and the settlement of remaining issues of the national revolution." The charter was signed by the attendees. After the charter was read, Governor Pangerang asked everyone to remain calm and carry out their respective duties and responsibilities.[16]
The following day, the composition of the military government was announced in which Sumual served as military administrator with Lahade as chief of staff. There was also a Central Advisory Council (or Dewan Pertimbangan Pusat) consisting of 101 members and four military governors under Sumual. The four military governors were Andi Pangerang for South and Southeast Sulawesi, Maj. Daniel Julius (D. J.) Somba for North and Central Sulawesi, Lt. Col. Herman Pieters for Maluku and West Irian, and Lt. Col. Minggu for Nusa Tenggara. At the time, Somba was the commander of the 24th Infantry Regiment (RI-24) based in Manado, Pieters was the commander of the 25th Infantry Regiment (RI-25) based in Ambon, and Minggu was the commander of the 26th Infantry Regiment (RI-26) based in Bali. Panggerang was formally appointed as military governor on 8 March, while Somba was formally appointed in Manado on 11 March.[17]
Bombing
The central government carried out a bombing raid of Manado six days after Somba's statement. At 8:15 am on 22 February 1958, two B-25 Mitchell bombers from the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) targeted the radio station in the city.[18] The bombers under command of Omar Dhani and Leo Wattimena attacked and bombed the Permesta radio station and mainpost to disable Permesta's communications. After attacking the radio station, the bombers dropped bombs around Mount Maria, Manado. The bombing of city buildings and houses killed thousands of civilians.[19]
After dropping bombs on the Permesta main base and the radio centre, the squadron turned its attack to the house of the rebel commander and the barracks. The rebels shot at the bomber but missed, and attacked the house of Ventje Sumual's mother-in-law when the squadron attacked the barracks and destroyed it. The bombing was a disaster in Manado by inflicting heavy casualties including the deaths of civilians.[20][21]
Aftermath
The bombing in Manado hastened the decisions of two Minahasan officers who were initially not enthusiastic about joining Permesta. They were Joop Warouw, who had joined Sumual to meet Sukarno in Tokyo, and Col. Alexander Evert Kawilarang who at that time was the military attaché in Washington, D.C.[22] Kawilarang was an experienced officer in the Indonesian Army who previously commanded three military territories: TT-I/Bukit Barisan in Medan, TT-III/Siliwangi in Bandung, and also TT-VII before Warouw and Sumual.
The bombing also resulted in the people of North Sulawesi being more enthusiastic to the Permesta cause. Two days after the bombing, KDM-SUT announced and instructed former soldiers of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army to report and join Permesta. It is estimated that around 2000 of them self-reported. Even though they were old because KNIL was formed during the Dutch occupation, they could train younger inexperienced enlistees who joined Permesta.[23] The training was held in Langowan near Tondano for three months, which resulted in the formation of seven companies from the number of youth who were trained.[24] In addition, a female unit was formed and was named the Permesta Women's Troops (PWP or Pasukan Wanita Permesta).[25]
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Harvey, Barbara S. (1977). Permesta: Half a Rebellion. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
Jacobson, M. (2002). Cross Border Triangles and Deterritorialising Identities. Assessing the Diaspora Triangle: Migrant-Host-Home. SEARC Working Papers Series. Vol.19. Hong Kong: South East Asia Research Series Publications.
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