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In United States corporation and business association law (particularly Delaware law and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act), a duty of care is part of the fiduciary duty owed to a corporation by its directors. The other aspects of fiduciary duty are a director's duty of loyalty and (possibly) duty of good faith.
Put simply, a director owes a duty to exercise good business judgment and to use ordinary care and prudence in the operation of the business. They must discharge their actions in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation, exercising the care an ordinary person would use under similar circumstances.
Directors' decisions are typically protected under the business judgment rule, unless they breach one of these duties or unless the decision constitutes waste. A breach of fiduciary duty will typically remove a director's decision from business judgment protection and require that the director show entire fairness.
Directors have a duty not to waste corporate assets by overpaying for property or employment services. Thus the definition of waste is an exchange so one-sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude the corporation has received adequate consideration. This is difficult to prove in a court of law.
The duty of care has been set out or clarified in a number of decisions. Among the important duty of care cases are:
Smith v. Van Gorkom [1] (setting out duty to be reasonably informed in decision-making). In this decision, a standard of gross negligence was used, which is defined as “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders or actions which are without the bounds of reason.” [2] In the case of Van Gorkom, a share price was set for a company buyout with essentially no consideration, this meeting the standard of gross negligence in informed decision making. Thus, the Duty of Care certainly involves informing oneself prior to making decisions.
Caremark , Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. , Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (setting out duty of supervision and knowledge of company finances).
Francis V. United Jersey Bank [3] (emphasizing monitoring as a part of the duty of care). In this case, a woman was given control of an implied trust as a result of her husband's death. Thus, she assumed the role of director. During her time as director, her sons stole millions of dollars from the trust. The courts stated that she breached her duty of care because she failed to monitor what was happening within her organization. Thus, monitoring activity within an organization is part of the fiduciary duty of care.
The Duty of Care is set out in the Model Business Corporation act sections 8.30 and 8.31. There is no statutory codification of the Duty of Care in the Delaware General Corporation Law.
Both Delaware and the Model Act allow for directors to be exculpated for some breaches of the duty of care. The exculpation provisions are found in Delaware General Corporate Law section 102(b)(7) and in Model Act section 2.02(b)(4).
It is difficult for a director to be found in breach of this duty as the business judgment presumption insulates directors from much of their liability. There is little accountability for corporate directors to shareholders, although some still exists.
As an example, a director for Disney was let go after 14 months of work with about $150MM in compensation, more than his entire employment contract. In Brehm v. Eisner , a Delaware Supreme Court decision from 2000, [4] the Court found that the Business Judgment Rule shielded the Board, which the Court found to have exercised bad business judgment, since it essentially complied with the Van Gorkom procedural requirement of informing themselves via an expert before approving the severance package. Thus the rule seems to protect even terrible business decisions from judicial review.
The counterargument is that shareholders are free to sell their stocks in the open market. Of course, some bad business decisions by the board may well affect the shareholders' ability to do so. Note, however, that this case was decided under Delaware's rather extreme codification of the Business Judgment Rule, §102(b)(7), which allows the Corporation to shield its board members from liability for almost anything short of outright bad faith. [5]
A fiduciary is a person who holds a legal or ethical relationship of trust with one or more other parties. Typically, a fiduciary prudently takes care of money or other assets for another person. One party, for example, a corporate trust company or the trust department of a bank, acts in a fiduciary capacity to another party, who, for example, has entrusted funds to the fiduciary for safekeeping or investment. Likewise, financial advisers, financial planners, and asset managers, including managers of pension plans, endowments, and other tax-exempt assets, are considered fiduciaries under applicable statutes and laws. In a fiduciary relationship, one person, in a position of vulnerability, justifiably vests confidence, good faith, reliance, and trust in another whose aid, advice, or protection is sought in some matter. In such a relation, good conscience requires the fiduciary to act at all times for the sole benefit and interest of the one who trusts.
A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for and on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.
Corporate law is the body of law governing the rights, relations, and conduct of persons, companies, organizations and businesses. The term refers to the legal practice of law relating to corporations, or to the theory of corporations. Corporate law often describes the law relating to matters which derive directly from the life-cycle of a corporation. It thus encompasses the formation, funding, governance, and death of a corporation.
The business judgment rule is a case-law-derived doctrine in corporations law that courts defer to the business judgment of corporate executives. It is rooted in the principle that the "directors of a corporation... are clothed with [the] presumption, which the law accords to them, of being [motivated] in their conduct by a bona fide regard for the interests of the corporation whose affairs the stockholders have committed to their charge". The rule exists in some form in most common law countries, including the United States, Canada, England and Wales, and Australia.
Directors and officers liability insurance is liability insurance payable to the directors and officers of a company, or to the organization itself, as indemnification (reimbursement) for losses or advancement of defense costs in the event an insured suffers such a loss as a result of a legal action brought for alleged wrongful acts in their capacity as directors and officers. Such coverage may extend to defense costs arising from criminal and regulatory investigations or trials as well; in fact, often civil and criminal actions are brought against directors and officers simultaneously. Intentional illegal acts, however, are typically not covered under D&O policies.
The Delaware Supreme Court is the sole appellate court in the United States state of Delaware. Because Delaware is a popular haven for corporations, the Court has developed a worldwide reputation as a respected source of corporate law decisions, particularly in the area of mergers and acquisitions.
The duty of loyalty is often called the cardinal principle of fiduciary relationships, but is particularly strict in the law of trusts. In that context, the term refers to a trustee's duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, and following the terms of the trust. It generally prohibits a trustee from engaging in transactions that might involve self-dealing or even an appearance of conflict of interest. Furthermore, it requires a fiduciary to deal with transparency regarding material facts known to them in interactions with beneficiaries.
Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 is a United States corporate law case of the Delaware Supreme Court, discussing a director's duty of care. It is often called the "Trans Union case". Van Gorkom is sometimes referred to as the most important case regarding business organizations because it shows a unique scenario when the board is found liable even after applying the business judgment rule. The decision "stripped corporate directors and officers of the protective cloak formerly provided by the business judgment rule, rendering them liable for the tort of gross negligence for the violation of their duties under the rule."
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, is a civil action that came before the Delaware Court of Chancery. It is an important case in United States corporate law and discusses a director's duty of care in the oversight context. It raised the question regarding compliance, "what is the board's responsibility with respect to the organization and monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the corporation functions within the law to achieve its purposes?" Chancellor Allen wrote the opinion.
Guth v. Loft Inc, 5 A.2d 503, 23 Del. Ch. 255 is a Delaware corporation law case, important for United States corporate law, on corporate opportunities and the duty of loyalty. It deviated from the year 1726 rule laid down in Keech v Sandford that a fiduciary should leave open no possibility of conflict of interest between his private dealings and the job he is entrusted to do.
In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke[2002] EWCA Civ 370 is a UK company law case concerning the fiduciary duties of directors, and in particular the doctrine concerning corporate opportunities. In the course of his appellate judgment, Lord Justice Sedley, sitting with Lord Justice Brooke and Lord Justice Jonathan Parker, cast doubt on the correctness of the contract law case, Bell v. Lever Bros
Directors' duties are a series of statutory, common law and equitable obligations owed primarily by members of the board of directors to the corporation that employs them. It is a central part of corporate law and corporate governance. Directors' duties are analogous to duties owed by trustees to beneficiaries, and by agents to principals.
United States corporate law regulates the governance, finance and power of corporations in US law. Every state and territory has its own basic corporate code, while federal law creates minimum standards for trade in company shares and governance rights, found mostly in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by laws like the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The US Constitution was interpreted by the US Supreme Court to allow corporations to incorporate in the state of their choice, regardless of where their headquarters are. Over the 20th century, most major corporations incorporated under the Delaware General Corporation Law, which offered lower corporate taxes, fewer shareholder rights against directors, and developed a specialized court and legal profession. Nevada has attempted to do the same. Twenty-four states follow the Model Business Corporation Act, while New York and California are important due to their size.
The corporate opportunity doctrine is the legal principle providing that directors, officers, and controlling shareholders of a corporation must not take for themselves any business opportunity that could benefit the corporation. The corporate opportunity doctrine is one application of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, was a landmark decision of the Delaware Supreme Court on hostile takeovers.
Jerome William Van Gorkom was a United States businessman who was U.S. Under Secretary of State for Management 1982–83. He served as the CEO of TransUnion for eighteen years. Van Gorkom is probably best known as the named defendant in the landmark corporate law case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, which involved the merger of TransUnion with the Marmon Group in 1980.
In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 907 A 2d 693 (2005) is a U.S. corporate law case concerning the scope of the duty of care under Delaware law. Disney is the leading case on executive compensation.
William T. Allen was a professor of corporate law at New York University law school, and the Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery from 1985 to 1997. He also worked for the bank and business law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.
Canadian corporate law concerns the operation of corporations in Canada, which can be established under either federal or provincial authority.
Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114 was a case in the Delaware Supreme Court between Benihana of Tokyo, Inc., and its subsidiary Benihana, Inc. that concerned the duty of loyalty between a company and its directors. The court held that a Board's approval of an issuance and purchase of preferred stock was a valid exercise of its business judgment under Delaware law.
Daniel Lionel Herrmann was an American lawyer, professor and community leader who served as a justice of the Delaware Supreme Court from 1964 to 1973 and chief justice from 1973 to 1985. Herrmann was known for his contributions to judicial reform and was the first Jewish judge in Delaware.