Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.

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Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 15, 1991
Decided June 3, 1991
Full case nameEdmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company
Citations500 U.S. 614 ( more )
111 S. Ct. 2077; 114 L. Ed. 2d 660; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3023
Case history
Prior860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988); vacated on rehearing en banc , 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990); cert. granted, 498 U.S. 809(1990).
Holding
Race-based use of peremptory challenges during jury selection in a civil trial between private litigants violates due process.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
Byron White  · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun  · John P. Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor  · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy  · David Souter
Case opinions
MajorityKennedy, joined by White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Souter
DissentO'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia
DissentScalia
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. V

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case which held that peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude jurors on the basis of race in civil trials. [1] Edmonson extended the court's similar decision in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), a criminal case. The Court applied the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as determined in Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), in finding that such race-based challenges violated the Constitution.

Contents

Background

A construction worker, Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, was injured during work on federal property. He sued Leesville Concrete Company for negligence leading to his injuries. During jury selection, Leesville used two of their three peremptory challenges on black jurors, leaving a panel of twelve with one African-American. Edmonson, citing Batson, requested that the trial court require Leesville give a race-neutral reason for the peremptory challenges to black jurors, but the court refused. The jury found that Leesville was responsible for 20% of Edmonson's injury and awarded him $18,000. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision, holding that parties become state actors during jury selection, and so Batson requires race-neutral selection in civil cases. [2] When the Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc, they affirmed the original District Court decision. [3] Recognizing a circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice Kennedy began with a long line of cases where the court held that racial discrimination was impermissible in jury selection before a criminal trial. He then pointed out that although the Court had never indicated such discrimination was permitted in a civil trial, either, it also holds that federal law restrains the actions of government, not private actors. To decide whether to apply federal law, Justice Kennedy applied a two-part test from Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. [4] The first part of the test is whether the constitutional deprivation, in this case the right to a fair and impartial jury, resulted from a right rooted in state authority. Kennedy found, almost summarily, that peremptory challenges' intimate role in shaping a jury meant the case met the first part of the test. The second part of the test is whether the private party, Leesville and its counsel, was acting as a "state actor".

In determining whether the Leesville was acting as a state actor, Justice Kennedy considered three issues and relevant precedent. The first issue was whether the actor relies on governmental assistance, and Justice Kennedy found that the system of jury selection clearly existed within the sphere of judicial proceedings and would not be possible without the assistance of the judge and all other constituent elements of the institution. The second consideration was whether the actor is performing a traditional function of government. Justice Kennedy first found that the jury was clearly performing a traditional function of government by serving as the finder-of-fact in a civil trial. Second, he drew a parallel between jury selection and elections, indicating that constitutional constraints apply to all the machinery involved in choosing representatives and juries (such as when parties control primary elections). This is unlike any other aspect of civil litigation, none of which involve a government function like jury selection. The third consideration was whether the injury caused was aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority. Justice Kennedy said racial discrimination inside the courtroom diminishes the integrity of the courts and "compounds the racial insult" of discrimination. [5]

Justice Kennedy then dealt with the question of whether litigants could raise violations of jurors' rights on their behalf. The relevant precedent in that consideration was Powers v. Ohio , [6] a similar case that dealt with race-based exclusion of jurors during jury selection in a criminal trial. In Powers, the Court held that litigants generally cannot make a claim due to violations of others' rights, except where the litigant has suffered an injury the courts can resolve, has a close relation with the third party, and the third party is hindered in protecting his or her own interests. [7] Justice Kennedy held that all three conditions were met in Edmonson's case, including the resolvable injury. The concrete resolvable injury arose, in Justice Kennedy's view, whenever racial discrimination took place within criminal or civil trials.

The Court did not make a holding regarding whether prima facie evidence of racial discrimination in Edmonson's case actually existed, and remanded the case to the trial court to determine that issue.

Dissent

Three justices dissented, arguing that there was no state action (which is required for any Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment violation) because the litigants are private parties. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice O'Connor wrote that "the Court's final argument is that the exercise of a peremptory challenge by a private litigant is state action because it takes place in a courtroom. [But] the actions of a lawyer in a courtroom do not become those of the government by virtue of their location. This is true even if those actions are based on race." "Constitutional 'liability attaches only to those wrongdoers who carry a badge of authority of [the government] and represent it in some capacity.' Tarkanian, 488 U.S., at 191 [double-internal quotation marks omitted]." Therefore, although "[r]acism is a terrible thing ... [t]he Government is not responsible for a peremptory challenge by a private litigant."

Related Research Articles

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court ruling that a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge in a criminal case—the dismissal of jurors without stating a valid cause for doing so—may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on their race. The Court ruled that this practice violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case gave rise to the term Batson challenge, an objection to a peremptory challenge based on the standard established by the Supreme Court's decision in this case. Subsequent jurisprudence has resulted in the extension of Batson to civil cases and cases where jurors are excluded on the basis of sex.

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States about racial discrimination and United States constitutional criminal procedure. Strauder was the first instance where the Supreme Court reversed a state court decision denying a defendant's motion to remove his criminal trial to federal court pursuant to Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Curtis Flowers</span> African-American man

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References

  1. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
  2. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860F.2d1308 (5th Cir.1988).
  3. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895F.2d218 (5th Cir.1990).
  4. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
  5. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.
  6. Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
  7. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410.