Monothematic delusion

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Monothematic delusion
Specialty Psychiatry

A monothematic delusion is a delusional state that concerns only one particular topic. This is contrasted by what is sometimes called multi-thematic or polythematic delusions where the person has a range of delusions (typically the case of schizophrenia). These disorders can occur within the context of schizophrenia or dementia or they can occur without any other signs of mental illness. When these disorders are found outside the context of mental illness, they are often caused by organic dysfunction as a result of traumatic brain injury, stroke, or neurological illness.

Contents

People who experience these delusions as a result of organic dysfunction often do not have any obvious intellectual deficiency nor do they have any other symptoms. Additionally, a few of these people even have some awareness that their beliefs are bizarre, yet they cannot be persuaded that their beliefs are false.[ citation needed ]

Types

Some delusions that fall under this category are:

Note that some of these delusions are sometimes grouped under the umbrella term of delusional misidentification syndrome.

Causes

Current cognitive neuropsychology research points toward a two-factor cause of monothematic delusions. [4] The first factor is an anomalous experience, often due to a neurological defect. The second is an impairment of the belief formation cognitive process.

For example, the first factor in Capgras delusion is an impairment in how the brain recognizes a familiar face – specifically, how it cross-references one’s feelings toward the person. A patient with this disorder can recognize a loved one’s face, but seeing it does not elicit the expected emotional reaction. The patient’s mind interprets this as seeing a stranger, who merely looks like their loved one.

The second factor, an impairment in the belief formation cognitive process, remains unclear as the process itself is not well-understood. And while the two-factor hypothesis is currently the dominant model, there are alternatives which do not involve a second factor. [5]

There is evidence that delusional people are more prone to jumping to conclusions, [6] [7] [8] predisposing them to accept anomalous experiences as real and make snap judgments about them. Studies have also shown that such individuals are more prone to making errors due to matching bias, showing an higher than average tendency to seek confirmation for existing beliefs as opposed to testing how well they stand up to being challenged. [8]

These judgment biases help explain how delusion-prone people adopt and hold firm to extreme beliefs, though researchers disagree about whether they are sufficient explanation. Some posit that patients must have an additional neurological defect that affects their belief formation process. This defect is largely speculative, but would likely be located in the right hemisphere of the brain. [9]

See also

References

  1. Christodoulou G.N. Syndrome of Subjective Doubles, Am. J. Psychiat.135,249,1978
  2. Berrios G.E.; Luque R. (1995). "Cotard Syndrome: clinical analysis of 100 cases". Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica. 91 (3): 185–188. doi:10.1111/j.1600-0447.1995.tb09764.x. PMID   7625193. S2CID   8764432.
  3. Benson DF, Gardner H, Meadows JC (February 1976). "Reduplicative paramnesia". Neurology. 26 (2): 147–51. doi:10.1212/wnl.26.2.147. PMID   943070. S2CID   41547561.
  4. Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., Breen, N. (2001). "Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account" (PDF). Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. 8 (2): 133–158. doi:10.1353/ppp.2001.0007. S2CID   43914021. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-03-02.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  5. Noordhof, Paul; Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (2021-06-21). "The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions". Synthese. 199 (3–4). Springer Science and Business Media LLC: 10277–10309. doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03245-x . ISSN   0039-7857. S2CID   237820651.
  6. Sellen, J., Oaksford, M., Langdon, R., Gray, N. (2005). "Schizotypy and Conditional Reasoning". Schizophrenia Bulletin . 31 (1): 105–116. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbi012 . PMID   15888430.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  7. Dudley RE, John CH, Young AW, Over DE (May 1997). "Normal and abnormal reasoning in people with delusions". British Journal of Clinical Psychology. 36 (Pt 2): 243–58. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8260.1997.tb01410.x. PMID   9167864.
  8. 1 2 Stone, T. (2005). "Delusions and Belief Formation" (Powerpoint).[ dead link ]
  9. Gurin, Lindsey; Blum, Sonja (2017). "Delusions and the Right Hemisphere: A Review of the Case for the Right Hemisphere as a Mediator of Reality-Based Belief". The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences. 29 (3). American Psychiatric Association Publishing: 225–235. doi: 10.1176/appi.neuropsych.16060118 . ISSN   0895-0172. PMID   28347214.