Regional reactions to China's maritime activities in the South China Sea

Last updated

Regional reactions to China's maritime activities in the South China Sea involve how China's maritime activities within the South China Sea have caused a wide range of reactions and responses from countries bordering the South China Sea, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan (Republic of China), Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore. [1]

Contents

Background

Many nation-states, with the exception of Singapore, possess overlapping territorial claims within the South China Sea, which are also at odds with China's claims. [1] China's maritime actions in the South China Sea include a broad range of measures, such as the deployment of maritime militias, [2] the coast guard, [3] and artificial land reclamation. [4] China has argued that their maritime activities are carried out to bolster China's maritime claims in the South China Sea, including areas within the nine-dash line, which has been ruled as going against the UNCLOS. [5] According to various scholars, the measures China have been using can be described as salami-slicing, [6] grey-zone warfare, [7] and lawfare. [5] The responses towards China's maritime activities from its regional South-Eastern neighbors vary from deterrence, escalation and diplomatic protests to appeasement, de-escalation and cooperation. [8] [9] [10]

Vietnam

Vietnam and China have been engaged in longstanding territorial disputes within the South China Sea, culminating to the Chinese takeover of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and expansion in the Spratly Islands in 1988. [10] China's maritime actions against Vietnamese maritime sovereignty takes the shape of apprehension of sinking Vietnamese fishing boats [11] to the seizing of maritime territories within the Johnson South Reef, Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands through salami-slicing techniques. [6] [12]

Recently in May 2022 Hanoi protested against Chinese naval drills near the Paracel Islands with Le Thi Thu Hang, spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that "China’s military drills in Hoang Sa archipelago seriously violate Vietnam’s sovereignty over these islands." [13]

In response to China's maritime behavior in the South China Sea, Vietnam together with the Philippines, have been the frontline actor in opposing China's actions in the South China Sea. [14] The response from Vietnam against China's maritime actions include the deployment of their own fishing militias, [15] military modernization, [16] [17] and lawfare. [18] Internationally, Vietnam has also been using its influence within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to rein in China's maritime ambitions while also deepening strategic cooperation with the United States and other major powers. [14] For Vietnam, these multi-pronged measures serve as a demonstration of its readiness to preserve its sovereignty. [12]

However, the intensity of Vietnam's opposition has varied over time, [12] which experts argue is due to Vietnam needing a stable bilateral relations with China to maintain its own economic development, [14] as China is its largest trading partner. [10] Thus, there have been several instances which saw Vietnam engage in appeasement policies towards China, [12] especially when the former feels like it can concede ground. [19] According to various expert in the field, the reasoning behind Vietnam's varying responses serve to “keep the diplomatic channels with Beijing open”, [12] while also upholding the bilateral agreements it has with China. [20]

Thus, various experts argue that Vietnam's response towards China's maritime within the South China Sea is confined itself to any particular kind of action in response to China's actions. [21] [19] On the contrary, Vietnam has employed a wide range of responses from military modernization to defense diplomacy displaying a degree of situational deftness. [16] [19] Thus, Vietnam's response to China's actions in the South China Sea highlights the former's balancing act of appeasement while simultaneously keeping its sovereignty and maritime interests intact. [12]

The Philippines

The Philippines and China have been engaging in longstanding territorial disputes within the South China Sea. [10] [22] This has led to instances from the apprehension of Filipino fishermen by Chinese authorities to armed stand-offs in Scarborough Shoal, leading to the Chinese take-over of the maritime area. [23] And recently in April 2023, ships representing the coast guards from both countries faced off with each other near Second Thomas Shoal. [24]

The reactions from the Philippines to China's maritime activities have included apprehension of Chinese fishermen, [25] international condemnation, lawfare, [18] launching media campaigns [26] and defense cooperation with the United States. [23] [27] Just recently in May 2023, following the visit by Philippine President Bongbong Marcos to the White House, the US highlighted its willingness in defending Philippine sovereignty. [27] [28] Thus, similar with Vietnam, the Philippines are also a front-runner nation regarding opposing China's actions in the South China Sea. [14]

Despite the opposition, the Philippines have also displayed various degrees of leniency regarding China's behavior in the South China Sea. [29] According to an article published by the Asian Yearbook of International Law, an example of this is how the Philippines handled the ruling from the South China Sea Arbitration concerning the legal issues of China's 9-dash claim [29] Although with the legal ruling in favor of them, the Philippines still downplayed its significance while expressing a willingness to negotiate, highlighting a post-decision shift to a more accommodating position towards China. [29] Several scholars in this field argue that this is due to the significance China being the Philippines' largest trading partner, giving the former economic leverage over the other. [23] [29] [30]

An article published by the Pacific Review has described that the Philippines’ response to China both incorporate a tough political stance while also incorporating leniency through a softer stance which favors cooperation rather than confrontation against the latter. [31] According to various scholars, these varying reactions from the Philippines towards China highlights the asymmetry between both belligerents, which leads to the Philippines’ quid pro quo behavior towards China. Thus, highlighting the Philippines' attempt to offset the disparity in capabilities it has compared to China. [32]

Taiwan

Historically, the Republic of China expressed its interest in the South China Sea by publishing the eleven-dash line. After retreating to Taiwan, it worked with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland over their shared claims. Differences emerged after the PRC removed two of the original dashes near Vietnam from its map in the 1950s. Taiwan through its constitution still claims sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea but controls only the Pratas Island and the Taiping Island. Losing official diplomatic recognition from other countries has made it difficult for Taiwan to assert its claims and distinguish them from PRC's. [10] [1] [33]

Malaysia

Throughout the time Malaysia's reactions and subsequent responses towards China's maritime actions within the South China Sea have mostly been of an appeasing nature, [10] with Malaysia adopting a "playing it safe" approach towards China. [34] Thus, highlighting Malaysia's prioritization of its bilateral relationship with China instead of enforcing its maritime claims within the South China Sea. [10] [34] This behavior has been embodied in Malaysia not engaging in much criticism toward China's claims in the South China Sea, but rather engaging in dialogue. [10] [34] [35] Scholars in the field have argued that this is mainly due to China being the largest trading partner to Malaysia. [10] [35] Just recently in May 2023, China pledged to invest a record sum of 170 billion Malaysian ringgit into the Malaysian economy, highlighting its status as Malaysia largest trading partner in 14 consecutive years. [36]

However in recent times there has been various points of contention between both countries, which mainly revolve around maritime boundary delimitation of the continental shelf and the proper allocation of resources within the South China Sea. [10] [35] This has culminated to the prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim in 2023 declaring that Malaysia's position regarding the South China Sea is to firmly protect its sovereign rights and interests in the South China Sea. [37] However at the same time, Anwar Ibrahim also expressed that Malaysia are still open for negotiation with China, [38] while describing Malaysia as a friend of China. [39] This has led to criticism from Anwar Ibrahim's political opponents for being too soft towards China. [40] Following the criticism regarding Anwar Ibrahim's statements, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declared that: “the government is firmly committed to protecting Malaysia’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and interests in its maritime areas in the South China Sea”. [41] Furthermore the statement also called all parties to maintain peace, stability and trade in accordance with the UNCLOS declarations, which means that Malaysia will continue the diplomatic approach with other states, including China. [41]

An article from the Geopolitical Monitor argues that Malaysia's recent behavior could be a sign for the beginning of a foreign policy shift, in which Malaysia has shifted from appeasement politics to a non-alignment policy when dealing with China. [42] This includes engaging in the process confidence-building between all the ASEAN and China to ensure stability in the region. [43]

Brunei

Brunei's reactions to China's maritime actions in the South China Sea have been limited and cautious in nature. [44] Compared to its regional peers, the South China Sea does not appear to hold as much significance in the relation between neither Brunei or China. [10] [45] Among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Brunei rarely assumes a leading role in matters related to the South China Sea. Instead, the country is committed to using diplomatic channels to address the dispute, rather than resorting to military action. [10] According to an article published by the National Bureau of Asian Research, the caution displayed by Brunei regarding international matters with China is due to the former's small-state strategy when interacting with the latter. [44] This is exemplified by how Brunei is not asserting its claims in the South China Sea. [46] Experts within the field argues that this non-assertiveness is due to Brunei sidelining its political interests in the South China Sea to secure future economic cooperation and gains with China. [45] [47] This cooperation is, according to various experts, essential for Brunei to engage in due to the small-power nation-state facing an uncertain economic future. [46]

Indonesia

In response to China's maritime actions in the South China Sea, Indonesia have maintained the stance of not having any overlapping claims with the former. [48] [49] [50] The Indonesian authorities argue that the following is mainly due to Indonesia not considering China is among its ten neighboring countries. [10] [50] Nevertheless, Indonesia has rejected China's nine-dash line as the basis for the latter's claims in the South China Sea. [50] Furthermore, Indonesia has still responded to China's naval presence and maritime behavior in the South China Sea, especially near the Natuna Sea which is part of Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). [49] [50] [51] This has led to several instances within the Natuna Sea which pitted the Indonesian navy against its Chinese counterparts into a naval standoff. [49] [50] [52] According to an article published by the Asian Journal of Political Science, these instances has led to Indonesia to become stauncher in protecting its territorial sovereignty, especially its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the Natuna Islands. [53] According to experts within this field, Indonesia's response towards China's maritime actions can be described as "soft assertiveness", as Indonesia is balancing act between its own national interests while refraining from antagonizing China. [50] The behavior highlights its stakes as a non-claimant state wishing for ASEAN unity and centrality against the domination of a single major power within the South China Sea. [50] Furthermore, the status of a non-claimant state allows Indonesia to elevate its diplomatic prestige by offering and facilitating multilateral and consensus-building dialogue between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors. [48] [51]

On the 22nd of February 2023 diplomatic envoys from both nations met in Jakarta led by Retno Marsudi Indonesia's Foreign Minister and his Chinese counterpart Qin Gang, to intensify the discussion of a code of conduct within the South China Sea. [54] Thus, highlighting Indonesia's commitment as a neutral mediator regarding the disputes found in the South China Sea. [48] [50]

Singapore

Singapore has long proclaimed its status as a non-claimant state concerning the South China Sea, showing flexibility and adaptiveness to China's maritime activities in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. [55] Furthermore Singapore has long been a proponent for all parties through diplomacy have to manage their differences peacefully in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS. [56] Thus, Singapore has been a proponent for further cooperation between ASEAN and China, becoming a leader and mediator for regional maritime cooperation in the South China Sea. [55]

In May 2023, the Foreign Minister of Singapore Vivian Balakrishnan voiced grave concern after a near collision between Chinese and Philippine vessels. The minister stressed that all nations, including superpowers, have to work together to ensure "free access and opportunities" within Southeast Asia and its sea lanes. [57]

According to an article published by the Diplomat, Singapore's particular reactions towards China is due to the latter being Singapore's largest trading partner, while simultaneously enjoying strong bilateral and security links with the AUKUS. [58] Therefore, despite Singapore's Western-leaning position, the city-state has avoided taking sides with the United States in a conflict with China. [58] Recently in April 2023, both Singapore and China conducted joint naval exercises in the South China Sea, highlighting both parties' military cooperation. [59]

According to an article published by Asia Policy, Singapore's particular reaction towards China is due to the former's ambitions of being an effective coordinator and honest broker between the various claimant states. [60] This ensures cooperation and freedom of navigation, which in the end would benefit Singapore's national interests as well. [60]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Southeast Asia</span> Subregion of the Asian continent

Southeast Asia is the geographical south-eastern region of Asia, consisting of the regions that are situated south of China, east of the Indian subcontinent, and north-west of mainland Australia which is part of Oceania. Southeast Asia is bordered to the north by East Asia, to the west by South Asia and the Bay of Bengal, to the east by Oceania and the Pacific Ocean, and to the south by Australia and the Indian Ocean. Apart from the British Indian Ocean Territory and two out of 26 atolls of Maldives in South Asia, Maritime Southeast Asia is the only other subregion of Asia that lies partly within the Southern Hemisphere. Mainland Southeast Asia is entirely in the Northern Hemisphere. East Timor and the southern portion of Indonesia are the parts of Southeast Asia that lie south of the Equator.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">South China Sea</span> Marginal sea of the Western Pacific Ocean

The South China Sea is a marginal sea of the Western Pacific Ocean. It is bounded in the north by South China, in the west by the Indochinese Peninsula, in the east by the islands of Taiwan and northwestern Philippines, and in the south by the Indonesian islands of Borneo, eastern Sumatra and the Bangka Belitung Islands, encompassing an area of around 3,500,000 km2 (1,400,000 sq mi). It communicates with the East China Sea via the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine Sea via the Luzon Strait, the Sulu Sea via the straits around Palawan, and the Java Sea via the Karimata and Bangka Straits. The Gulf of Thailand and the Gulf of Tonkin are part of the South China Sea.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">ASEAN</span> International organization of Southeast Asian countries

ASEAN, an abbreviation for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is a political and economic union of 10 states in Southeast Asia. Together, its member states represent a population of over 600 million over a land area of 4.5 million km2 (1.7 million sq mi). The bloc generated a purchasing power parity (PPP) gross domestic product (GDP) of around US$10.2 trillion in 2022, constituting approximately 6.5% of global GDP (PPP). ASEAN member states include some of the fastest growing economies in the world.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">ASEAN Free Trade Area</span> Free trade area of the Association of South East Asian Nations

The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is a trade bloc agreement by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations supporting local trade and manufacturing in all ASEAN countries, and facilitating economic integration with regional and international allies. It stands as one of the largest and most important free trade areas (FTA) in the world, and together with its network of dialogue partners, drove some of the world's largest multilateral forums and blocs, including Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, East Asia Summit and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Maritime Southeast Asia</span> Cultural and economic area within Southeast Asia

Maritime Southeast Asia comprises the countries of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and East Timor.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">ASEAN Summit</span> Meeting of ASEAN member states

The ASEAN Summit is a biannual meeting held by the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in relation to economic, political, security, and socio-cultural development of Southeast Asian countries. In addition, it serves as a prominent regional (Asia) and international (worldwide) conference, with world leaders attending its related summits and meetings to discuss various problems and global issues, strengthening co-operation, and making decisions. The summit has been praised by world leaders for its success and ability to produce results on a global level.

The ASEAN Common Time (ACT) is a proposal to adopt a standard time for all Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states. It was proposed in 1995 by Singapore, and in 2004 and 2015 by Malaysia to make business across countries easier. The proposal failed because of opposition in Thailand and Cambodia: Thais and Cambodians argued that UTC+08:00 was not really better than UTC+07:00, which is their current time zone.

The Philippines has claims on territories which include the Spratly Islands, portions of North Borneo, and the Scarborough Shoal.

The borders of Malaysia include land and maritime borders with Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand and shared maritime boundaries with Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam.

Malaysia and Vietnam are two Southeast Asian countries with maritime boundaries which meet in the Gulf of Thailand and South China Sea. The two countries have overlapping claims over the continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand. Both countries have, however, come to an agreement to jointly exploit the natural resources in the disputed area pending resolution of the dispute over sovereignty.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Spratly Islands dispute</span> Territorial dispute between China and Southeast Asian countries.

The Spratly Islands dispute is an ongoing territorial dispute between Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam concerning "ownership" of the Spratly Islands, a group of islands and associated "maritime features" located in the South China Sea. The dispute is characterized by diplomatic stalemate and the employment of military pressure techniques in the advancement of national territorial claims. All except Brunei occupy some of the maritime features.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nine-dash line</span> Contested Chinese map of South China Sea

The nine-dash line, also referred to as the eleven-dash line by Taiwan, is a set of line segments on various maps that accompanied the claims of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China in the South China Sea. The contested area includes the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Pratas Island and the Vereker Banks, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Scarborough Shoal. Certain places have undergone land reclamation by the PRC, ROC, and Vietnam. The People's Daily of the PRC uses the term Duànxùxiàn (断续线) or Nánhǎi Duànxùxiàn, while the ROC government uses the term Shíyīduàn xiàn.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Territorial disputes in the South China Sea</span> Disputes over ownership of islands in the South China Sea

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve conflicting island and maritime claims in the South China Sea by several sovereign states, namely the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The disputes involve the islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the region, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and various boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. The waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which some regard as geographically part of the South China Sea, are disputed as well. Maritime disputes also extend beyond the South China Sea, as in the case of the Senkaku Islands and the Socotra Rock, which lie in the East China Sea.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Philippines–Vietnam relations</span> Bilateral relations

The Philippines–Vietnam relations refers to the bilateral relations of the Republic of the Philippines and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Since the end of the Cold War, relations between the two countries have warmed significantly. Vietnam is sometimes referred to as the only communist military ally of the Philippines. Both nations have cooperated in the fields of education, tourism, agriculture, aquaculture, trade, and defense. Additionally, both nations have similar positions on the South China Sea issue, with Vietnam backing the Philippine victory in the ICC against China, and the Philippines backing to a certain extent the claim of Vietnam in the Paracels. Both nations have overlapping claims in the Spratlys, but have never made military confrontations as both view each other as diplomatic allies and ASEAN brethren.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">South China Sea Arbitration</span> 2016 international arbitration case

The South China Sea Arbitration was an arbitration case brought by the Republic of the Philippines against the People's Republic of China (PRC) under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning certain issues in the South China Sea, including the nine-dash line introduced by the mainland-based Republic of China since as early as 1947. A tribunal of arbitrators appointed the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) as the registry for the proceedings.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Moeldoko</span> Indonesian general

Moeldoko is an Indonesian government official, businessman, and retired general serving as the current Chief of Staff of Presidency for President Joko Widodo, previously serving as Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. He graduated from the Indonesian Military Academy (AKABRI) in 1981 and received the Adhi Makayasa medal as valedictorian of his class. On 27 August 2013, he was appointed Commander of the National Armed Forces by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and approved by the People's Representative Council after serving as the Chief of Staff of the Army for only three months. He succeeded Admiral (Ret.) Agus Suhartono who retired in May 2013.

The Hai Yang Shi You 981 standoff, also known as the 2014 China-Vietnam oil rig crisis, refers to the tensions between China and Vietnam arising from the Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation moving its Hai Yang Shi You 981 oil platform to waters near the disputed Paracel Islands in South China Sea, and the resulting Vietnamese efforts to prevent the platform from establishing a fixed position. According to an announcement by the Hainan Maritime Safety Administration of China, the drilling work of the Hai Yang Shi You 981 would last from May 2 to August 15, 2014. On July 15, China announced that the platform had completed its work and withdrew it fully one month earlier than originally announced.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Timeline of the South China Sea dispute</span>

The article covers events that are related to the South China Sea dispute. Located in the South China Sea are the disputed Paracel Islands between China and Vietnam, Pratas Island, a disputed island between China and Taiwan, and the Spratly Islands, which are intertwined with China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Because of this, numerous countries with territorial disputes have had conflicts in the South China Sea since the past.

Maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia refers to acts of extreme maritime violence committed with political motives within the Southeast Asian region. Despite seaborne terrorist attacks accounting for only 2% of all international terrorist incidents from 1978 to 2008, according to RAND's Terrorism Database, Southeast Asia has proven a hotbed of maritime terrorism. Due to the high frequency of pirates in the region, many Southeast Asian-based terrorist groups have appropriated piratical tactics in carrying out their violent political struggles. In 2003, the International Maritime Bureau reported that out of the 445 actual or attempted piratical attacks on merchant vessels, 189 occurred in Southeast Asia, which was more cases than either Africa or Latin America, with 121 attacks occurring in Indonesian waters and 35 attacks occurring in Malaysian and Singaporean waters. In 2004, while the number of actual and attempted attacks fell to 325, Southeast Asia remained at the top of the regional rankings, with 93 incidents occurring in Indonesian waters. Between 2014 and 2018, 242 attacks occurred in Southeast Asia, with the majority occurring in Indonesian waters. The most popular weapons of choice among Southeast Asian maritime terrorists have been explosive devices and firearms, which were used in roughly 60% of maritime attacks in the region.

References

  1. 1 2 3 Severino, Rodolfo C. (2014). "1. Preventing Conflict in the South China Sea". In Chachavalpongpun, Pavin (ed.). Entering Uncharted Waters?: ASEAN and the South China Sea. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 3–14. doi:10.1355/9789814380270-003. ISBN   978-981-4380-26-3.
  2. ↑ Shi, Yubing (19 October 2021). "China: China's Coast Guard Law: Interpretations and Implications". Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy. 6 (2): 300–308. doi:10.1163/24519391-06020010.
  3. ↑ Bhatia, Kapil (October 2018). "Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft in the South China Seas China's Strategy and Potential U.S. Options" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly. 4 (91): 11 – via National Defense University Press (NDU).
  4. ↑ Poling, Gregory B.; Prétat, Harrison; Mallory, Tabitha Grace; Studies, Center for Advanced Defense (2021-11-18). "Pulling Back the Curtain on China's Maritime Militia".{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  5. 1 2 Tacujan, Priscilla (2022-07-12). "Chinese Lawfare in the South China Sea | Journal of Political Risk". The Journal of Political Risk. Retrieved 2023-05-22.
  6. 1 2 Chatterji, S. K. (2020-10-22). "Wider connotations of Chinese 'salami slicing'". Asia Times. Retrieved 2023-05-16.
  7. ↑ Lin, Bonny; Garafola, Cristina L.; McClintock, Bruce; Blank, Jonah; Hornung, Jeffrey W.; Schwindt, Karen; Moroney, Jennifer D. P.; Orner, Paul; Borrman, Dennis; Denton, Sarah W.; Chambers, Jason (2022-03-30). "A New Framework for Understanding and Countering China's Gray Zone Tactics".{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  8. ↑ Elleman, Bruce A. (21 November 2017). "China's Naval Operations in the South China Sea: Evaluating Legal, Strategic and Military Factors". doi:10.2307/j.ctt1zqrn98. S2CID   169972411.{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  9. ↑ Johnston, Alastair Iain (2013). "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?". International Security. 37 (4): 7–48. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00115. JSTOR   24480619. S2CID   57558678.
  10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Elleman, Bruce A. (2017). China's Naval Operations in the South China Sea: Evaluating Legal, Strategic and Military Factors. Vol. 3. Amsterdam University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctt1zqrn98.9. ISBN   978-1-898823-68-1. JSTOR   j.ctt1zqrn98.[ page needed ]
  11. ↑ "Vietnam protests Beijing's expansion in disputed South China Sea". Reuters. 2020-04-19. Retrieved 2023-05-04.
  12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Thu, Houng Le (20 September 2020). "Rough Waters Ahead for Vietnam-China Relations". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 4 May 2023.
  13. ↑ "Vietnam protests China military exercise in South China Sea". hanoitimes.vn. Retrieved 2023-05-04.
  14. 1 2 3 4 "Vietnam Tacks Between Cooperation and Struggle in the South China Sea". www.crisisgroup.org. 2021-12-07. Retrieved 2023-05-04.
  15. ↑ Cui, Haoran; Shi, Yubing (3 July 2022). "A Comparative Analysis of the Legislation on Maritime Militia Between China and Vietnam". Ocean Development & International Law. 53 (2–3): 147–165. doi:10.1080/00908320.2022.2103478. S2CID   251655218.
  16. 1 2 Grossman, Derek; Anh, Nguyen Nhat (2018-05-11). "Deciphering Vietnam's Evolving Military Doctrine in the South China Sea". www.rand.org. Retrieved 2023-05-07.
  17. ↑ Hải, Đỗ Thanh; Linh, Nguyễn Thị (2021). "Vietnam and the East Sea in Its Strategic Thinking". Security, Strategy, and Military Dynamics in the South China Sea. pp. 101–116. doi:10.46692/9781529213478.007. ISBN   978-1-5292-1347-8.
  18. 1 2 Davenport, Tara. ""Lawfare" in the South China Sea disputes | Lowy Institute". www.lowyinstitute.org. Retrieved 2023-05-22.
  19. 1 2 3 Fook, Lye Liang; Hop, Ha Hoang (31 August 2018). "Vietnam's Responses to China's Maritime Assertiveness in the South China Sea" (PDF).
  20. ↑ "The Other Gulf of Tonkin Incident: China's Forgotten Maritime Compromise". Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 2015-10-21. Retrieved 2023-05-04.
  21. ↑ Thayer, Carlyle A. (2016). "Vietnam's Strategy of 'Cooperating and Struggling' with China over Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea". Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs. 3 (2): 200–220. doi:10.1177/2347797016645453. JSTOR   48601796. S2CID   156997593.
  22. ↑ "The South China Sea Dispute: A Brief History". Lawfare. 2015-06-08. Retrieved 2023-05-19.
  23. 1 2 3 De Castro, Renato (2015). "The Philippines Confronts China in the South China Sea: Power Politics vs. Liberalism-Legalism". Asian Perspective. 39 (1): 71–100. doi:10.1353/apr.2015.0010. JSTOR   43738115.
  24. ↑ "Tense face-off: Philippines confronts China over sea claims". AP NEWS. 2023-04-27. Retrieved 2023-05-19.
  25. ↑ Kreuzer, Peter (September 2016). "A Comparison of Malaysian and Philippine Responses to China in the South China Sea". The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 9 (3): 239–276. doi: 10.1093/cjip/pow008 .
  26. ↑ "Why the Philippines Is Exposing China's Aggressive Actions in the South China Sea". thediplomat.com. Retrieved 2023-05-19.
  27. 1 2 "US, Philippines Issue New South China Sea Defense Guidelines". VOA. 4 May 2023. Retrieved 2023-05-07.
  28. ↑ Mason, Jeff; Hunnicutt, Trevor; Brunnstrom, David; Mason, Jeff (2023-05-02). "Amid China pressure, US and Philippines recommit to security alliance". Reuters. Retrieved 2023-05-07.
  29. 1 2 3 4 deLisle, Jacques (2017-09-10). "Political-Legal Implications of the July 2016 Arbitration Decision in the Philippines-PRC Case Concerning the South China Sea: The United States, China, and International Law". Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 21 (2015). Brill Nijhoff. pp. 49–82. doi:10.1163/9789004344556_005. ISBN   978-90-04-34455-6.
  30. ↑ "China deploys 'durian diplomacy' to boost trade ties with Philippines". South China Morning Post. 2023-01-06. Retrieved 2023-05-07.
  31. ↑ Pan, Guangyi; Phan, Thu Hien (10 October 2022). "The transformation of asymmetry: the evolution of Philippine and Vietnamese South China Sea policies and the asymmetry of attention". The Pacific Review: 1–32. doi:10.1080/09512748.2022.2130411. S2CID   252837140.
  32. ↑ Yamazaki, Amane; Osawa, Suguru (December 2021). "Asymmetry Theory and China–Philippines Relations with the South China Sea as a Case". East Asia. 38 (4): 333–352. doi:10.1007/s12140-021-09370-1. PMC   8218783 . PMID   34177250.
  33. ↑ Tseng, Hui-Yi Katherine (2015). "Taiwan in the South China Sea Disputes: Policies and Prospects". Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. pp. 128–146. doi:10.1057/9781137463685_8. ISBN   978-1-349-49925-0.
  34. 1 2 3 Parameswaran, Prashanth (2016). "Malaysia's Approach to the South China Sea Dispute after the Arbitral Tribunal's Ruling". Contemporary Southeast Asia. 38 (3): 375–381. JSTOR   24916762.
  35. 1 2 3 Bing, Ngeow Chow (16 July 2021). "Have Friendly Malaysia-China Relations Gone Awry".
  36. ↑ "Anwar: Malaysia secures a record RM170 bil worth of investment commitments from China". The Edge Malaysia. April 2023. Retrieved 2023-05-22.
  37. ↑ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia. "MALAYSIA'S POSITION ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA". www.kln.gov.my.
  38. ↑ "Malaysia open to talks with Beijing over dispute in South China Sea – PM". Reuters. 2023-04-03. Retrieved 2023-05-04.
  39. ↑ "Navigating the Future of China-Malaysia Relations". thediplomat.com. Retrieved 2023-05-22.
  40. ↑ "Malaysia Clarifies South China Sea Policy Following PM's Comments". thediplomat.com. Retrieved 2023-05-22.
  41. 1 2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia. "MALAYSIA'S POSITION ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA". www.kln.gov.my.
  42. ↑ Uy, Anne; Espeña, Joshua Bernard B. (2020-09-23). "Examining Malaysia's Evolving Policy toward the South China Sea". Geopolitical Monitor. Retrieved 2023-05-11.
  43. ↑ Permal, Sumathy (2021-07-27), Houlden, Gordon; Romaniuk, Scott; Hong, Nong (eds.), "Competition, Contention, and Cooperation in the South China Sea: The Malaysian Perspective", Security, Strategy, and Military Dynamics in the South China Sea (1 ed.), Bristol University Press, pp. 135–148, doi:10.46692/9781529213478.009, ISBN   978-1-5292-1347-8 , retrieved 2023-05-24
  44. 1 2 "Brunei". The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Retrieved 2023-05-07.
  45. 1 2 Hart, Michael (2018-04-04). "Brunei Abandons South China Sea Claim for Chinese Finance". Geopolitical Monitor. Retrieved 2023-05-07.
  46. 1 2 "Brunei, ASEAN and the South China Sea | Lowy Institute". www.lowyinstitute.org. Retrieved 2023-05-04.
  47. ↑ Putra, Bama Andika (2021). "Comprehending Brunei Darussalam's vanishing claims in the South China Sea: China's exertion of economic power and the influence of elite perception". Cogent Social Sciences. 7 (1). doi: 10.1080/23311886.2020.1858563 . S2CID   230540235.
  48. 1 2 3 Chang, Felix (2020-01-27). "The Next Front: China and Indonesia in the South China Sea".
  49. 1 2 3 "China tells Indonesia to stop drilling off South China Sea islands". Nikkei Asia. Retrieved 2023-05-16.
  50. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Febrica, Senia; Romaniuk, Scott N. (2021-07-27), Houlden, Gordon; Romaniuk, Scott; Hong, Nong (eds.), "A Wary Warrior: Indonesia's "Soft-Assertiveness" in the South China Sea", Security, Strategy, and Military Dynamics in the South China Sea (1 ed.), Bristol University Press, pp. 151–178, doi:10.46692/9781529213478.010, ISBN   978-1-5292-1347-8 , retrieved 2023-05-24
  51. 1 2 Supriyanto, Ristian Atriandi (2016). "Out of Its Comfort Zone: Indonesia and the South China Sea". Asia Policy. 21 (21): 21–28. doi:10.1353/asp.2016.0008. JSTOR   24905085. S2CID   155319088.
  52. ↑ Robertua, Verdinand; Sinaga, Obsatar (12 January 2018). "Indonesia in the South China Sea Dispute: Humble-Hard Power". Jurnal Global & Strategis. 11 (2): 73. doi: 10.20473/jgs.11.2.2017.73-83 .
  53. ↑ Meyer, Patrik Kristhope; Nurmandi, Achmad; Agustiyara, Agustiyara (2 January 2019). "Indonesia's swift securitization of the Natuna Islands how Jakarta countered China's claims in the South China Sea". Asian Journal of Political Science. 27 (1): 70–87. doi:10.1080/02185377.2019.1590724. S2CID   159059061.
  54. ↑ Widianto, Stanley; Teresia, Ananda (2023-02-22). "China, ASEAN to intensify negotiations on South China Sea code". Reuters. Retrieved 2023-05-07.
  55. 1 2 Tseng, Hui-Yi Katherine (2021-07-27), Houlden, Gordon; Romaniuk, Scott; Hong, Nong (eds.), "The South China Sea Dispute: Regional Integration, Status Ad Quem, and Singapore's Position", Security, Strategy, and Military Dynamics in the South China Sea (1 ed.), Bristol University Press, pp. 179–192, doi:10.46692/9781529213478.011, ISBN   978-1-5292-1347-8 , retrieved 2023-05-24
  56. ↑ "MFA Press Statement Introductory calls on Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister Dr Vivian Balakrishn". www.mfa.gov.sg. Retrieved 2023-05-17.
  57. ↑ "Singapore Voices 'Grave Concern' Over South China Sea Tensions". Bloomberg.com. 2023-05-01. Retrieved 2023-05-17.
  58. 1 2 "Singapore's China Conundrum". thediplomat.com. Retrieved 2023-05-17.
  59. ↑ "China, Singapore plan military drills as Beijing forges defence ties". Reuters. 2023-04-24. Retrieved 2023-05-17.
  60. 1 2 Chan, Jane (2016). "Singapore and the South China Sea: Being an Effective Coordinator and Honest Broker". Asia Policy. 21 (1): 41–46. doi:10.1353/asp.2016.0017. S2CID   155719514. Project MUSE   609174.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.