Siege of Urbinus

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Siege of Urbinus (538)
Part of the Gothic War (535–554)
Gothic War - First Phase, 535-540.svg
First phase of the Gothic War campaigns
DateMid-summer or autumn – December 538 AD
Location
Urbinus (modern-day Urbino), Italy
43°43′N12°38′E / 43.717°N 12.633°E / 43.717; 12.633
Result Byzantine victory
Territorial
changes
Urbinus captured
Belligerents
Byzantine Empire Ostrogothic kingdom
Commanders and leaders
Moras  White flag icon.svg
Strength
  • Unknown under Belisarius
  • 7,000 under Narses [1]
  • 500 garrison size [2]
  • 2,000 reinforcements [2]

The siege of Urbinus, also called the siege of Urbino or siege of Urbinum, took place in the year 538 during the Gothic War when the Ostrogoths (Goths) surrendered the town to Byzantine forces.

Contents

The Byzantine general Belisarius aimed to secure northern Italy before advancing against the Gothic capital Ravenna, but tensions within the Byzantine command had grown after the capture of Ariminum. During the siege of Urbinus, Narses and John the Sanguinary began acting without regard for Belisarius's authority and withdrew their troops when negotiations with the Gothic garrison failed. Despite the setback, Belisarius employed conventional siege tactics with the construction of siege engines but just before Byzantine forces stormed the walls, the defenders surrendered because the only stream supplying the town with fresh water dried up.

Prelude

Meister von San Vitale in Ravenna 013.jpg
Narses.jpg
Mosaics, 6th century, depicting Belisarius (left) and Narses (right), from the Basilica of San Vitale, Ravenna, Italy.
Modern-day Urbino as seen from a kite, capturing the topography of the area Panorama of Urbino from a kite.jpg
Modern-day Urbino as seen from a kite, capturing the topography of the area

In 535 AD, the Byzantine Emperor, Justinian, launched a campaign to liberate the Italian cities that were under the control of the Ostrogothic Kingdom. The generals Belisarius, Mundus and Constantinianus had made swift gains, conquering Sicily, the southern Italian Peninsula, regions of Dalmatia and Illyria. [3]

Following the capture of Naples, Belisarius entered Rome in December 536, prompting the king of the Goths, Vitiges, to march with an army that had superior numbers to besiege the city (contemporary historian Procopius claimed a Gothic force of 150,000. [b] During the Siege of Rome (537–538) the Goths attacked the Aurelian Walls several times, countered by Belisarius's defensive preparations, use of artillery, and cavalry sorties that exploited the Goths' difficulties in countering mounted archers. [8] Both sides suffered from shortages and disease, but Byzantine control of sea supply routes gradually weakened the siege by the Goths, who faced problems in supplying their large army by land. [9] [10]

The siege of Rome by the Goths failed because Belisarius sent John the Sanguinary along with a cavalry detachment to raid Picenum. John ignored the fortified towns of Auximus and Urbinus, and instead captured the city of Ariminum. The loss of Ariminum led Vitigis to lift the siege of Rome and to recover Ariminum, due to its strategic location, a day's march from Ravenna, the capital of the Gothic kingdom. Vitiges also reinforced nearby towns under his rule, sending Moras with 2,000 troops to defend the fortified town of Urbinus and Albilas with 1,000 men to Urviventus. [11] Belisarius sought to replace John's cavalry with infantry, but John refused to obey. Soon after this, the Goths besieged Ariminum and trapped John inside the town. Belisarius joined forces with general Narses, who had arrived with reinforcements from Constantinople. John's insubordination divided the Byzantine leadership into two factions: Belisarius and his supporters on one side, and Narses, who supported John, on the other. Belisarius was convinced by Narses to rescue John despite his insubordination. [12] [13]

Even with the reinforcements, Belisarius wanted to avoid a battle with the numerically superior Gothic forces, and devised a plan incorporating psychological warfare tactics. He divided his forces into three detachments and advanced on Ariminum from different directions, deliberately leaving one escape route open. Additional campfires were lit to exaggerate the size of the Byzantine army. Alarmed by what they believed to be a massive force, the Goths withdrew towards Ravenna, and in July 538, Belisarius entered the town. [14] [15] After the victory, John refused to acknowledge Belisarius and instead credited Narses, who had convinced Belisarius to intervene. [16] From this point on, Narses and John challenged Belisarius's leadership and began to act independently of his command. [17] [18]

To prevent divisions within the Byzantine forces, Belisarius showed Narses, the letter of appointment by the Emperor Justinian, stating Narses was his subordinate and as such he should follow his command "in the best interests of the state". [16] Narses disregarded the letter because, in his view, Belisarius was not acting in the best interests of the state. [19] [20]

Siege

In the year 538, Byzantine general Belisarius split his forces to besiege Urbinus and Urviventus. The town of Urbinus stood on a round and steep hill, which made any attempt to take it by force more challenging. [21] [22] Upon arrival at Urbinus, Belisarius's army set up camp at the east side of the town. The forces under Narses and John joined him in the siege of Urbinus. They set up camp on the west side of the town, undermining Belisarius's authority. [19] [21]

Belisarius sent envoys offering the garrison a chance to surrender. The envoys stood in front of the city gates, as they were not allowed to enter, and negotiated with the Gothic garrison. The Goths refuted the offer as they were confident of their position and the abundance of their provisions. [22] After negotiations with the garrison failed, John declared the city could not be taken, and Narses agreed with him. During the night, they abandoned the siege and moved to Ariminum despite pleas from Belisarius. [21]

The following morning, the Goth soldiers taunted Belisarius for losing half of the army. Belisarius started preparing to assault the town with the construction of siege engines and a colonnade (vinea in Roman parlance). [2] As the Byzantines were preparing for the assault, the spring that supplied the town with fresh water suddenly failed, which disturbed the Gothic garrison. When the Byzantine troops advanced to assault the city, the Goths appeared on the walls and surrendered to Belisarius. [19] The surrender took place in mid-December 538. [2]

Aftermath

Belisarius accepted the surrender of the Goths as subjects of the emperor and equal to the Byzantine soldiers, which, according to historian Ilkka Syvänne, meant Belisarius recruited 2,500 Goths into his army. [2] Astonished by such success, Narses sent John to capture Caesena, but this assault failed. John then moved to and captured Forocornelius. After the siege of Urbinus, Belisarius moved to support the siege of Urviventus, which was captured shortly after. [23]

Despite sporadic success, the divided Byzantine forces became ineffective, leading to the loss of the city of Mediolanum (modern-day Milan) to the Goths in early 539. Procopius recorded that the Goths executed 300,000 men, their women sold to Burgundians, and the city was razed to the ground. [17] [18] [24] The emperor, Justinian, recalled Narses to Constantinople, leaving Belisarius in command of the Byzantine forces in Italy. [25]

See also

Footnotes

Notes

  1. 1 2 Participated in the first phase of the siege.
  2. The size of the army is plausible as it represented a national army in which all male Goths were required to serve in the army. [4] The historian, J. B. Bury, considered it an exaggeration. [5] Leif Petersen proposed an army size of 25,000–30,000 for besieging Rome, but considers Procopius's number to be a reasonable estimate of the total Gothic army in all their territories and navy. [6] Roy Boss argued for a 40,000 strong Gothic army. [7]

References

  1. Bury 1958, p. 197.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 Syvänne 2021, p. 167.
  3. Hughes 2009, pp. 122–125.
  4. Syvänne 2021, p. 131.
  5. Bury 1958, p. 181.
  6. Petersen 2013, pp. 155–156.
  7. Hughes 2009, p. 126.
  8. Syvänne 2021, p. 144.
  9. Hughes 2009, pp. 157–158.
  10. Syvänne 2021, pp. 144–158.
  11. Syvänne 2021, p. 162.
  12. Parnell 2015, pp. 119–120.
  13. Syvänne 2021, pp. 163–166.
  14. Syvänne 2021, p. 166.
  15. Hughes 2009, p. 165.
  16. 1 2 Procopius 1924, Book VI part xviii.
  17. 1 2 Parnell 2015, pp. 120–122.
  18. 1 2 Bury 1958, p. 204.
  19. 1 2 3 Hughes 2009, p. 167.
  20. Bury 1958, p. 200.
  21. 1 2 3 Procopius 1924, Book VI part xix.
  22. 1 2 Bury 1958, p. 201.
  23. Hughes 2009, p. 168.
  24. Procopius 1924, Book VI part xxi.
  25. Parnell 2015, p. 122.

Sources

Primary

  • Procopius (1924). Procopius, The History of Wars. Translated by Dewing, Henry B. London S. Heinemann.

Secondary

Further reading