The Battle of Taginae or Battle of Busta Gallorum took place in July of 552 AD, where Byzantine General Narses defeated the Ostrogoths (Goths) under King Totila. The Byzantine victory paved the way for the Byzantine reconquest of the Italian Peninsula and the dissolution of the Gothic kingdom.
Narses assembled his army at Salona, Dalmatia and from there marched along the coast of Adriatic sea to Italy. Despite obstacles laid by the Goths, the Byzantines were able to cross the river Po and reach Ravenna. After a nine-day break, Narses continued south along the Via Flaminia towards Rome. Totila, realizing that a defensive strategy was not viable, marched to intercept the Byzantines at Taginae.
On the battlefield and despite his numerical superiority, Narses placed his troops in a strong defensive position, with archers at the flanks protected by natural terrain. Totila used delaying tactics until reinforcements under Teia arrived. He then attempted a surprise attack by withdrawing his troops for lunch, hoping to tempt the Byzantines to pursue and abandon their position. Narses anticipated ruses and prevented this by keeping his army in the original defensive position. Totila then reformed his army for a concentrated cavalry charge into the Byzantine center, composed of foreign mercenaries.
The Gothic attack faltered after several volleys of arrows from Byzantine archers fired from both sides, inflicting many losses. The Byzantine center repelled the Gothic assault, and the cavalry retreat caused the Gothic infantry at the rear to panic and flee as well. Totila was mortally wounded during the battle. The Byzantine victory opened the way for Narses to advance on Rome, which fell with little resistance. The Gothic defeat shattered their military resistance and paved the way for the Byzantine control of Italy.
Background
Following the fall of Ravenna in May 540 AD, Belisarius restored Sicily and most of the Italian peninsula to Byzantine rule. His stratagem of inducing the Goths to surrender by offering him the Western imperial crown alarmed Emperor Justinian, who recalled him to Constantinople with Ravenna's treasury and the captive king Vitiges but denied him a triumph and reassigned him to the eastern front in advance of the Lazic War (541–562).[7] Belisarius was replaced by three coequal commanders, whose rivalry and corruption led to indiscipline and plundering of the Italian countryside.[8] Justinian's harsh tax audit to recover alleged Gothic-era arrears, combined with reduced rewards for wounded and distinguished soldiers, further alienated troops and civilians, collapsing morale and eroding Italian loyalty.[9][10][11]
Byzantine misrule strengthened the Goths under Ildibad, who defeated a Byzantine force at the Battle of Treviso and recovered much of the Po Valley. However, his reign was short-lived because he was assassinated before consolidating his power. The reign of Eraric followed, but it ended with his murder in late 541, because he secretly offered to abdicate and offer the kingdom to the Byzantines in exchange for the rank of patrician and a large payment. Through the turmoil among the Gothic aristocracy, Ildibad's nephew Totila became king.[12][13][14] Reprimanded by Justinian for inaction to exploit Gothic disunity, the Byzantine commanders failed to capture of Verona. Totila took the initiative and pursued them and defeated a larger Byzantine army at the Battle of Faventia in spring 542.[15][16] Advancing on Florence, Totila again routed Byzantine relief forces at the Battle of Mucellium. The Byzantines withdrew into fortified cities, while Totila bypassed central Italy and advanced to rapidly capture territories in southern Italy with the fall of Naples in March 543.[17][18]
Totila steadily expanded his control over Italy by combining military success with conciliatory policies toward the Italian population, presenting himself as a liberator from Byzantine exactions. In the meantime, a plague (541–549) weakened the Byzantine empire's ability to field armies, and one third of its population was killed.[19] By 543–544, much of southern and central Italy had fallen under Gothic control, leaving Byzantine control confined to a few fortified cities. Rome, poorly supplied and neglected by imperial authorities, was blockaded and captured by Totila in December 546, following famine and internal betrayal. Although the city was partially depopulated and its defenses deteriorated, Totila refrained from destroying it completely, seeking to leverage its symbolic value in negotiations. He offered peace to Justinian on moderate terms, proposing recognition of Gothic rule in Italy in exchange for nominal imperial suzerainty, however, Justinian rejected these overtures.[20] With diplomacy exhausted and Byzantine relief efforts faltering, Totila reoccupied Rome in 549 and consolidated Gothic dominance over most of the Italian peninsula and Sicily, prolonging the war until the Byzantine counteroffensive launched in 552 AD.[21][22][23]
The third player in the Gothic–Byzantine struggle was the Franks, who sought to expand in northern Italy by exploiting the weakening of both Byzantine and Gothic authorities. They offered limited diplomatic and material support to the Goths while avoiding a formal alliance, aiming to block a lasting Byzantine restoration in Italy. In 538, the Frankish King Theodebert I send of force of Burgundians to assist the Goths in the fall and destruction of Milan, while claiming to Justinian that they were not under his authority.[24] The following year, a Frankish army invaded northern Italy, attacking both the Goths and the Byzantine forces, but retreated due to disease.[25] During Totila's reign, the Franks found the opportunity to occupy provinces at the Cottian Alps (part of Liguria) and the Venetia, since most of the Gothic forces were in the south fighting against the Byzantines. Totila entered into an agreement with the Franks for a provisional occupation of the seized territories, which would become permanent in case of a Gothic victory. After 547 and the loss of Rome to the Byzantines, Totila proposed marriage to an unnamed Merovingian princess, probably a daughter of Theudebert, but the offer was refused on the prediction that he would fail to secure lasting control of Italy after losing Rome. This rejection underscored for Totila the political importance of holding Rome.[26]
Prelude
As early as 549, the Emperor Justinian I planned to dispatch an army to Italy to conclude the war with the Goths. It started with the cousin of Justinian, Germanus, who had started recruiting an army for this purpose.[27] However, Germanus's sudden death in 550 resulted in a temporary postponement as Justinian delayed in selecting a replacement for the commander-in-chief for the campaign. During the 550–551 period, an expeditionary force strong enough[a] to remove the Goths from Italy was gradually assembled at Salona at Dalmatia, comprising regular Byzantine units and several contingents of foreign allies, notably Lombards, Heruls, and Bulgars.[5] The Byzantine chamberlain (cubicularius) Narses was appointed to command in mid–551.[2] The reasons of this choice by Justinian were unclear. Narses had limited military experience, however, he had the strength of character to unify the fractured Byzantine leadership in Italy.[28] Narses avoided crossing the sea to Italy due to the threat posed by the Gothic fleet in the southern Adriatic sea.[2] The following spring, he led the Byzantine army around the coast of the Adriatic sea.[29]
Route of the Via Flaminia; the purple route indicates the Via Flaminia Nova. The orange route indicates the variant that crosses the central part of Marche and reaches the Adriatic Sea in Ancona
The Franks controlled the land route through Venetia but Narses failed to get permission to pass on the grounds that the Lombard troops in the Byzantine army were bitter enemies of the Franks.[3] He also faced the threat posed by the Gothic commander Teias, who held Verona. Teias with the best Gothic troops hindered a Byzantine crossing of the river Po, positioning himself to strike any attempted passage. To bypass these dangers, Narses adopted a plan proposed by John the Sanguinary, the nephew of consul Vitalian, who knew the region well: the army would march along the river coast while a fleet sailed alongside, ferrying troops across river mouths as needed. Though slow, this strategy allowed the Byzantine army to reach Ravenna safely.[3][30]
By the early summer of 552, Narses was in Italy, aiming to march down the Via Flaminia to Rome. At Ravenna, Narses and his army rested for nine days and they were joined by the remnants of the Byzantine forces under Valerianus and Justinus.[31] He left Justinus with a garrison there and then advanced toward Ariminum. Narses planned to march directly against Totila, who was at Rome, and force a decisive battle with all his available forces. So when the Gothic commander of Ariminum, Usdrilas, taunted and insulted Narses, he avoided him and continued his path to Rome.[30] Historian J. B. Bury noted that the usual coastal route from Ariminum to Rome through Fanum Fortunae and then Via Flaminia was blocked by Gothic control of Petra Pertusa. Narses therefore joined the Via Flaminia west of the gorge of Petra Pertusa, probably near modern Acqualagna, though it is unclear whether he left the coast near Ariminum or Pisaurum.[31]
Upon hearing the news that Narses was at Ravenna, Totila assembled his troops,[b] and moved to intercept the Byzantine forces.[2] Totila was in a bind because he could not protect Rome and other strongholds without splitting his forces, diminishing the strength of his field army.[30]
Military actions
Deployment
But the vast number of the enemy is worthy only to be despised, seeing that they present a collection of men from the greatest possible number of nations. For an alliance which is patched together from many sources gives no firm assurance of either loyalty or power, but being split up in nationality it is naturally divided likewise in purpose. And do not think that Huns and Lombards and Eruli, hired by them with I know not how much money, will ever endanger themselves for them to the point of death. For life with them is not so cheap as to take second place to silver in their estimation, but I well know that after making an appearance of fighting they will desert with all speed, either because they have received their pay, or as carrying out the orders of their own commanders. For even things that seem most delightful,—to say nothing of what happens in war—if they do not turn out in accordance with men's wishes, but if they are forced or hired or subject to any other compulsion, then such things will come no longer to be accounted pleasant, but by reason of the compulsion appear detestable. Remembering these things let us with all enthusiasm engage with the enemy.
— Last part of Totila's speech to his soldiers before the battle,Procopius, The Gothic Wars[32]
In July 552, the Byzantine and Gothic forces encountered each other at Busta Gallorum,[c] near the village of Taginae, located somewhere to the north of modern Gualdo Tadino.[1] Totila had all his forces except for 2,000 soldiers under Teias and pitched his camp at Taginae. Narses pitched his camp near Apennine Mountains and about 100 stades, c.18.4km (11.4mi), away from Totila's camp. Narses sent an envoy to Totila, urging him to surrender or name a day for battle. Totila replied that he would fight in eight days. Narses considered this a stratagem for a surprise attack, and instead, he deployed his army in a defensive position, anticipating an immediate engagement.[5][33]
In the center, he massed the Germanic mercenaries dismounted in a dense formation and placed the Byzantine troops to either side. On each wing, he stationed 4,000 foot-archers, who had a dual purpose. They could be used simultaneously as foot-archers and adopt a pike/spear phalanx formation.[34] The majority of non-foreign Byzantine troops were placed at the flanks, which were protected by the terrain features, and possibly caltrops.[35] Narses and John took post on the left and Valerian on the right wing.[36] He also placed at the extreme left a detachment of 1,500 cavalry behind the hill with instructions that the 500 to rescue any routed Byzantine units, while the rest to attack the Gothic infantry's rear once it entered into action.[37][33]
Skirmishes and delays
The following day, the two armies drew up facing one another at a distance of about two bowshots. There was a small hill that would provide security from flanking attack to the side occupied it, and it was accessible only by a narrow path fronted by a watercourse. The Goths attempted to seize it to outflank the Byzantine position, but Narses anticipated the move and preemptively occupied the hill with fifty infantrymen. Totila sent a cavalry squadron against them, but they were repelled.[5]
Approximate map of the battle of Taginae; the arrows outline approximate army movements.
Having failed to turn Narses' position, and expecting 2,000 reinforcements from Teias, Totila attempted to delay the battle. Totila sent out Coccas, who had deserted from the Byzantines to the Goths, to challenge the Byzantines to a single combat. Coccas was a horseman of great physical strength and rode to the Byzantines within speaking distance to lay the challenge. One of Narses' bodyguards of Armenian origin, named Anzalas, answered the challenge. Coccas charged at Anzalas, aiming with his spear at Anzalas's stomach, but at the last moment, Anzalas swerved his horse and stabbed Coccas at his left side. Coccas fell mortally wounded, and triumphant shouts rang from the Byzantine side.[38][39]
To delay further the engagement, Totila rode to the middle of the battlefield, dressed in shining purple and gold armor. His horse went circles, reared, pirouetted, and ran backwards as Totila tossed and caught his lance into the air. After some time, he rode back to his own army and changed into battle armor. He sent a message to Narses proposing negotiations, but Narses refused. With all these delay tactics, the forenoon passed, but by this time, the reinforcements under Teias had arrived.[38]
His reinforcements having arrived, Totila broke formation and retired for lunch. Narses, wary of a possible ruse, permitted his troops to refresh themselves without leaving their positions. When Totila returned to the field, he found the Byzantines ready. He then formed his whole cavalry into a single body across his whole front, while the infantry was placed in the rear.[40] Totila soon launched a sudden mounted assault upon the Byzantine center, followed by the Gothic infantry. His strategy appeared to be an attempt to break the Byzantine ranks with a concentrated cavalry charge, with the infantry taking advantage of the broken lines caused by the cavalry charge. Totila had given command to all his troops to use spears over any other weapon.[41]
Narses, anticipating Totila's actions, ordered the two archer detachments to turn half round so as to form crescents, each other facing, so that they fire arrows from both sides upon the upcoming Gothic cavalry charge. Caught in the enfilading fire from both sides, the Gothic cavalry sustained heavy casualties, and their attack faltered. The battle at the center was fierce but short-lived. Towards the evening, the Gothic cavalry gave way and started to retreat toward the Gothic infantry, which had not taken part in the fighting. Instead of opening a way for the cavalry to pass and to face the Byzantines, they turned and retreated along with the Gothic cavalry. The retreat became a flight, with the Byzantines pursuing them, and many prisoners were caught but later put to death, resulting in as many as 6,000 casualties occurring until nightfall.[42][43] Among the casualties was Totila, who died during the retreat or from an arrow wound.[d][46]
Aftermath
Byzantine general Narses over the defeated King of Ostrogoths Totila by Reinier van Persijn in 1655
Narses attributed his victory to divine favor. Afterwards, he dismissed his Lombard allies, whose immediate turn to arson and rape made them intolerable. He paid them generously and entrusted Valerian with escorting them to the Italian frontier. Once separated from the Lombards, Valerian encamped outside Verona and opened negotiations with the Gothic garrison, which was willing to surrender. However, the talks collapsed after intervention by the Franks in Venetia. Valerian then withdrew, where Narses ordered him to remain in the region and observe the remaining Gothic forces. Meanwhile, the remnants of Totila's army fled north with Teias to Ticinum, where Teias was proclaimed king and, supported by the Franks and the treasury Totila had stored there, sought to revive Gothic resistance.[47]
Narses and his troops entered Rome in July 552 or 553, and the keys of its gates were delivered to Justinian.[1] In 553, Teias was defeated and killed at the Battle of Mons Lactarius (near Mount Vesuvius) by a Byzantine army under Narses. The Goths failed to appoint a new king, which exposed the fragility of their remaining power.[48] Narses quickly captured a number of cities that lacked Goth garrisons, including Florence, Centumcellae, Volaterrae, and Pisa.[49] While the Battle of Taginae was not the last Byzantine–Gothic engagement, it was decisive enough to break the capability of the Goths to field a viable army to resist the Byzantine recapture of the Italian peninsula.[50]
The defeat of the Goths triggered another request from the Goths north of the River Po to the Franks to intervene. A 75,000-strong Frankish army, under Alamannic dukes Lothar and Buccelin, moved south to Italy in the following year. While the Franks outnumbered the Byzantines, the Byzantines had better supplies and fortifications. In October 554, Narses defeated the Franks in the Battle of Volturno, eliminating them as a threat.[51] The remaining cities in Italy under the Goths started to fall, notable cities were Campsa in 555 and Verona in 561.[52]
Scholarly assessment
Military historian Charles Oman placed the Battle of Taginae in his 1898 analysis within the broader development of medieval warfare, describing it as "the first experiment in the combination of pike and bow" and drawing parallels with later engagements such as the Battle of Crécy. His interpretation was based on the assumption that in late antiquity, the diminishing role of the infantry was replaced by mounted combat. In Byzantine warfare in particular, the rise of mounted archers was seen as decisive in many of Belisarius's victories. Narses's seemingly atypical use of infantry, i.e., his deployment of dismounted Germanic allies in phalanx formation and archers' crescent formation, and the Totila's cavalry charge "with spears only," resulted in a narrative of the brilliant "eunuch-general" outsmarting the brave but impetuous "barbarian king".[53]
Modern military scholarship, however, has rejected this interpretation. Historian Philip Rance argued that infantry remained the core component of Byzantine armies despite the growing importance of cavalry, and attributed this misconception to two factors. First, sixth-century warfare produced few decisive pitched battles in which infantry played an obvious tactical role. Second, Procopius's narrative disproportionately emphasized mounted combat, marginalizing infantry actions in battles and sieges.[54] Narses's army deployment reflected long-standing Byzantine military traditions and the tactical realities of late antique warfare.[55] Likewise, Totila's order to fight "with spears only" demonstrated his recognition that Byzantine archery could best be countered by close-quarters combat, and a surprise attack would have further minimized the impact of Byzantine archers.[56] Rance concluded that Totila had strategically lost the battle before it began, because he was compelled to intercept Narses's numerically superior army before reaching Rome.[57]
12Contemporary Procopius does not provide the exact army size under Narses. There are various estimates by historians: Ian Hughes supported the suggestion of Warren Treadgold of 20,000,[2] while J. B. Bury considered no more than 25,000 (of which 11,000 were foreign mercenaries).[3] E. A. Thompson considered an army size of 25,000–30,000.[4] Ilkka Syvänne provided a higher estimate of 35,000–40,000 men.[5]The Oxford dictionary of Byzantium states that Byzantines had a two-to-one numerical superiority, but does not provide exact numbers.[6]
12Procopius emphasizes the numerical superiority of the Byzantines over the Goths. E. A. Thompson considered an army size of 15,000–20,000, composed of Goths and Byzantine deserters.[4] Historian Ilkka Syvänne provided an estimate of 20,000 men.[5]The Oxford dictionary of Byzantium states that Goths had a two-to-one numerical disadvantage, but does not provide exact numbers.[6]
↑According to one account provided by Procopius, Totila fled with four or five companions and was pursued by Asbad the Gepid and others who did not recognize him. As Asbad was about to strike, a young Goth cried out, "Dog, will you smite your master?" The Gepid nevertheless drove his spear through Totila, though he was wounded in turn by one of the king's followers. The Goths carried their mortally wounded lord for about seven miles, halting only at Caprae, near Tadinum, where he died and was hastily buried. His death and burial place were later revealed to the Byzantines by a Gothic woman; the body was exhumed and identified, and then buried again.[44][45]John Malalas supplements this story with Totilas's blood-stained garments and gem-adorned cap being sent to Narses, who forwarded them to Constantinople as proof to the emperor that his long-defiant enemy was dead.[45]
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