Silicon Shield

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The Silicon Shield is a geopolitical and free enterprise strategy of prevention utilized by the country of Taiwan to deter a military invasion from China, also known as forced unification [1] [2] .

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Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2025/06) Chinese Unification Poll Taiwan.png
Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2025/06)

Overview

The geopolitical strength of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan is often referred to as Taiwan's "Silicon Shield." [4] Microchips are made out of silicon. According to the New York Times, "Taiwan has relied on its dominance of the microchip industry for its defense," and that, "because its semiconductor industry is so important to Chinese manufacturing and the United States consumer economy, actions that threaten its foundries would be too risky." [5]

In 2022 Matthew Pottinger challenged the existence of a Silicon Shield arguing that China does not behave in ways which appear rational to audiences in democratic countries. [6]

Background

CCP Territorial Claims over Taiwan and Neighbors

The Chinese Communist Party has for decades claimed Taiwan is a rogue province and is part of China's sovereign territory through their One-China Policy. Not long after the communists won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, did tensions flare between Beijing, Taipei and Washington DC. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis happened in 1954 and 1958 respectively. It wasn't until 1995 that a Third Taiwan Strait Crisis happened.

Then in January 2019, a potential fourth crisis began to brew when Chinese dictator Xi Jinping declared a desire to invade Taiwan using military force. [7] A month after the Taiwan threat, China proposed the 2019 Hong Kong Extradition Bill which was immediately followed by the infamous 2019-2020 Hong Kong Protests. The totality of threats against their sovereignty, the events in Hong Kong, followed closely by the COVID-19 lockdowns in China and China's Zero-COVID Policy, was not lost on Taiwan regarding their own security. [8] [9] The island nation has made it abundantly clear that they do not want China's One Country, Two Systems. [10]

China has been accused of using what its critics call Salami Slicing Tactics in the South China Sea. Taiwan is not the only neighbor feeling Beijing's squeeze as evidenced by China's nine-dash line claims over virtually the entire South China Sea.

Microchip Foundry Model

Starting in 1987, Taiwan fortuitously orchestrated international relations and began to pull the manufacturing microchips lever using the Foundry Model. To oversimplify it, American companies maintain control over chip design while Taiwan makes the chips. It also doesn't hurt being right next to the supply chain of the largest manufacturer in the world, China, who the US is seemingly always looking for opportunities to stick it to. In any case, the idea of the Foundry Model was conceived of by TSMC founder Morris Chang, and was implemented to great success.

In 1990, the US manufactured 37% of the world's microchips. [11] By 2020, TSMC alone accounted for more than 50% of the global wafer foundry market. [12] Furthermore, according to a briefing from the US International Trade Commission in 2024, Taiwan was "capturing nearly 70 percent of global foundry revenue in recent years." [13]

American Desire to Defend

It wasn't until the 2020's, after the COVID-19 Pandemic, that Americans became astutely aware of the strategic complications accompanying the gradual shift in chip manufacturing. [14] Up to that point, the US was seemingly running on autopilot following the end of the Cold War. Due to supply chain issues that reared their ugly head during the international health crisis, the global economy soon experienced massive price increases known as the 2021–2023 inflation surge.

In 2022, President Joe Biden threatened China with war if they tired to invade Taiwan. [15] A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would drastically increase the cost of microchips. [16] In 2024, two years after America passed the CHIPS and Science Act, Taiwan was still responsible for manufacturing 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors. [17]

Taiwanese Desire for Independence

Polling from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University in Taipei consistently shows a complete lack of desire for Unification, which has never polled above 5% in the 30+ years of results. [18] The annual polls cited measure Taiwanese Independence Stances from 1994-2025. Non Response (26.3% in '95) beat Maintain Status Quo, Decide At Later Date (24.8% '95) in the poll one time. In 2020, Maintain Status Quo, Move Toward Independence (25.8% in '20) and Maintain Status Quo Indefinitely (26.5% in '20) almost beat Maintain Status Quo, Decide At Later Date (28.8% in '20). In the most recent years from the poll, Maintain Status Quo Indefinitely has been winning, (29.4% in '22, 33.2% in '23, 34.1% in '24 and 34.6% in '25) marking the end of Maintain Status Quo, Decide At Later Date's dominance in the polls since 1996.

Security shortfalls

America is looking to grow its foundry industry. [19] Further more, Taiwan is an island and there's no NATO land bridge like there is to Ukraine, making resupply difficult if not impossible after a conflict begins. [20] Once an invasion starts, Taiwan is on their own, especially if US support falls through. [21] No single country has the logistical and military capabilities to aid Taiwan to victory from Chinese invasion besides the US. [22]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ "Silicon Shield 2.0: A Taiwan Perspective". thediplomat.com. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  2. ↑ "Can Taiwan's Silicon Shield Protect It against China's Aggression?". Voice of America. 2021-05-10. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  3. ↑ "Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2025/06)". esc.nccu.edu.tw (in Chinese (Taiwan)). Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  4. ↑ Huang, Joyce (10 May 2021). "Can Taiwan's Silicon Shield Protect It against China's Aggression?". Voice of America. VOA. Archived from the original on 22 January 2022. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
  5. ↑ Barnes, Julian E. (26 January 2022). "How the Computer Chip Shortage Could Incite a U.S. Conflict With China". The New York Times . Archived from the original on 26 January 2022. Retrieved 27 January 2022.
  6. ↑ Staff Writer. "'Silicon shield' not enough: expert". taipeitimes.com. Taipei Times. Archived from the original on 17 January 2023. Retrieved 17 January 2023.
  7. ↑ Kuo, Lily (2019-01-02). "'All necessary means': Xi Jinping reserves right to use force against Taiwan". The Guardian. ISSN   0261-3077 . Retrieved 2025-11-21.
  8. ↑ Institute, Global Taiwan (2020-09-23). "A Political Analysis of Taiwanese Perceptions of Hong Kong Protests". Global Taiwan Institute. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  9. ↑ "Taiwan's people are not impressed with China's "Zero COVID" status". Brookings. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  10. ↑ "Taiwan does not want China's 'one country, two systems,' president says". NBC News. 2025-10-31. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  11. ↑ "Turning the Tide for Semiconductor Manufacturing in the U.S." Semiconductor Industry Association. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  12. ↑ "Taiwan to remain largest semiconductor material market in 2020, 2021 - Focus Taiwan" (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2020-09-23. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  13. ↑ "Wayback Machine" (PDF). www.usitc.gov. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2025-10-04. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  14. ↑ Lee, Yen Nee (2021-03-16). "2 charts show how much the world depends on Taiwan for semiconductors". CNBC. Retrieved 2025-11-21.
  15. ↑ "Biden again says US would defend Taiwan if China attacks". 2022-09-19. Retrieved 2025-11-21.
  16. ↑ Klingler-Vidra, Robyn (2023-06-09). "The microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone". The Conversation. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  17. ↑ Affairs, Technology in Global (2024-05-27). "Semiconductor Manufacturing Facilities Map". Technology in Global Affairs. Retrieved 2025-11-21.
  18. ↑ "Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2025/06)". esc.nccu.edu.tw (in Chinese (Taiwan)). Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  19. ↑ Peterson, Dylan (2024-05-08). "America Projected to Triple Semiconductor Manufacturing Capacity by 2032, the Largest Rate of Growth in the World". Semiconductor Industry Association. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  20. ↑ ""Professionals Talk Logistics": Why Resupplying Taiwan in a Future War Will Be Harder Than Resupplying Ukraine | The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)" . Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  21. ↑ Chang, Wayne (2025-11-18). "Taiwan rolls out handbook on how to prepare for natural disasters – and a Chinese invasion". CNN. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
  22. ↑ Ong, Peter (2023-01-30). "CSIS Wargame: China's Invasion of Taiwan in 2026". Naval News. Retrieved 2025-11-22.
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