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Trademark dilution is a trademark law concept giving the owner of a famous trademark standing to forbid others from using that mark in a way that would lessen its uniqueness. In most cases, trademark dilution involves an unauthorized use of another's trademark on products that do not compete with, and have little connection with, those of the trademark owner. For example, a famous trademark used by one company to refer to hair care products might be diluted if another company began using a similar mark to refer to breakfast cereals or spark plugs. [1]
Dilution is a basis of trademark infringement that applies only to famous marks. With a non-famous mark, the owner of the mark must show that the allegedly infringing use creates a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the product or service being identified by the allegedly infringing use: it is highly unlikely a likelihood of confusion will be found if the products or services are in unrelated markets. With a famous mark, any other use has the potential for confusion, since consumers may assume affiliation with the owner of the mark regardless of the product or service.
Trademark law traditionally concerned itself with situations where an unauthorized party sold goods that are directly competitive with or at least related to those sold by the trademark owner. A trademark is diluted when the use of similar or identical trademarks in other non-competing markets means that the trademark in and of itself will lose its capacity to signify a single source. In other words, unlike ordinary trademark law, dilution protection extends to trademark uses that do not confuse consumers regarding who has made a product. Instead, dilution protection law aims to protect sufficiently strong trademarks from losing their singular association in the public mind with a particular product, perhaps imagined if the trademark were to be encountered independently of any product (e.g., just the word Pepsi spoken, or on a billboard). [1]
The strength required for a trademark to deserve dilution protection differs among jurisdictions, though it generally includes the requirement that it must be distinctive, famous, or even unique. Such trademarks would include instantly recognizable brand names, such as Coca-Cola, Kleenex, Kool-Aid, or Sony, and unique terms that were invented (such as Exxon) rather than surnames (such as Ford or Zamboni) or ordinary words in language. Some jurisdictions require additional registration of these trademarks as defensive marks in order to qualify for dilution protection.
Another way of describing the necessary strength of a trademark may establish some basis for dilution protection from a consumer-confusion standpoint. Truly famous trademarks are likely to be seen in many different contexts due to branching out or simple sponsorship, to the extent that there may be very few markets, if any, that a consumer would be surprised to see that famous trademark involved in. A prime example may be the past involvement of Coca-Cola in clothing lines.
One further use of the protection of trademark dilution is for controversial images, including the Cleveland Guardians' former mascot and logo, Chief Wahoo, while the team was known as the Cleveland Indians at the time along with the Washington Commanders, formerly known as the Redskins. In those cases, a limited selection of merchandise is distributed solely in their physical team stores of their former controversial Native American logos, both to maintain the trademarks and prevent others from usurping them, and to null the further use of those logos in public.
Dilution is sometimes divided into two related concepts: blurring, or essentially basic dilution, which "blurs" a mark from association with only one product to signify other products in other markets (such as "Kodak shoes"); and tarnishment, which is the weakening of a mark through unsavory or unflattering associations. [2] Not all dilution protection laws recognize tarnishment as an included concept.
The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with North America and do not represent a worldwide view of the subject.(July 2019) |
In Canada, the legal basis can be found in s. 22 of the Trade-marks Act :
22. (1) no person shall use a trade mark registered by another person in a manner that is likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching thereto. (2) In any action in respect of a use of a trade mark contrary to subsection (1), the court may decline to order the recovery of damages or profits and may permit the defendant to continue to sell wares marked with the trade-mark that were in his possession or under his control at the time notice was given to him that the owner of the registered trade-mark complained of the use of the trade-mark. [3]
It is commonly acknowledged that goodwill is constituted by the reputation of a trade mark and its persuasive effect. [4]
In the Clairol case, [5] the court stated that goodwill can be depreciated through "reduction of the esteem in which the mark itself is held or through the direct persuasion and enticing of customers who could otherwise be expected to buy or continue to buy goods bearing the trade mark". The court added that the test of confusion is irrelevant here and that the "test is the likelihood of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching to the trade mark" and that this result could be obtained without actual deception/confusion. [5]
S. 22 thus steps where confusion fails to tread. Even if there is no actual risk that the consumer might be confused between the two products, the trade mark owner will still be able to prevent another person from using his/her trade mark if that use is likely to depreciate the value of the trade mark.
In the Veuve Clicquot case, [6] the trade mark of the famous French champagne was used by a small chain of women's clothing store that was trading in eastern Quebec and Ottawa. According to the court, s. 22 applies even where a defendant's wares or services do not compete with the plaintiff's and their mark are not identical. The marks were not identical ("Cliquot" and "Veuve clicquot") and the risk of confusing the champagne brand and a clothing store was low. However the court ruled that the only element needed was the ability of an average consumer to recognize the first distinctive character. Even if the trade mark is not that well known, the fact that a significant goodwill is attached to it might be enough for the court to find the use by another person unlawful. [7] However, in that particular case, the court claimed that the plaintiff Veuve Clicquot failed to prove that the linkage between champagne and clothing was likely to cause depreciation.
In the Perrier case, [8] the plaintiff, a French company, was the bottler and distributor of spring water. It sought an injunction to restrain another company base in Ontario from advertising and distributing bottled water in association with the name "Pierre eh!" claiming that the value of the goodwill attached to the French trade mark would likely be depreciated. The plaintiff succeeded on section 22 to stop the use of "Pierre Eh!" on bottled water.
The plaintiff has to prove the elements of section 22, particularly that the use would likely depreciate the value of the goodwill of the claimant's mark. A precision has been made by Vaver, that the fact "that the use could well cause depreciation is not enough. The use must actually have caused depreciation". [7]
The use of Section 22 was restricted in the Clairol case to the use "in the technical trade-mark sense". For example, unions are allowed to use the trade mark to caricature because caricature or criticism is not a trade mark infringement, nor event a use of the trade mark, if it occurs outside "the normal course of trade". (see also The Michelin v CAW case. In that case, the court rejected the trade mark infringement argument because no one was planning on using the trade mark to sell a product).
Prior to specifically targeted laws being adopted, dilution protection was used in some U.S. jurisdictions to attack domain name infringement of trademarks (see Cybersquatting). For example, in the 1998 case of Panavision International v. Toeppen, defendant Dennis Toeppen registered the domain name www.panavision.com, and posted aerial views of the city of Pana, Illinois, on the site. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that trademark dilution occurred when potential customers of Panavision could not find its web site at panavision.com, and instead were forced to search through other (less obvious) domain names. The fact that potential customers might be discouraged from locating Panavision's legitimate website, coupled with evidence that Toeppen was in the business of registering domain names for profit, led the court to find that Toeppen's conduct "diminished the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision's goods and services on the Internet", and thus constituted dilution. [9]
Lately, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (H.R. 683), was signed into law, which overturned Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. , 537 U.S. 418 (2003). Moseley held the plaintiff needed to prove actual dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"). The new law revises the FTDA, requiring the plaintiff to show only that the defendant's mark is likely to cause dilution. [10] However, the revision also reduced the universe of marks falling under its protection, requiring that marks be nationally well known to qualify for protection from dilution.
For example, when Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., a New Hampshire-based coffee company, sold its coffee under the trademarks that included the words "Charbucks Blend" and "Mr. Charbucks," Starbucks Corporation sued, claiming that the use of the word "Charbucks" diluted the "Starbucks" mark by both blurring and tarnishment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided [11] that marks need not be "substantially similar" under the FTDA for dilution to occur when other factors supporting a finding of dilution, such as the distinctiveness of the famous mark and the degree of its recognition, were present. In its decision, the court found that these other factors may be sufficient to support a dilution claim and remanded the case to the district court in order to determine whether dilution had in fact occurred. [12] [ unreliable source? ] The district court ruled that sales of Charbucks did not violate the trademark and could continue. [11]
Trade dress is the characteristics of the visual appearance of a product or its packaging that signify the source of the product to consumers. Trade dress is an aspect of trademark law, which is a form of intellectual property protection law.
A trademark is a word, phrase, or logo that identifies the source of goods or services. Trademark law protects a business' commercial identity or brand by discouraging other businesses from adopting a name or logo that is "confusingly similar" to an existing trademark. The goal is to allow consumers to easily identify the producers of goods and services and avoid confusion.
Passing off is a common law tort which can be used to enforce unregistered trade mark rights. The tort of passing off protects the goodwill of a trader from misrepresentation.
The Lanham (Trademark) Act (Pub. L.Tooltip Public Law 79–489, 60 Stat. 427, enacted July 5, 1946, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. is the primary federal trademark statute in the United States. In other words, the Act is the primary statutory foundation of United States trademark law at the federal level. The Act prohibits a number of activities, including trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and false advertising.
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d),(passed as part of Pub. L.Tooltip Public Law 106–113 ) is a U.S. law enacted in 1999 that established a cause of action for registering, trafficking in, or using a domain name confusingly similar to, or dilutive of, a trademark or personal name. The law was designed to thwart "cybersquatters" who register Internet domain names containing trademarks with no intention of creating a legitimate web site, but instead plan to sell the domain name to the trademark owner or a third party. Critics of the ACPA complain about the non-global scope of the Act and its potential to restrict free speech, while others dispute these complaints. Before the ACPA was enacted, trademark owners relied heavily on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) to sue domain name registrants. The FTDA was enacted in 1995 in part with the intent to curb domain name abuses. The legislative history of the FTDA specifically mentions that trademark dilution in domain names was a matter of Congressional concern motivating the Act. Senator Leahy stated that "it is my hope that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others".
Canadian trademark law provides protection to marks by statute under the Trademarks Act and also at common law. Trademark law provides protection for distinctive marks, certification marks, distinguishing guises, and proposed marks against those who appropriate the goodwill of the mark or create confusion between different vendors' goods or services. A mark can be protected either as a registered trademark under the Act or can alternately be protected by a common law action in passing off.
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 is a United States federal law which protects famous trademarks from uses that dilute their distinctiveness, even in the absence of any likelihood of confusion or competition. It went into effect on January 16, 1996. This act has been largely supplanted by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), signed into law on October 6, 2006.
A trademark is a type of intellectual property consisting of a recognizable sign, design, or expression that identifies a product or service from a particular source and distinguishes it from others. A trademark owner can be an individual, business organization, or any legal entity. A trademark may be located on a package, a label, a voucher, or on the product itself. Trademarks used to identify services are sometimes called service marks.
Initial interest confusion is a legal doctrine under trademark law that permits a finding of infringement when there is temporary confusion that is dispelled before the purchase is made. Generally, trademark infringement is based on the likelihood of confusion for a consumer in the marketplace. This likelihood is typically determined using a multi-factor test that includes factors like the strength of the mark and evidence of any actual confusion. However, trademark infringement that relies on Initial interest confusion does not require a likelihood of confusion at the time of sale; the mark must only capture the consumer's initial attention.
Trademark infringement is a violation of the exclusive rights attached to a trademark without the authorization of the trademark owner or any licensees. Infringement may occur when one party, the "infringer", uses a trademark which is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark owned by another party, especially in relation to products or services which are identical or similar to the products or services which the registration covers. An owner of a trademark may commence civil legal proceedings against a party which infringes its registered trademark. In the United States, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 criminalized the intentional trade in counterfeit goods and services.
In Canada, passing off is both a common law tort and a statutory cause of action under the Canadian Trade-marks Act referring to the deceptive representation or marketing of goods or services by competitors in a manner that confuses consumers. The law of passing off protects the goodwill of businesses by preventing competitors from passing off their goods as those of another.
Under Canadian trade-mark law, "confusion" is where a trade-mark is similar enough to another trade-mark to cause consumers to equate them. Likelihood of confusion plays a central role in trade-mark registration, infringement and passing-off. Whether a trade-mark or trade-name is confusing is a question of fact. The role of confusion in trade-mark law is analogous to the role of substantial infringement in patent law.
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States holding that, under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a claim of trademark dilution requires proof of actual dilution, not merely a likelihood of dilution. This decision was later superseded by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA).
Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., [1992] 3 SCR 120, is a Supreme Court of Canada judgment on trademark law and more specifically the issue of passing off. Ciba-Geigy brought an action against Apotex and Novopharm, alleging that their versions of the prescription drug metoprolol were causing confusion to the public due to their similar appearance to Ciba-Geigy's version of the drug Lopresor. On appeal to the SCC, the issue was whether a plaintiff is required to establish that the public affected by the risk of confusion includes not only health care professionals but also the patients who consume the drugs in a passing off action involving prescription drugs of a similar appearance. The Supreme Court held affirmatively on this question.
Intel Corporation v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd., case C-252/07, was a case of the European Court of Justice in which the ECJ interpreted the meaning of Article 4 (4)(a) of the EU Trade Marks Directive. The court considered what elements are required to show that a later mark was causing dilution to an earlier mark. The case laid out a clear basis on which grounds a court can find that trademark dilution has occurred.
Dennis Toeppen is an American entrepreneur and owner of bus company Suburban Express. He was a party to two cases of first impression relating to domain name registration.
Masterpiece Inc. v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc. [2011] 2 S.C.R. 387, is a Supreme Court of Canada decision concerning the relevant criteria and basic approach to be undertaken by the Court in analyzing the likelihood of confusion in Canadian trademark law under the Trade-marks Act, 1985 The test adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada is whether, as a matter of first impression, the "casual consumer somewhat in a hurry" who encounters the Alavida trade-mark, with no more than an imperfect recollection of any one of the Masterpiece Inc. trade-marks or trade-name, would be likely to think that Alavida was the same source of retirement residence services as Masterpiece Inc. Furthermore, Rothstein J. affirmed a consumer protection principle of trade-marks as an indication of provenance, "providing consumers with a reliable indication of the expected source of wares or services." Rothstein J. delivering the majority judgment of the Court held that Alavida's proposed trade-mark "Masterpiece Living" was confusing with at least one of Masterpiece Inc.'s trade-marks when the registration application was filed on December 1, 2005. Alavida was therefore deemed to be not entitled to registration of its proposed marks, allowing then for the Registrar of Trade-marks to expunge Alavida's registration from the registrar.
Rosetta Stone v. Google, 676 F.3d 144 was a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that challenged the legality of Google's AdWords program. The Court overturned a grant of summary judgment for Google that had held Google AdWords was not a violation of trademark law.
Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International and Another is a landmark decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa on the intersection between freedom of expression and trademark law. The case concerned the proper interpretation of anti-trademark dilution provisions of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 in the context of the sale of T-shirts parodying established commercial brands. The court's unanimous judgment, delivered on 27 May 2005, was written by Justice Dikgang Moseneke.