The estimated hydropower potential of Mekong River Basin about 58,930 Megawatts (MW).[1][2][3] As of February 2024, there are an estimated 167 Hydropower Plants (HPPs) in the Mekong, with a combined installed capacity of some 36,376.3 MW. An additional 20 HPPs are currently under construction and at various stages of completion. These have a combined installed capacity of an additional 4,535.5 MW.
The single most significant impact on the use of water and its management in the Mekong Region is hydropower.[4] These developments in the Mekong River Basin have resulted in substantial environmental and social impacts, which are summarised below. These have fuelled controversy [5] and hydropower is a prominent part of the discussion around the river, its basin, and its management. This debate occurs in both the academic literature, as well as the media, and is a focus for many activist groups.[6][7]
The countries that share the Mekong River Basin have all sought the large-scale infrastructural development of its waters. As part of China's Great Western Development program, large-scale hydropower development in China's Yunnan Province has been substantial,[8][9][10] on the Mekong, the Jinsha, and the Red rivers. Large amounts of Yunnan's hydropower is exported eastwards to energy intensive load centres, such as Guangxi and Guangdong.[11] Yunnan, however, has large electricity over-supply problems, which has led to significant hydropower curtailment.[11][12]
The Lao government has also prioritized hydropower development, primarily as an export commodity. In 2021, almost 82% of Lao electricity was exported, mostly to Thailand.[13] Power production (from all sources, including hydropower) contributed 12.8% to national GDP in 2022, while electricity exports comprised almost 29% of total export values in the same year,[14] and investments in electricity production represented 79% of total foreign direct investment in 2021.[15]
Most of Cambodia's hydropower has been developed in the southwest of the country, outside of the Mekong River Basin.[16][17] Its largest HPP, the Lower Sesan 2 is, however, within the Mekong River Basin, and generates some 20% of the country's electricity.[18] Cambodia has ruled out developing hydropower on the Mekong mainstream,[19] but multiple dams are planned for construction in Mekong tributary catchments. Cambodia also exports electricity directly from the Don Sahong HPP, a southern Lao dam located on the Mekong mainstream.[20]
In Thailand, little technically exploitable hydropower potential remains in its parts of the Mekong River Basin. Most of its HPPs were developed in the 1980s and 1990s, and accompanied by large-scale irrigation infrastructure development as part of the massive Kong-Chi-Mun Project,[21] more recently rearticulated as the Khong-Loei-Chi-Mun Project [22][23] Large-scale energy infrastructure in Thailand has been met with strong resistance - for example, the Assembly of the Poor's opposition to the Pak Mun HPP, the last dam to be commissioned in Thailand. This has forced Thailand to export the social and environmental externalities of hydropower construction and operation to neighbouring states.[24][25]
While there are multiple HPPs planned for Myanmar parts of the Mekong River Basin,[26] years of political instability have generally impended hydropower development.
Vietnam's Mekong hydropower development is concentrated in its Central Highlands. It does not appear as if any technically-exploitable hydropower potential remains. Here, hydropower has also been accompanied by significant irrigation development. Vietnam's hydropower investments in this area includes sizeable dams on two key Mekong tributaries, the Sesan and the Srepok rivers.
Mekong mainstream hydropower plants
HPPs on the Mekong mainstream have aroused particular environmental concerns.[27][28] The majority of these are based in China's Yunnan Province. Table 1 below indicates the status of each of these HPPs.
Table 1: Hydropower plants on the Mekong mainstream[29]
The environmental impacts of Mekong hydropower development are generally well studied and understood. Some the key impacts of Mekong hydropower are as follows:
Hydrological impacts: about 75% of annual flows through the Mekong system occur between late June and early November,[30][31] which drives ecological productivity throughout the system.[32][33] This surge of water is known as the 'flood pulse' and dams (of all kinds) will contribute to its diminution. Wet season flows can be expected to reduce, while dry season flows can be expected to increase.[34] This has significant implications for the Mekong's ecology.
Fisheries impacts: the Mekong's fisheries are threatened in multiple ways, most importantly by dams and excessive fishing pressure.[35] Dams affect fisheries by:[36]
Acting as barriers to fish migration - either as fish try to migrate upstream to spawn; or for trapping fish fry or eggs as these travel downstream.
Interrupting natural flood cycles to which fish have evolved and adapted to over thousands of years.
Riverbed hardening. Dams typically release water in bursts, which removes smaller sediments like silt, sand, and gravel, as well as aquatic plants and animals and debris from vegetation. As a result, the bedrock below the dam becomes exposed and loses its value as a fish habitat.
Trapping sediment, a significant source of nutrition for fish.[37]
Altering water temperature. Water released from a dam is typically colder than prevailing temperatures downstream of the dam. This has a direct impact on fish habitats and populations.
Hydropeaking, which refers to the release of water from HPPs when demand is highest (usually during the day), and much smaller releases when demand is low. This also affects fisheries through the rapid alteration and high and low river flows. Globally, hydropeaking has been found to impact fish biodiversity, and fish community composition.[36][38][39]
The fisheries impact of all existing and planned mainstream dams will be most felt in Cambodia (which will experience three-quarters of the loss), while the balance will be experienced in Vietnam, Lao PDR and Thailand.[39] In terms of tonnages, this will represent a loss of between 580-750,000 Mt per year.[39]
In another study by the Mekong River Commission, fisheries assessments conducted in 2020 suggested that the annual finfish yield from the lower Mekong (i.e. those parts of the basin that fall within Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam)) was between 1.51 to 1.71 million tonnes, while the harvest of other aquatic animals (OAAs) was approximately 443,000 tons. This is approximately 25-30% less than yield estimates conducted in 2000 and 2010. The estimated value of the fish catch varies from USD 7.13 billion to USD 8.37 billion annually. In addition, the estimated value of the OAA harvest is approximately USD 1.13 billion.[40]
Sediment impacts: in the Mekong, some 40% of the sediments that reach the Mekong Delta are derived from the Three Parallel Rivers area in Yunnan, while some 52% come from the Central Highlands of Vietnam.[41] The balance comes from those parts of the basin in northern Thailand, and the Tibetan gorges.[41][42] Sediment loads are lowest during the dry season and highest during the first months of the flood season, when loose sediments weathered during the dry season are washed into rivers.[41][43]
Although suspended sediment concentrations in the Mekong have been monitored since 1994, the ‘pre-disturbance’ sediment load is unknown. Nevertheless, studies can demonstrate very significant declines in the Mekong's sediment load since 2001. At Chiang Saen, sediment flows have decreased from about 85 million metric tonnes per year (Mt/yr) to 10.8 million Mt/yr, meaning that the sediment contributions from China to the Mekong mainstream has decreased to about 16% of all sediments in the Lower Mekong as compared to about 55% historically.[44] A similar trend is seen down-stream at Pakse, where average loads have decreased from 147 Mt/yr to 66 Mt/yr between 1994 and 2013.[44]
The declining sediment load has significant implications for the Mekong Delta, recharging sediments otherwise washed away by the sea, consumed by sea-level rise, or in combination with land subsidence. Studies of the possible long-term consequences of system-wide sediment reductions suggest that it is likely that nearly half of the Delta's land surface will be below sea level by 2100, with the remaining areas impacted by saline intrusion from the sea and frequent flooding.[42] Much of the Mekong's sediment decline is attributed to the 'trapping efficiency' of dams.[42][44][45][46]
Forest impacts: there is a two-way relationship between (reservoir) hydropower a deforestation in the catchments they draw on. In the absence of soil conservation measures, deforestation often contributes to increased erosion, which is then deposited in the reservoir, a reducing reservoir capacity. The 1,570 MW Manwan HPP on the Mekong mainstream in China, for example, lost 21.5–22.8% of the total storage capacity to sediments in its first 11 years of operation.[47] But hydropower can also drive deforestation. Reservoirs need to be cleared of vegetation before filling, and given the size of some reservoirs, the area subjected to clearance can be considerable. The deforestation impact of reservoir clearance in the Mekong is unknown. In 2008, an estimated 60% of the timber harvested in Laos was approved under special quotas for hydroelectric and other infra-structure projects.[48] It has been estimated that hydropower development contributes to the loss of 13,100 ha of forest a year in Laos.[49] Over 2006/07, the Lao national timber quota was temporarily raised by 400,000 m3 to allow for logging specifically related to the development of the Nam Theun 2 HPP.[50] It has been argued that logging represents an additional motivation to hydropower development, and is frequently linked to corrupt actors[clarification needed].[51]
River connectivity: 'connectivity' refers to the degree to which matter and organisms can move among spatially defined units in a natural system. ‘River connectivity’ is typically described as longitudinal (between a river's main channel and its floodplains), lateral (between upstream areas in the river channel or catchment, and downstream ones), and vertical (within the water column, between upper water layers and lower ones.[52][53] River connectivity can be conceptualised as a continuum from 'fully connected' to 'disconnected'. River connectivity strongly influences the resistance and resilience of rivers to natural and human-induced disturbances.[53]
Dams interrupt connectivity, and so fish cannot swim upstream to spawn or breed; dams affect water quality in a variety of ways, altering upstream ecosystems so that they contrast starkly with downstream ones. Dam reservoirs are lacustrine (lake-like) environments unlike rapidly flowing waters downstream; upstream, the water is heavy with sediments, while downstream it is not; above the dam, the water is cold, while below it, it is warmer.
A 2014 study explores an HPP build-out of 81 proposed dams across the Mekong Basin.[54] If this were to occur, it would reduce the Mekong's connectivity to just 11% by 2022. This build-out – already well advanced – would make the Mekong one of the most heavily impounded rivers in the world.
Greenhouse gases: hydropower reservoirs do emit greenhouses gases (GHGs), although the volumes and types depend on the reservoir's latitude and age.[55] Young reservoirs tend to release larger amounts of GHGs than older ones due to the availability of decomposing vegetation and other organic matter soon after initial inundation; tropical reservoirs tend to release more than temperate ones due to higher rates of net primary production.[55][56]
In the Mekong, one study looked at 119 reservoirs across the basin, and found that these emit be-tween 0.2–1,994kg of CO2 per MWh over a 100 year lifetime with a median of 26kg of CO per MWh.[57] Hydropower reservoirs that also provided irrigation water (22) had generally higher emissions reaching over 22,000kg of CO2 per MWh.[57] Yearly emissions ranged from 26 to 181,3 000 Mt of CO2 per year over a 100-year lifetime, with a median of 28,000 Mt of CO2 per year. Altogether, 82% of hydropower reservoirs (119) and 45% of reservoirs also providing irrigation (22) had emissions comparable to other renewable energy sources (<190kg CO2 per MWh), while the rest had higher emissions equivalent to fossil fuel power plants (>380kg CO2 per MWh).[57] These results, the study authors caution, are tentative and they suggest that hydropower in the Mekong Region cannot be considered categorically as low-emission energy. Instead, the GHG emissions of hydropower should be carefully considered case-by-case.[57]
Mekong hydropower and resettlement of affected communities
People are affected by hydropower in a diversity of ways. Most immediately are those displaced by an HPP (i.e. resettled due to the presence of the dam itself, its reservoir, and/or ancillary buildings and infrastructure). Then there are those who will be affected by fisheries and sediment losses, and/or losses arising due to hydrological changes. Such populations may be eligible for compensation. Finally, there are broader impacts, related to the ways in which hydropower affects national economies. This section focuses on involuntary displacement and resettlement due to hydropower in the Mekong.
Figures for the number of people displaced by hydropower development are scattered and not generally available. Where data are available, they are as follows:
Table 4: Resettlement of hydropower-displaced people in the Mekong River Basin[29]
In 2011, it was estimated that hydropower development in Laos would result in the resettlement of between 100,000 and 280,000 people.[58] In 2019, the Lao Minister of Energy and Mines estimated that, up until that point, 60,000 people from 12,000 families from more than 200 villages across Laos had been resettled to make way for power projects.[59] Similar estimates are not available for other parts of the Mekong River Basin.
The Mekong or Mekong River is a trans-boundary river in East Asia and Southeast Asia. It is the world's twelfth-longest river and the third-longest in Asia with an estimated length of 4,909 km (3,050 mi) and a drainage area of 795,000 km2 (307,000 sq mi), discharging 475 km3 (114 cu mi) of water annually. From its headwaters in the Tibetan Plateau, the river runs through Southwest China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and southern Vietnam. The extreme seasonal variations in flow and the presence of rapids and waterfalls in the Mekong make navigation difficult. Even so, the river is a major trade route between Tibet and Southeast Asia. The construction of hydroelectric dams along the Mekong in the 2000s through the 2020s has caused serious problems for the river's ecosystem, including the exacerbation of drought.
Tonlé Sap is a lake in the northwest of Cambodia. Belonging to the Mekong River system, Tonlé is the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia and one of the most diverse and productive ecosystems in the world. It has been designated as a Biosphere Reserve by UNESCO in 1997 due to its high biodiversity. In the 21st century, the lake and its surrounding ecosystems are under increasing pressure from deforestation, infrastructure development and climate change.
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is an "...inter-governmental organisation that works directly with the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam to jointly manage the shared water resources and the sustainable development of the Mekong River". Its mission is "To promote and coordinate sustainable management and development of water and related resources for the countries' mutual benefit and the people's well-being".
Dams and reservoirs in Laos are the cornerstone of the Lao government's goal of becoming the "battery of Asia".
The Mekong giant catfish, is a large, threatened species of catfish in the shark catfish family (Pangasiidae), native to the Mekong basin in Southeast Asia and adjacent China. It is considered critically endangered due to overfishing and habitat loss.
The Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project, or simply NT2, is a hydroelectric dam on the Nam Theun River in Laos. Commercial operation of the plant began in April 2010. The scheme diverts water from the Nam Theun, a tributary of the Mekong River, to the Xe Bang Fai River, enabling a generation capacity of 1,075 MW, from a 350 m (1,148 ft) difference in elevation between the reservoir and the power station.
The Nam Ngum Dam is a hydroelectric dam on the Nam Ngum River, a major tributary of the Mekong River in Laos. It was the first hydropower dam built in the Lao PDR.
The Jullien's golden carp is a species of endangered freshwater ray-finned fish in the family Cyprinidae found in Southeast Asian river basins. Its existence is being threatened by various economic activities, such as large-scale agriculture and the building of dams for hydropower.
The Sirindhorn Dam is in Sirindhorn District, Ubon Ratchatani, Thailand. It impounds the Lam Dom Noi River, and its reservoir is the province's largest water resource. The dam was commissioned in 1971 to serve as a hydropower facility as well as to supply irrigation water. The dam was named after Princess Royal Sirindhorn. All of the electricity generated by the dam is destined for domestic markets. The dam was constructed and is owned and operated by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand and is located in the Mekong River Basin, just upstream from the controversial Pak Mun Dam.
The Sambor Dam is a proposed dam and hydroelectric power station on the Mekong River south of Sambor village in Prek Kampi District, Kratie Province, Cambodia. If built, it would be the lowest dam of the Mekong's mainstream dams, and largest in Cambodia.
The Stung Battambang 1 is a dam planned for construction on the Battambang River in Cambodia. The river is a major tributary of the Tonlé Sap. Of the two dams planned for this river, the larger is the Stung Battambang 1. A letter of commitment has been issued by the Cambodian authorities for a pre-feasibility study of the dam by an unknown Korean company
The Lower Se San 2 Dam is a hydroelectric dam under development on the Se San River in Stung Treng Province, northeastern Cambodia. The Se San River is a major tributary of the Mekong River. The dam site is located 25 kilometres (16 mi) east of the provincial capital, also named Stung Treng. The first turbine began producing electricity in November 2017. The dam was officially opened on December 18, 2018.
The Lower Se San/Sre Pok 2 scheme is a proposed hydroelectric dam to be located in Stung Treng Province, Cambodia on the Tonle Sre Pok some 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) upstream of its confluence with the Se San, and about 37 kilometres (23 mi) upstream of the confluence of the combined Sre Pok, Se San and Se Kong rivers with the Mekong mainstream.
The Stung Treng Dam is a proposed hydroelectric dam on the Mekong River in Stung Treng Province, Cambodia. It would be located on the mainstream of the Lower Mekong River. The project is controversial for several reasons, including its possible impact on the fisheries, as well as other ecological and environmental factors.
The Xayaburi Dam is a run-of-river hydroelectric dam on the Lower Mekong River, approximately 30 kilometres (19 mi) east of Sainyabuli (Xayaburi) town in northern Laos. Commercial operation of the dam started in October 2019. The main purpose of the dam is to produce hydroelectric power, 95% of which is to be purchased by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). The project is surrounded in controversy due to complaints from downstream riparians and environmentalists. Preliminary construction began in early-2012, but work on the dam itself was suspended shortly thereafter due to complaints from Cambodia and Vietnam downstream. After making modifications to the dam's design, Laos started construction with a ceremony on 7 November 2012. The Xayaburi Dam is the first of the 11 dams planned on the lower Mekong.
The Don Sahong is a hydroelectric dam commissioned in 2020 on the Mekong River in Siphandone area of Champasak Province, Laos, less than two kilometers upstream of the Laos–Cambodia border.
The Houay Ho is a dam located in Samakkhixay District of Attapeu Province, Laos, 160 km (99 mi) east of Pakse and 30 km (19 mi) northwest of Attapeu. The project is considered the first privately financed joint venture 'build-operate-transfer' (BOT) hydropower project in Laos. It has installed capacity of 152.1 megawatts (204,000 hp), almost all of which is exported to Thailand.
This page describes energy and electricity production, consumption and import in Laos.
Laos is a nation with plentiful surface water and broad rivers, but outside of cities there is little infrastructure to make that water clean and accessible. Very little improvement has been made since the end of the Laotian Civil War in 1975, especially compared to peer nations such as Thailand. By 2015, 76% of Laotians nationwide were estimated to have access to “improved” water, while 71% were estimated to have access to “improved” sanitation.
The Nam Ou cascade hydropower project is a series of seven hydroelectric dams along the Nam Ou river which are located in the provinces of Phongsaly and Luang Prabang in northern Laos. The project is managed by the Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina) and the Lao government. The project is the series of dams include seven levels of reservoirs in an attempt to mitigate ecological deterioration. The construction of the hydropower project is being completed in two phases. Phase I of the dams, including Nam Ou 2, Nam Ou 5, and Nam Ou 6 began operating on May 12, 2016. Phase II of the dams, including Nam Ou 1, 3, 4, and 7 is expected to be completed in 2020.
↑ J. Dore; Y. Xiaogang; K. Yuk-shing (2007). "China's energy reforms and hydropower expansion in Yunnan". In L. Lebel; J. Dore; R. Daniel; Y.S. Koma (eds.). Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. pp.55–92. ISBN978-9749511251.
↑ CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food. "CPWF Mekong". Archived from the original on April 28, 2012. Retrieved May 19, 2012.
↑ Yeophantong, Pichamon (2014). "China's Lancang Dam Cascade and Transnational Activism in the Mekong Region: Who's Got the Power?". Asian Survey. 54 (4): 700–24. doi:10.1525/as.2014.54.4.700.
↑ Magee, Darrin (2006). "Powershed Politics: Yunnan Hydropower under Great Western Development". The China Quarterly. 185 (2006): 23–41. doi:10.1017/S0305741006000038. S2CID154714463.
↑ Tilt, Brian (2015). Dams and development in China: the moral economy of water and power. New York: Colombia University Press. ISBN978-0-231-17010-9.
↑ Simpson, Adam (2007). "The environment – energy security nexus: critical analysis of an energy 'love triangle' in Southeast Asia". Third World Quarterly. 28 (3): 539–554. doi:10.1080/01436590701192710. S2CID154819073.
↑ Piman, Thanapon; Cochrane, Thomas A.; Arias, Maricio E.; Green, Anthony; Dat, N.D. (1999). "Assessment of Flow Changes from Hydropower Development and Operations in Sekong, Sesan, and Srepok Rivers of the Mekong Basin". Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management. 139 (6): 723–732. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0000286.
↑ Campbell, Ian C. (2009). "Introduction". In Campbell, Ian C. (ed.). The Mekong: biophysical environment of an international river basin. Amsterdam: Academic Press. pp.1–11. ISBN978-0-12-374026-7.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
