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Indian hegemony (also referred to as Indian hegemonism) is a concept in international relations that describes India's geopolitical, economic, military, and cultural dominance or influence in the Indian subcontinent region.[a] Critics frequently use the term to explain India's alleged interference in the internal affairs and foreign policy orientation of smaller Neighbouring countries, such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Bhutan.[b][c][d]
The Government of India and Indian strategic analysts generally reject this characterization. They argue that India follows a "Neighbourhood First" policy[52][53] and acts as a responsible "net security provider" for regional stability and development.[54][55]
Origins and theoretical background
Allegations of hegemonic behaviour by India in South Asia are often traced to the "Indira Doctrine".[56] This unwritten doctrine gained prominence during the tenure of Prime Minister of IndiaIndira Gandhi in the 1970s and 1980s. According to the doctrine:
India would not tolerate the intervention of external powers in the internal conflicts of South Asian countries.
Bilateral negotiations would be the only acceptable means of resolving regional disputes, excluding third-party mediation.
Political scientists such as S. D. Muni and C. Raja Mohan argue that India perceives itself as the successor to the British Raj and seeks to maintain a strategic security perimeter stretching from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean.[57] Relations with neighbouring countries at various times, tensions in India's bilateral relations with its neighbours have generated accusations of hegemonism.[58]
Despite historical and cultural closeness, some critics and analysts argue that India exercises hegemonic influence over Bangladesh's domestic politics, economy, and border management.[59][60] These claims are primarily based on long-standing economic asymmetries, water-sharing disputes, and military–political influence.
Water Sharing and Hydro-Hegemony
One of the most prominent allegations of Indian hegemony in Bangladesh concerns the control of transboundary water resources, often described as "hydro-hegemony".[61][62][63]
Commissioned in 1975, India's unilateral diversion of Ganges water during the dry season has been blamed for reduced river flow in southwestern Bangladesh, adversely affecting agriculture, ecology, and the Sundarbans ecosystem.[64]
Teesta Agreement
The water-sharing agreement over the Teesta River remains unresolved due to opposition from West Bengal, leading to irrigation shortages in northern Bangladesh. Critics argue that the delay allows India to retain political and economic leverage.[65]
The killing of Bangladeshi civilians by India's Border Security Force (BSF) along the Bangladesh–India border has drawn strong domestic and international criticism. According to Human Rights Watch, excessive use of force by the BSF is viewed as an example of India's aggressive posture in bilateral relations. India maintains that such actions are taken in self-defence to curb smuggling and illegal crossings, while critics see them as violations of sovereignty and human rights.[66]
Economic imbalance and trade deficit
India's trade relationship with Bangladesh features a persistent imbalance favoring India, fueling claims of economic dominance despite bilateral ties. Bangladesh faces a large trade deficit due to heavy imports from India, compounded by non-tariff barriers and border restrictions, while critics highlight the costs of providing transit facilities to India.[67]
Bangladesh's imports from India far exceed its exports, with the deficit reaching around $7-10 billion annually in recent years, driven by India's dominance in textiles, machinery, and essentials. Non-tariff barriers like stringent standards and documentation, alongside India's border controls, limit Bangladeshi goods' access, exacerbating the gap despite SAFTA provisions. This dynamic reinforces perceptions of unequal economic leverage in the bilateral trade framework.[68]
Transit facilities
Bangladesh grants India transit rights for accessing its northeastern states, incurring infrastructure costs, security burdens, and economic opportunity losses from reserved routes. Critics argue these facilities, formalized in protocols since 2015, benefit India disproportionately without reciprocal gains, straining Bangladesh's resources amid its own connectivity needs. Ongoing negotiations seek fairer terms, but the arrangement underscores broader regional asymmetries.[67]
Political influence allegations
Bangladeshi political parties and analysts often accuse India of meddling in elections and internal affairs, citing support for favorable regimes.[69]WikiLeaks cables from 1970s-2000s revealed alleged Indian roles in shaping outcomes, like backing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman or Awami League, intensifying sovereignty debates. Such claims persist, framing India-Bangladesh ties as influenced by India's strategic interests over mutual respect.[citation needed]
India's intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War in 1987 and the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) were perceived by many Sri Lankans as infringements on sovereignty, despite India's claim of peacebuilding intentions.[73]
Bhutan
India has exercised long-standing influence over Bhutan's foreign policy. Under the 1949 Indo-Bhutanese Treaty, Bhutan agreed to seek India's guidance on external relations. Although revised in 2007, Bhutan remains economically dependent on India, particularly in the hydropower sector.[citation needed]
Economic and cultural dominance
India maintains significant trade surpluses with most South Asian neighbors under the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement, despite commitments to reduce tariffs and promote balanced regional trade. Bollywood's pervasive influence through films, music, and TV further shapes perceptions of Indian cultural dominance, often criticized as aggressive and marginalizing local identities.[74][75][76]
Trade surplus
India holds substantial trade surpluses with key South Asian countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. For instance, India's exports to Bangladesh reached over $11 billion in FY2024, contributing to Bangladesh's large bilateral deficit of about $7 billion, while similar patterns persist with Nepal (over $7 billion exports) and others. The SAFTA agreement has reduced surplus slightly from FY22 to FY25, however, due to rising imports of trading partners and non-tariff barriers imposed by India, India continues to dominate regional merchandise trade.[77][67]
Cultural influence
Bollywood films, music, and Indian satellite TV saturate South Asian markets, promoting Hindi-language content that overshadows regional cinemas in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. This reach fosters cultural soft power but draws accusations of "cultural aggression" for stereotyping neighbors (e.g., negative Pakistan portrayals), homogenizing diverse traditions, and sidelining local languages and films. Diaspora communities amplify this, creating emotional ties to Indian narratives while reinforcing Hindi hegemony over South Asian identities.[75][78]
Counterarguments
The Government of India rejects allegations of hegemonism, maintaining that its regional policies are oriented toward stability, security, and development rather than domination. India argues that its foreign policy toward South Asia is guided by the Neighbourhood First Policy, which prioritises cooperative engagement with neighbouring states to address shared challenges and promote regional integration. From this perspective, India presents its military and strategic posture as stabilising in nature, emphasising its self-described role as a "net security provider" in the Indian Ocean region, aimed at safeguarding maritime routes and preventing external intervention. India also contends that counter-terrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing with neighbouring countries enhance collective security and reduce transnational threats.[citation needed]
In the economic sphere, India highlights development assistance and concessional lines of credit as evidence of partnership rather than coercion, particularly in infrastructure development in countries such as Bangladesh. Initiatives such as border haats (local cross-border markets) are promoted as mechanisms for grassroots-level economic integration and livelihood support in border regions. India further underscores its cultural and humanitarian engagement as reinforcing historical and civilisational ties instead of imposing political influence. Examples cited include disaster relief operations, the provision of COVID-19 vaccines under the Vaccine Maitri initiative, scholarships, cultural exchange programmes, and eased visa regimes, which India characterises as confidence-building measures.[citation needed]
Indian policymakers also point to a normative shift in foreign policy during the mid-1990s with the articulation of the Gujral Doctrine by External Minister and later Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral. In contrast to earlier interventionist approaches often associated with the Indira Doctrine, the Gujral Doctrine emphasised trust-building and the rejection of a "big brother" posture. Its core principles included non-reciprocity in dealings with smaller neighbours, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of territory against neighbouring states, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the peaceful bilateral resolution of disputes. The doctrine is often credited with facilitating cooperative outcomes such as the 1996 Ganges water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh and is widely interpreted as an attempt to reposition India as a responsible regional power rather than a hegemonic one.[citation needed]
↑Sood, Vikram (2009), "India and Regional Security Interests", Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States, B-42, Panchsheel Enclave, New Delhi 110 017 India: SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, pp.249–269, retrieved 2025-12-22{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
↑Kumar, Niraj (2008), "India: A Failed Democratic Developmental State?", Democracy, Development and Discontent in South Asia, B-42, Panchsheel Enclave, New Delhi 110 017 India: SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, pp.148–170, retrieved 2025-12-22{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
↑Singh, Swaran; Bailes, Alyson J. K.; Gooneratne, John; Inayat, Mavara; Khan, Jamshed Ayaz; Singh, Swaran (2007). India and regionalism (Report). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. pp.25–38.
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