The Iran hostage crisis negotiations were negotiations in 1980 and 1981 between the United States Government and the Iranian Government to end the Iranian hostage crisis. The 52 American hostages, seized from the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, were finally released on 20 January 1981. A detailed account of the hostage crisis and the Algiers Accords is found in American Hostages In Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis [Yale 1985] put together by the Council on Foreign Relations.
The first attempt to negotiate a release of the hostages involved Hector Villalon and Christian Bourget, representing Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh. They "delivered a formal request to Panama for the extradition of the Shah", which was "a pretext to cover secret negotiations to free the American hostages". This happened as the Soviets invaded Iran's neighbor Afghanistan, an event America hoped would "illustrate the threat" of its superpower neighbor and need for better relations with the Soviet's enemy, America. Ghotbzadeh himself was eager to end the hostage-taking before the January election cycle in Iran, as "moderates" were being eliminated from the Iranian government one by one after being exposed by the student hostage-takers as "traitors" and "spies" for having met at some time with an American official. [1] Specifically, both Ghotzbaeh and the Ayatollah were worried about the potential political ramifications of the Hostage Crisis on the upcoming United Nations Security Council vote on the imposition of sanctions on the new regime, which could have posed a threat to the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic (as predicted by Ghotzbadeh, Ten out the 15 Security Council members voted for the sanctions; although the measure was vetoed by the Soviet Union, the United States ended up imposing sanctions of its own [2] ). [3] Ghotzbadeh advocated the use of the "New Panamanian Channel" through which a process of legal negotiations and the initiation of the extradition of the Shah from Panama back to Iran would facilitate the release of the hostages. Both he and the Ayatollah adhered to the "principle of extradition" which entailed the right of Iran to seek the legal extradition of the Shah. The Panamanian Government, for its part, largely believed the Hostage Crisis to be an "American Plot" designed to engineer presidential candidate Ronald Reagan's victory. [4]
Carter aide Hamilton Jordan flew to Paris "wearing a disguise—a wig, false mustache and glasses" to meet with Ghotbzadeh. After "weeks of negotiation with...emissaries,...a complex multi-stepped plan" was "hammered out" that included the establishment of an international commission to study America's role in Iran. [5] Rumours of a release leaked to the American public and on February 19, 1980, the American Vice President Walter Mondale told an interviewer that "the crisis was nearing an end." The plan fell apart however after Ayatollah Khomeini gave a speech praising the embassy occupation as "a crushing blow to the world-devouring USA" and announced the fate of the hostages would be decided by the Iranian parliament, the Majlis , which had yet to be seated or even elected. [6] When the six-man international U.N. commission came to Iran they were not allowed to see the hostages, [7] and President Abolhassan Banisadr retreated from his criticism of the hostage-takers, praising them as "young patriots". [8]
The next unsuccessful attempt occurred in April, which entailed the imposition of western sanctions and the deployment of US military forces in Iran as a rescue operation. The failure of three helicopters meant the mission was aborted, resulting in the death of eight servicemen during the attempted escape (the bodies would be recovered by the Iranian government, displayed in Tehran, and ultimately returned to the United States). [9] The failure of the mission resulted in the resignation of Cyrus Vance [10] and president being forced to publicly promise not to "impose additional sanctions" on Iran. In exchange, custody of the hostages would be transferred to the government of Iran, who would be released after a short period—the Iranian president and foreign minister both opposing the continued holding of the hostages. To the American's surprise and disappointment, after Carter made his promise, President Banisadr added additional demands: official American approval of the resolution of the hostage question by Iran's parliament (which would leave the hostages in Tehran for another month or two), and a promise by Carter to refrain from making "hostile statements". Carter also agreed to these demands, but again Khomeini vetoed the plan. At this point, President Banisadr announced he was "washing his hands of the hostage mess". [11] The next day President Carter broke relations with the Islamic Republic, expelled Iranian diplomats and looked towards the military option. Mark B. Feldman Oral History,p. 111, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Feldman.Mark.pdf?swcfpc=1
In early July, the Iranians released hostage Richard Queen, who had developed multiple sclerosis. In the States, constant media coverage—yellow ribbons, footage of chanting Iranian mobs, even a whole new television news program, ABC's Nightline —provided a dispiriting backdrop to the presidential election season. As Carter advisor and biographer, Peter Bourne put it, "Because people felt that Carter had not been tough enough in foreign policy, this kind of symbolized for them that some bunch of students could seize American diplomatic officials and hold them prisoner and thumb their nose at the United States." The death of the Shah on July 27 and the invasion of Iran by Iraq in September 1980 may have made Iran more receptive to the idea of resolving the hostage crisis. There was little more advantage to be gained from further anti-American, anti-Shah propaganda, and the ongoing sanctions were making it harder to straighten out an already chaotic economy.
Talks that ultimately succeeded in bringing a release began secretly in September 1980 and were initiated by Sadegh Tabatabai, a brother-in-law of Khomeini's son Ahmad and "a mid-level official" in the former-provisional revolutionary government. On September 12, 1980, Khomeini announced four conditions for release of the hostages: one, return of the Shah's wealth to Iran; two, cancellation of U.S. claims against Iran; three, unfreezing Iran's assets in the United States; four, U.S. guarantees of non-interference in Iran's internal affairs. The Majlis approved these conditions on November 2, 1980––two days before the U.S. presidential election. On November 3, the U.S. received a diplomatic note from Algeria confirming that Iran was ready to negotiate on the basis of the four points through the good offices of the Algerian government. The hostage negotiations proceeded to conclusion via mediation by Algeria. There were no direct contacts between Washington and Tehran. Mark B. Feldman Oral History,p. 112, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Feldman.Mark.pdf?swcfpc=1
Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in the November 1980 presidential election with pressure being added to the negotiations by the President-Elect's talk of not paying "ransom for people who have been kidnapped by barbarians", [12] and a New Year's Day threat from Radio Tehran that if the United States did not accept Iran's demands the hostages would be tried as spies and executed if found guilty. [13] In the final stages of the negotiations in Algiers, the chief Algerian mediator was the Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed Benyahia who interacted primarily with Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher from the U.S. side. [14] Former Algerian ambassador to the U.S. Abdulkarim Ghuraib also participated in the negotiations.[ citation needed ] Much of the money involved was being held in overseas branches of twelve American banks, so Carter, his cabinet, and staff were constantly on the phone to London, Istanbul, Bonn, and other world capitals to work out the financial details.
The negotiations resulted in the "Algiers Accords" [15] of January 19, 1981. The package included two declarations issued by the government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the government of the United States of America and three supporting technical arrangements. The Accords were initialed by Warren Christopher in Algiers, formally accepted by President Carter and entered into force as an international agreement between Iran and the United States all on the same day, January 19, 1981. Mark B. Feldman Oral History,p. 116, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Feldman.Mark.pdf?swcfpc=1 The Algiers Accords called for Iran's immediate freeing of the hostages, the unfreezing of $7.9 billion of Iranian assets, termination of lawsuits Iran faced in America, and a pledge by the United States that "it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs". The Accords also created the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal, and Iran deposited $1 billion in an escrow account to satisfy claims adjudicated by the Tribunal in favor of American claimants. The Tribunal received approximately 4,700 private U.S. claims. The Tribunal has ordered payments by Iran to U.S. nationals totaling over $2.5 billion. Almost all private claims have now been resolved, but several intergovernmental claims are still before the Tribunal.
A series of crises slowed down the process. Lloyd Cutler, White House counsel, told the president there was a delay in the transfer of assets; the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did not have its part of the money, so funds were shifted among the reserve banks. Then, the telex codes required to transfer Iranian assets needed to trigger release of the hostages were not properly transmitted. Billions were involved and banks, including the NY Federal Reserve Bank, hesitated to proceed without proper documentation. President Carter's personal intervention was required to move the funds. Mark B. Feldman Oral History,p. 117, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Feldman.Mark.pdf?swcfpc=1 Another difficulty concerned the time difference between Washington and Tehran. Because of the war with Iraq, the Iranian officials had blackouts of airport lights. This meant that once it got dark in Iran (about 9:30 a.m. Washington time), even if the deal had been sealed, the Algerian pilots would not take off until dawn. Thus, if the departure time passed, everyone understood that it would be another eight to ten hours before anything could happen. In the wee hours of January 19, 1981, word came to Carter that the planes were on the runway in Tehran, and the hostages had been taken to the vicinity of the airport. At 4:44 a.m. Carter went to the press briefing room to announce that with the help of Algeria the United States and Iran had reached an agreement, but was halted because the Algerian negotiator sent word that the Iranian bank officials did not agree with the terms of accountability in the banking agreements. The staff soon understood that Carter's trip to Germany to greet hostages would not occur until after the inauguration.
The hostages were released on January 20, 1981, the day President Carter's term ended. While Carter had an "obsession" with finishing the matter before stepping down, the hostage-takers are thought to have wanted the release delayed as punishment for his perceived support for the Shah. [16] Iranians insisted on payment in gold rather than U.S. dollars so the U.S. government transferred 50 tonnes of gold to Iran while simultaneously taking ownership of an equivalent quantity of Iranian gold that had been frozen at the New York Federal Reserve Bank. [17] At 6:35 a.m., Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher informed Carter that, "All escrows were signed at 6:18. The Bank of England has certified that they hold $7.98 billion, the correct amount". At 8:04 a.m., Algeria confirmed that the bank certification was complete, and the Algerians were notifying Iran. At 9:45 a.m., Christopher told Carter take-off would be by noon, but, as a security measure, the Iranian officials did not want the word released until the hostages were out of Iranian airspace. President Carter said the United States would comply. [18]
Cyrus Roberts Vance Sr. was an American lawyer and United States Secretary of State under President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1980. Prior to serving in that position, he was the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Johnson administration. During the Kennedy administration he was Secretary of the Army and General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
The Iran hostage crisis was a diplomatic standoff between Iran and the United States. Fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were held hostage after a group of militarized Iranian college students belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, who supported the Iranian Revolution, took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took them as hostages. The hostages were held for 444 days, from November 4, 1979 to their release on January 20, 1981. The crisis is considered a pivotal episode in the history of Iran–United States relations.
Operation Eagle Claw, known as Operation Tabas in Iran, was a failed operation by the United States Armed Forces ordered by U.S. President Jimmy Carter to attempt the rescue of 52 embassy staff held captive at the Embassy of the United States, Tehran on 24 April 1980.
Sadegh Ghotbzadeh was an Iranian politician who served as a close aide of Ayatollah Khomeini during his 1978 exile in France and was foreign minister during the Iran hostage crisis following the Iranian Revolution. In 1982, he was executed for allegedly plotting the assassination of Ayatollah Khomeini and the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.
Executive Order 12170 was issued by American president Jimmy Carter on November 14, 1979, ten days after the Iran hostage crisis had started. The executive order, empowered under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, ordered the freezing of all Iranian government assets held within the United States.
The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) is an international arbitral tribunal established by the Algiers Accords, an international agreement between the U.S. and Iran embodied in two Declarations by the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria issued on 19 January 1981, to resolve the crisis in relations between the two countries arising out of incidents in U.S. embassy in Tehran.
United States of America v. Islamic Republic of Iran [1980] ICJ 1 is a public international law case brought to the International Court of Justice by the United States of America against Iran in response to the Iran hostage crisis, where United States diplomatic offices and personnel were seized by militant revolutionaries.
The "Canadian Caper" was the joint covert rescue by the Canadian government and the CIA of six American diplomats who had evaded capture during the seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran, Iran, on November 4, 1979, after the Iranian Revolution, when Islamist students took most of the American embassy personnel hostage, demanding the return of the US-backed Shah for trial.
The Algiers Accords of January 19, 1981 was a set of obligations and commitments undertaken independently by the United States and Iran to resolve the Iran hostage crisis, brokered by the Algerian government and signed in Algiers on January 19, 1981. The crisis began from the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, where Iranian students took hostage of present American embassy staff. By this accord and its adherence, 52 American citizens were able to leave Iran. With the two countries unable to settle on mutually agreeable terms, particularly for quantitative financial obligations, Algerian mediators proposed an alternative agreement model - one where each country undertook obligations under the accords independently, rather than requiring both countries to mutually adhere to the same terms under a bilateral agreement.
This article is a timeline of events relevant to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. For earlier events refer to Pahlavi dynasty and for later ones refer to History of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This article doesn't include the reasons of the events and further information is available in Islamic revolution of Iran.
In July 2001, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika became the first Algerian President to visit the White House since 1985. This visit, followed by a second meeting in November 2001, and President Bouteflika's participation at the June 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit, is indicative of the growing relationship between the United States and Algeria. Since the September 11 attacks in the United States, contacts in key areas of mutual concern, including law enforcement and counter-terrorism cooperation, have intensified. Algeria publicly condemned the terrorist attacks on the United States and has been strongly supportive of the international war on terrorism. The United States and Algeria consult closely on key international and regional issues. The pace and scope of senior-level visits has accelerated.
The Embassy of the United States of America in Tehran was the American diplomatic mission in the Imperial State of Iran. Direct bilateral diplomatic relations between the two governments were severed following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the subsequent seizure of the embassy in November 1979.
The Cuba–United States Maritime Boundary Agreement is a 1977 treaty between Cuba and the United States that set the international maritime boundary between the two states. Maritime boundary delimitation was necessary to facilitate law enforcement and resource management, and to avoid conflict, within the countries' overlapping two-hundred mile maritime zones.
Richard Henry Morefield was an American diplomat who served in the United States Foreign Service. He was one of the 66 staff members at the American embassy in Tehran who were taken captive by a militant Islamist student group called the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line on November 4, 1979, in what became known as the Iran hostage crisis. He was one of 52 Americans who were held as a hostage for 444 days, until negotiations for the remaining captives being held hostage were concluded with the signing of the Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981, with their release coming the following day.
Public Law 113-110 is a law that "ban(s) Iran's new United Nations ambassador, who has ties to a terrorist group, from entering the United States." Iran's proposed ambassador, Hamid Aboutalebi, is controversial due to his involvement in the Iran hostage crisis, in which a number of American diplomats from the US embassy in Tehran were held captive from 1979 until 1981. Aboutalebi said he did not participate in the takeover of the US embassy, but was brought in to translate and negotiate following the occupation. President Barack Obama told Iran that Aboutalebis selection was not "viable" and Congress reacted by passing this law to ban his presence in the United States.
Roberts Bishop "Bob" Owen was an American lawyer and diplomat. He served as Legal Adviser of the Department of State from 1979 to 1981 and acted as a mediator and arbitrator in several international disputes.
This is a timeline of the Iran hostage crisis (1979–1981), starting from the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's leaving of Iran and return of all hostages to the United States.
In 2016, the BBC published a report which stated that the administration of United States President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) had extensive contact with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his entourage in the prelude to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The report was based on "newly declassified US diplomatic cables". According to the report, as mentioned by The Guardian, Khomeini "went to great lengths to ensure the Americans would not jeopardise his plans to return to Iran - and even personally wrote to US officials" and assured them not to worry about their interests in Iran, particularly oil. According to the report, in turn, Carter and his administration helped Khomeini and made sure that the Imperial Iranian army would not launch a military coup.
Seghir Mostefai was an Algerian lawyer, economist and high civil servant. He graduated with a master's degree in law and economics from Sorbonne University, Paris. Long time anti-colonial activist with responsibilities in the political independentist organization in Algeria and later in exile in Tunis, he participated to the negotiation of the Évian Accords leading to the independence of Algeria. He founded the Central Bank of Algeria, created the national currency and served as Governor of the Central Bank, representing Algeria at the board of the IMF for 20 years.
The Villa Montfeld is an historic residence in the El Biar district of Algiers, Algeria, which serves as the residence of the Ambassador of the United States to Algeria. The villa was built in the mid-19th century and was reconstructed in a Moorish Revival style by the English architect Benjamin Bucknall between 1878 and 1895. In 1947 the villa was bought by the United States government for use as an ambassadorial residence. In 1981 Villa Montfeld hosted negotiations leading to the Algiers Accords, which ended the Iran hostage crisis.
Mark B. Feldman Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Feldman.Mark.pdf?swcfpc=1
Office of the Historian. "The Iranian Hostage Crisis - Short History - Department History - Office of the Historian." State.gov, 2019, history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises.
"Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980 - Office of the Historian." State.gov, 2023, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d144. Accessed 24 Apr. 2023.
The Associated Press. "Key Moments in the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis at US Embassy." AP NEWS, Associated Press, 4 Nov. 2019, apnews.com/article/6149da2418b140c2b1d5b0ca5779bac5. Accessed 24 Apr. 2023.
