Pacification of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia

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Pacification of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia
PACIF01.JPG
Prosvita society reading room demolished during Pacification in September–October of 1930. Knyahynychi, today Rohatyn Raion
Location Eastern Galicia
Date16 September − 30 November 1930
Attack type
Mass searches, arrests, destruction of property, food
PerpetratorsPolish Sanation regime
MotiveCrackdown on Ukrainian nationalists
Eastern Lesser Poland / Eastern Galicia: Lwow (Lviv), Tarnopol (Ternopil) and Stanislawow (Stanyslaviv, now Ivano-Frankivsk) Voivodeships - territories inhabited by the Ukrainian minority in the Second Polish Republic and affected by the pacification in 1930 Malopolska Wschodnia.png
Eastern Lesser Poland / Eastern Galicia: Lwów (Lviv), Tarnopol (Ternopil) and Stanisławów (Stanyslaviv, now Ivano-Frankivsk) Voivodeships - territories inhabited by the Ukrainian minority in the Second Polish Republic and affected by the pacification in 1930

The Pacification of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia was a punitive action against the Ukrainians in Galicia, carried out by police and military of the Second Polish Republic from September until November 1930 in reaction to a wave of sabotage and acts of terror perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalists. [nb 1] [1] [2] [3] [4]

Contents

It took place in 16 Polish counties of three southeastern voivodeships. During the Interbellum this area was part of the so-called Eastern Lesser Poland province. Therefore, in Ukrainian and Polish literature this event is called "Pacification of/in Eastern Galicia" (Ukrainian : Пацифікація у Східній Галичині) (Polish : Pacyfikacja Galicji Wschodniej) and "Pacification of Eastern Lesser Poland" (Polish : Pacyfikacja Małopolski Wschodniej).

Background

Eastern Galicia, with the ethnic composition of about two thirds Ukrainians and one third Poles (in 1931 in Lwów Voivodeship Poles made up 57,7% of population, Ukrainians and Ruthenians 34,1%, 7,5% Jews who identified mostly as Polish Jews or just Jewish, in Tarnopol Voivodeship 49,3% was Polish, 45,5% Ukrainian and Ruthenian, 4,9% Jewish, Stanisławów Voivodeship was 68,8% Ukrainian and Ruthenian, 22,4% Polish, 7,4% Jewish) east of the Curzon line, was incorporated into the Second Polish Republic after Austria-Hungary's collapse and the defeat of the short-lived West Ukrainian People's Republic. [1] Ukrainians during the war were held in internment camps by the Polish government, the total number of Ukrainian internees, prisoners of war, and hostages who passed through Polish prisoner-of-war camps, internment camps, collection stations, and prisons during the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919 was at most 30–35 thousand people. Of this number, about 1.5–2 thousand people successfully escaped, and a further 1.5 thousand prisoners, internees, and hostages died due to epidemic diseases, starvation, or natural causes. [5] After the war, in 1920–1921, approximately 100,000 Ukrainians (mostly from UNR, but also from ZUNR) were held in internment camps by the Polish government, where they were often denied food and medicine; some of them died from starvation, disease or suicide. The victims included not only soldiers and officers but also priests, lawyers and doctors who had supported the Ukrainian cause. The death toll at these camps from diseases was estimated at 20,000 people, [6]

Many Ukrainian organizations continued close contact with the Weimar Republic, later Nazi Germany, while others kept in contact with the new Soviet government to the east. The Ukrainian language was banned in government agencies in 1924 and support was steadily withdrawn from Ukrainian schools. Polish-Ukrainian relations deteriorated during the Great Depression, leading to much economic disruption, hitting hard, particularly the rural areas. In this atmosphere, radical Ukrainian nationalists propagating active resistance to Polish domination found a ready response from Ukrainian youth. [7]

In July 1930, activists of the extremist Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) began sabotage actions, during which warehouses and cereal fields owned by Poles were burned, Polish homes were destroyed, bridges were blown up, state institutions, rail lines and telephone connections were damaged. [1] [8] The organizer of the action was Yevhen Konovalets. [9] Financing was provided and weaponry was illegally smuggled with Weimar German support.[ citation needed ]

The main reason behind the sabotage campaign was the mainstream Ukrainian parties' decision to participate in the Polish elections, coupled with Józef Piłsudski's policy of tolerance, which threatened the OUN's position in Ukrainian society. [1] [10] The organization reacted by adopting a tactic designed to radicalize Ukrainian public opinion and block any form of compromise with Polish authorities. [1] [8] [9] The OUN used terrorism and sabotage in order to force the Polish government into reprisals so fierce that they would cause the more moderate Ukrainian groups ready to negotiate with the Polish state to lose support. [11] OUN directed its violence not only against the Poles but also against all Ukrainians wishing for a peaceful settlement of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. [12]

Over time, local Ukrainians, many of whom saw the Poles as occupiers of their land, joined the action. Offices of the Polish paramilitary Riflemen's Association were burned, as were the stands of the popular trade fairs in Lwów (Lviv). Government offices and mail trucks were attacked. This situation lasted until September, with some sporadic incidents happening as late as November. Between July and November 1930, there were 197 cases of terrorist and sabotage activities. The vast majority, 172 incidents, were directed against private civilian property, mostly belonging to Polish and Jewish civilians, only 25 cases involved state-owned property, this shows that the violent acts were mostly aimed at terrorizing civilian population, while attacks on state infrastructure accounted for only a small portion of the total. [13] The terror action was limited to Galicia, and did not take place in Volhynia. [1]

In response, Polish authorities decided to pacify the turbulent province. The decision to carry out the action was made by Marshal Józef Piłsudski in his capacity as Prime Minister of the Second Polish Republic. According to historian Roman Wysocki, the acts of sabotage merely served as a pretext for the pacifications with them being chiefly aimed at distracting the government's critics in the run up to elections. [14] Recognizing that terrorist actions carried out by the OUN did not amount to an insurrection, Piłsudski ordered a police action, rather than a military one, and deputized the Minister of Interior, Felicjan Sławoj Składkowski with its organization. Sławoj Składkowski in turn ordered regional police commanders to prepare for it in the Lwów Voivodeship, Stanisławów Voivodeship and Tarnopol Voivodeship. The commander of the planned action was Lwów Voivodeship's chief of police, Czesław Grabowski.[ citation needed ]

Before the action commenced, around 130 Ukrainian activists, including a few dozen former Sejm (Polish parliament) deputies were arrested. [15] The action itself began on 14 September 1930, in several villages of Lwów Voivodeship, where the 14th Jazlowiec Uhlan Regiment was directed, even though the detailed plan for the action was not established until 18 September.[ citation needed ]

Forces involved

From 20 to 29 September, 17 companies of police (60 policemen each) were used. Of these, 9 came from the police academy in Mosty Wielkie (Velyki Mosty), 3 from Lwów Voivodeship, 2.5 from Stanisławów Voivodeship, 2.5 from Tarnopol Voivodeship (a total of 1,041 policemen and officers). The main operations with the participation of military units took place in the first half of October.

Overall, the action affected:

Or in total 494 villages. Timothy Snyder and other sources give the figure of 1000 policemen used in the operation, affecting 450 villages. [1]

Nature of the action

The operation was carried out in three stages. First, a basic edict was issued authorizing a particular action. Second, police units were brought in. Third units of the regular army carried out "operational maneuvers".[ citation needed ]

The pacification involved the search of private homes as well as buildings in which Ukrainian organizations (including the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church) were based. During the search, the buildings, belongings, and property of Ukrainians were destroyed and the inhabitants were often beaten and arrested. Several Ukrainian schools (in Rohat, Drohobycz, Lwów, Tarnopol and Stanisławów) were closed and the Ukrainian Youth Scout organization Plast was outlawed. On 10 September, five deputies of Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance were arrested.[ citation needed ]

The pacification was carried out by first surrounding a village with police units, then calling out the village elder or an administrator of the village. He in turn was informed about the purpose of the operation and was ordered to give up any weapons or explosives hidden in the village. All villagers were to remain in their houses. Subsequently, the houses of those suspected of cooperation with Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists were searched, which included the tearing up of floors and ceilings. During the course of the search, the furniture and property inside the houses were often destroyed. [16] Policemen found about 100 kilograms of explosives and weapons (1287 rifles, 566 revolvers, 31 grenades). [1] Also, during the searches, physical force was used and many people were beaten. [16] According to Polish historian Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, there were no fatalities, [17] while, according to Ukrainian historian and an OUN member, Petro Mirchuk, 35 Ukrainian civilians died during the pacification. Stephan Horak estimates the number of victims at 7. [18] Additional punishments included levying special "contributions" on the villages and stationing regiments of cavalry in the village, which had to be fed and quartered by the villages.[ citation needed ]

Ukrainian nationalists lodged an official complaint regarding the "pacification" action to a committee of the League of Nations, which in its response disapproved the methods used by the Polish authorities, but also put blame on the Ukrainian extremist elements for consciously provoking this reaction from the Polish government. The committee concluded that the pacification did not constitute the governmental policy of persecution of the Ukrainian minority. [7] [19]

Effects of the action

The operation resulted in a reduction of Ukrainian terrorist actions carried out by the OUN for a short while, [20] but also, just as the OUN had planned, [21] in an antagonism between the Ukrainians and the Poles. [22] On the other hand, however, some Ukrainian activists criticized the methods used by the OUN (e.g., Petliurites, some members of the UNDO). The OUN also gained increased funding from the Weimar Republic and the Nazi Germany. Tensions in Polish–Ukrainian relations were escalated by Ukrainian nationalist periodicals. The Ukrainian nationalist newspaper “Rozbudova Natsii” appealed to the Ukrainian nation in the following words:

“A new war is coming, and we must prepare for it. When that day arrives, we will be merciless; we will see the rising of Zalizniaks and Gontas, and no one will find mercy, and the poet will be able to sing ‘a father murdered his own son.’ We will not investigate who is without guilt—like the Bolsheviks, we will first shoot, and only afterwards try and carry out investigations." [23]

The OUN continued its terroristic activities and engaged in numerous assassinations. Some of those murdered by the OUN after the Pacification included Tadeusz Hołówko, a Polish politician who promoted support for the Ukrainian minority’s culture and education, advocating legal protections and policies to preserve their identity and foster peaceful coexistence, Emilian Czechowski, Lwów's Polish police commissioner, Alexei Mailov, a Soviet consular official killed in retaliation for the Holodomor, and most notably Bronisław Pieracki, the Polish interior minister. The OUN also killed moderate Ukrainian figures such as the respected teacher (and former officer of the Ukrainian Galician Army of the West Ukrainian People's Republic) Ivan Babij. [24]

According to Ukrainian-Canadian historian, Orest Subtelny, "collective punishment" meted out on thousands of "mostly innocent peasants" resulted in the exacerbation of animosity between the Polish state and the Ukrainian minority. [7]

Notes

  1. ↑ Snyder writes: "In July 1930, Ukrainian nationalists began sabotage actions in Galicia, destroying Polish properties and homes throughout the region in hundreds of terrorist actions. In September, Piłsudski ordered the pacification of Galicia, sending a thousand policemen to search 450 villages for nationalist agitators... "In 1930, as the OUN terrorized the Galician countryside...Volhynia remained comparatively peaceful..." [1]

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Snyder, Timothy (2007). Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine. Yale University Press. pp. 75–76, 157. ISBN   978-0300125993.
  2. ↑ Lucyna, Kulińska (2009). Działalność terrorystyczna i sabotażowa nacjonalistycznych organizacji ukraińskich w Polsce w latach 1922-1939[Activities of terrorism and sabotage by Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Poland in the years 1922-1939] (in Polish) (1st ed.). Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka. p. 212. ISBN   9788371881473. OCLC   613214866.
  3. ↑ Pisuliński, Jan (2003). "Pacyfikacja w Małopolsce Wschodniej na forum Ligi Narodów". Zeszyty Historyczne (in Polish) (144). Instytut Literacki: 110. ISSN   0406-0393.
  4. ↑ Ostanek, Adrian Adam (2017). "Stosunki polsko‑ukraińskie a bezpieczeństwo II Rzeczypospolitej w kontekście wydarzeń 1930 roku w Małopolsce Wschodniej". Studia Historica Gedanensia (in Polish). VIII: 164.
  5. ↑ Kania, Leszek. "Administracja polskich obozów dla jeńców i internowanych wojennych w polsko-ukraińskiej wojnie o Galicję Wschodnią (1918-1919)" (PDF). Biblioteka Cyfrowa Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Sulechowie – Instytut Prawa i Administracji.
  6. ↑ Jochen Böhler. (2019). Civil War in Central Europe, 1918-1921: The Reconstruction of Poland. Oxford University Press, pg. 81 "100,000 Ukrainians were subsequently interred in the camps of the ultimately victorious Polish Army. One fifth of them fell to infectious diseases."
  7. 1 2 3 Subtelny, Orest (1994). Ukraine. A history. University of Toronto Press. pp. 429–431. ISBN   978-0802071910.
  8. 1 2 Lagzi, Gábor (2004). "The Ukrainian Radical National Movement in Inter-War Poland. The Case of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)". Regio - Minorities, Politics, Society - English Edition. VII (1): 201. Burning and damaging property owned by Poles, according to the logic of the perpetrators, maintained the Ukrainians' "revolutionary attitude" and strengthened the OUN's position in Ukrainian society
  9. 1 2 Mazur, Grzegorz (2001). "Problem Pacyfikacji Małopolski Wschodniej w 1930 r.". Zeszyty Historyczne (in Polish) (135). Instytut Literacki: 4–5. ISSN   0406-0393.
  10. ↑ Bulutgil, H. Zeynep (2016). The Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Europe. Cambridge University Press. p. 103. ISBN   978-1107135864.
  11. ↑ Crampton, R. J. (1994). Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – And After. Routledge. p. 50. ISBN   978-0415053464.
  12. ↑ Hann, C. M.; Magocsi, Paul R., eds. (2005). Galicia: A Multicultured Land (1st ed.). University of Toronto Press. p. 148. ISBN   978-0802037817.
  13. ↑ Adam Adrian Ostanek. "Wydarzenia 1930 roku w Małopolsce Wschodniej a bezpieczeństwo II Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 2017, s. 90".{{cite web}}: Missing or empty |url= (help)
  14. ↑ Wysocki 2003, p. 130.
  15. ↑ Paczkowski, Andrzej; Cane, Jave (2003). The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom. Penn State University Press. p. 48. ISBN   978-0271023083.
  16. 1 2 Teich, Mikuláš; Porter, Roy, eds. (1993). The National Question in Europe in Historical Context. Cambridge University Press. p. 309. ISBN   978-0521367134.
  17. ↑ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka, 1942-1960: działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańczej Armii (in Polish). PAN. p. 57. ISBN   83-7399-163-8.
  18. ↑ Brandon, Ray; Lower, Wendy, eds. (2008). The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization. Indiana University Press. p. 148. ISBN   978-025335084-8.
  19. ↑ Piotrowski, Tadeusz (2000). Genocide and Rescue in Wolyn. McFarland. p. 226. ISBN   0-7864-0773-5.
  20. ↑ Grzegorz Mazur, Problem pacyfikacji Małopolski Wschodniej, „Zeszyty Historyczne”, nr 135, s. 35, 39.
  21. ↑ „Trudne sąsiedztwo” s. 423-425.
  22. ↑ Cordell, Karl, ed. (2000). Poland and the European Union. Routledge. p. 187. ISBN   978-0415238854.
  23. ↑ Florentyna Rzemieniuk, Unici Polscy 1596–1946, Siedlce, 1998, pp. 202, 204, 210.
  24. ↑ Alexander Motyl. (1985). Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland, 1921-1939. East European Quarterly, 19:1 (1985:Spring) p.45

Bibliography

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