Rummel v. Estelle

Last updated

Rummel v. Estelle
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 7, 1980
Decided March 18, 1980
Full case nameWilliam James Rummel v. Estelle, Corrections Director
Citations445 U.S. 263 ( more )
100 S. Ct. 1133; 63 L. Ed. 2d 382; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 90
Holding
The Texas state court's decision was affirmed, that life in prison with possibility of parole is not cruel and unusual punishment for a habitual offender convicted of passing bad checks.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Potter Stewart
Byron White  · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun  · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist  · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun
ConcurrenceStewart
DissentPowell, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), (sometimes erroneously cited as Rummel v. Estell) was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a life sentence with the possibility of parole under Texas' three strikes law for a felony fraud crime, where the offense and the defendant's two prior offenses involved approximately $230 of fraudulent activity (worth $847 in 2023 dollars, or about four 40-hour weeks at the contemporary Texas minimum wage of $1.40/hour). [1] [2] [3]

Contents

Background

Defendant William James Rummel had, prior to the offense in question, twice pleaded guilty to felony charges involving property: [1]

The third offense, in 1973, involved Rummel refusing to return $120.75 received as payment for repairs of an air conditioning unit that were not performed at all. [1] By itself, the crime was designated as "felony theft" and punishable by 2–10 years in the TDC. However, the prosecution sought to enhance the sentence under Texas' three strikes law, citing the 1964 and 1969 convictions as proof of Rummel's being a repeat offender; the law required a mandatory sentence of life with the possibility of parole if the enhancement allegation were found to be true.

A jury found Rummel guilty of felony theft and also found as true the allegation that Rummel had been convicted of two prior felonies; the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence in accordance with the law. [1]

Prior appeals

The Texas appellate courts rejected Rummel's appeal of the conviction as well as subsequent collateral attacks on his sentence. [1] Rummel then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, which also denied relief, on the basis that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the constitutionality of Texas' three strikes law, as well as agreeing with the State that the sentence was not truly "life" as Rummel would be eligible for parole in 12 years.

However, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the sentence on grounds that it "was 'so grossly disproportionate' to his offenses as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment." But the Court of Appeals sitting en banc reversed the panel's ruling, on the basis that Rummel would be eligible for parole; six judges dissented on the basis that Rummel had no enforceable right to parole and that prior Supreme Court rulings mandated overturning the sentence.

Opinions of the Court

Majority opinion

Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court opinion affirming Rummel's life sentence. [1]

At the outset, Rehnquist noted that Rummel did not challenge the general constitutionality of the three strikes law, only its application to his case, nor did Rummel challenge the classification of his current offense or either of his prior two offenses as felonies.

The Court then noted that in Graham v. West Virginia, a 1912 case which involved an individual convicted of three separate counts of horse thievery totaling $235 (only slightly more than the $230 total of Rummel's three offenses), Graham's life sentence was upheld.

Rummel then attempted to challenge his sentence "on an alleged 'nationwide' trend away from mandatory life sentences and toward 'lighter, discretionary sentences'", and provided "detailed charts and tables documenting the history of recidivist statutes in the United States since 1776" in an attempt to show that "[n]o jurisdiction in the United States or the Free World punishes habitual offenders as harshly as Texas." The Court noted, however, that Washington and West Virginia also imposed mandatory life sentences for habitual offenders, so Texas was not as harsh as other states.

The Court also noted that, although Rummel had no Constitutional right to a parole of his sentence, Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting "good time" credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as little as 12 years." The Court noted that this sentence was still not as harsh as Mississippi law, which imposed a life without parole sentence for three felony convictions where one was a violent felony, and upheld it.

Concurring opinion

Justice Stewart (who also joined the majority opinion) noted that "[i]f the Constitution gave me a roving commission to impose upon the criminal courts of Texas my own notions of enlightened policy, I would not join the Court's opinion", indicating that he would not have upheld the sentence. However, as the question posed was "whether those procedures fall below the minimum level the [Constitution] will tolerate", Justice Stewart was "constrained to join the opinion and judgment of the Court." [1]

Dissenting opinion

Justice Powell delivered a dissenting opinion, arguing that "(i) the penalty for a noncapital offense may be unconstitutionally disproportionate, (ii) the possibility of parole should not be considered in assessing the nature of the punishment, (iii) a mandatory life sentence is grossly disproportionate as applied to petitioner, and (iv) the conclusion that this petitioner has suffered a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights is compatible with principles of judicial restraint and federalism." [1]

Justice Powell focused the majority of his dissent on the second and third points. He noted that prior Court opinions ruled that prisoners had no Constitutional right to parole; thus, consideration of the possibility of parole should not be considered in determining whether a sentence was disproportionate. Justice Powell noted that "parole is simply an act of executive grace", and that in June 1979, the Governor of Texas refused to grant parole to 79% of state prisoners for which the parole board recommended release.

Justice Powell also noted that 3/4 of the state legislatures had never instituted a three strikes law imposing a mandatory life sentence for two or more nonviolent offenses, and of the 12 states that had, only three (Texas, West Virginia, and Washington) still retained the law. Specifically, Justice Powell noted that the states of Kansas and Kentucky changed their laws to a more flexible sentencing scheme. Justice Powell also noted that the federal habitual offender law also did not impose a mandatory life sentence.

Subsequent events

Rummel later filed another habeas corpus challenge to his sentence, this time claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. On October 3, 1980, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted Rummel's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. [4] Rummel then pleaded guilty to theft by false pretenses and was sentenced to time served under the terms of a plea-bargaining agreement.

Texas would later amend its three strikes law to remove the mandatory life imprisonment rule, changing it to permit a jury to return a sentence of life (with the possibility of parole) or a sentence of a term between 25 and 99 years. [5]

The Rummel case is commonly used by Texas courts as a proportionality test (if requested on appeal, usually by the defendant) to determine whether, under the Eighth Amendment, a sentence is excessive. Almost always the ruling is that a sentence is not excessive, given that Rummel's life sentence for a small felony conviction which only involved misappropriation of a small amount of property, enhanced by his two prior convictions both involving similar offenses and both involving small amounts of property, was upheld by the United States Supreme Court. [6] The case has also been used by Federal courts for proportionality test purposes, again with usually the same ruling that the sentence is not excessive. [7]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment regulating forms of punishment

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against imposing excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishments. This amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791, along with the rest of the United States Bill of Rights. The amendment serves as a limitation upon the federal government to impose unduly harsh penalties on criminal defendants before and after a conviction. This limitation applies equally to the price for obtaining pretrial release and the punishment for crime after conviction. The phrases in this amendment originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.

Probation in criminal law is a period of supervision over an offender, ordered by the court often in lieu of incarceration.

In the United States, habitual offender laws have been implemented since at least 1952, and are part of the United States Justice Department's Anti-Violence Strategy. These laws require a person who is convicted of an offense and who has one or two other previous serious convictions to serve a mandatory life sentence in prison, with or without parole depending on the jurisdiction. The purpose of the laws is to drastically increase the punishment of those who continue to commit offenses after being convicted of one or two serious crimes.

Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, Jurek v. Texas, Woodson v. North Carolina, and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. It reaffirmed the Court's acceptance of the use of the death penalty in the United States, upholding, in particular, the death sentence imposed on Troy Leon Gregg. The case is referred to by a leading scholar as the July 2 Cases, and elsewhere referred to by the lead case Gregg. The court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing procedures must employ in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punishments". The decision essentially ended the de facto moratorium on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

Mandatory sentencing requires that offenders serve a predefined term of imprisonment for certain crimes, commonly serious or violent offenses. Judges are bound by law; these sentences are produced through the legislature, not the judicial system. They are instituted to expedite the sentencing process and limit the possibility of irregularity of outcomes due to judicial discretion. Mandatory sentences are typically given to people who are convicted of certain serious and/or violent crimes, and require a prison sentence. Mandatory sentencing laws vary across nations; they are more prevalent in common law jurisdictions because civil law jurisdictions usually prescribe minimum and maximum sentences for every type of crime in explicit laws.

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), is the first landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution was interpreted to prohibit criminalization of particular acts or conduct, as contrasted with prohibiting the use of a particular form of punishment for a crime. In Robinson, the Court struck down a California law that criminalized being addicted to narcotics.

A habitual offender, repeat offender, or career criminal is a person convicted of a crime who was previously convicted of other crimes. Various state and jurisdictions may have laws targeting habitual offenders, and specifically providing for enhanced or exemplary punishments or other sanctions. They are designed to counter criminal recidivism by physical incapacitation via imprisonment.

The Baumes law was an anti-crime statute adopted by New York State in 1926.

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), was a United States Supreme Court case concerned with the scope of the Eighth Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment. Mr. Helm, who had written a check from a fictitious account and had reached his seventh nonviolent felony conviction since 1964, received a mandatory sentence, under South Dakota law at that time, to life in prison with no parole. Petitioner Mr. Solem was the warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary at the time.

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), is one of two cases upholding a sentence imposed under California's three strikes law against a challenge that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As in its prior decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court could not agree on the precise reasoning to uphold the sentence. But, with the decision in Ewing and the companion case Lockyer v. Andrade, the Court effectively foreclosed criminal defendants from arguing that their non-capital sentences were disproportional to the crime they had committed.

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), decided the same day as Ewing v. California, held that there would be no relief by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a sentence imposed under California's three strikes law as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Relying on the reasoning of Ewing and Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court ruled that because no "clearly established" law held that a three-strikes sentence was cruel and unusual punishment, the 50-years-to-life sentence imposed in this case was not cruel and unusual punishment.

Wilson v. State, 652 S.E. 2d 501, 282 Ga. 520 (2007) was a Georgia court case brought about to appeal the aggravated child molestation conviction of Genarlow Wilson.

In the United States, life imprisonment is amongst the most severe punishments provided by law, depending on the state, and second only to the death penalty. According to a 2013 study, 1 of every 20,000 inhabitants of the U.S. were imprisoned for life as of 2012. Many U.S. states can release a convict on parole after a decade or more has passed, but in California, people sentenced to life imprisonment can normally apply for parole after seven years. The laws in the United States categorize life sentences as "determinate life sentences" or "indeterminate life sentences," the latter indicating the possibility of an abridged sentence, usually through the process of parole. For example, sentences of "15 years to life," "25 years to life," or "life with mercy" are called "indeterminate life sentences", while a sentence of "life without the possibility of parole" or "life with no mercy" is called a "determinate life sentence". The potential for parole is not assured but discretionary, making it an indeterminate sentence. Even if a sentence explicitly denies the possibility of parole, government officials may have the power to grant an amnesty to reprieve, or to commute a sentence to time served.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States holding that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide offenses.

Expungement in the United States is a process which varies across jurisdictions. Many states allow for criminal records to be sealed or expunged, although laws vary by state. Some states do not permit expungement, or allow expungement under very limited circumstances. In general, once sealed or expunged, all records of an arrest and of any subsequent court proceedings are removed from the public record, and the individual may legally deny or fail to acknowledge ever having been arrested for or charged with any crime which has been expunged.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2012 California Proposition 36</span> Passed proposition to change the three-strikes law

Proposition 36, also titled A Change in the "Three Strikes Law" Initiative, was a California ballot measure that was passed in November 2012 to modify California's Three Strikes Law. The latter law punishes habitual offenders by establishing sentence escalation for crimes that were classified as "strikes", and requires a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 to life for a "third-strike offense."

United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), is a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)'s five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for certain sex offenses committed by federal supervised releasees as unconstitutional unless the charges are proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Gorsuch's plurality opinion, while Breyer provided the necessary fifth vote with his narrow concurrence that began by saying he agreed with much of Justice Alito's dissent, which was joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh.

Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that state robbery offenses that involve overcoming victim resistance count as "violent felonies" under the definition of that term under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, even when only 'slight force' is required. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, defendants with three or more violent felonies can face higher sentences when subsequently convicted of a federal firearms-related offense. This case upheld a ruling by the 11th Circuit.

Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. ___ (2020), is an opinion of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, the definition of “serious drug offense” only requires that the state offense involve the conduct specified in the statute. Unlike other provisions of the ACCA, it does not require that state courts develop “generic” version of a crime, which describe the elements of the offense as they are commonly understood, and then compare the crime being charged to that generic version to determine whether the crime qualifies under the ACCA for purposes of penalty enhancement. The decision states that offenses defined under the ACCA are "unlikely names for generic offenses," and are therefore unambiguous. This renders the rule of lenity inapplicable.

R v Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which held that life sentences without a realistic possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court unanimously struck down section 745.51 of the Criminal Code, which gave sentencing judges the discretion to stack periods of parole ineligibility for multiple murders, for violating Section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

References