Farmer v. Brennan | |
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Argued January 12, 1994 Decided June 6, 1994 | |
Full case name | Dee Farmer, Petitioner v. Edward Brennan, Warden, et al. |
Docket no. | 92-7247 |
Citations | 511 U.S. 825 ( more ) 114 S. Ct. 1970; 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 |
Argument | Oral argument |
Opinion announcement | Opinion announcement |
Case history | |
Prior | 11 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1992); cert. granted, 510 U.S. 811(1993). |
Subsequent | Vacated and remanded, 28 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir. 1994); appeal after remand, 81 F.3d 1444 (7th Cir. 1996). |
Holding | |
The "deliberate indifference" of an official at a prison to the substantial risk of any serious harm against an inmate is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Souter, joined by Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg |
Concurrence | Blackmun |
Concurrence | Stevens |
Concurrence | Thomas (in judgment) |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. Amend. VIII |
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a prison official's "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Farmer built on two previous Supreme Court decisions addressing prison conditions, Estelle v. Gamble and Wilson v. Seiter. [1] The decision marked the first time the Supreme Court directly addressed sexual assault in prisons. [2]
Dee Farmer, a trans woman, was convicted of credit card fraud in 1986, and was initially incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution, Oxford, a medium-security federal prison for men. [3] Farmer was incarcerated with the general male population due to federal prison guidelines that assigned trans prisoners to facilities based on medical transition status. [3] In 1989, Farmer was transferred to the general male population at US Penitentiary Terre Haute, Indiana, a higher security facility that housed "more troublesome prisoners." [4] Within two weeks of arriving at the penitentiary, Farmer was beaten and sexually assaulted by another inmate in her cell, which potentially exposed her to HIV infection. [5]
Farmer subsequently filed a Bivens lawsuit in federal court without a lawyer, alleging that the wardens of both of her prisons and other officials within the Federal Bureau of Prisons violated her Eighth Amendment rights. [5] In an amended filing, she specified that the prison administration was deliberately indifferent to her safety when it transferred her to a general male prison population with a history of inmate violence, knowing that she would be particularly vulnerable to rape as a trans woman. [6]
The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, denying Farmer's motion to delay its ruling until the defendants complied with a discovery request. It concluded that failure to prevent inmate assaults violates the Eighth Amendment only if prison officials had "actual knowledge" of a potential danger, and that respondents lacked such knowledge because Farmer never expressed any safety concerns to them. [7]
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court in a short memorandum opinion, noting that any issues that could be raised on appeal were "insubstantial," and the parties did not need to submit any briefs for the court to consider. [8]
The Supreme Court granted Farmer's petition for certiorari from the Seventh Circuit decision, in order to resolve disagreement among different Courts of Appeals regarding the proper test to assess "deliberate indifference" of officials. [9]
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the ACLU National Prison Project stepped in to represent Farmer. [1] In their briefing before the Court and at oral argument, Farmer and the ACLU argued that deliberate indifference should be defined objectively, where deliberate official indifference to obvious risks that are likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights is sufficient for a plaintiff to show an Eighth Amendment violation. [10] This standard is akin to the recklessness standard used in civil cases. [11] The federal government argued that the Court should adopt a test more similar to criminal recklessness, which would require that a plaintiff show that the prison official had actual knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm. [12]
ACLU attorney Elizabeth Alexander used Farmer's proper pronouns in her briefs and at oral arguments, while lawyers for the federal government used male pronouns. [1]
Amicus briefs were filed in favor of reversing the Seventh Circuit on behalf of the Montana Defender Project, the D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services Project, and Stop Prisoner Rape. [13] An amicus brief in favor of affirming the Seventh Circuit was filed on by the Attorney General of Maryland, which was joined by all other state attorneys general. [13]
The brief filed by Stop Prison Rape emphasized that prison rape is "widespread, repetitive, deadly, devastating, predictable, and preventable," but is rarely reported because it is "ingrained in the culture of confinement, both among prisoners and prison officials." [14] In order to address this issue, the brief asked the Court to use Farmer's case to add pressure to prison officials to bring about systemic prison reforms, and to create greater access to the courts for survivors of prison rape. [14]
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a 9–0 decision that "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of harm to an inmate can render a prison official liable under the Eighth Amendment. [15] Justice David Souter wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, along with Justices Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. [16] Justices Blackmun and Stevens also wrote separate concurring opinions. [17] [18] Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion joining in the judgment, but disagreed with the majority's reasoning. [19]
The majority opinion of the Court held a prison official could be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if they are "deliberately indifferent" to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner. The Court explained that the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, which includes provision of "adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care," and taking "reasonable measures" to ensure inmate safety. [19] In particular, prison officials have a duty to prevent harm from other prisoners. [20] In order to prove that a constitutional rights violation occurred, however, an inmate must show (1) a substantial risk of serious harm and (2) that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to inmate health and safety. [21]
The Court then proceeded to clarify what qualified as "deliberate indifference." Under the deliberate indifference standard, a prison official must actually know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health and safety. [22] The Court explained that this is a subjective standard, under which the official must be aware of facts that would lead to an inference that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and then must also draw that inference. [22]
Applying this standard to Farmer's case, the Court noted that the District Court mistakenly relied on the fact that Farmer never notified the guards of her risk of being assaulted in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. [23] Notification was not required under the deliberate indifference standard, and Farmer could use other circumstantial evidence to prove actual knowledge, such as admissions by prison guards that she was likely to face "a great deal of sexual pressure" in prison. [24] Consequently, the Court vacated the judgment by the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. [25]
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion went further by saying that the government was responsible for the conditions inside, regardless of a prison or government official's subjective state of mind:
Where a legislature refuses to fund a prison adequately, the resulting barbaric conditions should not be immune from constitutional scrutiny simply because no prison official acted culpably....The responsibility for subminimal conditions in any prison inevitably is diffuse, and often borne at least in part, by the legislature. Yet, regardless of what state actor or institution caused the harm and with what intent, the experience of the inmate is the same. A punishment is simply no less cruel or unusual because its harm is unintended. In view of this obvious fact, there is no reason to believe that, in adopting the Eighth Amendment, the Framers intended to prohibit cruel and unusual punishments only when they were inflicted intentionally. [17]
Justice Stevens wrote a short concurring opinion noting that he agreed with Justice Blackmun, but joined in Justice Souter's majority opinion because it more closely followed the Court's precedent. [18]
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment only, explaining that conditions of confinement should not violate the Eighth Amendment unless they are imposed as part of a sentence. [19] In Farmer's case, because the attack "was not part of his [lower-alpha 1] sentence, it did not constitute 'punishment' under the Eighth Amendment." [19] However, he agreed that a "deliberate indifference" standard should govern prison official liability, and therefore concurred in the Court's ruling. [26]
The District Court again granted summary judgment against Farmer on remand. This second summary judgment was overturned by the Court of Appeals for not giving Farmer a meaningful chance to seek discovery in her case. [27] The subsequent trial lasted only two days, [28] and the jury found for defendants after deliberating for one hour. [28] The jury found that there was insufficient evidence presented to prove that Farmer's sexual assault had occurred. [28]
Tens of thousands of cases in the lower courts have cited Farmer's case and the legal standard it established. [29] Farmer also continues to have an impact on jailhouse lawyers. By carefully explaining how to argue constitutional violations behind bars, defining complex legal terms like “subjective recklessness” and mapping out a successful claim, Justice Souter's majority opinion serves as a roadmap for Eighth Amendment prison condition litigation. [1] Nonetheless, the "actual knowledge" focus of the standard adopted by the Court in Brennan sets a high bar for plaintiffs that can often prove difficult to surmount. [30] These claims became even more difficult to pursue after the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal , which established a strict plausibility pleading standard, and makes it difficult for inmate plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss without clear evidence of prison officials' actual knowledge of their substantial risk of harm. [31]
Stop Prisoner Rape lauded the decision as a "historic breakthrough" in efforts to end "the widespread and institutionalized practice of rape of prisoners." [2] The attention that the case brought to sexual assault in prisons, especially for trans inmates, helped to spur policy changes as well. [29] Nine years later, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 and both the House and Senate referenced Farmer in floor debates regarding the bill. [32] In 2012, the Department of Justice announced regulations implementing the PREA, including specific protections for transgender people that referred to Farmer expressly. [33] The final rule implemented by the DOJ explained that placement decisions for trans inmates must be made on a case-by-case basis, and should entail consideration of whether a placement would ensure the inmate's health and safety, with serious consideration given to the inmate's own views regarding their own safety. [34]
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), is a United States Supreme Court decision where the Court on a 7–2 vote held that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though the inmate does not suffer serious injury.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), was a case in which the US Supreme Court ruled that an implied cause of action existed for an individual whose Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizures had been violated by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The victim of such a deprivation could sue for the violation of the Fourth Amendment itself despite the lack of any federal statute authorizing such a suit. The existence of a remedy for the violation was implied by the importance of the right violated.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), was a United States Supreme Court decision which held that police officials do not need a warrant to observe an individual's property from public airspace.
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled by 6 votes to 3 that a claim of actual innocence does not entitle a petitioner to federal habeas corpus relief by way of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), was a landmark case in which the United States Supreme Court split on the First Amendment issue of local school boards removing library books from junior high schools and high schools. Four Justices ruled that it was unconstitutional, four Justices concluded the contrary, and one Justice concluded that the court need not decide the question on the merits. Pico was the first Supreme Court case to consider the right to receive information in a library setting under the First Amendment, but the court's fractured plurality decision left the scope of this right unclear.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), held that the death penalty for rape of an adult was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the defense of qualified immunity, under which government actors may not be sued for actions they take in connection with their offices, did not apply to a lawsuit challenging the Alabama Department of Corrections's use of the "hitching post", a punishment whereby inmates were immobilized for long periods of time.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States established the standard of what a prisoner must plead in order to claim a violation of Eighth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the Court held that a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Though the Court credited Gamble's complaint that doctors had failed to provide appropriate care, it held that medical malpractice did not rise to the level of "cruel and unusual punishment" simply because the victim is a prisoner.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that states participating in Medicaid are not required to fund medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement was unavailable as a result of the Hyde Amendment, which restricted the use of federal funds for abortion. The Court also held that the funding restrictions of the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Fifth Amendment or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which upheld the constitutionality of a particular method of lethal injection used for capital punishment.
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that state juries may convict a defendant by a less-than-unanimous verdict in a felony criminal case. The four-justice plurality opinion of the court, written by Justice White, affirmed the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals and held that there was no constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. Although federal law requires federal juries to reach criminal verdicts unanimously, the Court held Oregon's practice did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and so allowed it to continue. In Johnson v. Louisiana, a case decided on the same day, the Court held that Louisiana's similar practice of allowing criminal convictions by a jury vote of 9–3 did not violate due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that peremptory challenges based solely on a prospective juror's sex are unconstitutional. J.E.B. extended the court's existing precedent in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), which found race-based peremptory challenges in criminal trials unconstitutional, and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company (1991), which extended that principle to civil trials. As in Batson, the court found that sex-based challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) people face difficulties in prison such as increased vulnerability to sexual assault, other kinds of violence, and trouble accessing necessary medical care. While much of the available data on LGBTQ inmates comes from the United States, Amnesty International maintains records of known incidents internationally in which LGBTQ prisoners and those perceived to be lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender have suffered torture, ill-treatment and violence at the hands of fellow inmates as well as prison officials.
Prisoner suicide is suicide by an inmate in a jail or prison.
The Julia Tutwiler Prison for Women is a prison for women of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC), located in Wetumpka, Alabama. All female inmates entering ADOC are sent to the receiving unit in Tutwiler. Tutwiler houses Alabama's female death row, which qualifies it for the "maximum security" classification.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), was a 1978 United States Supreme Court case in which the Court refused to recognize a "right of access", under the First Amendment, to interview particular prisoners.
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case over the issue of gender bias in statutory rape laws. The petitioner argued that the statutory rape law discriminated based on gender and was unconstitutional. The court ruled that this differentiation passes intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because it serves an important state goal, stating that sexual intercourse entails a higher risk for women than men. Thus, the court found the law justified.
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies to civil forfeiture cases.
Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119 (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case regarding the standards for challenging methods of capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that when a convict sentenced to death challenges the State's method of execution due to claims of excessive pain, the convict must show that other alternative methods of execution exist and clearly demonstrate they would cause less pain than the state-determined one. The Court's opinion emphasized the precedential force of its prior decisions in Baze v. Rees and Glossip v. Gross.
Lisa Simpson; Anne Gilmore v. University of Colorado Boulder, Nos. 06-1184 and 07-1182 was a case in which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that there was enough evidence that the University of Colorado Boulder was deliberately indifferent under Title IX of not taking appropriate measures to limit sexual assault on their campus despite officials, such as Gary Barnett, having a general knowledge of the harassment and the risk of sexual assault occurring.