United States Refugee Admissions Program

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The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) is a collaboration among federal agencies and nonprofit organizations responsible for identifying and admitting qualified refugees for resettlement in the United States. [1] The program operates under Section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which authorizes the admission of refugees who meet defined criteria of persecution or humanitarian concern. [2]

Contents

Overview

According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), USRAP’s purpose is to provide resettlement opportunities to individuals overseas who are of “special humanitarian concern,” while maintaining national security and preventing fraud. [3]

Each year, the President of the United States, after consultation with Congress, determines refugee admissions ceilings and priorities for the coming fiscal year. [4]

Goals

The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) states that USRAP's mission is "to offer resettlement opportunities to people overseas who are of special humanitarian concern while protecting national security and combating fraud". [5] The goals of USRAP are: [6]

Every year, immigration law requires that the Executive Branch officials:

Historical background

Origins and development

After World War II, U.S. refugee admissions were conducted on an ad hoc basis. Non-governmental organizations such as the International Rescue Committee, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), and Church World Service played leading roles in early resettlement efforts. [8]

The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 established the first legal framework for admitting refugees to the United States, allowing the entry of over 400,000 displaced Europeans. [9] Following the Vietnam War, the United States accepted large numbers of Indochinese refugees, prompting Congress to enact the Refugee Act of 1980, which standardized refugee admissions and established a uniform resettlement structure. [10]

Since 1980, over three million refugees have been admitted to the United States under the Act. [11]

21st century developments

Refugee admissions fluctuated in the 2010s and 2020s. In 2017, Executive Order 13769 temporarily suspended refugee admissions and reduced the annual ceiling. The limit was later raised under the Biden administration to 125,000 for fiscal year 2022. [12] In January 2025, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 14163, which again suspended USRAP pending review of national security procedures. [13] [14]

Policy and impact

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a refugee is a person unable or unwilling to return to their country of nationality due to persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. [15]

Applicants must be referred by UNHCR, a U.S. embassy, or a designated NGO, and undergo multi-stage security and medical screening before admission.

Socioeconomic effects

Peer-reviewed research indicates that refugees in the United States do not increase crime rates and contribute positively to long-term economic growth. [16] [17] A 2017 study by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services found that refugees generated more in tax revenue than the cost of federal assistance programs between 2005 and 2014. [18]

Ongoing challenges

Audits and academic reviews have identified systemic challenges in coordination among agencies, case processing delays, and inconsistent access to services at the local level. [19] Key issues include insufficient funding for local integration programs, uneven English-language training, and gaps in medical care for vulnerable populations. [20]

Program structure

Government entities

USRAP is not run by any one agency of the federal government; rather, it is a collaborative effort among many different agencies and departments of the federal government as well as a number of nonprofit organizations. [21] According to the U.S. Department of State website, three entities make up the federal arm of the USRAP program: USCIS, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, which is part of the Department of State; and the Office of Refugee Resettlement, which is part of the Department of Health and Human Services. [21]

"The following agencies are also involved in this effort:

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

USCIS is responsible for activities that could be termed the "legal side" of USRAP operations. It processes applications for refugee admission to the United States and applications for permanent residency. It also issues documents that permit refugees to return to the United States after traveling abroad. [22] Although USCIS is involved in humanitarian efforts by virtue of its inclusion in USRAP, the organization plays more of an incidental processing role than a humanitarian one.

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

As part of the U.S. Department of State, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration is primarily responsible for USRAP's operations abroad. [23] According to the Bureau's website, its roughly 130 staff members perform primarily pass-through operations where they do not work directly with refugees. Rather, they work through other organizations such as the International Rescue Committee and other various intergovernmental organizations so as to provide services to refugees. [23] The Bureau also processes applications for refugee resettlement to the United States. [23]

Office of Refugee Resettlement

Whereas the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration primarily handles the foreign-based portions of USRAP and USCIS works with admissions and legal issues, the Office of Refugee Resettlement "provide[s] new populations with the opportunity to maximize their potential in the United States." [24]

The Office of Refugee Resettlement plays a particularly important role within USRAP. Bringing refugees into the United States and processing their documents is quite a different thing from assisting those same refugees in living and working in a new and foreign culture. This is the task of the Office of Refugee Resettlement.

Non-profit affiliates

Nonprofits play a special role in USRAP. There are nine nonprofits appointed to work with the nation in either refugee referrals or in refugee resettlement. The ten non-profits currently working with USRAP are listed below: [25]

These nine nonprofits have some 360 affiliated offices across the nation. Each nonprofit provides help for refugees to become self-sufficient after their arrival in the United States. Specifically, each nonprofit provides housing, food, clothing, enrollment in school, English language classes, employment, health screenings, and other public services. [26] The following descriptions detail the unique contributions of two of the USRAP-involved nonprofits: the Church World Service and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society.

Church World Service

Church World Service [27] works with eight different denominations, the United Methodist Church, United Church of Christ, Reformed Church in America, Presbyterian Church (USA), Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the Episcopal Church, the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, and Christian Church (Disciples of Christ). Along with the basic public services provided by every nonprofit, the Church World Service administers the Religious Services Program, a program which helps refugees continue to practice their religion in the U.S. (regardless of the individual refugee's specific religious practices).

HIAS

HIAS (founded as the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society) [28] works within the Jewish Communal Network Commission to provide basic services to refugees. [28] HIAS created the Refugee Family Enrichment program that addresses the problems a refugee family may face during resettlement. [28] As part of their resettlement program through USRAP, HIAS teaches communication and conflict resolution skills that help families work through the difficulties of resettlement.

Budget and funding

During FY 2011, USRAP received $302 million from the federal government to fund its programs. [29] That number will increase by over 25 percent (to $417 million) in FY 2012 and then drop back down to $310 million in FY 2013. [29] According to the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, some of these monies are used to "[fund] ten public and private non-profit organizations to help provide initial services and assist refugees to achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible." [30]

Refugee eligibility

According to USRAP, "A refugee is someone who has fled from his or her home country and cannot return because he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution based on religion, race, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group." [31] Once a refugee has fled their country into a neighboring country, there is an intensive process before they can be legally admitted into the United States of America. While the process aims to take about eight months to a year, the reality is that it takes much longer. [31] Once a refugee has been admitted to the United States, it is the responsibility of the sponsoring organization to help them adapt to their new life. It is the hope that they will be enfolded into their community and become an asset to the country.

Table 1 USRAPTABLE1.JPG
Table 1

Services

Cash assistance

As touched on above, much of the literature on USRAP challenges the efficacy of the program's cash assistance efforts. A recent study conducted by Columbia University argued that the program's failure to take individual circumstances into account when providing cash assistance has led to most of the problem:

... The notion that every refugee needs the same baseline services that has persisted since the inception of the refugee program aligns poorly with the goals of self-sufficiency and integration in the medium and long term. This is especially true given the diversity of the refugees arriving to the United States and the diversity of circumstances they face once here. Refugees have little agency over what services they can access, and even volags [local programs] have minimal room to account for refugees' individual profiles when deciding what services to offer. Instead ... quick placement in employment is emphasized across the board, access to supplementary services and community support is determined essentially by lottery, and secondary migration is not accounted for. [32] :11

This same article goes on to point out the varying degree of assistance from state-to-state creates a random allocation of assistance for refugees. Depending on their location, some refugees are given transportation assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) support, and local community assistance as well while other refugees are given the bare minimum of federal funding. This inequitable allocation leads to the successful integration of some refugees while others are left behind. [32] :11

Employment

The purpose of cash assistance is to help refugees find employment. This goal, however, is frequently not achieved. "…The cash assistance received was not enough to cover basic expenses and often ran out long before employment was secured." [33] :20 One of the main issues with refugee employment is that there is simply not enough time or money to support a thorough job search. The time allotted for support is eight months, however, the paper quoted above claimed that in reality the support lasts six months or less. This lack of time and funding results in a push for quick, insufficient employment rather than full, sustaining careers.

Refugees are pushed toward short-term jobs, simply to get them employed. This ignores individual refugees abilities, past education, and professional experience. The reason behind this push is that the goal is not that of long-term self-sustainability, but rather of self-sustainability by the end of the "eight"-month refugee assistance. [33] :25 The result is that the program turns into a machine bent on churning out integrated refugees. This method is inefficient because more refugees must then rely on the government over the long-term through welfare programs.

These short-term jobs have above minimum wage pay, but the average wage per hour for full-time workers obtained by refugees within four months of arrival was $8.67 in 2009. [34] :24 This rate is insufficient for refugees who provide for their families. Many face eviction and eventual unemployment. [35] :12 This quick employment issue greatly affects the refugees' ability to be self-sustaining." [34] :20 In fiscal year 2007, ORR's performance data show that between 59 percent and 65 percent of all refugees receiving cash assistance from ORR's four assistance programs entered employment within 4 to 8 months of coming to the United States. There are mechanisms in place to allow for refugees to transfer their professional degrees; however, these transfers require recertification that costs as much as $1,000. [33] :24

English language

If a refugee cannot speak English, their job possibilities decrease. "The ability to speak English can greatly facilitate a refugee's chances of finding employment." [34] :27 USRAP does provide English language classes. There is, however, a wide array of problems with these classes: inadequate facilities, no longevity, poor teacher quality, and lack of transportation to classes. [34] :27

Because of these issues, most refugees are not getting the English language training they need to achieve self-sustainability. The literature focused mainly on the problems with facilities and transportation.

According to Table 2, 58 percent of the incoming refugees could not speak English. This indicates that there is a great need for English language training among the refugees.

Table 2. Data for 1982 and 1986 are limited to Southeast Asian refugees. Data are averages for these years. USRAPTABLE2.JPG
Table 2. Data for 1982 and 1986 are limited to Southeast Asian refugees. Data are averages for these years.

Because of the large percentage of refugees that need English classes, facilities are not expansive enough to cover the need. [35] :20–21 As stated above, another barrier to English acquisition is the lack of transport to classes. Because refugees do not have a way to get to the classes, they do not go to the classes and thus they do not learn English. [33] :23 "Limited funding means training provision typically stops at English language training during the early resettlement period". [32] :13 This correlates directly with the refugee's ability to obtain employment. Approximately 90 percent of refugees who were living on government welfare programs did not speak English. [34] :27

Healthcare

In addition to employment assistance, USRAP is also responsible for the health, both mental and physical, of refugees entering the United States. According to our bylaws, refugee resettlement agencies are "... authorized to fund social services projects designed to provide, where specific needs have been shown and recognized by the Director, health (including mental health) services, social services, educational and other services." [36]

This responsibility becomes a problem when a high percentage of entering refugees have health issues. As the literature points out, this is a growing reality for the United States, "The number of refugees with chronic untreated medical and mental health conditions continues to grow. Needy refugees who do not qualify for Medicaid are limited to up to eight months of Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA)." [35] :20 There are reasons for why so many refugees suffer from poor mental and physical health:

Because the United States has admitted an increased number of refugees who have spent many years living in difficult conditions, such as refugee camps, a larger proportion of recently arrived refugees have health and other issues that make it difficult for them to work and achieve self-sufficiency. Because of these changes in refugee populations, [resettlement programs] faced difficulties in estimating the costs of serving newly arrived refugees, which, in turn, has affected the agency's unobligated balances. [34] :2

As one article posited, this rise in mental illness among refugees calls for better training for psychologists in working with diverse populations: "The diversity of the refugee population in the United States requires practicing psychologists to respond by adapting clinical services to meet their mental health needs." [37] Hopefully with better training, psychologists of refugees will be able to better address their specific health needs. USRAP has an obligation to improve health services for the incoming refugee population.

Current issues

U.S. foreign policy issues

At times, United States foreign policy has had negative implications for the lives of the refugees USRAP aims to serve. Although official United States procedure states that foreign policy should have no impact on refugee admissions, this has not always been the case. [38] :393 For example, on September 11, 2001, a number of Afghan refugees were scheduled to arrive in the United States. Not surprisingly, those plans did not move forward. [38] :391

This use of refugee admissions programs to further national interests is, unfortunately, not uncommon. Legislation regarding refugee admissions written after World War II excluded large numbers of refugees (including ninety percent of Jewish refugees) from being eligible for resettlement in the United States. [38] :395 This treatment was justified by some because of fears concerning the refugees' possible impacts on the American economy. [38] :395 During the Cold War, the United States used refugee admissions policy largely as a propaganda tool in an attempt to discredit communism by granting asylum to those seeking to escape communist nations. [38] :395–396

However, the interplay between United States refugee admissions and foreign policy is not entirely one-sided. A 2012 USRAP report to Congress states that United States involvement in discussions and actions concerning refugee resettlement have given the United States the opportunity to advance human-rights as well as influence other countries to be more open to accepting refugees. [39] The example given in the report is that of Bhutanese refugees. Because the United States offered resettlement, other countries demonstrated a greater willingness to accept refugees as well. [39]

Local government issues

Along with its foreign policy problems, the literature points out that USRAP has had issues with its domestic policies as well. A report, Abandoned Upon Arrival: Implications for Refugees and Local Communities Burdened by a U.S. Resettlement System That is not Working, points out that local communities have confronted many challenges due to refugees resettlement. In the study, seven main findings were reported concerning the local resettlement communities.

First, the federal government uses "faith-based groups," for refugee placement. [40] :8 Local agencies are required to regularly consult with local governments. Receiving new refugees into a community requires numerous resources from the local government, but these local governments are not given enough funding from the federal government. They are also not informed as to how many new refugees they are going to receive. This has been a heavy burden for the local governments.

Second, the refugees' language barriers, caused by lack of adequate language instruction, prevent the refugees from communicating effectively concerning important issues such as health. USDHS conducted a study in 2008, showing that the better language skills refugees have, the better outcomes they obtain. [41] Schools are not usually able to assist the refugees they teach with developing their English specifically, since the government does not provide the additional funding to do so. [42]

Third, regardless of each refugee's situation in regards to education, health, or psychological background, the government has applied a "one-size-fits-all assistance" approach. [40] :9 This impedes the local governments' ability to accommodate the refugees according to their needs, and to prepare or teach them in areas that they are weak.

Fourth, while the Federal Government has increased funding for refugees, this does not fix the current problems. [40] :9

Fifth, insufficient funding after initial support for resettlement has created a difficult economic climate for the local communities.

Sixth, the current resettlement system not only is a burden, but also inhibits services for other refugees who have already been resettled.

In order to help the cities and refugees with these problems, this study suggests seven strategies for improvement: (1) ensure the local leaders involvement in decision-making processes, (2) provide better language courses, (3) establishing strategies in education, (4) remove "one-size-fits-all assistance", (5) improve accountability, (6) search for innovative models, and (7) promote community engagement. [40] :4–6

Administrative issues

Program fragmentation and lack of cohesion among different agencies produces challenges unnecessary burdens for those who are intended to benefit from the program.[ how? ]

Failure to share information

Many of these problems associated with USRAP begin with a lack of information sharing between the agencies involved. [33] :36 Much of the information gathered from refugees is not shared between agencies to ensure that the placement meets the needs of the refugee. For the most part, this information is only used to assess refugee admissibility into the resettlement program. At no point during the resettlement process does a government employee or contracted party have the responsibility to investigate and report "the presence of a needs-related vulnerability for the purposes of ensuring post-arrival assistance. Instead, such information is only gathered to help support the individual's persecution claim." [33] :38

Similarly, medical examinations and interviews of refugees performed by the USCIS overseas are not used to determine the health and resettlement needs of the refugee. Rather, this information is used to assess the admissibility of the refugee. [43] :10 In fact, resettlement agencies must make placement decisions before they even receive the medical records of refugees. [43] :10

One of the most crucial factors to the success of refugees is where they are placed in United States. [32] :10 Even though the most vulnerable populations are being targeted for resettlement, these vulnerabilities are not being communicated to the placing agencies. [32] :11 No structured system exists in USRAP for the collecting and distributing of refugee information for planning purposes. [33] :41 This failure to share information down the resettlement chain hurts the resettled refugees and the success of USRAP.

Failure to coordinate/monitor refugees

Because critical information is not always considered when a placement decision is made, it is not surprising that many refugees leave the locations of original placement to look for better opportunities elsewhere. In many instances, refugees will seek out communities of fellow country-of-origin nationals. [32] :16 Current legislation recognizes this secondary migration as a "natural and expected phenomenon." [32] :16 However, there are no tools or tracking system in place to manage this phenomenon. [32] :16 USRAP takes no measures in anticipating foreseeable trends in secondary migration by refugees. [33] :35 When refugees move, they get lost in the system and their federal assistance money does not follow them. Consequently, these secondary migration refugees lose out on a part of their eight months of cash and medical treatment. [33] :35

References

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