In 1960, the oft-expressed optimism of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam that the Viet Cong (VC) were nearly defeated proved mistaken. Instead the VC became a growing threat and security forces attempted to cope with VC attacks, assassinations of local officials, and efforts to control villages and rural areas. Throughout the year, the U.S. struggled with the reality that much of the training it had provided to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) during the previous five years had not been relevant to combating an insurgency. The U.S. changed its policy to allow the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to begin providing anti-guerrilla training to ARVN and the paramilitary Civil Guard.
PresidentNgô Đình Diệm of South Vietnam was faced with growing dissatisfaction with his government, culminating in a coup d'état attempt by military officers in November.
North Vietnam's support for the VC increased, and in December the National Liberation Front (NLF) was created to carry on the struggle. Ostensibly a coalition of anti-Diem organizations, the NLF was under the direct control of Communist Party of Vietnam.
January
4 January
President Diem said to General Samuel Williams, the head of MAAG in Saigon, that the counterinsurgency programs of his government had been successful and that "the Communists have now given up hope of controlling the countryside."[3]:335
7 January
General Williams said that "the internal security situation here now, although at times delicate, is better than it has been at any time in the last two or three years.[3]:334
17 January – 26 February
In what has been called "the start of the Vietnam War", the VC attacked and took temporary control of several districts in Kiến Hòa Province (now Bến Tre Province) in the Mekong Delta.[4] The VC set up "people's committees," and confiscated land from landlords and redistributed it to poor farmers. One of the leaders of the uprising was Madame Nguyễn Thị Định who led the all-female "Long Hair Army." Dinh was the secretary of the Bến Tre Communist Party and later a VC Major General.[5]
Although the ARVN recaptured the villages, uprisings spread to many other areas of South Vietnam. The uprisings were spontaneous, and contrary to the restrained and defensive policy of the Communist government in Hanoi.[6]:73
26 January
Two hundred VC guerrillas attacked the headquarters of the ARVN 32nd Regiment, 21st Division in Trang Sup village in Tây Ninh Province northeast of Saigon. The VC killed or wounded 66 soldiers and captured more than 500 weapons and a large quantity of ammunition. Later, a VC spokesman said that "the purpose of the attack was to launch the new phase of the conflict with a resounding victory and to show that the military defeat [of the South Vietnamese Army] was easy, not difficult." The attack shocked the Diệm government and its American advisers. A U.S. Embassy study of the implications of the battle recommended that two divisions of the ARVN be trained in guerrilla warfare.[3]:338
February
15 February
On his own initiative without consulting his American advisers, President Diệm ordered the formation of commando companies to undertake counter-insurgency (as anti-guerrilla warfare was beginning to be called) operations. Diệm planned to create 50 commando companies, composed of volunteers, of 131 men each. MAAG and the United States Department of Defense (DOD) opposed Diệm's proposal. General Williams said that Diệm's proposal to create 50 commando companies was "hasty, ill-considered, and destructive." To defeat the VC, he said that South Vietnam needed a well-trained Civil Guard, intensive training between operations, improved counterintelligence, and a clear chain of command. The U.S. was also concerned that Diem's proposal was an attempt to increase the number of South Vietnamese military personnel beyond the 150,000 ceiling that the U.S. was committed to support.[3]:349–51
President Diệm requested that the United States provide anti-guerrilla training to both the Civil Guard and ARVN.[7]
March
2 March
Ambassador Durbrow reported to the Department of State that the VC now numbered more than 3,000 men and that the Diệm government was losing its capability of dealing with the VC insurgency in rural areas.[8][3]:354
Two hundred VC in the Mekong Delta ambushed three ARVN companies. More than 40 soldiers were killed, wounded, or missing.[3]:340
18 March
Stimulated by a report from CIA operative and Diệm confidant Edward Lansdale, a military conference in Washington concluded that in South Vietnam "military operations without a sound political bases will be only a temporary solution." The conference recommended that the U.S. assign advisers to Vietnamese provincial governments to attempt to overcome shortcomings of the government at the local as well as the national level. The recommendation had little immediate impact.[3]:357
20 March
General Williams reported a difficult military situation in the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. The VC were overrunning Civil Guard posts and assassinating village officials. The guerrillas were also launching successful attacks on the ARVN which was unable to deal effectively with the guerrillas.[9]
25 March
An ARVN company on the Cái Nước River in the Mekong Delta was ambushed by VC. More than 50 ARVN soldiers were killed or wounded. A few days later in the same area more than 100 ARVN soldiers were killed in an ambush.[3]:341–2
30 March
In response to the request of Ambassador Durbrow, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff reversed MAAG policy and directed that MAAG assist the ARVN to develop an anti-guerrilla capability.[7]
April
7 April
Ambassador Durbrow requested permission from the State Department to threaten Diệm with actions to encourage him to reform his government. General Williams in Saigon and General Lansdale in Washington, strongly disagreed with Durbrow. Lansdale said "it would not be wisdom now, at a time of threat, to harass Diệm with ill-conceived political innovations.[8]:236
14 April
Increasing evidence was coming to light that the VC had infiltrated many South Vietnamese government agencies including the ARVN. The CIA reported that the ARVN had conducted five major operations in the Mekong Delta that year. In each case, 'there was every evidence that the Viet Cong knew in advance" about the date, plan, and route of the operation.[3]:347
15 April
Communist authorities in Hanoi continued to resist supporting an all-out insurgency in South Vietnam. National Assembly leader Tôn Đức Thắng said "the will and keen wish of our [North Vietnamese] people are work and peace. We want to preserve peace in order for our people to use their strength to build socialism." However, at the same meeting of the National Assembly southern leaders called for assistance and support from the north to support the VC who faced "an extremely unsafe situation."[6]:74–5
17 April
North Vietnam protested to Great Britain and the Soviet Union, co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, about the large increase in the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam and accused the U.S. of preparing for "a new war."[10]:19
18 April
The ARVN reported that it had killed 931 VC and captured 1,300 from mid-January to mid-April, but reported that they had captured only 150 weapons. During the same period the ARVN lost more than 1,000 weapons which led General Williams to doubt "how a well-trained...soldier feels it necessary to throw his weapons away."[3]:343
23 April
The Army Times praised General William's MAAG group in Saigon as possibly "the finest there is."[3]:302
27 April
Eighteen prominent Vietnamese intellectuals, in the "Caravelle Group"," wrote to President Diệm to express their concerns about the direction the government was taking. In particular they protested against the agroville program which aimed to concentrate rural residents into protected settlements. The intellectuals said, "Tens of thousands of people are being mobilized for hardship and toil to leave their work and go far from their homes and fields, separated from their parents, wives and children, to take up a life in collectivity in order to construct beautiful but useless agro-villes which tire the people, lose their affection, increase their resentment and most of all give an additional opportunity for propaganda to the enemy."[11]
May
5 May
The U.S. announced that the number of personnel of the MAAG would be increased from 327 to 685 by the end of 1960.[10]:19
9 May
President Eisenhower agreed that Diệm was becoming "arbitrary and blind" to the growing problems of his country and directed the State Department, CIA and the DOD to try to prevent the further deterioration of the situation."[8]:237
20 May
General Williams told Senator Mike Mansfield that MAAG could probably be reduced in size in 1961 by about 15 percent and reduced another 20 percent in 1962.[3]:340
30 May
Three U.S. Special Forces teams, a total of 46 soldiers, arrived in South Vietnam to train Vietnamese commando companies. These 4-week courses were the first formal training for counterinsurgency operations that the U.S. had provided to the ARVN.[3]:354
June
2 June
In an interview with Time-Life magazines General Williams said that the ARVN was "whipping" the VC.[3]:342
3 June
A senior South Vietnamese official told the CIA that the government would probably lose control of the Cà Mau Peninsula, the southernmost part of South Vietnam to the VC.[3]:355
6 June
The U.S. Embassy submitted a critical analysis of the Agroville Program to the Department of State. The program, begun by President Diệm, aimed to concentrate rural villagers into defensible settlements. The Embassy stated that the Agroville program "is a complete reversal of tradition and the social and economic pattern of the people affected. It is apparent that all planning and decisions have been made without their participation and with little if any consideration of their wishes, interests or views."[12]:218–9[13]
July
The Nam Bo (Southern Vietnam) Executive Committee of the VC asked Hanoi for more and better weapons as the armed struggle against the Diệm government was still weak.[6]:76
August
In August, Diệm abandoned the unpopular Agroville program.[12]:579
9 August
Captain Kong Le and the 2nd Lao Paratroop battalion overthrew the government of Laos, thus initiating a struggle for power in Laos with both the United States and the Soviet Union taking sides and supporting their respective factions. For the remainder of 1960 and extending into 1961, Laos eclipsed Vietnam in the interest of the superpowers and the media.[7]
23 August
The U.S. government compiled a National Intelligence Estimate stating that support for the VC was increasing and that supplies and combatants were moving to them from North Vietnam overland and by sea. The Diệm government faced growing hostility. "Criticism...focuses on Ngo family rule, especially the role of the President's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and Madame Nhu, the pervasive influence of the Can Lao...[and if] these adverse trends....remain unchecked, they will almost certainly in time cause the collapse of Diệm's regime."[3]:364
29 August
The British Embassy reported to London that Ho Chi Minh, Võ Nguyên Giáp and other moderates were being criticized by more militant communist party members for the lack of progress toward reunification of South and North Vietnam. Party militants were arguing for a more aggressive policy. For the moment, the British believed that the moderates had the upper hand.[6]:78
September
1 September
General Lionel C. McGarr replaced General Williams as chief of MAAG in Saigon. Williams had been in the position since 1955.[7]
7 September
At the Third National Party Congress in Hanoi, North Vietnam approved a 5-year economic plan with the goal of becoming a socialist economy by 1965, replacing private enterprise with state capitalism, and promoting industrialization. This despite a reduced rice ration for the population and discontent in rural areas and the cities, especially among intellectuals, shopkeepers, and Catholics.[6]:83
13 September
General Lansdale, now Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, argued that Diệm was the only option for stability in South Vietnam and that he should be assured "of our intent to provide material assistance and of our unwavering support to him in this time of crisis."[3]:368
16 September
Ambassador Durbrow told the Department of State that the Diệm government was facing two threats: a coup supported by non-communist opponents in Saigon and the expanding VC threat in rural areas. "Political, psychological and economic measures" in addition to military and security measures would be necessary to meet the threats.[3]:366
22 September
The CIA said that ARVN reports to Saigon from the provinces were doctored "to make it appear that they were continually conducting successful anti-communist operations. In one province, ARVN reported it had captured 60 VC, but an investigation discovered that all 60 were civilians.[3]:343
The Third National party Congress of the Communist Party in Hanoi reaffirmed the priority of strengthening the economy and government in North Vietnam rather than assisting the insurgency in South Vietnam. The VC would have to continue the struggle against South Vietnam utilizing mostly their own resources. However, the Congress elected Lê Duẩn as First Secretary of the Communist Party over Võ Nguyên Giáp. Giáp was a moderate while Lê Duẩn was a militant who had advocated more aggressive action by the North to aid the VC. His election may have been a concession to the southerners who were displeased with the lack of support from the Congress for their cause.[6]:85–6
October
14 October
Ambassador Durbrow met with President Diệm and requested that Diệm take a number of actions to "broaden and increase his popular support."
26 October
In a letter President Eisenhower congratulated President Diệm on the fifth anniversary of South Vietnam's creation. Eisenhower said that "the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."[10]
For the first time South Vietnam charged North Vietnam with aggression. A few days earlier the VC had captured several ARVN and Civil Guard posts near Kontum in the Central Highlands. The Diệm government claimed that the attack had been mounted by soldiers from North Vietnam who had infiltrated South Vietnam through Laos utilizing the network of trails and roads later called the Ho Chi Minh trail. The ARVN recaptured the lost posts.[15]:166
11 November
Five paratroop battalions encircled the Independence Palace in Saigon in what would be a failed coup attempt against President Diệm. The coup attempt was led by Lieutenant Colonel Vương Văn Đông and Colonel Nguyễn Chánh Thi of the Airborne Division. Diệm negotiated with Colonel Đông, promising reforms, until loyal forces could be gathered to put down the rebels.
12 November
Two infantry divisions loyal to Diệm arrived at the Independence Palace, engaged the rebels and forced them to withdraw. The coup attempt had failed. The leaders fled to Cambodia where they were given sanctuary by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.[15]:166–7
13 November
The New York Times said that Diệm was "between two fires" of the insurgency in rural areas and disgust among the populace at the authoritarian nature of his government. His survival might depend on the "reforms he now decides to make to meet such justifiable grievances as may exist among his people."[15]:167
In the early days of the Ho Chi Minh trail, bicycles were often used to transport arms and equipment from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
4 December
Ambassador Durbrow reported to the State Department that if Diệm did not reform his government, "we may well be forced to undertake the difficult task of identifying and supporting alternate leadership."[12]:220
12 December
The NLF was created at a conference at Xom Giua near the Cambodian border and the city of Tây Ninh.[17] The conference was attended by 100 delegates from more than a dozen political parties and religious groups, but was dominated by the North Vietnamese communist party. The NLF was said to include "all the patriots from all social strata, political parties, religions and nationalities" with the objective of overthrowing the "U.S. imperialists" and its "puppet administration" in Saigon.[6]:87–8[18]
A Vietnamese historian has said that the creation of the NLF was to emphasize that the VC struggle against South Vietnam and the U.S. had legitimate roots in the south and "to give the USSR and China no reason to oppose the armed struggle." Both the Soviet Union and China had been skeptical about the wisdom of North Vietnam attempting to reunite Vietnam by force.[6]:89
19 December
The Royal Thai Air Force began flying photo-reconnaissance flights over Laos using U.S. supplied RT-33A aircraft.[14]:74
26 December
H-34C Choctaw
Four H-34C Choctaws from United States Army inventory were airlifted to Saigon replace the worn out H-19s of the RVNAF 1st Helicopter Squadron. A further seven would follow later.[14]:55
29 December
Under pressure from MAAG chief McGarr and the Department of Defense, Ambassador Durbrow withdrew his opposition to the expansion of the ARVN from 150,000 to 170,000 soldiers. The increase would be financed by the United States.[3]:371
31 December
Approximately 900 U.S. military personnel were in South Vietnam on this date.[19] Five American soldiers were killed in Vietnam during 1960.[2] South Vietnamese armed forces numbered 146,000 regulars and 97,000 militia.[20] They suffered 2,223 killed in action.[21]
The number of VC combatants, counting both full-time and part-time guerrillas, was estimated at 15,000.[22] North Vietnam infiltrated 500 soldiers and party cadre, 1,600 weapons, and 50 tons of supplies into South Vietnam during the year.[23]
Related Research Articles
A Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is a designation for a group of United States military advisors sent to other countries to assist in the training of conventional armed forces and facilitate military aid. Although numerous MAAGs operated around the world throughout the 1940s–1970s, including in Yugoslavia after 1951, and to the Ethiopian Armed Forces, the most famous MAAGs were those active in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, before and during the Vietnam War. Records held by the National Archives and Records Administration detail the activities of numerous assistance advisory groups.
During the Second Indochina War, better known as the Vietnam War, a distinctive land warfare strategy and organization was used by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) or better known as the Viet Cong (VC) in the West, and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) or North Vietnamese Army (NVA) to defeat their American and South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) opponents. These methods involved closely integrated political and military strategy – what was called dau tranh - literally "to struggle". The National Liberation Front, (NLF) was an umbrella of front groups, sympathizers and allies set up by the rulers of North Vietnam to conduct the insurgency in South Vietnam. The NLF also included fully armed formations- regional and local guerrillas, and the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF). The PLAF was the "Main Force" – the Chu Luc or full-time soldiers of the NLF's military wing. Many histories lump both the NLF and the armed formations under the term "Viet Cong" or "VC" in common usage. Both were tightly interwoven and were in turn controlled by the North. Others consider the Viet Cong, or "VC" to primarily refer to the armed elements. The term PAVN, identifies regular troops of the North Vietnamese Army or NVA as they were commonly known by their Western opponents. Collectively, both forces- the southern armed wing and the regulars from the north were part of PAVN.
On November 11, 1960, a failed coup attempt against President Ngô Đình Diệm of South Vietnam was led by Lieutenant Colonel Vương Văn Đông and Colonel Nguyễn Chánh Thi of the Airborne Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).
Dr. Trần Kim Tuyến was the chief of intelligence of South Vietnam under its first President Ngô Đình Diệm from 1955 to 1963. As a Roman Catholic, he was trusted by the Ngô family, and was part of their inner circle. Tuyến was responsible for a variety of propaganda campaigns against communists, and was prominent in operating the secret Cần Lao party apparatus which maintained the Ngô family's rule. In the course of his work, Tuyến emulated the tactics of the communists. He eventually became disillusioned and plotted against the regime before being exiled. After Diệm was deposed, Tuyến returned to South Vietnam, but the military junta which had replaced the Ngô family jailed him for five years. He fled the country in 1975 as Saigon was falling.
Phạm Ngọc Thảo, also known as Albert Thảo, was a communist sleeper agent of the Việt Minh who infiltrated the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and also became a major provincial leader in South Vietnam. In 1962, he was made overseer of Ngô Đình Nhu's Strategic Hamlet Program in South Vietnam and deliberately forced it forward at an unsustainable speed, causing the production of poorly equipped and poorly defended villages and the growth of rural resentment toward the regime of President Ngô Đình Diệm, Nhu's elder brother. In light of the failed land reform efforts in North Vietnam, the Hanoi government welcomed Thao's efforts to undermine Diem.
The Taylor-Rostow Report was a report prepared in November 1961 on the situation in Vietnam in relation to Vietcong operations in South Vietnam. The report was written by General Maxwell Taylor, military representative to President John F. Kennedy, and Deputy National Security Advisor W.W. Rostow. Kennedy sent Taylor and Rostow to Vietnam in October 1961 to assess the deterioration of South Vietnam’s military position and the government's morale. The report called for improved training of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops, an infusion of American personnel into the South Vietnamese government and army, greater use of helicopters in counterinsurgency missions against North Vietnamese communists, consideration of bombing the North, and the commitment of 6,000-8,000 U.S. combat troops to Vietnam, albeit initially in a logistical role. The document was significant in that it seriously escalated the Kennedy Administration's commitment to Vietnam. It was also seen historically as having misdiagnosed the root of the Vietnam conflict as primarily a military rather than a political problem.
The South Vietnamese Regional Forces, originally the Civil Guard, were a component of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) territorial defence forces. Recruited locally, they served as full-time province-level forces, originally raised as a militia. In 1964, the Regional Forces were integrated into the ARVN and placed under the command of the Joint General Staff.
CIA activities in Vietnam were operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in Vietnam from the 1950s to the late 1960s, before and during the Vietnam War. After the 1954 Geneva Conference, North Vietnam was controlled by communist forces under Ho Chi Minh's leadership. South Vietnam, with the assistance of the U.S., was anti-communist under Ngo Dinh Diem's leadership. The economic and military aid supplied by the U.S. to South Vietnam continued until the 1974. The CIA participated in both the political and military aspect of the wars in Indochina. The CIA provided suggestions for political platforms, supported candidates, used agency resources to refute electoral fraud charges, manipulated the certification of election results by the South Vietnamese National Assembly, and instituted the Phoenix Program. It worked particularly closely with the ethnic minority Montagnards, Hmong, and Khmer. There are 174 National Intelligence Estimates dealing with Vietnam, issued by the CIA after coordination with the U.S. intelligence community.
The 1954 to 1959 phase of the Vietnam War was the era of the two nations. Coming after the First Indochina War, this period resulted in the military defeat of the French, a 1954 Geneva meeting that partitioned Vietnam into North and South, and the French withdrawal from Vietnam, leaving the Republic of Vietnam regime fighting a communist insurgency with USA aid. During this period, North Vietnam recovered from the wounds of war, rebuilt nationally, and accrued to prepare for the anticipated war. In South Vietnam, Ngô Đình Diệm consolidated power and encouraged anti-communism. This period was marked by U.S. support to South Vietnam before Gulf of Tonkin, as well as communist infrastructure-building.
The 1959 to 1963 phase of the Vietnam War started after the North Vietnamese had made a firm decision to commit to a military intervention in the guerrilla war in the South Vietnam, a buildup phase began, between the 1959 North Vietnamese decision and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which led to a major US escalation of its involvement. Vietnamese communists saw this as a second phase of their revolution, the US now substituting for the French.
The year 1961 saw a new American president, John F. Kennedy, attempt to cope with a deteriorating military and political situation in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong (VC) with assistance from North Vietnam made substantial gains in controlling much of the rural population of South Vietnam. Kennedy expanded military aid to the government of President Ngô Đình Diệm, increased the number of U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam, and reduced the pressure that had been exerted on Diệm during the Eisenhower Administration to reform his government and broaden his political base.
The defeat of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in a battle in January set off a furious debate in the United States on the progress being made in the war against the Viet Cong (VC) in South Vietnam. Assessments of the war flowing into the higher levels of the U.S. government in Washington, D.C. were wildly inconsistent, some citing an early victory over the VC, others a rapidly deteriorating military situation. Some senior U.S. military officers and White House officials were optimistic; civilians of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), junior military officers, and the media were decidedly less so. Near the end of the year, U.S. leaders became more pessimistic about progress in the war.
The Viet Cong (VC) insurgency expanded in South Vietnam in 1962. U.S. military personnel flew combat missions and accompanied South Vietnamese soldiers in ground operations to find and defeat the insurgents. Secrecy was the official U.S. policy concerning the extent of U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam. The commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General Paul D. Harkins, projected optimism that progress was being made in the war, but that optimism was refuted by the concerns expressed by a large number of more junior officers and civilians. Several prominent magazines, newspapers and politicians in the U.S. questioned the military strategy the U.S. was pursuing in support of the South Vietnamese government of President Ngô Đình Diệm. Diệm created the Strategic Hamlet Program as his top priority to defeat the VC. The program intended to cluster South Vietnam's rural dwellers into defended villages where they would be provided with government social services.
1959 saw Vietnam still divided into South and North. North Vietnam authorized the Viet Cong (VC) to undertake limited military action as well as political action to subvert the Diệm government. North Vietnam also authorized the construction of what would become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to supply the VC in South Vietnam. Armed encounters between the VC and the government of South Vietnam became more frequent and with larger numbers involved. In September, 360 soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were ambushed by a force of about 100 VC guerrillas.
In 1955, the Prime Minister of South Vietnam Ngô Đình Diệm faced a severe challenge to his rule over South Vietnam from the Bình Xuyên criminal gang and the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo religious sects. In the Battle of Saigon in April, Diệm's army eliminated the Bình Xuyên as a rival and soon also reduced the power of the sects. The United States, which had been wavering in its support of Diệm before the battle, strongly supported him afterwards. Diệm declined to enter into talks with North Vietnam concerning an election in 1956 to unify the country. Diệm called a national election in October and easily defeated Head of State Bảo Đại, thus becoming President of South Vietnam.
Ngo Dinh Diem consolidated his power as the President of South Vietnam. He declined to have a national election to unify the country as called for in the Geneva Accords. In North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh apologized for certain consequences of the land reform program he had initiated in 1955. The several thousand Viet Minh cadres the North had left behind in South Vietnam focused on political action rather than insurgency. The South Vietnamese army attempted to root out the Viet Minh.
In 1957 South Vietnam's President Ngô Đình Diệm visited the United States and was acclaimed a "miracle man' who had saved one-half of Vietnam from communism. However, in the latter part of the year, violent incidents committed by anti-Diệm insurgents increased and doubts about the viability of Diệm's government were expressed in the media and by U.S. government officials.
In 1958, the upswing in violence against the government of South Vietnam continued, much of which was committed by the communist-dominated insurgents now called the Viet Cong (VC). In South Vietnam, President Ngo Dinh Diem appeared to be firmly in power, although many American officials expressed concern about the repressive nature of his regime. The United States continued to finance most of the budget of the government of South Vietnam. North Vietnam continued to campaign for reunification with the South while focusing on its internal economic development, but pressure from hard-pressed communists in the South was forcing the North to contemplate a more active military role in overthrowing the Diem government.
Tran Ngoc Châu was a Vietnamese soldier, civil administrator, politician, and later political prisoner, in the Republic of Vietnam until its demise with the Fall of Saigon in 1975.
When 1954 began, the French had been fighting the insurgent communist-dominated Viet Minh for more than seven years attempting to retain control of their colony Vietnam. Domestic support for the war by the population of France had declined. The United States was concerned and worried that a French military defeat in Vietnam would result in the spread of communism to all the countries of Southeast Asia—the domino theory—and was looking for means of aiding the French without committing American troops to the war.
1 2 3 Adamson, Michael R. "Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy: Elbridge Durbrow, Frederick Nolting, and the U.S. Commitment to Diem's Vietnam, 1957-1961" Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 2002), p. 235. Downloaded from JSTOR
↑ Buzzanco, Robert Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 71
1 2 3 Daugherty, Leo (2002). The Vietnam War Day by Day. Chartwell Books, Inc. ISBN978-0785828570.
↑ Zasloff, Joseph J. "Rural Resettlement in South Vietnam: The Agroville Program", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1962-1963), p. 337. Downloaded from JSTOR.
1 2 3 Mann, Robert (2001). A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam. Basic Books. ISBN0-465-04369-0.
↑ Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, p. 579
1 2 3 Doyle, Edward; Lipsman, Samuel (1981). The Vietnam Experience: Passing the Torch. Boston Publishing Company. ISBN978-0939526017.
↑ Conboy, Kenneth; Morrison, James (1996). Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos. Paladin Press. pp.31–45. ISBN0-87364-825-0.
↑ Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold war mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the origins of America's war in Vietnam, 1950-1963. Rowman & Littlefield. p.119. ISBN0-7425-4448-6.
↑ Willbanks, James (2013). Vietnam War Almanac: An In-Depth Guide to the Most Controversial Conflict in American History. Simon and Schuster. p.32. ISBN9781626365285.
↑ Lewy, Gunther (1978), America in Vietnam, New York: Oxford University Press.
↑ Clarke, Jeffrey J. (1988), United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, p. 275
↑ Cosmas, Graham A. (2006), MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962-1967, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, p. 14
↑ Stewart, Richard W. (2012), Deepening Involvement 1945-1965, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, p. 24
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
South Vietnam 
United States 
Kingdom of Laos 
North Vietnam 
Viet Cong 
Pathet Lao 
