Affirmative defense

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An affirmative defense to a civil lawsuit or criminal charge is a fact or set of facts other than those alleged by the plaintiff or prosecutor which, if proven by the defendant, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the defendant's otherwise unlawful conduct. In civil lawsuits, affirmative defenses include the statute of limitations, the statute of frauds, waiver, and other affirmative defenses such as, in the United States, those listed in Rule 8 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In criminal prosecutions, examples of affirmative defenses are self defense, [1] insanity, [2] entrapment [3] and the statute of limitations.

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In an affirmative defense, the defendant may concede that they committed the alleged acts, but they prove other facts which, under the law, either justify or excuse their otherwise wrongful actions, or otherwise overcomes the plaintiff's claim. In criminal law, an affirmative defense is sometimes called a justification or excuse defense. [4] Consequently, affirmative defenses limit or excuse a defendant's criminal culpability or civil liability. [5]

A clear illustration of an affirmative defense is self defense. [1] In its simplest form, a criminal defendant may be exonerated if he can demonstrate that he had an honest and reasonable belief that another's use of force was unlawful and that the defendant's conduct was necessary to protect himself. [6]

Most affirmative defenses must be pleaded in a timely manner by a defendant in order for the court to consider them, or else they are considered waived by the defendant's failure to assert them. The classic unwaivable affirmative defense is lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. [7] The issue of timely assertion is often the subject of contentious litigation.[ citation needed ]

The insanity plea

Among the most controversial affirmative defenses is the insanity defense, [8] whereby a criminal defendant seeks to be excused from criminal liability on the ground that a mental illness, at the time of the alleged crime, prevented him or her from understanding the wrongful nature of his or her actions.

Burden of proof

Because an affirmative defense requires an assertion of facts beyond those claimed by the plaintiff, generally the party who offers an affirmative defense bears the burden of proof. [9] The standard of proof is typically lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. It can either be proved by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence.

In this respect, affirmative defenses differ from ordinary defenses [claim of right, alibi, infancy, necessity, and self-defense (which is an affirmative defense at common law)], which the prosecution has the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt.

Governing rules

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the assertion of affirmative defenses in civil cases that are filed in the United States district courts. Rule 8(c) specifically enumerates the following defenses: "accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that affirmative defenses be based on "knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," and cannot consist of a laundry list of all known affirmative defenses.[ citation needed ]

Affirmative vs. negating defense

An affirmative defense is different from a "negating defense". A negating defense is one which tends to disprove an element of the plaintiff's or prosecutor's case. An example might be a mistake of fact claim in a prosecution for intentional drug possession, where the defendant asserts that he or she mistakenly believed that the object possessed was an innocent substance. Because this defense simply shows that an element of the offense (knowledge of the nature of the substance) is not present, the defendant does not have any burden of persuasion with regard to a negating defense. At most the defendant has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise the issue. [10]

Fair use

In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. , [11] the United States Supreme Court held that fair use was an affirmative defense to copyright infringement. This means that in litigation on copyright infringement, the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving that the use was fair and not an infringement.

However, fair use is not always an affirmative defense; the burden of persuasion may instead fall to the copyright owner in Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) infringement actions. In a case challenging a takedown notice issued under the DMCA, the Ninth Circuit held in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. that the submitter of a DMCA takedown request (who would then be the plaintiff in any subsequent litigation) has the burden to consider fair use prior to submitting the takedown request. "Even if, as Universal urges, fair use is classified as an 'affirmative defense,' we hold—for the purposes of the DMCA—fair use is uniquely situated in copyright law so as to be treated differently than traditional affirmative defenses. We conclude that because 17 U.S.C. § 107 created a type of non-infringing use, fair use is "authorized by the law" and a copyright holder must consider the existence of fair use before sending a takedown notification under § 512(c)." [12]

Examples

See also

Related Research Articles

Fair use is a doctrine in United States law that permits limited use of copyrighted material without having to first acquire permission from the copyright holder. Fair use is one of the limitations to copyright intended to balance the interests of copyright holders with the public interest in the wider distribution and use of creative works by allowing as a defense to copyright infringement claims certain limited uses that might otherwise be considered infringement. Unlike "fair dealing" rights that exist in most countries that were part of the British Empire in the 20th century, the fair use right is a general exception that applies to all different kinds of uses with all types of works and turns on a flexible proportionality test that examines the purpose of the use, the amount used, and the impact on the market of the original work.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Laches (equity)</span> Unreasonable delay by a plaintiff in bringing their claim

In common-law legal systems, laches is a lack of diligence and activity in making a legal claim, or moving forward with legal enforcement of a right, particularly in regard to equity. This means that it is an unreasonable delay that can be viewed as prejudicing the opposing party. When asserted in litigation, it is an equity defense, that is, a defense to a claim for an equitable remedy.

A statute of limitations, known in civil law systems as a prescriptive period, is a law passed by a legislative body to set the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. In most jurisdictions, such periods exist for both criminal law and civil law such as contract law and property law, though often under different names and with varying details.

In a legal dispute, one party has the burden of proof to show that they are correct, while the other party has no such burden and is presumed to be correct. The burden of proof requires a party to produce evidence to establish the truth of facts needed to satisfy all the required legal elements of the dispute.

In jurisprudence, duress or coercion refers to a situation whereby a person performs an act as a result of violence, threat, or other pressure against the person. Black's Law Dictionary defines duress as "any unlawful threat or coercion used... to induce another to act [or not act] in a manner [they] otherwise would not [or would]". Duress is pressure exerted upon a person to coerce that person to perform an act they ordinarily would not perform. The notion of duress must be distinguished both from undue influence in the civil law. In criminal law, duress and necessity are different defenses.

In criminal law, diminished responsibility is a potential defense by excuse by which defendants argue that although they broke the law, they should not be held fully criminally liable for doing so, as their mental functions were "diminished" or impaired.

In a civil proceeding or criminal prosecution under the common law or under statute, a defendant may raise a defense in an effort to avert civil liability or criminal conviction. A defense is put forward by a party to defeat a suit or action brought against the party, and may be based on legal grounds or on factual claims.

Copyright misuse is an equitable defence to copyright infringement in the United States based upon the doctrine of unclean hands. The misuse doctrine provides that the copyright holder engaged in abusive or improper conduct in exploiting or enforcing the copyright will be precluded from enforcing his rights against the infringer. Copyright misuse is often comparable to and draws from the older and more established doctrine of patent misuse, which bars a patentee from obtaining relief for infringement when he extends his patent rights beyond the limited monopoly conferred by the law.

<i>Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.</i> American legal case concerning the DMCA

The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 is a legal case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concerning the anti-trafficking provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), in the context of two competing universal garage door opener companies. It discusses the statutory structure and legislative history of the DMCA to help clarify the intent of the anti-circumvention provisions and decide who holds the burden of proof. It expresses that the statute creates a cause of action for liability and does not create a property right, and holds that as Chamberlain had alleged that Skylink was in violation of the anti-trafficking provision, it had the burden to prove and failed to show that access was unauthorized and its rights were infringed under the Copyright Act. As Chamberlain incorrectly argued that Skylink had the burden of proof and failed to prove their claim, the court upheld summary judgment in favor of Skylink.

<i>In re Aimster Copyright Litigation</i>

In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, was a case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed copyright infringement claims brought against Aimster, concluding that a preliminary injunction against the file-sharing service was appropriate because the copyright owners were likely to prevail on their claims of contributory infringement, and that the services could have non-infringing users was insufficient reason to reverse the district court's decision. The appellate court also noted that the defendant could have limited the quantity of the infringements if it had eliminated an encryption system feature, and if it had monitored the use of its systems. This made it so that the defense did not fall within the safe harbor of 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). and could not be used as an excuse to not know about the infringement. In addition, the court decided that the harm done to the plaintiff was irreparable and outweighed any harm to the defendant created by the injunction.

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the standards governing awards of attorneys' fees in copyright cases. The Copyright Act of 1976 authorizes, but does not require, the court to award attorneys' fees to "the prevailing party" in a copyright action. In Fogerty, the Court held that such attorneys'-fees awards are discretionary, and that the same standards should be applied in the case of a prevailing plaintiff and a prevailing defendant.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act</span> 1998 U.S. federal law

The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA) is United States federal law that creates a conditional 'safe harbor' for online service providers (OSP), a group which includes Internet service providers (ISP) and other Internet intermediaries, by shielding them for their own acts of direct copyright infringement as well as shielding them from potential secondary liability for the infringing acts of others. OCILLA was passed as a part of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and is sometimes referred to as the "Safe Harbor" provision or as "DMCA 512" because it added Section 512 to Title 17 of the United States Code. By exempting Internet intermediaries from copyright infringement liability provided they follow certain rules, OCILLA attempts to strike a balance between the competing interests of copyright owners and digital users.

Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F.Supp. 2d 1106 is a case where Google Inc. successfully defended a lawsuit for copyright infringement. Field argued that Google infringed his exclusive right to reproduce his copyrighted works when it "cached" his website and made a copy of it available on its search engine. Google raised multiple defenses: fair use, implied license, estoppel, and Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe harbor protection. The court granted Google's motion for summary judgment and denied Field's motion for summary judgment.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Digital Millennium Copyright Act</span> United States copyright law

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is a 1998 United States copyright law that implements two 1996 treaties of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It criminalizes production and dissemination of technology, devices, or services intended to circumvent measures that control access to copyrighted works. It also criminalizes the act of circumventing an access control, whether or not there is actual infringement of copyright itself. In addition, the DMCA heightens the penalties for copyright infringement on the Internet. Passed on October 12, 1998, by a unanimous vote in the United States Senate and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on October 28, 1998, the DMCA amended Title 17 of the United States Code to extend the reach of copyright, while limiting the liability of the providers of online services for copyright infringement by their users.

<i>Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.</i>

Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, is a U.S. district court case about whether the operator of a computer bulletin board service ("BBS") and Internet access provider that allows that BBS to reach the Internet should be liable for copyright infringement committed by a subscriber of the BBS. The plaintiff Religious Technology Center ("RTC") argued that defendant Netcom was directly, contributorily, and vicariously liable for copyright infringement. Netcom moved for summary judgment, disputing RTC's claims and raising a First Amendment argument and a fair use defense. The district court of the Northern District of California concluded that RTC's claims of direct and vicarious infringement failed, but genuine issues of fact precluded summary judgment on contributory liability and fair use.

<i>Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.</i>

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, is a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, holding that copyright owners must consider fair use defenses and good faith activities by alleged copyright infringers before issuing takedown notices for content posted on the Internet.

<i>IO Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.</i> 2008 US District Court case

IO Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, is an American legal case involving an internet television network named Veoh that allowed users of its site to view streaming media of various adult entertainment producer IO Group's films. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that Veoh qualified for the safe harbors provided by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). According to commentators, this case could foreshadow the resolution of Viacom v. YouTube.

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (2000), was the district court case which preceded the landmark intellectual property case of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001). The case was heard by Judge Marilyn Hall Patel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Napster appealed this case to United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

<i>Ouellette v. Viacom International Inc.</i> US legal case

Ouellette v. Viacom, No. 9:10-cv-00133; 2011 WL 1882780, found the safe harbor provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) did not create liability for service providers that take down non-infringing works. This case limited the claims that can be filed against service providers by establishing immunity for service providers' takedown of fair use material, at least from grounds under the DMCA. The court left open whether another "independent basis of liability" could serve as legal grounds for an inappropriate takedown.

The Texas Penal Code is the principal criminal code of the U.S. state of Texas. It was originally enacted in 1856 and underwent substantial revision in 1973, with the passage of the Revised Penal Code, in large part based on the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.

References

  1. 1 2 Neubauer, David W. (2005). America's Courts and the Criminal Justice System. Wadsworth. p. 320. ISBN   0-534-62892-3.
  2. ↑ "Insanity defense". LII / Legal Information Institute. Retrieved October 25, 2021.
  3. ↑ "Entrapment". Wex. Cornell Law School. Retrieved October 25, 2021.
  4. ↑ Brody, David C.; James R. Acker; Wayne A. Logan (2001). Criminal law. Aspen. p. 241. ISBN   0-8342-1083-5.
  5. ↑ "Affirmative Defense". Wex. Cornell Law School. Retrieved June 20, 2017.
  6. ↑ "MCL 780.972". State of Michigan - Legislative Services Bureau. Retrieved February 10, 2012.
  7. ↑ Wright, Charles A.; Miller, Arthur R. (1983). Federal Practice and Procedure. Thomson West. pp. 863–864. ISBN   0314261486.
  8. ↑ Neubauer, David W. (2005). America's Courts and the Criminal Justice System. Wadsworth. p. 321. ISBN   0-534-62892-3.
  9. ↑ Oran, Daniel; Mark Tosti (2000). Oran's Dictionary of the Law. Delmar. p. 20. ISBN   0-7668-1742-3.
  10. ↑ "State v. Walkup, 220 S.W.3d 748 (Mo. banc 2007)". Google Scholar. Retrieved June 20, 2017. ("[I]t is a negative or negating defense because the defendant has no burden to present evidence or to persuade....")
  11. ↑ Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. , 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
  12. ↑ Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015)
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