Bradwell v. Illinois

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Bradwell v. Illinois
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 18, 1873
Decided April 15, 1873
Full case nameMyra Bradwell v. State of Illinois
Citations83 U.S. 130 ( more )
16 Wall. 130; 21 L. Ed. 442; 1873 U.S. LEXIS 1140
Case history
PriorApplication denied, sub nom., In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (1869)
SubsequentNone
Holding
Illinois constitutionally denied law licenses to women, because the right to practice law was not one of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase
Associate Justices
Nathan Clifford  · Noah H. Swayne
Samuel F. Miller  · David Davis
Stephen J. Field  · William Strong
Joseph P. Bradley  · Ward Hunt
Case opinions
MajorityMiller, joined by Clifford, Davis, Strong, Hunt
ConcurrenceBradley, joined by Swayne, Field
DissentChase
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. XIV

Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), was a United States Supreme Court case which ruled that the women were not granted the right to practice a profession under the United States Constitution. [1] The case was brough to the court by Myra Bradwell, who sought to be admitted to the bar to practice law in Illinois. [1] The Court ruled that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the right to practice a profession as a woman. [1] This court case was a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to sex discrimination in the United States, and it no longer reflects reflects current legal standards as current Title VII Laws restrict employment discrimination based on gender. [2]

Contents

Background of the case

Myra Bradwell began informally practicing law in 1852 as an apprenticeship to her husband, James Bradwell. [3]  At the age of thirty-eight, in 1869, she passed the Illinois bar, but despite fulfilling the Illinois statute requirements of good standing character and sufficient training, she was denied the right to practice law due to her gender. [3] [4]

After bringing suit, she received a communication from the Illinois Supreme Court that her rejection was a result of her "marital disability". [3] Her ability to practice law was restricted due to the fact that she was a married woman. The Illinois Supreme Court cited the legal doctrine of feme covert, a common law principle, which granted a woman's legal standing to her husband upon marriage. [5] This meant that Myra Bradwell did not have a legal existence apart from her husband.

Bradwell appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected her right to pursue a lawful profession like any other citizen, regardless of her marital status. [6] Bradwell argued that as a citizen of the United States, she was entitled to the rights and privileges afforded to citizens, including the right to practice law. [6] Lastly, Bradwell argued that the Illinois Court decision based on feme covert was outdated and that her marital status did not correlate with her ability to practice law. [6]

Decision

Majority Opinion

In an 8 - 1 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Illinois ruling, denying Bradwell the right to practice law. [6] The majority opinion, written by Justice Samuel Miller, stated that the right to practice law was not protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was not considered a fundamental right of U.S. citizenship. [7] The court emphasized that the power to regulate professions, including setting qualifications for the legal profession, fell under the jurisdiction of individual states. [7]

The Court first rejected Bradwell's claim that her rights were violated under Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees citizens of each state the "privileges and immunities" of citizens in other states. [7] Since Bradwell was a resident and citizen of Illinois, the Court concluded that this provision did not apply to her case. [7] As Justice Miller stated, "The protection designed by that clause, as has been repeatedly held, has no application to a citizen of the state whose laws are complained of"(Page 83 U.S. 138). [7] The clause was designed to protect citizens when they traveled to other states, not to protect citizens from discriminatory laws within their own state. [7]

Myra Bradwell 1870.png

The Court also dismissed Bradwell's argument that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause had been violated. [7] The justices held that the right to practice law was not among the rights associated with U.S. citizenship. As Justice Miller wrote, “The right to admission to practice in the courts of a state is not one of [the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship]... this his right in no sense depends on the citizenship of the United States”(Page 83 U.S. 139). [7] Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the power of a state to prescribe qualifications for admission to the bar was unaffected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [7] The ability to set criteria for those wishing to enter the legal profession was squarely within state authority, and the federal government had no basis for interfering in this matter. [7] The Court pointed to the recently decided Slaughterhouse Cases to support its position, which clarified the limited scope of federal authority over state-regulated privileges. [7] According to this precedent, the right to regulate professional admissions fell within the state's jurisdiction, and states could determine qualifications without federal intervention. [7]

Justice Joseph P. Bradley concurred with the Court's decision, basing his decision on the natural differences between men and women. He argued that it was not a fundamental right or privilege for women to be admitted to every profession, particularly those requiring special qualifications and responsibilities such as the practice of law. [7] He characterized men as the natural "protector and defender" of women and described women as inherently possessing "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy" that rendered them unsuitable for many occupations, including the practice of law (Page 83 U.S. 141). [7] Justice Bradley's decision was based on the perception of traditional gender roles, yet he also relied on the precedent of the limited scope federal authority had over state-regulated privileges. [7] Concurring with other justices, he found that the laws of Illinois that restricted women from practicing law were justified under the powers of the state, which allowed the legislature to determine which offices and professions should be restricted to men. [7]

This decision was a landmark in the judiciary upholding gender discrimination, which reaffirmed the states' authority in determining qualifications for professions. This decision reflects how societal norms regarding gender roles influenced judicial reasoning, reinforcing the view that women were naturally unfit for participation in certain aspects of public life, including the practice of law.

Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase.jpg

Dissenting Opinion

Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase dissented from the Court's decision, and was not able to elaborate on his reasoning as he was seriously ill at the time. [6] [8]

Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase

Although Justice Chase did not elaborate on his dissent, he had a history of advocating for expanded legal rights and was known for supporting progressive causes, such as the abolition of slavery and women's rights. [8] Chase's dissent did not change the outcome of the case, yet it likely reflected his view that equal equality should extend to women.

Aftermath

The decision in Bradwell v. Illinois no longer reflects the current legal understanding of gender discrimination. Over time, significant legal changes have expanded rights and opportunities for women. The ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, which granted women the right to vote, [9] was an important step in increasing women's political influence and advancing gender equality. Subsequent civil rights movements in the 20th century further challenged discriminatory practices, and in 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was enacted, prohibiting employment discrimination based on sex. [10] This law allowed women to enter all professions, including law, reversing the legal precedents that allowed states to impose gender-based restrictions.

Several landmark Supreme Court cases have since overturned the principles set by Bradwell v. Illinois. In Reed v. Reed (1971), the Court ruled that gender discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, establishing a critical precedent against gender-based classifications. [11] This was followed by Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) [12] and Craig v. Boren(1976) [13] which introduced the standard of intermediate scrutiny for gender-based discrimination. Under this standard, states must demonstrate that any gender-based law serves an important government interest and is substantially related to achieving that interest. [14] Therefore, the state currently needs to demonstrate an actual rational basis for arguing in favor of gender-based discrimination instead of relying on traditional norms.

The evolution from Bradwell v. Illinois to these later rulings reflects broader shifts in American constitutional interpretation, moving from an era of restrictive gender-based legal doctrines to one focused on expanding equality. Today, the principles underlying Bradwell have been completely overturned, and women are no longer barred from full participation in the professional workforce, including the legal profession.  

See also

Related Research Articles

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The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted on July 9, 1868, as one of the Reconstruction Amendments. Usually considered one of the most consequential amendments, it addresses citizenship rights and equal protection under the law and was proposed in response to issues related to formerly enslaved Americans following the American Civil War. The amendment was bitterly contested, particularly by the states of the defeated Confederacy, which were forced to ratify it in order to regain representation in Congress. The amendment, particularly its first section, is one of the most litigated parts of the Constitution, forming the basis for landmark Supreme Court decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education (1954) regarding racial segregation, Loving v. Virginia (1967) regarding interracial marriage, Roe v. Wade (1973) regarding abortion, Bush v. Gore (2000) regarding the 2000 presidential election, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) regarding same-sex marriage, and Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023) regarding race-based college admissions. The amendment limits the actions of all state and local officials, and also those acting on behalf of such officials.

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Myra Colby Bradwell was an American publisher and political activist. She attempted in 1869 to become the first woman to be admitted to the Illinois bar to practice law, but was denied admission by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1870 and the United States Supreme Court in 1873, in rulings upholding a separate women's sphere. Bradwell had founded and published Chicago Legal News from 1868, reporting on the law and continued that work. Meanwhile, influenced by her case, in 1872 the Illinois legislature passed a state law prohibiting gender discrimination in admission to any occupation or profession.

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References

  1. 1 2 3 "Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872)". Justia Law. Retrieved October 25, 2024.
  2. ↑ "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964". US EEOC. Retrieved October 25, 2024.
  3. 1 2 3 4 Friedman, Jane M. (May 1, 1993). America's First Woman Lawyer: The Biography of Myra Bradwell. Prometheus Books. ISBN   0879758120.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
  4. 1 2 Katz, Elizabeth D. (July 30, 2021). "Sex, Suffrage, and State Constitutional Law: Women's Legal Right to Hold Public Office". Yale Journal of Law & Feminism. Rochester, NY. SSRN   3896499.
  5. 1 2 Morello, Karen Berger (1986). The Invisible Bar: The Woman Lawyer in America, 1638 to the Present. Random House.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 "Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872)". Justia Law. Retrieved October 6, 2024.
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 "Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872)". Justia Law. Retrieved October 6, 2024.
  8. 1 2 Aynes, Richard L. (February 1, 1999). "Bradwell v. Illinois: Chief Justice Chase's Dissent and the "Sphere of Women's Work"". Louisiana Law Review. 59 (2): 521–541. ISSN   0024-6859 – via Justia Law.
  9. 1 2 "19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Women's Right to Vote (1920)". National Archives. September 21, 2021. Retrieved October 6, 2024.
  10. 1 2 "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964". US EEOC. Retrieved October 6, 2024.
  11. 1 2 "Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)". Justia Law. Archived from the original on March 30, 2019. Retrieved October 6, 2024.
  12. 1 2 "Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)". Justia Law. Retrieved October 6, 2024.
  13. 1 2 "Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)". Justia Law. Retrieved October 6, 2024.
  14. 1 2 "intermediate scrutiny". LII / Legal Information Institute. Retrieved October 6, 2024.
  15. ↑ Jordan, Gwen (July 1, 2015). ""Horror of a Woman": Myra Bradwell, the 14th Amendment, and the Gendered Origins of Sociological Jurisprudence". Akron Law Review. 42 (4). ISSN   0002-371X.

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