Facts
From 1946, California ran an insurance system to cover private sector employees if temporarily unemployed because of a disability not covered by workmen's compensation. It was funded by contributions deducted from the wages of participating employees, for whom participation was generally mandatory unless they belonged to an approved private insurance plan. Employees who had contributed 1% of a minimum income to the disability fund for one year prior to a period of disability were eligible to receive benefits. However, certain disabilities would not be covered, including those resulting from commitment for dipsomania, drug addiction, or sexual psychopathy. [1] In Geduldig, the appellees challenged the further exclusion of certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy, as found in §2626 of the Unemployment Insurance Code: “In no case shall the term ‘disability’ or ‘disabled’ include any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter.”
The litigation began as two separate class action suits brought by employees who had paid into the state’s disability fund but who had been denied benefits relating to pregnancy-related disabilities. Three of the employees suffered employment disability after complications that arose during their pregnancies, while the fourth experienced a normal pregnancy which still led to a temporary inability to work. Carolyn Aiello brought suit in Federal District Court, while Augustina Armendariz, Elizabeth Johnson, and Jacqueline Jaramillo brought suit as a petition for a writ of mandate in the state’s supreme court. The separate cases were consolidated when the state suit was removed to federal court by the appellant, Dwight Geduldig, Director of the California Department of Human Resources Development.
Initially, the appellees sought to enjoin enforcement of the exclusionary policy, and the District Court, as a divided three-judge panel, granted their motion for summary judgment, holding that the program’s administration violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and stating that “the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities is not based upon a classification having a rational and substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” The court further denied a motion to stay its judgment pending appeal. The appellant proceeded to file a similar motion with the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal.
Although three of the appellees brought suit to recover benefits for loss of work after complications from pregnancy (tubal and ectopic pregnancies and a miscarriage), this issue was moot by the time the case reached the Supreme Court due to a decision in another case. In Rentzer v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, the state court interpreted the statute as applying only to benefit payments for disabilities resulting from normal pregnancies, thus allowing a woman who had suffered an ectopic pregnancy to recover benefits. [2] Therefore, the only remaining live controversy in Geduldig was whether appellee Jaramillo and others similarly situated were entitled to benefits for work loss related to normal and generally healthy pregnancy and childbirth.
Judgment
Part II of the majority opinion first laid out the rational basis for the policy as argued by the state. Justice Stewart focused largely on the economics of the benefit system, which had been operating as a self-supporting system since its inception. The contribution rate to the disability fund as set struck a balance that allowed the state to cover the health conditions that it had deemed eligible under the program: in the years immediately preceding Geduldig, 90-103% of the disability fund's revenue had been utilized to pay disability and hospital benefits. Both parties acknowledged that to cover more disability risks would require an increase in the amount of money going into the fund, although they disagreed on the amount this would entail. [3] The District Court accepted the state's estimate that to cover normal pregnancy and delivery would require the fund to pay out over $100 million more in benefits but found that this would not destroy the solvency of the program, although it would require “reasonable changes in the contribution rate, the maximum benefits allowable, and other variables.” [4] The state, however, argued that such changes would jeopardize the ability of low-income Californians to participate in the program, and thus it had a rational basis to maintain the system in its existing state.
The majority pointed to Williamson v. Lee Optical, in which the Court found that a legislature could legitimately address problems in phases, prioritizing issues which were most pressing. The Geduldig majority stated that it would be particularly hesitant to second-guess such prioritization and legislative calculation in regards to social welfare programs, citing the premise in Dandridge v. Williams that the Equal Protection Clause “does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.” [5] California, the majority held, could legitimately and constitutionally decide that it was better to “keep benefit payments at an adequate level for disabilities that are covered, rather than to cover all disabilities inadequately.”
Finally, Stewart's opinion turned to the issue of whether California's rational basis for its policy was sufficient to uphold the state's position. The majority found in the insurance system no invidious discrimination that would violate the Equal Protection Clause, pointing out that women as a group were still eligible for benefits even though the particular condition of pregnancy might not be covered. The Court reasoned that there was “no risk from which men are protected and women are not,” and “no risk from which women are protected and men are not.” As stated in Footnote 20 of the majority opinion,
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes.
While the Court acknowledged that only women could undergo the excluded condition, “it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.” Pregnancy was an objectively identifiable characteristic rather than a subjective judgment, and the appellants had made no showing that the state's asserted rationale for the policy was a pretext for invidious discrimination. Thus, California's policy was not one which the Court would subject to the heightened scrutiny that it had used to evaluate cases such as Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson, and therefore the rational basis presented by the state was enough to allow the policy to stand.
The majority reversed the lower court's decision and vacated the stay previously granted.
Dissent
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented from the majority's opinion, arguing that under Reed and Frontiero, intermediate scrutiny was the proper level of review for the issue, and that under this analysis California's classification failed, as the appellants had only set out a rational basis for the state's policy. The dissenters acknowledged that the fiscal solvency of California's insurance program was a legitimate concern and that to include temporary disabilities resulting from normal pregnancy in the scope of conditions covered by the system would require an increase in the employee contribution, an increase in the yearly contribution ceiling, or state subsidization. However,
whatever role such monetary considerations may play in traditional equal protection analysis, the State’s interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its disability insurance program simply cannot render the State’s use of a suspect classification constitutional.
The dissenters pointed out that pregnancy was one of the only common conditions affecting health that was not covered by the broad scope of California's Unemployment Insurance Code, even though the economic results of it might be functionally identical to those of other disabilities, in that wages might be lost due to temporary physical inability to work, and even in healthy individuals, pregnancy, delivery, and post-partum care are costly.
Brennan and the other dissenters viewed the state's policy as “singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar to women,” creating a “double standard.” They interpreted the policy as one in which
a limitation is imposed upon the disabilities for which women workers may recover, while men receive full compensation for all disabilities suffered. ...In effect, one set of rules is applied to females and another to males. Such dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination.
The dissenters expressed dissatisfaction with the majority's explanation for its refusal to apply a higher standard of review in a case involving issues tied to sex. Brennan, Douglas and Marshall viewed Stewart's opinion as a retreat from recent equal protection decisions and voiced concern that the majority's decision would relegate sex-based classifications to the same “traditional” analysis that had allowed legislation such as that in Muller v. Oregon.
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court case about Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court decided that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act was unconstitutional, insofar as it allowed states to be sued by private citizens for money damages.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case which decided that benefits given by the United States military to the family of service members cannot be given out differently because of sex. Frontiero is an important decision in several respects, including the fact that it informed the military establishment that in terms of pay, allowances and general treatment, women must be considered on an equal plane as men. However, the Court did not issue a broad decision requiring the military to prove in the courts its reasons for excluding women from combat positions.
Pregnancy discrimination is a type of employment discrimination that occurs when expectant women are fired, not hired, or otherwise discriminated against due to their pregnancy or intention to become pregnant. Common forms of pregnancy discrimination include not being hired due to visible pregnancy or likelihood of becoming pregnant, being fired after informing an employer of one's pregnancy, being fired after maternity leave, and receiving a pay dock due to pregnancy. Pregnancy discrimination may also take the form of denying reasonable accommodations to workers based on pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. Pregnancy discrimination has also been examined to have an indirect relationship with the decline of a mother's physical and mental health. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women prohibits dismissal on the grounds of maternity or pregnancy and ensures right to maternity leave or comparable social benefits. The Maternity Protection Convention C 183 proclaims adequate protection for pregnancy as well. Though women have some protection in the United States because of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, it has not completely curbed the incidence of pregnancy discrimination. The Equal Rights Amendment could ensure more robust sex equality ensuring that women and men could both work and have children at the same time.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), is a landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United States struck down the long-standing male-only admission policy of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in a 7–1 decision. Justice Clarence Thomas, whose son was enrolled at the university at the time, recused himself.
California's Paid Family Leave (PFL) insurance program, which is also known as the Family Temporary Disability Insurance (FTDI) program, is a law enacted in 2002 that extends unemployment disability compensation to cover individuals who take time off work to care for a seriously ill family member or bond with a new minor child. If eligible, you can receive benefit payments for up to eight weeks. Payments are about 60 to 70 percent of your weekly wages earned 5 to 18 months before your claim start date. You will receive payments by debit card or check. Benefits equal approximately 70% of earnings and have a maximum per week, for a total of up to six weeks.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978 is a United States federal statute. It amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to "prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy."
Bliss v Canada (AG) [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 is a famous Supreme Court of Canada decision on equality rights for women under the Canadian Bill of Rights. The Court held that women were not entitled to benefits denied to them by the Unemployment Insurance Act during a certain period of pregnancy. This case has since become the prime example demonstrating the inadequacies of the Canadian Bill of Rights in upholding and protecting individuals' rights. This ruling was eventually overturned in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 SCR 1219.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) is a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that Section 1985(3) of The Civil Rights Act of 1871 does not provide a federal cause of action against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics. Alexandria Health Clinic, along with several other abortion clinics, sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from blocking the entrance to clinics in Washington D.C.
In United States constitutional law, a suspect classification is a class or group of persons meeting a series of criteria suggesting they are likely the subject of discrimination. These classes receive closer scrutiny by courts when an Equal Protection claim alleging unconstitutional discrimination is asserted against a law, regulation, or other government action, or sometimes private action. When a law or government action affects a group that falls under a "suspect classification," courts apply the strict scrutiny standard in reviewing the constitutional validity of a law or action.
Employment discrimination law in the United States derives from the common law, and is codified in numerous state, federal, and local laws. These laws prohibit discrimination based on certain characteristics or "protected categories." The United States Constitution also prohibits discrimination by federal and state governments against their public employees. Discrimination in the private sector is not directly constrained by the Constitution, but has become subject to a growing body of federal and state law, including the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Federal law prohibits discrimination in a number of areas, including recruiting, hiring, job evaluations, promotion policies, training, compensation and disciplinary action. State laws often extend protection to additional categories or employers.
Equal Rights Advocates (ERA) is an American non-profit gender justice/women's rights organization that was founded in 1974. ERA is a legal and advocacy organization for advancing rights and opportunities for women, girls, and people of gender identities through legal cases and policy advocacy.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which unanimously held that the gender-based distinction under 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) of the Social Security Act of 1935—which permitted widows but not widowers to collect special benefits while caring for minor children—violated the right to equal protection secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986), reversed a lower court's decision and stated that the lower court should not have heard the case until after the Ohio Civil Rights Commission had concluded their investigation. The Commission argued that the non-renewal and firing constituted unlawful sex discrimination, while the school argued that this was an ecclesiastical matter not suitable for review by civil authorities.
AT&T Corporation v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009), is a US labor law case of the United States Supreme Court, holding that maternity leave taken before the passage of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act needed not to be considered in calculating employee pension benefits.
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), was a case before the United States Supreme Court that was decided per curiam.
Employment practices liability is an area of United States labor law that deals with wrongful termination, sexual harassment, discrimination, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, breach of contract, emotional distress, and wage and hour law violations. It may be categorized as a form of professional liability. Employment practices liability insurance (EPL) is sold as a type of management liability insurance, which is related to professional liability insurance.
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, is a 2004 decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upholding Florida's ban of adoption of children by homosexual persons as enforced by the Florida Department of Children and Families.
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case over the issue of gender bias in statutory rape laws. The petitioner argued that the statutory rape law discriminated based on gender and was unconstitutional. The court ruled that this differentiation passes intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause because it serves an important state goal, stating that sexual intercourse entails a higher risk for women than men. Thus, the court found the law justified.
States have passed state equal rights amendments (ERAs) to their constitutions that provide various degrees of legal protection against discrimination based on sex. With some mirroring the broad language and guarantees of the proposed Federal Equal Rights Amendment, others more closely resemble the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the different treatment of men and women mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(D) constituted invidious discrimination against female wage earners by affording them less protection for their surviving spouses than is provided to male employees, and therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The case was brought by a widower who was denied survivor benefits on the grounds that he had not been receiving at least one-half support from his wife when she died. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the court, ruling unconstitutional the provision of the Social Security Act which set forth a gender-based distinction between widows and widowers, whereby Social Security Act survivors benefits were payable to a widower only if he was receiving at least half of his support from his late wife, while such benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband were payable to his widow regardless of dependency. The Court found that this distinction deprived female wage earners of the same protection that a similarly situated male worker would have received, violating due process and equal protection.
