Early in his chief ministership,Marshall dealt with strikes and riots,and worked to remove the Emergency Regulations,something they had promised to address in their 1955 election campaign. He was then involved in a constitutional crisis in July 1955,following disagreements with governorRobert Black on the Rendel Constitution,that escalated with him threatening resignation. His demands were eventually met following meetings with Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd,where Marshall was granted more power as the chief minister over the governor. He further addressed issues pertaining to education,citizenship,and the civil service,and improved trade relations between Singapore and Indonesia.
Apart from his successes,Marshall's chief ministership was also marked with internal conflicts. The LF was plagued with issues when they held office,and a publicised feud between him and LF assemblymen A. R. Lazarous and Lee Choon Eng led to them leaving the LF and joining the opposition,severely affecting the LF's majority over the opposition as both sides held even seats. Marshall had also been criticised for his actions in dealing with the Hock Lee bus riots and the Chinese school sit-ins,as he was considered to have been lax in giving punishment and instead agreed to the strikers' terms. External opinions of his government include the British,who tolerated Marshall while he was in office and accommodated him when he threatened resignation in fear of a more volatile government succeeding his. The Australian government largely held the same position as the British,as they believed that his government was too unstable for self-governance to be granted.
In 1956,the Marshall government sent a delegation to London to discuss the self-governance for Singapore,with a planned date of self-governance by April 1957. The British rejected Marshall's plan and gave counteroffers themselves which would have granted Singapore slight self-governance,but Marshall refused them. The constitutional talks subsequently broke down on 15 May. Marshall resigned as chief minister on 7 June 1956,having promised that if he did not obtain self-governance,he would do so. He remained as a backbencher,and was succeeded by Lim Yew Hock of LF as chief minister. Scholarly analysis gives both praise and criticism to his government,while studies using contemporary newspapers show that he generally received support from the Chinese community.
The 1955 general election's Nomination Day was on 28 February,[2] and the LF fielded 17 out of the 79 candidates participating in the election; the other parties included the PP, the People's Action Party (PAP), the Democratic Party (DP), the Singapore Malay National Organisation (SUMNO)–Malay Union (MU)–Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) alliance, the Labour Party, and 10 independents. Marshall chose to specifically contest in PP leader Tan Chye Cheng's constituency as he wanted to confront his and the PP's views, which was shown in his speeches where he frequently spoke of self-governance and anti-colonialism. Throughout his campaign, his opponents brought up his previous affiliations and views on income tax and land, to which he stated did not reflect his current, more socialist views.[3][4]
Despite not having agreed earlier with the PAP, the PAP and LF had a mutual understanding of not fielding candidates in each other's constituencies. The PAP themselves stated that, in constituencies with none of their candidates, the vote should go to the LF.[5] Marshall later stated on the PAP's anti-British and self-governance views that it was "impractical though desirable", with their need for self-governance "going a little too fast".[6] During the campaign period, The Singapore Free Press described Cairnhill Constituency as where "high political issues [were] on trial", with Marshall, PP's Tan, and DP's Tan Khiang Khoo all contesting there. Marshall held several rallies at Empress Place, along with visiting local constituents. He also frequently challenged Tan to debates.[7][8]
The results of the election were announced on 3 April, with the LF winning the most seats with 10. The PP performed poorly, with 18 of their 22 candidates being unsuccessful, including Tan. Although the LF won the majority of seats, the PAP's Lee Kuan Yew won the largest majority in a constituency. Marshall himself was surprised by the results and he received congratulations from Lee and Tan; the former pledged cooperation with Marshall and his government. He was also, as the LF's leader, named as the first chief minister.[9][10] In Cairnhill, Marshall was elected with 3,305 votes as compared to Tan of PP's 2,530 and Tan of DP's 1,111.[11] The results of the election were also unexpected by governorJohn Nicoll, who had speculated that the pro-British PP would have won ten seats, with five seats each for the remaining parties.[12]
Following the LF's minor majority of 10 of the 25 seats in the Legislative Assembly,[c] Marshall set up his minority government as the chief minister. The evening after their win, the LF met up in Marshall's home to discuss forming a coalition with the other parties; Marshall wanted Abdul Hamid Jumat of the SUMNO to be included, as it would display Malay representation in his cabinet. The LF wanted to form a coalition with either the PAP or the SUMNO–MU–MCA alliance as their minority government of 10 seats could be easily deterred in the larger 32 total seats of the Assembly. As Marshall continued talks with Abdul, his cabinet began to take shape, but during his meeting with governor Nicoll on 4 April, he stated that even if he got the SUMNO–MU–MCA alliance to join a coalition with them, they would still not obtain a majority in the Assembly. To increase the LF's representation, Marshall requested Nicoll to allow him four LF nominees under the Rendel Constitution, but Nicoll refused as it would show that any minority government could rule. Instead, Nicoll appointed two LF executive committee members – Thomas and R. C. H. Lim – and two non-partisans – G. A. P. Sutherland and Ong Piah Teng – to the Assembly. Sutherland and Ong represented European and Chinese commercial interests, respectively.[15][16]
On 5 April, the LF successfully reached an agreement to form a coalition with the SUMNO's Abdul and MCA's Wong Foo Nam, although the MU withdrew; he had only managed to get their support after being appointed the two LF members from Nicoll.[17] For his cabinet, Marshall was required to include three colonial officials for the roles of chief secretary, financial secretary, and attorney-general, which were given to William Goode, T. M. Hart, and E. J. Davies,[b] respectively. The rest of his cabinet included Marshall as the chief minister and commerce and industry minister, Chew Swee Kee as the education minister, Lim as the labour and welfare minister, A. J. Braga as the health minister, Thomas as the communications and works minister, Abdul as the local government, lands and housing minister, and J. M. Jumabhoy as the assistant commerce and industry minister. Chew's appointment as education minister was seen as unexpected, as he was a first-time politician and Thomas appeared the more likely choice due to his background in education, but Marshall believed that the education minister should be Chinese given the recent issues with Chinese schools and students. Marshall also maintained diversity in his cabinet as he wanted multi-racialism and equality to be shown.[19][20] He officially unveiled his cabinet on 7 April at Empress Place, and they were sworn in by Nicoll.[21]
Domestic affairs
Relations with the British
In the early days of his chief ministership, Marshall did not maintain a good relationship with Nicoll; he considered him to be "discourteous" and "arrogant". Additionally, he frequently went against both Nicoll and the British members of the Legislative Assembly. At the opening of the first Legislative Assembly on 22 April, he protested against them by arriving in a bush jacket, while Thomas wore a safari jacket and sandals. Due to Marshall's behaviour, Nicoll made his aide-de-camp take Marshall's speech written for the governor for him, instead of taking it himself per tradition.[22][23] In another incident, Nicoll stated that he would use red ink to represent his final decision in documents, and that no one else was to use red. Following Nicoll's admission, attorney-general Davies added that he himself would use green ink. Marshall, upset with this designation of specific colours, ignored Davies and thus stated that he would use green, with no one else allowed to use it; from then on, Marshall signed all his official documents in green ink.[24]
Other issues he faced with the British was the lack of accommodation for the chief minister or other ministers, despite their positions in the Assembly. There was a lack of a chief minister's office, and he was instead asked to use the commerce minister's office due to his concurrent role serving as both. After he protested to the British officials that he would use a desk under the "old apple tree" at Empress Place if no proper office was made for him, the officials relented and made space in a room under the stairs of the Assembly House; this required moving Public Relations Officer G. G. Thomson out of the room. There were further incidents such as when Marshall found himself placed seventh in line to the governor instead of second during public events, which went against the proper procedure and he would have it rectified. He also wrote letters to the chief secretary, demanding them to respect the Asian police officers of the Singapore Guard Regiment on duty at Government House.[25]
One of the first things Marshall addressed were the Emergency Regulations, especially since it was an issue that the LF had pledged to acknowledge in the 1955 general elections; the earlier 1954 National Service riots were an anti-colonial response to the British, and were part of the reason why they were still being enforced. After the Marshall government had discussed the issue amongst themselves and inspected the Regulations, they modified them to reduce its powers but extended its period to another three months; the powers removed were the search, seizure of property, and the closure of roads by the police. Marshall chose to introduce the Regulations' extension himself, despite the fact that it was an unpopular decision and supposed to be the duty of the chief secretary and the colonial authorities. In July 1955, Marshall had planned to remove the Regulations but was forced to extend them for another three months as it could have been seen as threatening to the Malayan government.[26][27]
Furthermore, another civil unrest had occurred in April, the Hock Lee bus riots, and Marshall was conflicted on the matter; he respected their right to strike, but wanted to maintain law and order. Marshall later addressed the Hock Lee strikers on a 1 May rally, stating that the government would allow them the right to strike, but that they had to exercise this right responsibly. He then met with Lee Kuan Yew, legal adviser of the Singapore Bus Workers' Union (SBWU) and PAP assemblyman; Fong Swee Suan, the SBWU's secretary-general; and Lim Chin Siong, a SBWU committee member, to form a peaceful agreement to end the Hock Lee riots. As the riots began to escalate with the involvement of Chinese students, Marshall addressed them on 12 May via radio. On 14 May, Marshall met with the SBWU, Hock Lee Amalgamated Bus Company, and the Hock Lee Employees' Union at Assembly House to discuss an end to the riots, announcing later that day that an agreement had been reached between the government and affected parties.[28][29][30]
After managing the Hock Lee bus riots, Marshall focused on the issue of the Chinese students, who were occupying Chinese schools that were closed during the Hock Lee riots, namely Chung Cheng High School's main and Yishun branch and The Chinese High School. The schools' boards were ordered by the government to expel the involved students and to provide the names of those that participated in the Hock Lee riots. However, this only intensified the conflict between the students and the authorities, with the schools only prolonging their sit-ins along with the addition of Nanyang Girls' High School. Marshall was pressured to respond, especially after the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union threatened a strike in support of the students. He subsequently appointed an All-Party Committee to investigate the students' issues, with his first meeting with the committee advising him to reopen the schools, which Marshall did.[31][32]
Marshall's management of the Hock Lee riots and the Chinese school sit-ins were met with criticism; letters were sent to The Straits Times detailing his incompetence as chief minister.[33][34] In the weeks following the quelling of the Hock Lee riots, many expected Marshall and his government to exercise punishments on those involved, but their responses were considered to be small. During that period, the governor and chief secretary had urged him to send in troops, but Marshall withheld as he did not believe in police action.[35] Furthermore, in the Chinese school sit-ins, Marshall was seen to have "meekly obeyed"[33] to the Chinese students, despite calls of action to be taken on them such as deportation.[36] The British had actually wanted Marshall to use local military to ease the situation, but eventually understood that military force would have painted a bad look on the LF government, and they helped by restraining the police force from acting against Marshall's plans. Chinese-language newspapers such as Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh frowned upon police use as they supported the Chinese rioters, which was another reason why the Marshall government refrained from such tactics in order to maintain their support from the Chinese community.[37]
As more strikes broke out across Singapore, with the main unionists being Devan Nair, Lim, and Sandrasegaran Woodhull, Marshall met with them to discuss and prevent a planned general strike on 13 June. Although the meeting was described as cooperative by the unionists, on 11 June Marshall's government arrested five unionists[d] under the Emergency Regulations for being involved in the planning of the general strike. This was met with aggression from the unions, but when 13 June arrived, only an eighth of the planned workers went on strike.[39] On 5 July, Marshall held a final meeting with the unions, where they outlined the issues they faced. This meeting was successful, as both Marshall and the unions reached an agreement over the final disputed points, officially ending the strikes after 66 days.[40][41][42] Following the conclusion of the strikes, Nicoll and The Straits Times both stated that the "unconditional surrender" of the Marshall government led to the strikers fulfilling all of their requests. Conversely, Marshall's government's actions were praised by both Chinese-language and Malay-language newspapers.[43]
Emergency Regulations
By October, he decided to work on fully removing the Emergency Regulations as promised by the LF during their election campaign. However, Marshall with met with opposition from the British and Malaya; the British had repeatedly advised against fully relaxing the Regulations, while Malaya interpreted it as potentially undermining their efforts in combatting the communist insurgency. Governor Robert Black's suggestion was for Marshall to repeal the Regulations and later have Black reinstate them, thereby bearing the resentment of the population, but Marshall rejected this proposal as hypocritical. As they were also against renewing them every three months, the LF government opted instead to introduce seven new bills that would jointly hold the powers of the Emergency Regulations. Among these bills was the Preservation of Public Security Bill (PPSB), which allowed the chief minister to give detention without trial for two years, give the right of appeal to a tribunal consisting of three judges before releasing a detainee, and have it renewed in three years time, before Marshall left office.[44]
This was met with great resistance from the PAP, who organised protests against the PPSB as it appeared to target the pro-communists elements within their party. A rally was held by the PAP on 18 September, three days before the PPSB was to be discussed in the Assembly, which showed over 6,000 arriving to protest against it; furthermore, a strike of the PAP Trade Union Committee's 80,000 members was threatened the day the PPSB was to be discussed. Black recommended that the PPSB's readings be done together to expedite the process, but Marshall declined as he wanted "it [to be] more democratic [and] allow all sides ample time to consider the [PPSB]". At the discussion of the bill in the Legislative Assembly, Marshall defended against the opposition – which were the three PAP members and Independent Ahmad Ibrahim – on why it should be instated.[45] In public statements to the Singapore Standard, Marshall characterised elements of the PAP as communist.[46] The bill was ultimately passed and, on 29 October, Marshall announced that the Emergency Regulations were no longer in use.[47][48]
Constitutional crisis
Following the handling of the riots, Marshall felt that his government was inadequate and inefficient. His ministers were often overworked, and he tended to neglect his second portfolio as the commerce and industry minister. Thus, in July 1955, with the arrival of the new governor Black who replaced Nicoll, Marshall expressed in his ceremonial address his desire for amendments to the Rendel Constitution. Marshall reiterated this position to Black in a letter on 11 July, stating that the Constitution allowed for the creation of nine new junior ministers, of which he was to appoint four initially and the rest at a later date. In response, Black allowed him only two junior ministers. Marshall described this as a matter of "grave constitutional importance", as the governor did not acknowledge the opinion of the Council of Ministers and interpreted the Constitution as permitting the governor to override the chief minister's recommendations.[49][50]
Marshall was asked to hold off on his resignation until the arrival of Alan Lennox-Boyd(pictured).
Following Black's refusal to appoint his proposed junior ministers, Marshall threatened to resign from the chief ministership due to the issues with the Constitution, citing Section 32 which stated that "the governor after consultation with the chief minister may from among elected members in the Assembly appoint Assistant Ministers to assist ministers in the discharge of their duties and functions." Marshall believed that this allowed him full control of his cabinet appointments, while Black disagreed, arguing that such a view insisted that Singapore was a self-governing state. However, his resignation brought along alarm from Singapore and the British, due to the hasty elections that would have to be held in response to the supposed constitutional crisis. Black then requested that Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd visit Singapore while on his Eastern tour in August, and asked Marshall to postpone his resignation till Lennox-Boyd's arrival.[51][52]
During this period, Marshall held an emergency meeting with the Assembly, where most of them urged him to defer his resignation. In addition, several Singaporean unions and unionists also encouraged him not to stay in office, with a seven-man delegation representing 110 unions compromising approximately 100,000 members meeting with Marshall to persuade him.[53] The Indian Daily Mail reported that S. Jaganathan, president of the Singapore Trade Union Congress, agreed on the issues with the Constitution, but did not consider them worth resigning over.[54] Gold Coast prime minister Kwame Nkrumah also told Marshall not to resign, sending a message from Ghana.[55] With this support, Marshall presented a three-part motion to the Assembly, which detailed that they would end colonial rule, rewrite the Constitution to benefit those elected with the view of self-governance, and that the governor would act on the advice of the chief minister.[56] Marshall's motion saw support from twenty-eight members; G. A. P. Sutherland was the only dissenter, and the colonial officials – Davies, Hart, and Goode – abstained. Following the passage of this motion, Marshall held off on his resignation until the arrival of Lennox-Boyd.[57]
Lennox-Boyd arrived in Singapore on 31 July, where he and Marshall held several meetings, before he briefly departed to visit London and Borneo, returning once more on 15 August.[58] In the subsequent days, Lennox-Boyd and the Legislative Assembly discussed the issues throughly, with a statement being announced on 18 August that an agreement had been reached. The colonial authorities edited the governor's powers to be in favour of the elected ministers, requiring the governor to act on the advice or in consultation with the chief minister. Regarding self-governance, Marshall was invited to send a delegation to London to discuss it further. In the press, Marshall stated that he was "very pleased with the outcome",[59] though opposition assemblymen cast doubts on Lennox-Boyd's ambiguous wording and the lack of actual self-governance, instead being asked to travel to London.[60] Reports by the Colonial Office indicate that the British largely accepted Marshall's terms due to fear that his resignation would lead to further political crisis in Singapore, result in a more "radical and irresponsible government" coming into power, and undermine the confidence of the British's politics just three months after the general elections. Black had reportedly sought to postpone Marshall's resignation until Lennox-Boyd's arrival to help manage these issues.[61]
Party and government issues
Throughout the LF's time in office, they experienced multiple internal conflicts such as financial issues, leadership issues, and conflicting viewpoints. Marshall was said to have a tendency to argue over differing viewpoints with his colleagues and did not hold frequent meetings with his ministers. These problems were addressed in the LF's first annual conference on 29 October 1955, however it only introduced more financial and management issues. During the conference, executive member C. H. Koh suggested repealing the PPSB and validating the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which were rejected as conflicting with the government's policies. Furthermore, in the LF's party president election, Marshall chose not to contest and instead promoted his chief lieutenant Lim Yew Hock for the role. However, Lim lost the election to Farrer Park assemblymanA. R. Lazarous, who was an opponent of the current government. This prompted Marshall to investigate Lazarous' election, leading to some members walking out, but it was ultimately determined that Lazarous had bribed other members to vote for him, voiding his ballot. Lim was subsequently declared the party president.[62][63][64]
These internal issues had since been made public, with Marshall attributing the disagreements to personal ambitions instead of policy differences. Lazarous and Koh had been pushing for positions in Marshall's cabinet since April, which was intensified by the new junior minister posts introduced following the constitutional crisis. After learning of their rejections, Lazarous and Koh rebelled against Marshall, alongside Queenstown assemblymanLee Choon Eng who was similarly rejected of a ministerial position. This eventually culminated into Lazarous and Lee leaving LF on 7 November to join the opposition, significantly affecting the LF government's majority as both sides now had an even 16 seats.[e][66][67] This led to a possibility by the opposition to hold a no-confidence vote and form their own coalition, with the PP and the DP supporting this initiative. Eventually, the opposition was calling for new elections to be held. In response, Marshall challenged the opposition at the upcoming November budget debate, where he stated that he would dissolve the Assembly if the budget was voted down. During the budget debate, opposition member and PAP assemblyman Lee Kuan Yew criticised Marshall's budget, but did not advocate for the government's dissolution. In the end, Marshall's government survived the budget debate with a vote of 19 to 13.[66][68]
Following this, Marshall implemented several populist and anti-colonial measures to reinforce his position as chief minister and gain political leverage. For example, he linked the renewal of the Exchange Control Ordinance with the development of constitutional talks with the British, effectively tying economic stability to political negotiations. He further called for the expedited passing of the Labour Ordinance, despite lacking proper regulations from the Assembly. During this period, Marshall saw continued support from the British despite disagreements over his handling of a communist-led public transportation strike and his populist, anti-colonialist views. Black stated in a despatch that "[his] policy, in the absence of any palatable alternatives, [was] to attempt to keep Mr Marshall in position". With the British's support, Marshall acquired a vote of confidence for his government and successfully enacted the Labour Ordinance. He further obtained a multi-party consensus that the upcoming constitutional talks would establish a fully elected legislature controlling the internal government, while foreign relations and external defence would remain under the British.[65]
Government reorganisation
As recommended by the Rendel Constitution, the City Council and Rural Board were suggested to be replaced with a City and Island Council that would be made up of elected members. In response, Marshall's government established the Committee of Local Government in July 1955 to explore decentralising the City Council and Rural Board and to consider creating additional councils. Based on the committee's recommendations, the Rural Board was abolished and replaced with a city council and four district councils responsible for managing the Singapore Island and northern islands. The committee also recommended retaining the local government authorities. A city council made up of 32 elected members – one of whom would be elected amongst them as the mayor – would also be established, but it ended up as an outlet that the PAP used to enhance their reputation. The committee further recommended separating the functions of housing and planning, a measure that eventually contributed to the modern Housing and Development Board and the Public Utilities Board.[69]
Education and multilingualism
Prior to Marshall taking office, the Chinese community in Singapore had been campaigning for equal treatment of Chinese-language education alongside English-language education. Enrolment to Chinese schools in Singapore was high after World War II, with 58% of the population receiving a Chinese education in 1948. However, over the years, English education steadily became more favoured. The dropping enrolment numbers, coupled with the introduction of the School Registration Ordinance – which allowed authorities to close schools suspected of communist influence – and the active campaigning for the establishment of Nanyang University, led to more heightened aggression from the Chinese community.[70]
In May 1955, following Chinese student riots breaking out, Marshall established an All-Party Committee to "re-examine the general situation of Chinese schools". For the committee, he had each political party represented on it, though he was not a member of the committee himself. The Committee would present their findings in early 1956 in two papers, the All-Party Report and White Paper on Education Policy. According to academic Chan Heng Chee, the All-Party Committee's papers were the Marshall government's most significant contributions, as they outlined a multilingual education policy for Singapore. These papers would become the basis for education in the following years, as the government would offer a choice of education in four different languages and the option to take up a second language as detailed in the papers.[71][72] The White Paper was widely accepted by the Legislative Assembly, although criticism came from the PAP and the PP. The PAP's Lee Kuan Yew brought up that the White Paper did not frame Malay as the language of the future, but Marshall argued that English would emerge as the dominant language due to Singapore's role as an international trade hub; such a view would later be adopted by the PAP in the 1970s for their own language policy.[73]
Alongside the education issue, the use of multilingualism also arose. The non-English-speaking community wanted multilingualism to be prohibited in the Legislative Assembly, so that they could better represent their views and participate in politics. At the 1955 general election, the issue of multilingualism was not brought up as only English speakers were allowed to vote, but Marshall stated "multilingualism was practical" during his campaign. Marshall eventually included this issue on his list of points he was to discuss at the December 1955 preliminary talks, and, in February 1956, he gained the unanimous approval of the Assembly to allow multilingualism in debates. This would be built upon in the State of Singapore Act of 1958, which allowed representatives to hold their debates in one of the four recognised languages.[74][75]
Citizenship
Under British rule, the Singaporean populace was divided into British and non-British subjects. British subjects, which included naturalised subjects and Commonwealth subjects, were allowed political rights, while non-British subjects did not have any. A large portion of non-British subjects were around 220,000 China-born individuals who, despite contributing to Singapore's economic success, had no political rights and were unwilling to convert to British nationality in favour of their Chinese nationality. The Chinese community advocated for proper citizenship rights unsuccessfully prior to Marshall taking office.[76]
Following political strikes in June 1955 by the Chinese community, citizenship was acknowledged as key issue. Marshall met with members of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC) and requested they publicly condemn the strikes. He subsequently held further discussions with them that looked through their previous citizenship suggestions. In July, Marshall announced his plans for a Singaporean citizenship that required applicants to meet a minimum residential period; declare Singapore as their permanent home; renounce other nationalities; make an oath of allegiance to the British; and pledge loyalty towards Singapore. This plan received support from the SCCC, but received opposition from the PAP and UMNO as it created a "second class citizenship" that allowed non-British subjects citizenship rights.[77]
Citizenship would also be discussed between Marshall and the leaders of Malaya, where Marshall defended his citizenship plans by arguing that the loyalty of the Chinese community needed to be secured first before considering the establishment of a Chinese embassy. Malayan chief minister Tunku Abdul Rahman indicated that a merger between Singapore and Malaya would be difficult to consider if Marshall did not concede to his current citizenship plans. In light of this, and along with the criticism from the PAP and UMNO, he ultimately decided to modify his proposal. On 6 September, he began holding meetings with a twenty-member committee made up of different communities and political parties to develop a revised citizenship plan. Under the revised plan, it saw all individuals born in Singapore automatically granted Singaporean citizenship, including full political rights and responsibilities.[78]
When Marshall met Lennox-Boyd in London, he asked if the Colonial Secretary would veto their law if passed in the Legislative Assembly, to which Lennox-Boyd stated that Marshall needed the agreement from all communities in Singapore to go forward with his plans. At the 1956 constitutional talks, the British agreed to a Singaporean citizenship that would be similar to the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty. Despite the breaking down of the talks, his agreement with the British of a basis for a Singaporean citizenship was successful.[79][80]
Civil service
Following World War II, local officers in the public sector and army believed they were treated less favourably as compared to European officers in the same sectors, particularly in terms of back pay, allowance, and employment conditions. This disparity led to resentment from the local civil servants towards the colonial government. Local civil servants also felt they were receiving slower promotions to higher posts, leading to a public challenge from the unions to the colonial government. This movement gained support amongst those who were both affiliated and unaffiliated with the civil service, becoming a factor in gaining self-governance.[81]
Upon assuming office, Marshall found the Rendel Constitution to be vague on certain points, especially on who was in control of power; the Rendel Constitution described the role of chief minister as performing the role of the "prime minister in a fully self-governing state", yet found himself deferring to the governor and chief secretary in practice. Under the constitution, civil servants were given the role of briefing their respective ministers on matters, but Marshall's government considered expatriate civil servants difficult to work with as they had previously exercised greater authority. In the first few months of 1955, the Marshall government attempted to establish proper relationships between the ex-officio ministers – namely the chief secretary, financial secretary, and attorney-general – and the expatriate civil service. Expatriate civil servants were often uncooperative with the new arrangement seeing as they had to respond to ministers, and Marshall regarded the attorney-general's chambers as undercutting his government.[82]
On 4 August 1955, after he challenged the governor on the Constitution's points, Marshall created a Malayanisation Commission that would examine the civil service to conclude the "[most] rapid, systemic and complete Malayanisation of the Public Service"; it was chaired by B. R. Sreenivasan. The Commission met over a six-month period, where they investigated training more graduates, increasing the training of local officers, abolishing and compensating expatriate officers' positions, and the "malayanisation" process of different departments. In February 1956, an Interim Report was published, although unanimous agreement was not achieved, with commissioners T. P. F. McNeice and Robert Ho submitting a Minority Report. The Interim Report strongly suggested replacing expatriate officers in conjunction with self-governance, in order to ensure a government that was "entirely or almost entirely carried out by the country". The Minority Report offered that they would lose efficiency and funds in replacing the expatriates.[83]
Despite the report, Marshall's malayanisation efforts faced criticism from the PAP's Lee Kuan Yew. As early as November 1955, when Marshall's government presented their first budget, Lee noted the continuation of high salaries being paid to senior colonial officers and questioned Marshall's malayanisation efforts as Lee considered to have Marshall "[drifted] towards his expatriate officials" and had "keenness to defend them". In response, Marshall had Sreenivasan publicly refute Lee's views. However, as chief minister, Marshall's relationships with colonial officials led some to believe that he was not fully committed towards anti-colonialism. The Malayanisation Commission's report would not be acted on for nine months, but malayanisation was included on the agenda of the 1956 constitutional talks. Eventually, the Assembly would pass the White Paper on Malayanisation in December 1956, based largely on the Commission's suggestions.[84]
In 1955, Marshall's government amended the Central Provident Fund Ordinance, which was originally introduced in 1953 by Marshall as a member of the Progressive Party. A committee was appointed, that was led by economist Sir Sydney Caine, that would examine the minimum standard of living that the government should adopt.[85]
During his chief ministership, Marshall introduced Meet-the-People Sessions, where he met with Singaporeans at the conference room of the Public Relations Office. These sessions were held weekly and typically lasted seven to eight hours long. Marshall later expanded these sessions to include representatives of the relevant ministries that received the most common issues. These Meet-the-People Sessions promoted political engagement with the locals, and Chan regards this as "the most innovative of Marshall's policies". Meet-the-People Sessions would later be adopted by the PAP to receive their own feedback.[86]
Following his constitutional success in August, Marshall sought to improve bilateral relations with Indonesia, with the aim of easing trade restrictions between the countries. Before his trip to Indonesia, three Indonesian officials arrived in July 1955 to hold preliminary discussions. In September 1955, Marshall led a delegation to Indonesia, which included assistant trade and industry minister Jumabhoy and housing and local government minister Abdul, and arrived in Jakarta. During the visit, Marshall held discussions regarding trade between the countries with the Indonesian government. At the time, newly elected Indonesian prime minister Burhanuddin Harahap's government had introduced regulations to control graft, which had the effect of halting trade between Singapore and Indonesia entirely. They eventually reached an agreement where a Singaporean economic mission (with the option of including Malaya) would be sent to Indonesia in October, followed by a full economic mission in December. Indonesia also agreed to relax the regulations on textile imports, temporarily ease the importation of slab rubber, and import dried fish from Singapore.[87][88] Marshall received praise upon his return to Singapore from both English-language and Chinese-language newspapers.[89]
Since the 1955 general elections, merger with Malaya had been a key political objective for Singapore and had been a point of interest at the election. Both the LF and PAP regarded merger with Malaya as the most viable route to gain independence from the British, given concerns for Singapore's viability as a standalone nation. In Malaya, the UMNO's leader and chief minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was an opponent of the idea at the time; when first asked in January 1955, the Tunku rejected the proposal. He believed that merger was "a very long way off" and should only be considered after both Singapore and Malaya gained independence. In August, the Tunku and Marshall would officially meet in Singapore, but the former was still opposed to merger. After returning from the December 1955 talks in London, Marshall broached the idea of merger to him again and found the Tunku to be more receptive. The Tunku had revised his earlier position from merger coming after independence to possibly incorporating Singapore into the Federation as a state. However, this was undesirable and Marshall spoke to the Tunku in Kuala Lumpur to consider a confederation as an alternative, but was unsuccessful.[90]
In December 1955, Marshall met with the Tunku and Malayan finance minister Tan Cheng Lock in Baling, Kedah, to take part in discussions aimed at resolving the Malayan Emergency, particularly issues concerning the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its leader Chin Peng. The discussions, later known as the Baling Talks, were initiated after the MCP requested a meeting with the Tunku and Tan in late September. Chin initially expressed reservations of Marshall's inclusions, however the Tunku insisted on his participation. Marshall's inclusion was eventually confirmed by mid-October, a development that significantly raised his political reputation. The talks were held at the Baling English School from 28 to 29 December. Although negotiations broke down on the 29, the talks were nonetheless regarded as having been of some value.[91] In March 1956, the Tunku suggested to Marshall that he should "limit his London objective to self-government" as "it could hardly expect to be granted independence on its own". The Tunku then floated the idea that attaining independence could be done later by joining Malaya.[92]
1956 constitutional talks and resignation
Background
On 2 December 1955, Marshall travelled to London to hold preliminary constitutional talks, stopping in Sri Lanka and India where he met their respective prime ministers John Kotelawala and Nehru. While in Sri Lanka and India, he spoke about anti-colonialism, but after speaking with Nehru, Marshall became interested in pursuing dominion status for Singapore instead of self-governance. These remarks drew criticism from The Straits Times as his position had differed, and it was rejected by the Colonial Secretary on the grounds that Singapore did not hold full sovereignty unlike other dominions.[93] Nevertheless, it was decided that a Constitutional Conference would be held in 1956 to discuss the internal self-governance for Singapore. Alongside these developments, the British made the post of chief minister independent, designating Marshall's second portfolio of commerce minister to the assistant commerce minister; allowed the Legislative Assembly to sanction multilingualism in debates; and gave control of the National Servicemen to the Singaporean government.[94]
In March 1956, Marshall sought to bolster Singapore's position at the upcoming constitutional talks in London by holding a "Merdeka Week", timed to coincide with the arrival of a delegation of six British parliamentarians tasked with assessing the prospects of independence. It was planned that, upon their arrival at Kallang Airport, a petition with over 170,000 signatures supporting self-governance would be presented to the parliamentarians, followed by a speech given by Marshall. However, as Marshall stood on the wooden stage alongside others such as Lee Kuan Yew, Ong Eng Guan, and Lim Chin Siong, the crowd shook the hastily-constructed stage, causing it to topple. It eventually escalated into a clash between the crowd and the police, and severely affected the reputation of possible self-governance for Singapore.[95]
Constitutional talks
In April 1956, as planned at the December 1955 talks, a Singaporean delegation was received by the British to hold the constitutional talks. The topics of discussion, which were similarly outlined at the December 1955 talks, was the definition of self-governance; a possible date for the introduction of self-governance; how the Legislative Assembly, external defence, external relations, and public service functioned; and any other possible matters. On 5 April, the Legislative Assembly – with the exception of nominated member G. A. P. Sutherland and the officials – unanimously agreed that the All-Party Delegation were to discuss "the status of an independent territory within the Commonwealth and ceding back external defence and external relations other than trade and commerce to the Government of the United Kingdom" at the constitutional talks.[96]
On 14 April, the Singaporean delegation left for London. The thirteen-man delegation was composed of the LF's chief minister Marshall, labour minister Lim, local government minister Abdul, health minister A. J. Braga, commerce and industry minister J. M. Jumabhoy, and assemblymen Seah Peng Chuan and Wong Foo Nam; the Liberal-Socialist's[f] assemblymen Lim Choon Meng, William Tan, Lim Koon Teck, and Lim Cher Keng; and the PAP's assemblymen Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Chin Siong. Additionally accompanying the delegation was secretary R. C. Hoffman, assistant secretary G. Leembruggen, special assistant Lee Siow Mong, governor Sir Robert Black, director of personnel J. D. Higham, and attorney-general C. H. Butterfield.[98][99] The constitutional talks opened on 23 April and focused on the delegation's view of independence, formation of a Singaporean citizenship, and management by the Commonwealth Office, among other issues. The Colonial Secretary responded that the British wanted to maintain control of Singapore's defence, particularly internal security and external affairs, or at least joint control between them.[100]
Following a brief adjournment over the weekend, the Singaporean delegation gave their memorandum and a draft of Heads of Agreement, which aimed for Singapore's independence by April 1957. On 25 April, Alan Lennox-Boyd rejected the delegation's proposed April 1957 independence date and instead offered a new constitution which granted a larger degree of self-governance, but still retained British control over Singapore's defence. Among other concessions from the British, Marshall ultimately refused this counteroffer. Over the next few days, the constitutional talks slowly broke down following internal disagreements in the Singaporean delegation, such as Marshall's refusal to compromise with the British. Dealing with the issue of the British's reserve powers, Marshall suggested that three representatives from Singapore and the United Kingdom be appointed to the Defence and Security Council, with a Malayan serving as its chairman. However, Lennox-Boyd insisted on a British High Commissioner serving as chairman, leading to the delegation unanimously voting against the British's plan, with only the Liberal-Socialists abstaining. The talks subsequently broke down on 15 May.[101]
Aftermath and resignation
Later that same day, Marshall met with British prime minister Anthony Eden and Lennox-Boyd at 10 Downing Street, where he expressed his frustration over the talks with Eden. In the afternoon, he attended the House of Commons debate on the Singapore constitutional talks and found Labour Party parliamentarians suggesting a reopening of the talks, inspiring Marshall to meet up with his delegates to plan something similar. On 16 May, Marshall discussed the matter further with Lennox-Boyd, who was unopposed but wanted to know what the rest of the delegation thought. In a meeting on 17 May, despite the opposition parties being uninterested in restarting the talks, Marshall outlined his planned negotiation points if they did, namely that new legislature by the Colonial Office should seek the approval of the House of Commons first; that Singapore should no longer be managed by the Colonial Office; and that Singapore's head of state would be a local and not affiliated with the British.[102]
However, Marshall faced heavy criticism from his delegation for his decision to reopen the constitutional talks. It was seen as "humiliating" and "degrading", with accusations from the opposition that Marshall only wanted to restart the talks to maintain his office as chief minister. Furthermore, he had announced his decision to reopen talks first to the press, before discussing this with his delegation. This undoubtedly halted any possibility of reopening the talks, as Lennox-Boyd would only be willing if Marshall received the full support of his delegation. In spite of that, Marshall noted that Lennox-Boyd was willing to discuss these new proposals, with the only caveat being the lack of support. He later returned to Singapore on 21 May, with the idea that Lennox-Boyd would support his plan of moving Singapore from the Colonial Office and granting a local head of state, if only he received support.[103]
Marshall continued to preach his plan to the Colonial Secretary to reopen the talks, under the assumption that his plan would succeed and, that if it did not by 6 June, Marshall would resign from his post. During this time, his fellow LF members had been urging him to resign, with arrangements being made to replace him with another member as chief minister. By 23 May, Lim Yew Hock was already viewed as the upcoming chief minister, following support from the LF and Lennox-Boyd. The evening of his return, Marshall had contacted governor Black to inquire whether Lennox-Boyd would receive a new delegation headed by Lim that discussed his originally planned points, if Marshall resigned. On 28 May, Lennox-Boyd replied that he did not want to interfere with Singapore's affairs and, on 30 May, the Colonial Office rejected Marshall's points outright, ensuring Marshall's resignation.[104] On 6 June, Marshall appeared before the Legislative Assembly and requested a censure following his performance at the constitutional talks, but was rejected. On 7 June, he requested a censure again but was similarly refused. Marshall resigned later that day at 5:00 p.m. SST as chief minister, but remained as a backbencher. He was succeeded by Lim.[105]
External assessments
British view
Throughout his tenure as chief minister, Marshall was tolerated by the British. Although they preferred his removal from office, there was concerns that doing so would result in the PAP coming into power and forming a government perceived to be more pro-communism, or necessitate fresh elections shortly after Marshall's appointment. As a result, the British consistently accommodated Marshall when he threatened resignation. Views from London regarded Marshall as difficult to work with and expressed a desire for his departure, but also acknowledged that his removal could lead to a "more radical and irresponsible government" taking his place.[106] Around July to August 1955, after his success in trade with Indonesia, Marshall was reported to have a good relationship with governor Robert Black.[107] The Colonial Secretary explained to British prime minister Eden the British's policy of Marshall as:[108]
If Marshall's coalition threw its hand in or were driven out of office it would be necessary either at once to suspend the Constitution or to hold fresh general election. The latter course would almost certainly secure the return of a government so much further to the left than the present one that the suspension of the Constitution would still before long become unavoidable. The consequences of suspending the Constitution are not easy to predict but might well be very damaging indeed and ought not to be induced if they could possibly be prevented.
Prior to the 1956 constitutional talks, the British may have already decided to not grant internal self-governance as early as April 1955. Their concerns centred around Marshall's government's ability to maintain internal security and its political stability. Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd was convinced that Singapore would not be given self-governance, writing to prime minister Eden in January 1956 that "it may be necessary to take a different line in Singapore from that which is found acceptable in the Federation [of Malaya]". Black similarly expressed reservations over granting Singapore self-governance. Although Marshall's willingness to leave defence and foreign affairs under the British control relieved some concerns, the issue of his ability to stay in power remained.[109]
Lennox-Boyd further characterised Singapore's independence as "a delusion", and instead recommended that Singapore merge with Malaya. He proposed that, at the 1956 constitutional talks, the British demonstrate that "we have gone as far as our vital strategic and economic interests permit towards meeting the desire of the people of Singapore to manage their own affairs". He also recommended that they reserve the governor's role over Singapore's defence, foreign affairs, and internal security as a necessity, given Singapore's lack of local forces. By contrast, Black was willing to accommodate Marshall's demands, provided they received guarantee on securing Singapore's military bases. Black also warned that refusing Marshall would certainly lead to his resignation and that the PAP would exploit the anti-colonial resentment generated by this against them.[110]
Australian view
The Australian government, under prime minister Robert Menzies(pictured), maintained the view that the British should not grant Singapore self-governance, with a merger with Malaya being more desirable.
Following the Malayan Emergency in 1948, the British increased Malaya's political autonomy as British prime ministers Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill believed that it would allow greater political cooperation with the non-communist leaders in Malaya. The British planned for the independence of Malaya to be a lengthy process, however the Alliance Party's landslide victory at the 1955 Malayan general election led to much earlier calls of independence for Malaya. The Australian government, led by prime minister Robert Menzies, were doubtful of the British's plans as transferring the power to Malaya would affect Australia's defence in the region. The Australian government was also concerned with how the transfer of power to Malaya would influence Singapore's political future as well, with some senior ministers believing that Singapore would soon follow Malaya.[111]
On 17 January 1956, Menzies spoke to British prime minister Eden about the defence plan for Malaya and how it could not be separated from decisions about Singapore, noting that the Commonwealth's security arrangements in Southeast Asia would largely hinge on the position of the Singapore government. Eden agreed with Menzies that the security of Malaya and Singapore was closely related, but argued that Britain could adopt a more accommodating approach toward the Tunku, whom he considered as more fully aware of the communist threat and that he was committed to address it. He considered the internal security of Singapore to be significantly more difficult than that of Malaya's, and therefore maintained that the British's policy towards Singapore would not be limited to agreements made with Malaya. As the Australian government observed the civil unrest and riots of Singapore in 1955, they did not believe that Marshall's government would last.[112]
As the 1956 constitutional talks in London approached, Australian policymakers discussed their view of Singapore from late February to early March 1956. The Australian Commissioner for Southeast Asia in Singapore Alan Watt stated that if the British granted self-governance to Singapore, that Marshall would be removed from office and replaced with someone more volatile; Watt explained that "the problems [Marshall] has to face are so intractable that it is difficult to be optimistic enough to believe that he will succeed in solving them". Therefore, the assistant secretary of the Department of External Affairs, James Plimsoll, maintained that while Britain should avoid rejecting independence as Singapore's eventual objective – as denying it outright could lead to further unrest – they must not grant early independence, since he considered it carried a serious risk of communist control and regional instability. Plimsoll therefore believed that Britain needed to retain authority over defence, foreign affairs, and internal security.[113]
Watt warned that Australian recommendations to the British to delay Singapore’s independence could provoke hostility from Marshall if discovered, while also contradicting Australia's original opposition to military use for internal security. While rejecting immediate independence, he argued that Singapore's merger with Malaya remained the only viable solution, a position later echoed by diplomat Laurence McIntyre, who advised the Australian government to ignore Singapore as a separate entity, and instead support its rapid merger with Malaya despite the likelihood of short-term instability. However, both the British and the Tunku considered merger to be unlikely at that point in time.[114] On 27 March 1956, Australia informed the British of their position on the matter, where Menzies advised Eden to go "to the limit of reasonableness in meeting Marshall's demands".[115]
Other views
Following the failure of the 1956 constitutional talks and Marshall's resignation, Thailand, Pakistan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, and Ceylon had privately expressed their understanding of the British's position at the talks, with the Indian government reportedly regarding Marshall as "impatient". Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru considered the prospect of a Chinese-dominated government to be "distressing" and therefore favoured a more gradual transfer of power. Although Indonesia showed little interest about Singapore's self-governance, the Indonesian embassy in Australia reportedly showed "concern about the growth of communism in Singapore". Upon learning of the news of the failed constitutional talks, the Tunku remarked that he was "very, very sorry indeed", before reportedly adding "please can I now go back to bed?"[116]
Evaluation and reception
Academic Chan Heng Chee(pictured), in her 1984 biography of Marshall, described him as a "shooting star" who "filled the sky with brilliance and disappeared".
Marshall's government has received both praise and criticism in scholarly analysis. For example, in criticism of Marshall, writer Dennis Bloodworth described Marshall's government as having been "shaken" after the Hock Lee bus riots, while historian Yeo Kim Wah called his policies during the civil unrest as "weak-kneed". Furthermore, historians Lee Ting Hui, C. M. Turnbull, and John Drysdale state that his relaxed policies led to uncontrolled growth of pro-communist organisations in Singapore. On the other hand, Yeo and Turnbull also praised Marshall for defying colonialism and his progress towards independence. Speaking on Marshall's 1955 constitutional crisis, Yeo stated that he had "deliberately created a crisis", while Drysdale called it "Marshall's Machiavellian challenge" to the British.[118]
Academic Chan Heng Chee, in her 1984 biography of Marshall, attributed Marshall's inability to hold office to be due to his internal rivalries and limitations of his fellow party members, along with his own impulsive tendencies. She explains that, following their sudden entry into office, Marshall had neglected proper party-building in the LF. Chan considered Marshall to have been "far ahead of his party colleagues", and he only shared his troubles with Francis Thomas and Lim Yew Hock, whom he found to be trustworthy and helpful. Due to Marshall’s dominance within his party, he tend to take charge of addressing the crises and issues confronting his administration, leading to Chan describing his methods as "perceptibly autocratic".[119]
An analysis into Marshall's chief ministership by academic James Low using contemporary newspapers shows that Marshall consistently received support from the Chinese community as displayed through the Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh. Particularly, his decisions to establish Meet-the-People Sessions, the creation of the Labour Ordinance, and his lack of police action in the riots and strikes of 1955 were received positively by the Chinese-language newspapers.[37] Marshall's 1955 constitutional crisis was met with mixed responses in the press; for example, Sin Chew Jit Poh supported the issue, while Tamil Murasu viewed it negatively.[120] His success in easing trade restrictions between Singapore and Indonesia was highly praised by newspapers, with Low considering the "unanimous compliments" as "the peak of Marshall's government".[89]
References
Notes
↑Marshall originally held both the role of chief minister and commerce minister, but in 1956, it was given to J. M. Jumabhoy so that he could focus on his work as chief minister. Jumabhoy had previously served as the assistant commerce minister from 1955 to 1956.[13]
↑According to the 1954 Rendel Constitution, the Legislative Assembly would consist of 32 members, 25 of whom would be elected by popular vote through elections.[14]
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
