| Part of the Sudanese refugee crisis in the outfall of the El Fasher massacre, committed during the Sudanese civil war (2023–present) | |
 Internally displaced refugees setting up shelter in Tawila, the largest landing site of IDPs for those fleeing El Fasher. | |
| Date | 26 October 2025 – present |
|---|---|
| Location | |
| Displaced | >100,000 people |
The El Fasher refugee crisis is an ongoing crisis in Sudan amid the Sudanese civil war.
After an 18-month siege, on 26 October 2025, the RSF captured the city of El Fasher, the largest city in the Darfur region. Reports contained accounts of massacres of unarmed civilian communities and other large-scale atrocities. Systematic killings were committed, including those attempting to flee. In El Fasher, RSF fighters carried out door-to-door raids and executions, and committed acts of sexual violence against women and girls. A report which contained satellite imagery of El Fasher which was analyzed by Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) stated that swaths of civilians had been killed in the Daraja Oula area. The HRL believed "the actions by [the] RSF... may be consistent with war crimes and crimes against humanity (CAH) and may rise to the level of genocide.” [1] According to estimates, the RSF takeover has resulted in over 2,000 civilian deaths, sparking widespread ethnic violence, and deepening the humanitarian crisis. Arab states and human rights groups have condemned these actions. [2] [3] [4] [5]
Even prior to the beginning of the massacre, refugees which attempted to flee the city reported paying ransom, encountering RSF patrols, and other violence. Before the fall of El Fasher, Tawila was already a landing ground for many IDPs, with Gurni as the first stop along the journey. [6] [7] However, it was largely incapable of tending to its refugee camps as services collapsed and violence grew. The Sudanese American Physicians Association (SAPA) reported that between October 18 and 27, 3,038 IDPs had fled from El-Fasher to Tawila, with many of them arriving to the town's resources already running thin. This problem was compounded by IDPs arriving with what the SAPA described as "nothing but their lives." [7] The European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) estimated that Tawila's population grew from approximately 238,000 to 576,000 between March and September 2025. [7] [8] Médecins Sans Frontières reported that of arrivals to the Tawila refugee camp during the week prior to the fall of city, 5% of children were acutely malnourished, and 26% were severely malnourished. [9] The SAPA warned that Sudan's looming rainy season could constrain aid efforts and intensify the spread of diseases like cholera. [7]
The UN estimated that more than 26,000 people had fled the city in a couple days after the beginning of the massacre, mostly towards the neighboring town of Tawila, where refugee camps were established. [10] [9] The SAPA recorded 3,000 IDP arrivals on 26 October, 26,030 on 27 October, and 7,455 on 28 October. [2] Many of the children which arrived were separated or unaccompanied, [4] [11] believing their parents to have gone missing, been detained, or killed. [11] Several centers for displaced people, including the Dar al-Arqam displacement center at Omdurman Islamic University, were attacked. Reports further claim that in a single incident, more than 60 people were killed, including 22 women and 17 children. [12]
By October 29, the IOM revised earlier figures from ECHO, reporting that between March and September 2025, Tawila's IDP population had grown from 238,084 to 652,079, which amounted to 37% of all IDPs across North Darfur and 7% across all of Sudan. 57% of all individuals in all of Tawila were children under 18 years old. IOM found that 74% of displaced households in Tawila were living in informal settlements or gathering sites. Of both formal and informal settlement, 43% were damaged or collapsed. Much of this damage was to roofs, which made shelters prone to leaking when it rained, which were problems the IOM believed would be exacerbated due to growing winter conditions. Other shelter issues included significant overcrowding, which contributed to limited or poor sleeping areas and lack of storage space. 70% of households had required healthcare within the last three months, although half did not receive it. [13]
By 4 November, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) suspected that "many others" were still "trapped in the city without food, water and medical care." It stated that it was providing assistance to refugees which had arrived in Tawila. Furthermore, it had household-item aid kits prepared for distribution in Nyala, awaiting safe access into El Fasher, which was still blockaded at the time. [5] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported the same day that over 445,000 had been displaced across Sudan in 2025 alone. It claimed that the situation seemed uncertain for refugees with "aid funding sharply declining and essential services stretched to breaking point." [14]
Being present in Sudan since April 2023, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)'s Logistics Officer for Sudan, Shoshat Osman, noted on 7 November that aid delivery often had "a very narrow window." He added that "we [UNICEF] succeed some days, and other days we don't"—the success rate of which was compounded by the difficulty to remain "neutral and impartial." [15] Its Director of Emergency Operations, Lucia Elmi, expressed the life-saving capability of delivering "therapeutic food, safe water and essential medicines and health services," especially amidst worsening food insecurity causing famine; access to bed nets, safe water, and vaccines; and other health services which can slow of halt prevalent diseases like cholera and malaria. [7] [15]
By 11 November, UN Women's Regional Director for East and Southern Africa, Anna Mutavati, said that the refugee crisis worsened as fighting around the city continued. Some also fled to the neighboring towns of Korma and Malit, where Mutavati categorized the aid presence as "scarce." [16] Tens of thousands of arrivals have led to overcrowding in refugee camps. [17] The IOM said that ground assaults and heavy shelling in the weeks since the massacre began displaced approximately 90,000. Tens of thousand remained trapped within the city, with the IOM reporting that hospitals, markets, and water systems collapsed. The IOM claimed that the humanitarian situation was "on the brink of collapse," with aid resources depleted despite local organizations starting emergency projects to provide "shelter kits, protection assistance, and health services," and improve "access to water, sanitation, and hygiene." [18]
By 14 November, the UNHCR estimated the refugee figures was nearing 100,000, with Tawila as the largest destination for incoming civilians. [19] By November 16, the SAPA underscores that key urgent needs were not being met. This included shelter, food, water, medical care, and protection. In addition, conflict in and around El Fasher made it difficult for aid groups to access those in need or coordinate between one another. [20]
By November 22, UNICEF recorded the arrival of 354 children unaccompanied by any immediate family members to the refugee camps in Tawila, being able to reunite 84 children with their families. UNICEF noted that this success could be attributed, in part, to the presence of numerous aid organizations in Tawila. [21]
The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) recorded upwards of 400 children unaccompanied by any immediate family members, with many being in the care of "extended relatives, neighbors and strangers who didn’t want to leave them alone in the desert or el-Fasher [El Fasher]." According to the NRC's advocacy manager, Mathilde Vu, "many children arrived with clear signs of hunger," noting their skinny, bony, and dehydrated appearance. [21]
By November 27, the NRC registered upwards of 15,000 new arrivals in Tawila since the beginning of the massacre. The NRC noted that of these arrivals, an average of 200 or more children were registered every day. One teacher with the NRC noted children showed "signs of acute trauma" as they struggled with speaking, had nightmares, and described hours of traumatic, chaotic travel fleeing the city. [11]
On November 28, a victim from the massacre staying in a UNHCR refugee camp in Chad told Al Jazeera that he was digging holes to make money. Despite having watched his father die in El Fasher before fleeing, in addition to his uncle and brother going missing, the victim said the money was necessary to provide for his "big family." [22] The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, Denise Brown, which travelled to Darfur with Thomas Fletcher, the UN's Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, continued to express that aid organizations still did not "have enough of anything." Brown argued countries and donors' lack of funding created the "yawning shortfall," especially considering the UN, as "one of the best funded humanitarian responses in the world," was only at 28% of the funding it needed. Brown said that while money was not the only resource needed, especially considering the need for psychological support for women who had suffered sexual violence, it was "surely going to help our humanitarian response." For aid to successfully be delivered, Brown, like Fletcher, argued that aid organizations needed safe, non-militarized access. [23]
On November 30, witnesses recounted needing to leave behind children which were abducted or the dead bodies of relatives which died along the way. They arrived to refugee camps virtually empty-handed as RSF fighters as checkpoints stripped individuals of their money, phones, and clothes; ransom collected through video calls occurred numerous times at each of those checkpoints. [6]
Many could not escape as the city was surrounded by RSF's 56-kilometer blockade, which was used during the siege. [24] [10] Aid groups said there were no safe routes for civilians. Videos show scores of massacred civilians around the sand berm and inside its ditches. [24] [25] Witnesses recounted dead bodies being left out unburied for two to three days or more. [6]
Civilians which managed to escape the perimeter, sometimes an estimated 20 km out from the city, were stopped by RSF soldiers in vehicles. Testimonies recounted RSF militants having killed the elderly, sick, and wounded, noting that they had lamented needing to bring them in the back of their pickup trucks and choosing to execute them instead. [26] People who attempted to flee were reportedly kidnapped with ransoms demanded for release. [27] For weeks, dozens of civilians coming from El Fasher and arriving in Tawila were seriously wounded. [18]
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