Illusory correlation

Last updated

In psychology, illusory correlation is the phenomenon of perceiving a relationship between variables (typically people, events, or behaviors) even when no such relationship exists. A false association may be formed because rare or novel occurrences are more salient and therefore tend to capture one's attention. [1] This phenomenon is one way stereotypes form and endure. [2] [3] Hamilton & Rose (1980) found that stereotypes can lead people to expect certain groups and traits to fit together, and then to overestimate the frequency with which these correlations actually occur. [4] These stereotypes can be learned and perpetuated without any actual contact occurring between the holder of the stereotype and the group it is about.

Contents

History

"Illusory correlation" was originally coined by Chapman (1967) to describe people's tendencies to overestimate relationships between two groups when distinctive and unusual information is presented. [5] [6] The concept was used to question claims about objective knowledge in clinical psychology through Chapmans' refutation of many clinicians' widely used Wheeler signs for homosexuality in Rorschach tests. [7]

Example

David Hamilton and Robert Gifford (1976) conducted a series of experiments that demonstrated how stereotypic beliefs regarding minorities could derive from illusory correlation processes. [8] To test their hypothesis, Hamilton and Gifford had research participants read a series of sentences describing either desirable or undesirable behaviors, which were attributed to either Group A (the majority) or Group B (the minority). [5] Abstract groups were used so that no previously established stereotypes would influence results. Most of the sentences were associated with Group A, and the remaining few were associated with Group B. [8] The following table summarizes the information given.

BehaviorsGroup A (majority)Group B (minority)Total
Desirable18 (69%)9 (69%)27
Undesirable8 (30%)4 (30%)12
Total261339

Each group had the same proportions of positive and negative behaviors, so there was no real association between behaviors and group membership. Results of the study show that positive, desirable behaviors were not seen as distinctive so people were accurate in their associations. On the other hand, when distinctive, undesirable behaviors were represented in the sentences, the participants overestimated how much the minority group exhibited the behaviors. [8]

A parallel effect occurs when people judge whether two events, such as pain and bad weather, are correlated. They rely heavily on the relatively small number of cases where the two events occur together. People pay relatively little attention to the other kinds of observation (of no pain or good weather). [9] [10]

Theories

General theory

Most explanations for illusory correlation involve psychological heuristics : information processing short-cuts that underlie many human judgments. [11] One of these is availability : the ease with which an idea comes to mind. Availability is often used to estimate how likely an event is or how often it occurs. [12] This can result in illusory correlation, because some pairings can come easily and vividly to mind even though they are not especially frequent. [11]

Information processing

Martin Hilbert (2012) proposes an information processing mechanism that assumes a noisy conversion of objective observations into subjective judgments. The theory defines noise as the mixing of these observations during retrieval from memory. [13] According to the model, underlying cognitions or subjective judgments are identical with noise or objective observations that can lead to overconfidence or what is known as conservatism bias—when asked about behavior participants underestimate the majority or larger group and overestimate the minority or smaller group. These results are illusory correlations.

Working-memory capacity

In an experimental study done by Eder, Fiedler and Hamm-Eder (2011), the effects of working-memory capacity on illusory correlations were investigated. They first looked at the individual differences in working memory, and then looked to see if that had any effect on the formation of illusory correlations. They found that individuals with higher working memory capacity viewed minority group members more positively than individuals with lower working memory capacity. In a second experiment, the authors looked into the effects of memory load in working memory on illusory correlations. They found that increased memory load in working memory led to an increase in the prevalence of illusory correlations. The experiment was designed to specifically test working memory and not substantial stimulus memory. This means that the development of illusory correlations was caused by deficiencies in central cognitive resources caused by the load in working memory, not selective recall. [14]

Attention theory of learning

Attention theory of learning proposes that features of majority groups are learned first, and then features of minority groups. This results in an attempt to distinguish the minority group from the majority, leading to these differences being learned more quickly. The Attention theory also argues that, instead of forming one stereotype regarding the minority group, two stereotypes, one for the majority and one for the minority, are formed. [15]

Effect of learning

A study was conducted to investigate whether increased learning would have any effect on illusory correlations. It was found that educating people about how illusory correlation occurs resulted in a decreased incidence of illusory correlations. [16]

Age

Johnson and Jacobs (2003) performed an experiment to see how early in life individuals begin forming illusory correlations. Children in grades 2 and 5 were exposed to a typical illusory correlation paradigm to see if negative attributes were associated with the minority group. The authors found that both groups formed illusory correlations. [17]

A study also found that children create illusory correlations. In their experiment, children in grades 1, 3, 5, and 7, and adults all looked at the same illusory correlation paradigm. The study found that children did create significant illusory correlations, but those correlations were weaker than the ones created by adults. In a second study, groups of shapes with different colors were used. The formation of illusory correlation persisted showing that social stimuli are not necessary for creating these correlations. [18]

Explicit versus implicit attitudes

Two studies performed by Ratliff and Nosek examined whether or not explicit and implicit attitudes affected illusory correlations. In one study, Ratliff and Nosek had two groups: one a majority and the other a minority. They then had three groups of participants, all with readings about the two groups. One group of participants received overwhelming pro-majority readings, one was given pro-minority readings, and one received neutral readings. The groups that had pro-majority and pro-minority readings favored their respective pro groups both explicitly and implicitly. The group that had neutral readings favored the majority explicitly, but not implicitly. The second study was similar, but instead of readings, pictures of behaviors were shown, and the participants wrote a sentence describing the behavior they saw in the pictures presented. The findings of both studies supported the authors' argument that the differences found between the explicit and implicit attitudes is a result of the interpretation of the covariation and making judgments based on these interpretations (explicit) instead of just accounting for the covariation (implicit). [19]

Paradigm structure

Berndsen et al. (1999) wanted to determine if the structure of testing for illusory correlations could lead to the formation of illusory correlations. The hypothesis was that identifying test variables as Group A and Group B might be causing the participants to look for differences between the groups, resulting in the creation of illusory correlations. An experiment was set up where one set of participants were told the groups were Group A and Group B, while another set of participants were given groups labeled as students who graduated in 1993 or 1994. This study found that illusory correlations were more likely to be created when the groups were Group A and B, as compared to students of the class of 1993 or the class of 1994. [20]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Cognitive bias</span> Systematic pattern of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment

A cognitive bias is a systematic pattern of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment. Individuals create their own "subjective reality" from their perception of the input. An individual's construction of reality, not the objective input, may dictate their behavior in the world. Thus, cognitive biases may sometimes lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, and irrationality.

Confirmation bias is the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information in a way that confirms or supports one's prior beliefs or values. People display this bias when they select information that supports their views, ignoring contrary information, or when they interpret ambiguous evidence as supporting their existing attitudes. The effect is strongest for desired outcomes, for emotionally charged issues, and for deeply entrenched beliefs.

The availability heuristic, also known as availability bias, is a mental shortcut that relies on immediate examples that come to a given person's mind when evaluating a specific topic, concept, method, or decision. This heuristic, operating on the notion that, if something can be recalled, it must be important, or at least more important than alternative solutions not as readily recalled, is inherently biased toward recently acquired information.

The representativeness heuristic is used when making judgments about the probability of an event being representional in character and essence of a known prototypical event. It is one of a group of heuristics proposed by psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in the early 1970s as "the degree to which [an event] (i) is similar in essential characteristics to its parent population, and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated". The representativeness heuristic works by comparing an event to a prototype or stereotype that we already have in mind. For example, if we see a person who is dressed in eccentric clothes and reading a poetry book, we might be more likely to think that they are a poet than an accountant. This is because the person's appearance and behavior are more representative of the stereotype of a poet than an accountant.

In psychology, the false consensus effect, also known as consensus bias, is a pervasive cognitive bias that causes people to "see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common and appropriate to existing circumstances". In other words, they assume that their personal qualities, characteristics, beliefs, and actions are relatively widespread through the general population.

The physical attractiveness stereotype, commonly known as the "beautiful-is-good" stereotype, is the tendency to assume that physically attractive individuals, coinciding with social beauty standards, also possess other desirable personality traits, such as intelligence, social competence, and morality. The target benefits from what has been coined as “pretty privilege”, namely social, economic, and political advantages or benefits. Physical attractiveness can have a significant effect on how people are judged in terms of employment or social opportunities, friendship, sexual behavior, and marriage.

The implicit-association test (IAT) is an assessment intended to detect subconscious associations between mental representations of objects (concepts) in memory. Its best-known application is the assessment of implicit stereotypes held by test subjects, such as associations between particular racial categories and stereotypes about those groups. The test has been applied to a variety of belief associations, such as those involving racial groups, gender, sexuality, age, and religion but also the self-esteem, political views, and predictions of the test taker. The implicit-association test is the subject of significant academic and popular debate regarding its validity, reliability, and usefulness in assessing implicit bias.

The overconfidence effect is a well-established bias in which a person's subjective confidence in their judgments is reliably greater than the objective accuracy of those judgments, especially when confidence is relatively high. Overconfidence is one example of a miscalibration of subjective probabilities. Throughout the research literature, overconfidence has been defined in three distinct ways: (1) overestimation of one's actual performance; (2) overplacement of one's performance relative to others; and (3) overprecision in expressing unwarranted certainty in the accuracy of one's beliefs.

In psychology, a dual process theory provides an account of how thought can arise in two different ways, or as a result of two different processes. Often, the two processes consist of an implicit (automatic), unconscious process and an explicit (controlled), conscious process. Verbalized explicit processes or attitudes and actions may change with persuasion or education; though implicit process or attitudes usually take a long amount of time to change with the forming of new habits. Dual process theories can be found in social, personality, cognitive, and clinical psychology. It has also been linked with economics via prospect theory and behavioral economics, and increasingly in sociology through cultural analysis.

Optimism bias is a cognitive bias that causes someone to believe that they themselves are less likely to experience a negative event. It is also known as delusional optimism, unrealistic optimism or comparative optimism.

Implicit cognition refers to cognitive processes that occur outside conscious awareness or conscious control. This includes domains such as learning, perception, or memory which may influence a person's behavior without their conscious awareness of those influences.

Aversive racism is a social scientific theory proposed by Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio (1986), according to which negative evaluations of racial/ethnic minorities are realized by a persistent avoidance of interaction with other racial and ethnic groups. As opposed to traditional, overt racism, which is characterized by overt hatred for and discrimination against racial/ethnic minorities, aversive racism is characterized by more complex, ambivalent expressions and attitudes nonetheless with prejudicial views towards other races. Aversive racism arises from unconscious personal beliefs taught during childhood. Subtle racist behaviors are usually targeted towards African Americans. Workplace discrimination is one of the best examples of aversive racism. Biased beliefs on how minorities act and think affect how individuals interact with minority members.

In social psychology, illusory superiority is a cognitive bias wherein people overestimate their own qualities and abilities compared to others. Illusory superiority is one of many positive illusions, relating to the self, that are evident in the study of intelligence, the effective performance of tasks and tests, and the possession of desirable personal characteristics and personality traits. Overestimation of abilities compared to an objective measure is known as the overconfidence effect.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Stereotype</span> Generalized but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing

In social psychology, a stereotype is a generalized belief about a particular category of people. It is an expectation that people might have about every person of a particular group. The type of expectation can vary; it can be, for example, an expectation about the group's personality, preferences, appearance or ability. Stereotypes are often overgeneralized, inaccurate, and resistant to new information. A stereotype does not necessarily need to be a negative assumption. They may be positive, neutral, or negative.

Implicit attitudes are evaluations that occur without conscious awareness towards an attitude object or the self. These evaluations are generally either favorable or unfavorable and come about from various influences in the individual experience. The commonly used definition of implicit attitude within cognitive and social psychology comes from Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji's template for definitions of terms related to implicit cognition: "Implicit attitudes are introspectively unidentified traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects". These thoughts, feelings or actions have an influence on behavior that the individual may not be aware of.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Introspection illusion</span> Cognitive bias

The introspection illusion is a cognitive bias in which people wrongly think they have direct insight into the origins of their mental states, while treating others' introspections as unreliable. The illusion has been examined in psychological experiments, and suggested as a basis for biases in how people compare themselves to others. These experiments have been interpreted as suggesting that, rather than offering direct access to the processes underlying mental states, introspection is a process of construction and inference, much as people indirectly infer others' mental states from their behaviour.

An implicit bias or implicit stereotype is the pre-reflective attribution of particular qualities by an individual to a member of some social out group. Recent studies have determined that "implicit bias" towards those of the opposite gender may be even more influential than racial implicit bias.

Implicit bias training programs are designed to help individuals become aware of their implicit biases and equip them with tools and strategies to act objectively, limiting the influence of their implicit biases. Some researchers say implicit biases are learned stereotypes that are automatic, seemingly associative, unintentional, deeply ingrained, universal, and can influence behavior.

Diversity ideology refers to individual beliefs regarding the nature of intergroup relations and how to improve them in culturally diverse societies. A large amount of scientific literature in social psychology studies diversity ideologies as prejudice reduction strategies, most commonly in the context of racial groups and interracial interactions. In research studies on the effects of diversity ideology, social psychologists have either examined endorsement of a diversity ideology as individual difference or used situational priming designs to activate the mindset of a particular diversity ideology. It is consistently shown that diversity ideologies influence how individuals perceive, judge and treat cultural outgroup members. Different diversity ideologies are associated with distinct effects on intergroup relations, such as stereotyping and prejudice, intergroup equality, and intergroup interactions from the perspectives of both majority and minority group members. Beyond intergroup consequences, diversity ideology also has implications on individual outcomes, such as whether people are open to cultural fusion and foreign ideas, which in turn predict creativity.

References

Notes

  1. Pelham, Brett; Blanton, Hart (2013) [2007]. Conducting Research in Psychology: measuring the weight of smoke (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning. pp. 11–12. ISBN   978-0-495-59819-0.
  2. Mullen, Brian; Johnson, Craig (1990). "Distinctiveness-based illusory correlations and stereotyping: A meta-analytic integration". British Journal of Social Psychology . 29 (1): 11–28. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8309.1990.tb00883.x.
  3. Stroessner, Steven J.; Plaks, Jason E. (2001). "Illusory Correlation and Stereotype Formation: Tracing the Arc of Research Over a Quarter Century". In Moskowitz, Gordon B. (ed.). Cognitive Social Psychology: The Princeton Symposium on the Legacy and Future of Social Cognition. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 247–259. ISBN   978-0-8058-3414-7.
  4. Peeters, Vivian E. (1983). "The Persistence of Stereotypic Beliefs: a Cognitive View". In Richard P. Bagozzi; Alice M. Tybout (eds.). Advances in Consumer Research. Vol. 10. Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Consumer Research. pp. 454–458.
  5. 1 2 Whitley & Kite 2010
  6. Chapman, Loren J. (1967). "Illusory correlation in observational report". Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior. 6 (1): 151–155. doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(67)80066-5.
  7. Chapman, Loren J.; Chapman, Jean P. (1969). "Illusory Correlation as an Obstacle to the Use of Valid Psychodiagnostic Signs". Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 74 (3): 271–80. doi:10.1037/h0027592. PMID   4896551.
  8. 1 2 3 Hamilton, D; Gifford, R (1976). "Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 12 (4): 392–407. doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(76)80006-6.
  9. Kunda 1999 , pp. 127–130
  10. Plous 1993 , pp. 162–164
  11. 1 2 Plous 1993 , pp. 164–167
  12. Plous 1993 , p. 121
  13. Hilbert, Martin (2012). "Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing can bias human decision making" (PDF). Psychological Bulletin. 138 (2): 211–237. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.432.8763 . doi:10.1037/a0025940. PMID   22122235.
  14. Eder, Andreas B.; Fiedler, Klaus; Hamm-Eder, Silke (2011). "Illusory correlations revisited: The role of pseudocontingencies and working-memory capacity". The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 64 (3): 517–532. doi:10.1080/17470218.2010.509917. PMID   21218370. S2CID   8964205.
  15. Sherman, Jeffrey W.; Kruschke, John K.; Sherman, Steven J.; Percy, Elise J.; Petrocelli, John V.; Conrey, Frederica R. (2009). "Attentional processes in stereotype formation: A common model for category accentuation and illusory correlation" (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 96 (2): 305–323. doi:10.1037/a0013778. PMID   19159134.
  16. Murphy, Robin A.; Schmeer, Stefanie; Vallée-Tourangeau, Frédéric; Mondragón, Esther; Hilton, Denis (2011). "Making the illusory correlation effect appear and then disappear: The effects of increased learning". The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 64 (1): 24–40. doi:10.1080/17470218.2010.493615. PMID   20623441. S2CID   34898086.
  17. Johnston, Kristen E.; Jacobs, Janis E. (2003). "Children's Illusory Correlations: The Role of Attentional Bias in Group Impression Formation". Journal of Cognition and Development. 4 (2): 129–160. doi:10.1207/S15327647JCD0402_01. S2CID   143983682.
  18. Primi, Caterina; Agnoli, Franca (2002). "Children correlate infrequent behaviors with minority groups: a case of illusory correlation". Cognitive Development. 17 (1): 1105–1131. doi:10.1016/S0885-2014(02)00076-X.
  19. Ratliff, Kate A.; Nosek, Brian A. (2010). "Creating distinct implicit and explicit attitudes with an illusory correlation paradigm". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 46 (5): 721–728. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.04.011.
  20. Berndsen, Mariëtte; Spears, Russell; Pligt, Joop; McGarty, Craig (1999). "Determinants of intergroup differentiation in the illusory correlation task". British Journal of Psychology. 90 (2): 201–220. doi:10.1348/000712699161350.

Sources