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Indian hegemony in Bangladesh refers to the perceived dominance or influence exerted by India over Bangladesh in political, economic, military, and cultural spheres since Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan in 1971.[1][2][3]
The concept is often debated in the context of bilateral relations, with proponents citing India's role in the 1971 Liberation War and subsequent aid, trade dependencies, and security cooperation as evidence of asymmetric power dynamics. Critics, including some Bangladeshi nationalists, argue it manifests in areas like border disputes, water-sharing agreements (e.g., the Ganges Water Treaty), and political interventions, while Indian perspectives emphasize mutual benefits and regional stability under frameworks like SAARC and BIMSTEC. The notion remains a contentious issue in Bangladeshi discourse, influencing domestic politics and foreign policy.[4][5]
Background
India played a pivotal role in Bangladesh's independence by providing direct military intervention and diplomatic support during the 1971 Liberation War against Pakistan. The Indian Army's involvement, culminating in the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dhaka on December 16, 1971, was instrumental in the birth of Bangladesh, fostering initial goodwill and close ties under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League government.[6] Post-independence relations remained friendly in the early 1970s, marked by the 1972 Indo-Bangla Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace, which committed both nations to non-aggression and mutual assistance.[7]
However, tensions emerged after the 1975 assassination of Mujibur Rahman and the subsequent rise of military rule under Ziaur Rahman (1975–1981) and later Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1982–1990).[8] These regimes pursued policies of economic diversification and non-alignment, straining ties with India amid unresolved issues such as border enclaves, smuggling, and migration disputes.[9]
Key flashpoints included chronic disagreements over river water sharing, particularly the Ganges (Padma) waters, leading to droughts in Bangladesh and the contentious 1996 Ganges Water Treaty under Bangladeshi prime ministerSheikh Hasina.[10] Trade imbalances persisted, with Bangladesh facing a significant deficit due to India's dominance in exports like cotton and machinery, while non-tariff barriers hindered Bangladeshi goods.[11] Border skirmishes and killings by India's Border Security Force (BSF) further fueled resentment, with human rights groups documenting hundreds of civilian deaths annually in the 2000s and 2010s.[12]
The perception of Indian hegemony gained traction among some Bangladeshi political parties — particularly the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami — intellectuals, and citizens, who accused India of meddling in elections, supporting favored regimes (e.g., post-2009 Awami League governments), and leveraging security concerns like militancy to exert influence.[13] This view intensified during periods of political upheaval, such as the 1/11 caretaker government era (2007–2008) and the 2024 student-led uprising that ousted Hasina, amid allegations of Indian backing for her administration.[14] Indian observers, conversely, highlight mutual benefits through frameworks like SAARC, BIMSTEC, and joint counter-terrorism efforts, framing the relationship as one of strategic partnership rather than dominance.[15]
Political dominance and internal interference
Analysts argue India exerts direct and indirect influence on Bangladesh's internal matters, harming national sovereignty.[16]
Allegations of covert attacks and intelligence interference
Long-standing accusations claim Indian security agencies conducted assassinations, attacks, and disappearances against anti-India or nationalist figures, including former president Ziaur Rahman, BNP leaders Ilias Ali, and Osman Hadi.[17][18][16]Assassination of Ziaur Rahman is often linked to internal military coups but conspiracy theories implicate India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).[19] Similar attacks on anti-hegemonism figures are attributed to Indian espionage.[20]
Ziaur Rahman, Bangladesh's former president and BNP founder, was killed in 1981 during a military coup at Chittagong Circuit House. Conspiracy theories, voiced by BNP leaders like Ruhul Kabir Rizvi, claim RAW orchestrated it due to Zia's independent policies shifting away from Indian influence. Official accounts attribute it to internal army factions, but allegations persist of RAW involvement amid India's concerns over his Islamization efforts.[18]
Disappearance of Ilias Ali and assassination of Osman Hadi
BNP leader Ilias Ali disappeared in 2012, with unverified claims linking his case to Indian intelligence operations against opposition figures.
Violence erupted over the assassination of student leader Osman Hadi in December 2025 in Dhaka, where protesters accused RAW of running a global hit squad against critics of Indian hegemony.[21] Hadi, the spokesperson of Inqilab Moncho, was shot during an election campaign and died in Singapore, fueling anti-India unrest.[20][22][23][24][25]
Allegations of Indian involvement in Bangladesh Rifles revolt
The 2009 Bangladesh Rifles revolt and killings at BDR headquarters in Pilkhana, Dhaka drew claims of Indian involvement from political parties, victims' families, and media.[26][27][28][29] An interim government commission reported 921 Indians entered Bangladesh during the event, with 67 unaccounted for; it alleged India aimed to weaken Bangladesh Army.[30][31]
Victims' families accused then-prime ministerSheikh Hasina of orchestrating it for Indian interests and power retention.[32][33][28] BNP leaders blamed India directly for weakening the military. India denied involvement, with diplomat Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty calling it against their interests and suggesting BNP-Jamaat support instead.[34][35]
National Independent Inquiry Commission on BDR mutiny submitting the reinvestigated report to Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus
Following the fall of the Hasina government in September 2024, several speakers at a discussion in Dhaka publicly accused former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the Indian government of involvement in the mutiny, calling for a renewed investigation and the restoration of the force's original name, BDR.[36] Some participants, including retired military officers and relatives of victims, alleged broader political motives and external influence behind the incident.[37]
On 15 December 2024, the Ministry of Home Affairs informed the High Court that it would not form a commission to re-investigate the massacre, prompting public criticism.[38] Two days later, leaders of the Students Against Discrimination announced plans for protests if a commission was not created. On 23 December, the ministry established a seven-member commission to conduct a fresh inquiry.[39][40]
On 30 November 2025, the commission released its findings, concluding that the massacre was a planned operation rather than a spontaneous mutiny.[41][42] The report alleged involvement of senior Awami League figures, claiming that Sheikh Fazle Noor Taposh acted as a key coordinator and that then–Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina approved the operation.[43] It also cited evidence destruction and missing key individuals during the original probe. That same day, the commission’s chief stated that 921 Indian nationals had entered Bangladesh around the time of the incident, with 67 remaining unaccounted for.[44] The report suggested that the killings were planned with the involvement of external and domestic actors. According to the 360-page report submitted to authorities, a high-level meeting at the office of Fazle Noor Taposh, with the presence of other senior figures from Awami League, such as Sheikh Selim, Sohel Taj, and a group of 24 foreign agents, finalized the plan for the massacre. Awami League leaders Jahangir Kabir Nanak, Mirza Azam, Harun Ur Rashid (also known as Leather Liton), and Torab Ali were present at several meetings to implement the plan. Colonel Shams Chowdhury, Commanding Officer of 44 Rifles Battalion, was aware of these plans and Taposh was responsible for obtaining approval for the decision from the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The report claims that BDR personnel were first mobilized via covert recruitment shortly after the 2008 general election, then indoctrinated and financially incentivized to carry out the violence at Pilkhana.
The report also claimed that, after the mutiny began, Captain Tanvir Haider Noor informed his wife about the presence of Indian National Security Guard members in Pilkhana. His wife, Tasnuva Maha, said that she heard three men dressed in BDR uniforms talking with each other in Hindi. Multiple witnesses reported hearing conversations in Hindi, Western Bengali dialect, and unknown languages in Pilkhana that day. The commission cited various facts in the report, including hearing foreign languages, the escape of outsiders, foreign numbers in the call list, and Captain Tanvir's last conversation, as evidence of India's involvement.[45]
Asylum for Sheikh Hasina and Awami League leaders
Sheikh Hasina and Awami League leaders received asylum in India post-1975 Mujib assassination (1975–1981) and after the 2024 uprising.[46][47][48] Critics see repeated refuge as evidence of Indian influence, enabling political organization from India. Supporters view it as humanitarian, tied to 1971 support.[citation needed]
After the 15 August 1975, military coup killed Mujibur Rahman and most of Hasina's family, she fled from West Germany to India, where Prime Minister Indira Gandhi provided shelter, security, and housing in Delhi's Pandara Road and Lajpat Nagar under assumed identities.[49] Hasina, her husband MA Wazed Miah, sister Sheikh Rehana, and children lived there incognito for six years (1975–1981), allowing her to regroup politically amid Bangladesh's military rule.[citation needed]
Hasina fled to India on 5 August 2024, amid violent protests, marking India's third instance of sheltering her during crises (including brief 1979 refuge).[50][51] She resides in New Delhi, hosting Awami League exiles, which enables continued political organization despite Bangladesh's demands for extradition.[citation needed]
Critics, including BNP and nationalists, view the repeated asylum as proof of Indian hegemony, allowing Hasina to plot comebacks and influence Dhaka remotely. Supporters frame it as humanitarian aid, rooted in India's 1971 Liberation War support and familial ties from Mujib's era.[52][53][54]
Influencing preferred parties to power
Critics and opposition groups in Bangladesh allege that India has supported governments aligned with its geopolitical interests, particularly the Awami League (AL) under Sheikh Hasina, across multiple national elections since 2008, including those held in 2008, 2014, 2018, and 2024.[55][56] These allegations—raised by parties such as the BNP, nationalist groups, and political analysts—include claims of diplomatic backing, intelligence involvement, and policy concessions such as transit facilities in exchange for political alignment.[57] Indian authorities have consistently denied any interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs, maintaining that bilateral relations are based on mutual sovereignty and non-intervention.[58][59]
India provided refuge to Hasina after the 1975 Mujib assassination and supported her 1981 return, viewing AL as a bulwark against Islamist or so-called Pakistan-aligned forces. In 2008, New Delhi backed Hasina's landslide win amid caretaker government controversies, seeing it as stabilizing bilateral ties post-BNP rule.[60] This pattern continued, with India shielding AL from international scrutiny during BNP boycotts.[citation needed]
The 2014 polls, boycotted by BNP, saw India endorse Hasina despite violence and rigging claims, prioritizing her anti-China, anti-Pakistan stance over democratic concerns. Similarly in 2018, amid opposition arrests, Indian diplomats met AL leaders, allegedly coordinating to counter BNP-Jamaat alliances. Transit deals and border fencing concessions followed, interpreted as rewards for alignment.[citation needed]
India's high-level visits and statements ahead of the January 2024 vote fueled "India Out" protests, accusing RAW of rigging via election officials and suppressing BNP. Post-election charges against commissioners highlighted foreign influence claims, with India resisting US calls for fairness. Hasina's ouster in August 2024 uprising intensified narratives of Indian orchestration of her prior dominance.[61] Critics cite diplomatic pressure, intelligence sharing (e.g., RAW-DGFI ties), economic levers like Teesta delays and transit fees, and media narratives portraying BNP as extremist. #IndiaOut highlighted Indian apparel imports and Adani deals as economic coercion. Allegations extend to covert election funding and voter suppression favoring AL.[citation needed]
India views Bangladesh as a buffer against China-Pakistan encirclement, backing AL to secure transit to northeast states and counter Islamist militancy. This contrasts with BNP's perceived Pakistan tilt, making AL the preferred partner despite human rights issues.[citation needed][original research?] New Delhi consistently denies meddling, framing support as mutual security cooperation and economic partnership, respecting Dhaka's sovereign choices. Officials stress non-interference while celebrating ties with elected governments.[62]
Defending Awami League government from the international pressure
India allegedly shielded Awami League from Western criticism on elections and rights, using stability arguments for Northeast security. It employs 'sticks and carrots' on strategic issues like discouraging Chinese investments.[citation needed][opinion]
Influence on foreign policy
India significantly shapes Bangladesh's foreign policy, often prioritizing its own strategic interests, such as curbing Dhaka's ties with China and Pakistan.[63] New Delhi views closer Bangladesh-China-Pakistan engagements as a potential encirclement threat and pressures Dhaka to limit them.[64][65][66][67]
India expresses concerns over Bangladesh's diplomatic meetings with China and Pakistan, like those in Kunming, fearing a South Asian axis excluding it. Despite Bangladesh's non-aligned assurances, New Delhi remains wary amid shifting regional geopolitics. Recent analyses highlight India's fears of Islamist influences and enhanced Beijing-Islamabad sway in Dhaka.[64][65][66][67]
Bangladesh maintains balanced relations but faces Indian apprehensions that influence its policy choices toward neighbors. This dynamic persists despite Dhaka's efforts to diversify partnerships without joining any anti-India bloc.[68][65]
Economic dominance
India exerts significant economic influence over Bangladesh through trade imbalances, transit agreements, tied loans, and strategic pressures, often perceived as one-sided and exploitative.[citation needed]
Unilateral trade imbalance
Bangladesh faces a massive and growing trade deficit with India, importing far more in essentials like textiles, machinery, and yarn while exporting limited goods such as garments and jute. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including India's Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) certifications, complex documentation, and border delays, severely restrict Bangladeshi exports, despite SAFTA tariff reductions. This asymmetry, with deficits exceeding $10 billion annually in recent years, undermines Bangladesh's economic diversification and reinforces India's market dominance.[69][citation needed]
Transit issues
Bangladesh provides India transit facilities through its territory to connect northeastern states, formalized in 2015 protocols, but critics argue it yields minimal revenue while imposing heavy costs. Infrastructure strain on roads and rails requires Bangladesh-funded maintenance, security, and lost economic opportunities from reserved routes, without fair tolls or reciprocity.[70] This arrangement prioritizes India's connectivity needs over Bangladesh's, exemplifying unequal bilateral gains.[citation needed]
Lines of credit and loan conditions
India offers lines of credit (LoCs) at low interest for infrastructure projects, but mandates 65-75% procurement from Indian companies, sidelining local firms and channeling funds back to India's economy. Over $8 billion in LoCs since 2016 have funded bridges, power plants, and rail lines, yet tied terms limit competition and foster dependency. Critics view this as neocolonial financing that boosts Indian exports while constraining Bangladesh's industrial growth.[71][72]
Discouraging Chinese investments
India pressures Bangladesh to limit Chinese involvement in strategic projects like deep-sea ports (e.g., Payra), power plants, and rail corridors, citing security concerns over China's regional expansion. In response, India counters with its LoCs as alternatives, effectively blocking Beijing while securing Indian contracts. This "sticks and carrots" tactic aligns Bangladesh's choices with New Delhi's interests, evident in scaled-back Chinese bids for projects worth billions.[73][74]
Water resources and environmental dominance
India unilaterally diverts shared rivers, impacting Bangladesh's agriculture and ecology.[citation needed]
The Teesta water-sharing agreement remains unresolved since negotiations began in 2011, with India refusing to finalize terms despite Bangladesh's dependence on the river for 7,000 square km of irrigation in the north.[75] Upstream dams like Gajoldoba barrage in India reduce dry-season flows by up to 80%, causing water shortages that devastate rice production and exacerbate droughts in Rangpur and northern districts.[76] Domestic politics in India, particularly opposition from West Bengal, block progress, leaving Bangladesh vulnerable while India prioritizes its water needs.[77][78]
Farakka Barrage
The Farakka Barrage, operational since 1975 on the Ganges, diverts water to the Hooghly River, drastically reducing downstream flows into Bangladesh during lean months.[79] This has increased salinity intrusion in southwestern regions, rendering over 100,000 hectares of farmland unproductive and threatening the Sundarbans mangrove ecosystem, home to the Bengal tiger and vital for coastal protection. Long-term impacts include declining fish stocks, shrimp farming losses, and groundwater depletion, costing Bangladesh billions in economic damages annually.[80]
Cultural and intellectual dominance
Bollywood films, Indian TV channels, and OTT platforms like Hotstar dominate Bangladeshi households via satellite, marginalizing local cinema, music, and Dhallywood productions. Hindi and dubbed content promote Indian narratives, eroding Bangla linguistic pride and cultural identity among youth. Critics label this "cultural aggression," as it overshadows indigenous arts while some Bangladeshi intellectuals and media allegedly promote pro-India views, shaping public opinion favorably for New Delhi.[81][82]
India's Border Security Force (BSF) has killed over 1,200 Bangladeshis since 2000, including cattle traders and villagers, often during alleged smuggling pursuits, with little accountability or compensation. Incidents like the 2001 Felani killing highlight excessive force, yet joint probes rarely yield justice, straining bilateral trust. Bangladesh protests yield diplomatic notes but no systemic change, seen as India's assertion of border dominance.[83]
Pressure on terrorism suppression
India demands Bangladesh crack down on northeastern insurgents like United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) hiding in border areas, extraditing leaders such as Anup Chetia in 2015 despite local legal hurdles. This involves intelligence sharing and operations that prioritize India's security over Bangladesh's sovereignty, with accusations of RAW involvement in domestic surveillance. Critics argue it forces unilateral cooperation, limiting Bangladesh's independent counter-terror policy.[84][85]
A multi-layered movement fights for sovereignty on water, borders, trade, and politics; key figures include Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani (1976 Farakka Long March). Post-1975 shifts fostered nationalism against perceived dominance.[86]
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