This article needs to be updated.(August 2023) |
Act of Parliament | |
Long title | An Act to make provision about the interception of communications, equipment interference and the acquisition and retention of communications data, bulk personal datasets and other information; to make provision about the treatment of material held as a result of such interception, equipment interference or acquisition or retention; to establish the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and other Judicial Commissioners and make provision about them and other oversight arrangements; to make further provision about investigatory powers and national security; to amend sections 3 and 5 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994; and for connected purposes. |
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Citation | 2016 c. 25 |
Introduced by | |
Territorial extent | England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland |
Dates | |
Royal assent | 29 November 2016 |
Commencement | 29 November 2016 |
Other legislation | |
Amends |
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Status: Current legislation | |
History of passage through Parliament | |
Text of statute as originally enacted | |
Revised text of statute as amended |
The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (c. 25) (nicknamed the Snoopers' Charter) [1] is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom which received royal assent on 29 November 2016. [2] [3] Its different parts came into force on various dates from 30 December 2016. [4] The Act comprehensively sets out and in limited respects expands the electronic surveillance powers of the British intelligence agencies and police. [4] It also claims to improve the safeguards on the exercise of those powers. [5]
The Act was amended by the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act 2024, following a review by Lord Anderson of Ipswich, the person whom originally proposed the Act.
In 2014 the British government asked David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, to review the operation and regulation of investigatory powers available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in particular the interception of communications and communications data, and to recommend change. This report [6] was published in June 2015 and recommended a new law to clarify these powers. [7]
The Draft Investigatory Powers Bill was published in November 2015, with a large number of accompanying documents, and a Joint Committee of the House of Commons and House of Lords was established to scrutinise the draft bill. [8] Some parts of the bill referring to bulk personal datasets came into effect in November 2015, before parliamentary scrutiny began. [9] The Joint Committee published its pre-legislative scrutiny report in March 2016. The Government accepted the vast majority of its 198 recommendations, [10] together with the recommendations of two other parliamentary committees that had scrutinised the draft Bill, and the revised bill was introduced in the House of Commons, [11] where it was subject to debate by Members of Parliament. [12] [13]
In March 2016 the House of Commons passed the Investigatory Powers Bill on its second reading by 281 votes to 15, moving the bill to the committee stage. [14] The Labour Party and Scottish National Party abstained from the vote, while the Liberal Democrats voted against it. [15] [16]
At the committee stage constitutional, [17] technology, [18] and human rights issues were examined. The Labour Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Harriet Harman, said:
The Bill provides a clear and transparent basis for powers already in use by the security and intelligence services, but there need to be further safeguards. Protection for MP communications from unjustified interference is vital, as it is for confidential communications between lawyers and clients, and for journalists’ sources, the Bill must provide tougher safeguards to ensure that the Government cannot abuse its powers to undermine Parliament’s ability to hold the Government to account.
— Harriet Harman, [19]
At this stage, at the insistence of the Labour Party, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation was commissioned to conduct a further review of the operational case for the bulk powers reserved under the Bill to the British intelligence agencies: bulk interception, bulk collection of metadata, bulk equipment interference and the retention and use of bulk datasets. That review was conducted with the help of a small, security-cleared expert team, and together with 60 case studies, was published in August 2016. [20] Like the 2014-15 reports of the PCLOB [21] and National Academy of Sciences [22] in the US, it is a significant information source for the utility of so-called mass surveillance techniques
On 16 November 2016 the House of Lords approved the final version of the Investigatory Powers Bill, leaving only the formality of Royal Assent to be completed before the Bill became law. [23]
On 21 December 2016, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared that the generalised retention of certain types of personal data is unlawful, although little is known as to how this will affect the Investigatory Powers Act at this stage. [24] As of 29 January 2017, many sources have since reported on the Investigatory Powers Act as if it is currently in action. [25] [26] [27] [28] Draft codes of practice laid out by the Home Office in February 2017 did not provide insight on the Government's communications data code of practise, as it was for the Court of Appeal to decide how to apply the December ruling of the ECJ on data retention in member states. [29] It was then reported in late February 2017 that the aspects of the Bill forcing communications service providers to retain data had been "mothballed" due to the ECJ ruling on the "general and indiscriminate" retention of communications data being illegal. [30]
The Act created the role of Investigatory Powers Commissioner to provide independent oversight of the use of investigatory powers by intelligence agencies, police forces and other public authorities. In March 2017 Lord Justice Sir Adrian Fulford, a Court of Appeal judge, was appointed as first Commissioner for a three-year term. His office (IPCO) [45] will have fifteen senior judges as judicial commissioners, a technical advisory panel of scientific experts, and around 50 staff. [46] [47] The Act gives the prime minister the power to appoint the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and other Judicial Commissioners. [48]
In January 2019 the Home Office blocked the appointment of Eric King as head of investigations at IPCO, citing national security grounds. King had previously been director of the Don't Spy On Us coalition, and deputy director of Privacy International for five years. King commented "The problem, at its heart, is that there’s a conflict as to whether my previous work and views are a positive or negative thing. They are both the reason I was hired and the reason my clearance was refused by the Home Office vetting team." [49]
Investigatory Powers Commissioners have been:
List of authorities allowed to access Internet connection records without a warrant: [50] [51] [52]
Does the UK really want the dubious honor of introducing powers deemed too intrusive by all other major democracies, joining the likes of China and Russia in collecting everyone's browsing habits? [53]
—Anne Jellema, head of the World Wide Web Foundation
The draft Bill generated significant public debate about balancing intrusive powers and mass surveillance with the needs of the police and intelligence agencies to gain targeted access to information as part of their investigations. [54] [55] Although the Home Office said the Bill will be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, [56] the content of the draft Bill has raised concerns about the impact on privacy. [57] [58]
Privacy campaigners say the bill clearly lays out the mass surveillance powers that would be at the disposal of the security services, and want it amended so that the surveillance is targeted and based on suspicion and argue that the powers are so sweeping, and the bill's language so general, that not just the security services but also government bodies will be able to analyse the records of millions of people even if they are not under suspicion. [59]
In January 2016 a report published by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament recommended that the bill should focus on the right to privacy. Committee chairman, Conservative MP Dominic Grieve, said: "We have therefore recommended that the new legislation contains an entirely new part dedicated to overarching privacy protections, which should form the backbone of the draft legislation around which the exceptional powers are then built. This will ensure that privacy is an integral part of the legislation rather than an add-on." The committee also recommended that Class bulk personal dataset warrants are removed from the legislation. [60] Dominic Grieve later clarified the extent of these freedoms, "the principle of the right to privacy against the state is maintained except if there is a good and sufficient reason why that should not happen." [61]
Gavin E. L. Hall, a doctoral researcher at the University of Birmingham, argues that public fear of the bill is not justified, writing that there are benefits to formally codifying in law what state security services can and cannot do and that "While it may technically be possible under the bill to impugn individual freedom, John Bull has little to fear." [62]
The Register argued the Act enshrines parallel construction in law and allows the state to lie about the origins of evidence in court, treating it as infallible, and prohibit the defendant from questioning it. [63]
Article 19, a freedom of expression campaign group, criticized the Act as one of the most draconian pieces of surveillance legislation passed worldwide, warning that it "offers a template for authoritarian regimes and seriously undermining the rights of its citizens to privacy and freedom of expression". [64] The Chinese government cited the Snooper's Charter (officially the Draft Communications Data Bill) when defending its own intrusive anti-terrorism legislation. [53]
Recent Wikileaks articles suggest that phone and digital device tracking both direct and indirect (e.g. FM radio blipping via Android exploit) also mentioned in Register posts by "Anonymous Coward" to covertly follow subjects have been used in the past but for operational reasons it is not clear if they are still used. The original poster has since decided to cooperate with the authorities and not comment further publicly on this subject, though the technique was independently rediscovered before the article in question was released.
This section needs to be updated. The reason given is: [2019] EWHC 2057 (Admin).(December 2020) |
In November 2016, a petition demanding the law be repealed gained 100,000 signatures. [65] In December 2016, pornographic media site xHamster redirected UK traffic to the petition. [66] In March 2017, Liberty, a human rights organisation, raised £50,000 via crowd funding towards legal actions against the bill. Silkie Carlo, policy officer at Liberty, said:
The powers we're fighting undermine everything that's core to our freedom and democracy — our right to protest, to express ourselves freely and to a fair trial, our free press, privacy and cybersecurity. But with so much public support behind us, we're hopeful we will be able to persuade our courts to restrain the more authoritarian tendencies of this Government.
— Silkie Carlo, policy officer at Liberty [67]
In April 2018 the High Court of Justice ruled that the Investigatory Powers Act violates EU law. [5] [68] The government had until 1 November 2018 to amend the legislation. [69] On 31 October 2018 The Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018 [70] came into force to address this ruling. These regulations increased the threshold for accessing communications data only for the purposes of serious crime (defined as offences which are capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 12 months or more) and requires that authorities consult an independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner before requesting data. The regulations also included a loophole where rapid approval can be made internally without independent approval but with a three-day expiry and with subsequent review by the independent body. Most debates about the regulations have been about the definition of "serious crime" with many arguing that the threshold should be at three years. [71]
It was revealed in 2021 that two British ISPs were collaborating on a government initiative for the collection of Internet Connection Records. [72] [73]
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, regulating the powers of public bodies to carry out surveillance and investigation, and covering the interception of communications. It was introduced by the Tony Blair Labour government ostensibly to take account of technological change such as the growth of the Internet and strong encryption.
Mass surveillance is the intricate surveillance of an entire or a substantial fraction of a population in order to monitor that group of citizens. The surveillance is often carried out by local and federal governments or governmental organizations, but it may also be carried out by corporations. Depending on each nation's laws and judicial systems, the legality of and the permission required to engage in mass surveillance varies. It is the single most indicative distinguishing trait of totalitarian regimes. It is often distinguished from targeted surveillance.
Data retention defines the policies of persistent data and records management for meeting legal and business data archival requirements. Although sometimes interchangeable, it is not to be confused with the Data Protection Act 1998.
Homeland Security Group is an executive directorate of the UK government Home Office, created in 2007, responsible for leading the work on counter-terrorism in the UK, working closely with the police and security services. The office reports to the Home Secretary, and to the Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism. Its current Director General is Chloe Squires, who is the senior government official responsible for counter-terrorist and organised crime strategy.
Big Brother Watch is a non-party British civil liberties and privacy campaigning organisation. It was launched in 2009 by founding director Alex Deane to campaign against state surveillance and threats to civil liberties. It was founded by Matthew Elliott. Since January 2018, Silkie Carlo is the Director.
The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) is a first-instance tribunal and superior court of record in the United Kingdom. It is primarily an inquisitorial court.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is appointed by the Home Secretary and by the Treasury for a renewable three-year term and tasked with reporting to the Home Secretary and to Parliament on the operation of counter-terrorism law in the UK.
Sir Charles Blandford Farr was a British civil servant, intelligence officer, and diplomat. He was Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Head of the Joint Intelligence Organisation at the Cabinet Office until his death in February 2019. Before that, from 2007 until 2015 Farr was the Director of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) at the United Kingdom's Home Office.
Snooper's Charter may refer to:
The Draft Communications Data Bill was draft legislation proposed by then Home Secretary Theresa May in the United Kingdom which would require Internet service providers and mobile phone companies to maintain records of each user's internet browsing activity, email correspondence, voice calls, internet gaming, and mobile phone messaging services and store the records for 12 months. Retention of email and telephone contact data for this time is already required by the Data Retention Regulations 2014. The anticipated cost was £1.8 billion.
The Telecommunications Act 1984 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The rules for the industry are now contained in the Communications Act 2003.
The use of electronic surveillance by the United Kingdom grew from the development of signal intelligence and pioneering code breaking during World War II. In the post-war period, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was formed and participated in programmes such as the Five Eyes collaboration of English-speaking nations. This focused on intercepting electronic communications, with substantial increases in surveillance capabilities over time. A series of media reports in 2013 revealed bulk collection and surveillance capabilities, including collection and sharing collaborations between GCHQ and the United States' National Security Agency. These were commonly described by the media and civil liberties groups as mass surveillance. Similar capabilities exist in other countries, including western European countries.
Mass surveillance in Australia takes place in several network media, including telephone, internet, and other communications networks, financial systems, vehicle and transit networks, international travel, utilities, and government schemes and services including those asking citizens to report on themselves or other citizens.
The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 was an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, repealed in 2016. It received Royal Assent on 17 July 2014, after being introduced on 14 July 2014. The purpose of the legislation was to allow security services to continue to have access to phone and internet records of individuals following a previous repeal of these rights by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The act was criticised by some Members of Parliament for the speed at which the act was passed through parliament, by some groups as being an infringement of privacy.
The UK encryption ban was a pledge by former British prime minister David Cameron to ban online messaging applications that offer end-to-end encryption, such as WhatsApp, iMessage, and Snapchat, under a nationwide surveillance plan. Cameron's proposal was in response to the services which allow users to communicate without providing the UK security services access to their messages, which in turn could allegedly allow suspected terrorists a safe means of communication.
"Bulk personal datasets" is the UK government's euphemism for datasets containing personally identifiable information on a large number of individuals, as part of mass surveillance in the United Kingdom and on citizens around the world.
Targeted surveillance is a form of surveillance, such as wiretapping, that is directed towards specific persons of interest, and is distinguishable from mass surveillance. Both untargeted and targeted surveillance is routinely accused of treating innocent people as suspects in ways that are unfair, of violating human rights, international treaties and conventions as well as national laws, and of failing to pursue security effectively.
David William Kinloch Anderson, Baron Anderson of Ipswich, is a British barrister and life peer, who was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom between 2011 and 2017. On 8 June 2018 it was announced that he would be introduced to the House of Lords as a cross-bench (non-party) working peer. On the same day he was appointed a Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (KBE), for services to national security and civil liberties, in the Queen's 2018 Birthday Honours.
The Special Envoy on Intelligence and Law Enforcement Data Sharing is a British creation of the diplomatic corps at Cabinet level to report on, and facilitate dialogue between the executive branch of government and technology firms, often global in nature, that provide service in the internet realm.
The Covert Human Intelligence Sources Act 2021 is an act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The act makes provision for the use of undercover law enforcement agents and covert sources and the committing of crimes in the undertaking of their duty. It was also referred to as the "Spy Cops Bill" – a reference to the UK undercover policing relationships scandal.
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