Laboratory Response Network

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The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is a collaborative effort within the US federal government involving the Association of Public Health Laboratories and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Most state public health laboratories participate as reference laboratories (formerly level B/C) of the LRN. These facilities support hundreds of sentinel (formerly level A) laboratories in local hospitals throughout the United States and can provide sophisticated confirmatory diagnosis and typing of biological agents that may be used in a bioterrorist attack or other bio-agent incident. The LRN was established in 1999.

Contents

Levels

The LRN consists of a loose network of government labs at three levels: [1]

Sentinel Laboratories

These laboratories, found in many hospitals and local public health facilities, have the ability to rule out specific bioterrorism threat agents, to handle specimens safely, and to forward specimens to higher-level labs within the network.

Reference Laboratories

These laboratories (more than 100), typically found at state health departments and at military, veterinary, agricultural, and water-testing facilities, can rule on the presence of the various biological threat agents. They can use BSL-3 practices and can often conduct nucleic acid amplification and molecular typing studies.

National Laboratories

These laboratories, including those at CDC and U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), can use BSL-4 practices and serve as the final authority in the evaluation of potential bioterrorism specimens. They provide specialized reagents to lower level laboratories and have the ability to bank specimens, perform serotyping, and detect genetic recombinants and chimeras.

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Biosecurity in the United States is governed by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which is part of the US Department of State. It obtains guidance and advice on specific matters relating to biosecurity from various other government agencies.

Sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance, synonym epidemiological reconnaissance is a literal name of a concept and routine of finding out disease potential on a territory of arrival of major contingent. Russian: санитарно-эпидемиологическая разведка, син. эпидемиологическая разведка. This is a kind of medical reconnaissance, process of information gathering on possible infectious diseases' origin-sources, the ways and factors of the infection transfer and determining all conditions that could have promoted the spread of infestation among army service personnel. In 1939 Academician E.N.Pavlovsky announced his "doctrine of nidality", so called by Soviet biologists. People can acquire zoonoses and insect-borne diseases when they occupy at certain times of the year natural habitat of a certain pathogen. The WHO Expert Committee on Zoonoses listed over 100 such diseases. About natural focality of the diseases is known elsewhere.

The United States Biological Defense Program—in recent years also called the National Biodefense Strategy—refers to the collective effort by all levels of government, along with private enterprise and other stakeholders, in the United States to carry out biodefense activities.

References

  1. Cieslak, Theodore J. and George W. Christopher (2007), "Medical Management of Potential Biological Casualties: A Stepwise Approach", In: Dembek, Zygmunt F. (2007), Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare Archived 2012-08-27 at the Wayback Machine , (Series: Textbooks of Military Medicine), Washington, DC: The Borden Institute, pg 457.

See also