Leon Petrosjan | |
---|---|
![]() Leon Petrosjan | |
Born | |
Nationality | Russia |
Alma mater | St. Petersburg University |
Awards | Order of Friendship |
Scientific career | |
Fields | Game theory |
Thesis | On a class of Pursuit Games (1965) |
Doctoral advisor | Nikolai Nikolaevich Vorobiev [1] |
Leon Petrosjan (Russian : Леон Аганесович Петросян) (born December 18, 1940) is a professor of Applied Mathematics and the Head of the Department of Mathematical Game theory and Statistical Decision Theory at the St. Petersburg University, Russia. [2]
The research interests of Leon Petrosjan lie mostly in the fields of operations research, game theory, differential games, and control theory.
In particular, he contributed to the study of the following topics:
Leon Petrosjan is the Editor of the journal International Game Theory Review (W.S. Pbl., Singapore, London); [3] the Editor of the international periodical Game Theory and Applications (Nova sci. Pbl. N.Y., USA); [4] the Chief Editor of the Vestnik Peterburgskogo Universiteta, seria 10: Applied Mathematics, Control, Informatics; [5] and the Chief Editor of the journal Mathematical Game Theory and Applications (Karelian Research Centre of RAS). [6]
Two special issues of the International Game Theory Review were dedicated to Prof. Leon A. Petrosyan — one of the Founding Editors of the Review — on his 70th and 75th birthdays (Vol. 12, No. 4, 2010 and Vol. 18, No. 2, 2016).
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions among rational agents. It has applications in all fields of social science, as well as in logic, systems science and computer science. Originally, it addressed two-person zero-sum games, in which each participant's gains or losses are exactly balanced by those of other participants. In the 21st century, game theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations; it is now an umbrella term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals, as well as computers.
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium, named after the mathematician John Nash, is the most common way to define the solution of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players. In a Nash equilibrium, each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no one has anything to gain by changing only one's own strategy. The principle of Nash equilibrium dates back to the time of Cournot, who in 1838 applied it to competing firms choosing outputs.
John Forbes Nash, Jr. was an American mathematician who made fundamental contributions to game theory, real algebraic geometry, differential geometry, and partial differential equations. Nash and fellow game theorists John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten were awarded the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics. In 2015, he and Louis Nirenberg were awarded the Abel Prize for their contributions to the field of partial differential equations.
In economics, dynamic inconsistency or time inconsistency is a situation in which a decision-maker's preferences change over time in such a way that a preference can become inconsistent at another point in time. This can be thought of as there being many different "selves" within decision makers, with each "self" representing the decision-maker at a different point in time; the inconsistency occurs when not all preferences are aligned.
In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will be played. These predictions are called "solutions", and describe which strategies will be adopted by players and, therefore, the result of the game. The most commonly used solution concepts are equilibrium concepts, most famously Nash equilibrium.
Hobart Peyton Young is an American game theorist and economist known for his contributions to evolutionary game theory and its application to the study of institutional and technological change, as well as the theory of learning in games. He is currently centennial professor at the London School of Economics, James Meade Professor of Economics Emeritus at the University of Oxford, professorial fellow at Nuffield College Oxford, and research principal at the Office of Financial Research at the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. Informally, this means that at any point in the game, the players' behavior from that point onward should represent a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game, no matter what happened before. Every finite extensive game with perfect recall has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Perfect recall is a term introduced by Harold W. Kuhn in 1953 and "equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves".
Rufus Philip Isaacs was a game theorist especially prominent in the 1950s and 1960s with his work on differential games.
In fully cooperative games players will opt to form coalitions when the value of the payoff is equal to or greater than if they were to work alone. The focus of the game is to find acceptable distributions of the payoff of the grand coalition. Distributions where a player receives less than it could obtain on its own, without cooperating with anyone else, are unacceptable - a condition known as individual rationality. Imputations are distributions that are efficient and are individually rational.
The International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG) is an international non-profit, professional organization for the advancement of the theory of dynamic games.
In game theory, differential games are a group of problems related to the modeling and analysis of conflict in the context of a dynamical system. More specifically, a state variable or variables evolve over time according to a differential equation. Early analyses reflected military interests, considering two actors—the pursuer and the evader—with diametrically opposed goals. More recent analyses have reflected engineering or economic considerations.
Generalized game theory is an extension of game theory incorporating social theory concepts such as norm, value, belief, role, social relationship, and institution. The theory was developed by Tom R. Burns, Anna Gomolinska, and Ewa Roszkowska but has not had great influence beyond these immediate associates. The theory seeks to address certain perceived limitations of game theory by formulating a theory of rules and rule complexes and to develop a more robust approach to socio-psychological and sociological phenomena.
Mathematical economics is the application of mathematical methods to represent theories and analyze problems in economics. Often, these applied methods are beyond simple geometry, and may include differential and integral calculus, difference and differential equations, matrix algebra, mathematical programming, or other computational methods. Proponents of this approach claim that it allows the formulation of theoretical relationships with rigor, generality, and simplicity.
Ehud Kalai is a prominent Israeli American game theorist and mathematical economist known for his contributions to the field of game theory and its interface with economics, social choice, computer science and operations research. He was the James J. O’Connor Distinguished Professor of Decision and Game Sciences at Northwestern University, 1975-2017, and currently is a Professor Emeritus of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences.
Jean-François Mertens was a Belgian game theorist and mathematical economist.
In game theory, Mertens stability is a solution concept used to predict the outcome of a non-cooperative game. A tentative definition of stability was proposed by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-François Mertens for games with finite numbers of players and strategies. Later, Mertens proposed a stronger definition that was elaborated further by Srihari Govindan and Mertens. This solution concept is now called Mertens stability, or just stability.
Mean-field game theory is the study of strategic decision making by small interacting agents in very large populations. It lies at the intersection of game theory with stochastic analysis and control theory. The use of the term "mean field" is inspired by mean-field theory in physics, which considers the behavior of systems of large numbers of particles where individual particles have negligible impacts upon the system. In other words, each agent acts according to his minimization or maximization problem taking into account other agents’ decisions and because their population is large we can assume the number of agents goes to infinity and a representative agent exists.
Ferenc Forgó (born 16 April 1942 in Pécs) is a Hungarian economist and mathematician. He is a Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and professor emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. His main research interests have been mathematical programming and game theory.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)