Task Force Hudelson
On 25 December 1944 VI Corps ordered the division's Combat Command R, commanded by Colonel Daniel Hudelson, to assemble a regimental-sized task force (TF Hudelson), to establish defensive positions along a 10-mile section of the Seventh Army line linking XV and VI Corps. It was located in the rugged Vosges Mountains in the area of Bannstein in France, southeast of Saarbrücken. The balance of the division was placed in Corps Reserve to protect against a Saar Valley penetration by the Germans. Additionally, it was ordered to be prepared to move to the vicinity of Phalsbourg as a counter-attacking force to stop and prevent a break-through in the XV Corps area.
TF Hudelson consisted of the division's 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion, the 94th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Company A of the 125th Armored Engineer Battalion. TF Hudelson was further reinforced by two VI Corps units, the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 1st Battalion, 540th Combat Engineers. Just before midnight on New Year's Eve 1944, the German Army Group G launched Operation Nordwind, the last major German counter-offensive of the war. The advancing German units were from the XC and LXXXIX Corps, attacking through the Low Vosges. TF Hudleson held only a thin line of strong points and screens. During the night and day of 1 January 1945, TF Hudelson found itself engaged by elements of five enemy divisions, the 256th, 257th, 361st and 559th Volksgrenadier. Just after midnight on the 1st, the 62nd Armored Infantry reported "enemy attack across the entire front of our battalion zone. The main effort by enemy being made on battalion left flank in the sector of C Co, by estimated 2000 Infantry supported by five (5) Mark IV tanks". [3] The troops of TF Hudelson took the brunt of the German advance which had penetrated to Bannstein by day-break. The Task Force was soon overrun or bypassed by the German divisions but it managed to delay and slow the German advance until substantial reinforcements could arrive and stem the German advance. By the fourth day of the German counter-offensive it had advanced 10 miles. With pressure building during the first day of the attack, aerial observation reported a strong regimental size element moving towards Bannstein. Reinforcements were sent to Baerenthal to reinforce the VI Corps left flank and the 14th Armored Division was ordered to establish blocking positions. On 2 January, the 45th Division along with the attached Task Force, occupied positions to block any further penetration by the Germans. This allowed for the relief of Task Force Hudelson and its return to division control.
The major fighting between 1 and 8 January occurred in the Vosges Mountains and two combat commands of the division were in almost continuous action against the German thrusts. With the failure of his attack in the Vosges, the enemy attempted to break through to Hagenau and threaten Strasbourg and the Saverne Gap by attacks at Hatten and Rittershoffen, two small villages located side by side on the Alsatian Plain. However, this, the strongest attack of Operation Nordwind, was halted by the 14th Armored in the fierce defensive Battle of Hatten-Rittershoffen which ranged from 9 to 21 January 1945.
Hatten and Rittershoffen
As the fighting in the VI Corps sector intensified, the Germans committed the 21st Panzer and the 25th Panzer Grenadier Divisions to the attack with a breakthrough to Hagenau. On 9 January, German armor was able to penetrate the center of the VI Corps sector. This caused Brooks, the Corps commander, to commit his final reserve force, the 14th Armored, in an effort to stop the German XXXIX Panzer Corps advance. Ordered to take up positions in the vicinity of Hatten and Rittershoffen, the 14th assumed command and control of units from the 242nd Infantry Regiment and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 315th Infantry Regiment, 79th Infantry Division . With heavy fighting in and around the towns, success was measured in how many buildings were controlled by each side as the Americans controlled the western half of the villages and the Germans the eastern half. On 15 January, the Germans strengthened the forces in both villages with elements of the 20th Parachute Regiment from the 7th Parachute Division, and the 104th Infantry Regiment from the 47th Volksgrenadier Division. As the fighting raged, the 14th Armored found itself increasingly on the defensive with Combat Command A holding Rittershoffen and Combat Command Reserve defending positions in and around Hatten. Combat Command B took up defensive positions behind the Rittershoffen to Leiterswiller road. [4]
The resupply of the division was becoming very difficult due to the constant reorganizing of forces, the evacuation of the wounded and the shrinking perimeter. Gasoline, of which almost 200,000 gallons was consumed in seven days, had to come from near Saverne 35 miles away along icy roads in blackout conditions. Mortar ammunition had run out by 15 January and the Division's G-4 notified the advanced command post that no more might be available for two weeks. Instructions were given for all abandoned German 8 cm mortar ammunition to be picked up and a method was devised by the Division ammunition officer to use this in American 81mm mortars. Artillery ammunition was strictly rationed after 15 January when 6,247 rounds of ammunition were expended out of a total of nearly 40,000 rounds for the entire seven days. In order to alleviate the shortage a convoy of twenty 2 1/2 ton trucks were sent to Marseilles and returned loaded with ammunition dug out of the surf and the landing sites for the invasion of Southern France. Artillery was further handicapped by the shortage of telephone wire. Poor visibility hampered air operations on both sides for most days. On 15 January the first German jet propelled aircraft was seen in the area bombing a battery of the 499th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. [4]
Approximately 39 American and 51 German tanks were destroyed, damaged or abandoned. Recovery of disabled vehicles was very difficult due to the complete lack of cover. Following the battle, the division's G-4 (staff officer) reported to the commanding officer that the division was still short of 62 medium tanks despite having received over 60 replacements during the month of January. The 136th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion's report for the month listed approximately 150 tanks that had been knocked out in combat, repaired and returned to the division's tank battalions. An example of this is seen in the operational reports of the 47th and 48th Tank Battalions. At the height of the fighting the 47th reported that it had a total of 17 operational tanks out of an authorized strength of 50, all were committed to holding its portion of the line. The 48th Tank Battalion report for the same period included the comment that its tank companies were now of approximately squad strength.
The Division sustained battle casualties amounting to 104 killed, 899 wounded and 112 missing. German losses were estimated at in excess of 3,100 in total. The problem of obtaining infantry and armored replacement personnel, especially combat junior officers, was critical. [4]
The Division's 11-day stand at Hatten and Rittershoffen allowed the VI Corps and Seventh Army to withdraw to prepared defensive positions. On 21 January, after the rest of Seventh Army had withdrawn to the south bank of the Moder River, the 14th and its supporting units withdrew from Hatten and Rittershoffen and moved south to join the rest of the army.
Lieutenant-General Jacob L. Devers, commanding general, 6th Army Group later commented that the Battle of Hatten-Rittershoffen "was one of the greatest defensive battles of the war." The 14th Armored Division was nominated for four Presidential Unit Citations for its actions at Hatten-Rittershofen. Of these, two were awarded. Col. Hans von Luck, who commanded the 21st Panzer Division at Hatten-Rittershoffen wrote in his memoirs "Panzer Commander" that the battle ".... was one of the hardest and most costly battles that had ever raged on the western front." These are strong, telling words from a professional German panzer officer who had fought with Rommel's famed Afrika Korps in North Africa, served two tours of duty on the Eastern Front, and led the only armored counter-attack to be attempted against the Allied beachhead in Normandy. A veteran officer who served on the staff of Army Group G during the battle wrote after the war that the American defense of the town against overwhelming odds was "heroic."
After rest, rehabilitation and defensive missions during February and early March, the division returned to the offensive on 15 March 1945; it drove across the Moder River, cracked through the Siegfried Line and by the end of the month, had captured Germersheim on the Rhine River. On Easter Sunday, 1 April, the 14th moved across the Rhine near Worms, protecting the long left flank of the Seventh Army and advanced against moderate to heavy opposition through Lohr, Gemunden, Neustadt, and Hammelburg where, on 6 April, Combat Command B (CCB) liberated Stalag XIII-C and the more famous Oflag XIII-B.
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