Maj. Gen. Platon Vasilevich Chernyaev Col. Aleksandr Ivanovich Danilin Col. Akhmet-Aln Melik-oglu Aliyev Col. Yakov Yakovlevich Verbov Col. Ivan Grigorevich Babak Maj. Gen. Fyodor Ivanovich Gryzlov
Military unit
The 156th Rifle Division was first formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in August 1939 in the Crimea, part of the Odessa Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) that would become official the following month. It was still in the Crimea when the German invasion began in June 1941, as part of 9th Rifle Corps, which was subordinated to 51st Army in August. As one of two regular rifle divisions in the peninsula it was given responsibility for defending the well-fortified Isthmus of Perekop as Axis forces arrived from Ukraine in September.
The 156th began forming on August 16, 1939, at Simferopol, based on a rifle regiment from the 30th Rifle Division. At the outbreak of war it was still in the Crimea, one of two rifle divisions stationed there. At this time its order of battle was as follows:
Kombrig Platon Vasilevich Chernyaev came from command of the 30th Division to take over the new division on the day it began forming. A veteran of World War I and the Russian Civil War, including service in the 1st Cavalry Army, he had briefly studied at the Frunze Academy in 1930-32 and had been acting commander of the 90th Rifle Division in 1937-38. His rank would be modernized to that of major general on June 5, 1940.
Defense of Crimea
At the outset of the German invasion the 156th was part of 9th Rifle Corps, which also contained the 106th Rifle and 32nd Cavalry Divisions,[2] for a strength of about 35,000 personnel, all under command of Lt. Gen. P. I. Batov. The Corps was tasked with defending the Crimea and preparing for amphibious operations elsewhere in the Black Sea.[3] On August 20 the Corps was subordinated to 51st Army.[4] Before the Axis forces arrived General Chernyaev left the division to take up duties in Separate Coastal Army and was replaced Col. Aleksandr Ivanovich Danilin on September 1. Chernyaev would be killed by artillery fire on June 22, 1942 in the Donbas.[5] Danilin had been in command of the 85th Rifle Regiment, 29th Rifle Division, when he was arrested in July 1938 during the Great Purge. He remained under arrest until December 1939, and was reinstated in the Red Army in February 1940. Before taking command of the 156th he was serving as deputy commander of the 74th Rifle Division.
51st Army, with a strength of some 95,000, was placed under command of Col. Gen. F. I. Kuznetsov, who began preparing a defense of the Isthmus of Perekop in mid-August with most of his assigned forces, apart from 9th Corps, still en route. Roughly 30,000 civilians were drafted into building defenses alongside the Red Army troops on the Perekop and the Chongar Peninsula. His deployment was badly affected by faulty intelligence from the STAVKA in General Staff Order No. 001033 of August 18 which stated in part:
According to information from the English military mission, the Germans are preparing sea [amphibious] operations against the Crimea in the most immediate future, while concentrating amphibious assault transports in Bulgarian and Romanian ports. The amphibious assault operation will be supported by airborne forces...
In fact, the Axis had no amphibious capability to speak of, and the German airborne force had been devastated on Crete in May, so it was odd that this information was given credence. It led Kuznetsov to deploy 40,000 troops to defend the coast against landings that were effectively impossible, while a further 25,000 were in the Crimean interior on anti-paratroop duty. Just 30,000 were left to defend the northern approaches, including Danilin's 7,000 at Perekop.[6]
Maj. S. P. Baranov issues orders to officers of 5th Tank Regiment
The Army was not initially assigned any tanks, so Southern Front managed to scrape up ten T-34s and 56 T-37s from repair facilities to form the 5th Tank Regiment under command of Maj. S. P. Baranov, giving Kuznetsov a small mobile reserve. On August 30 the German 11th Army forced a crossing of the Dniepr River at Beryslav in the face of resistance from Southern Front's 9th Army. The attackers broke out on September 9-10, forcing a shattered 9th Army back toward Melitopol and opening the approaches to the Crimea. The 11th Army commander, Gen. E. Ritter von Schobert, directed his LIV Army Corps toward Perekop, without any clear idea of what that force would face; in fact German intelligence had not yet identified 51st Army. Schobert directed the Corps commander, Gen. E. Hansen, to form a forward detachment in an effort to take the Perekop by coup de main, just before Schobert was killed in an air crash on September 12. Gen. E. von Manstein was appointed by Hitler as his successor, but he would not arrive for five days.[7]
On the day of Schobert's death the reconnaissance battalion of Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, under command of SturmbannführerK. Meyer, made a 35km dash from Beryslav toward Perekop, followed by the 22nd Reconnaissance Battalion, and reached the village of Preobrazhenka, 8km north of the ancient Tatar Wall, at around 0600 hours. Meyer's force consisted of motorcycle infantry, a few armored cars, and a battery of towed Pak 36 antitank guns, but no engineers and no other heavy weapons. As it entered the village his lead company took 76mm artillery fire from the armored trainVoykovets as well as small arms fire from the 2nd Battalion of the 361st Rifle Regiment entrenched at the nearby Chervonyi Chaban Sovkhoz. Meyer could see that extensive fortifications continued to the south and as he retreated he reported back to Hansen that "coup against Perekop impossible."[8]
Battle of Perekop
Manstein arrived at Mykolaiv on September 17 and found that Hansen had moved up his 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions toward the Perekop but had not attempted to reduce the Soviet defenses. Furthermore, XXX Army Corps had sealed off the Chonhar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit with Leibstandarte but had also made no effort to push into the Crimea. The 156th had constructed three defensive lines across the Perekop, with the main line making use of the Tatar Wall. In the forward line two battalions of the 361st Regiment held strongpoints, each with an artillery battalion of the 434th Regiment in support. Behind this advanced position was a recently-dug antitank ditch some 2m deep and four lines of tanglefoot-type barbed-wire obstacles. Within the main line of resistance concrete and timber/stone bunkers had been dug for 76mm regimental guns and 45mm antitank guns, plus several dug-in tanks. The Tatar Wall itself was fronted by the old moat, now 12m deep and 33m wide; the Wall sat on 5m-high earthen berm. The surrounding countryside was barren of trees and other vegetation, completely open to Soviet observation. Most concerning for the attackers, however, was the extensive employment of antipersonnel mines, including thousands of wooden PMDs which could not be found by conventional detectors, plus improvised devices including aerial bombs and naval mines. Remote-control buried flamethrowers were also in service. Overall, the German Army had not had to penetrate such a defence to date in the war.[9]
Manstein was keen to avoid a frontal assault and set 11th Army's engineers to find some way to bypass these lines. One possibility was cross the shallow Syvash as had been done by the Red Army in 1920, but due to the tidal conditions and soft bottom at this time German engineers trying to wade across quickly sank to their hips. The use of Sturmbooten was also considered, but rejected. In addition, Kuznetsov was expecting this move and had ordered Danilin to deploy two battalions of the 530th Rifle Regiment on the Litovskii Peninsula where the 1920 crossing had occurred. On the Chonhar the railroad bridge had been destroyed and obstacles plance in the water below, while the Arabat was so long, narrow and exposed that it could only be crossed if unopposed.[10]
Facing the prospect of a frontal assault, Manstein took steps to add combat multipliers to his forces. Limited armor support was available from the StuG III Ausf B assault guns of Sturm Battalion 190. Heavy artillery was in short supply, mostly Czech-built pieces with very limited ammunition. LIV Corps had a total of about 152 guns, and its divisions had been brought up to full strength with infantry replacements. The artillery preparation began at 0500 hours on September 24 with over 2,500 rounds fired, as well as limited air support. At 0730 the assault groups of 46th and 73rd Infantry moved to attack the outer defenses of the 156th; each employed four or five battalions with engineers, 20mm antiaircraft guns, Panzerjägers, and StuGs in support. The 213th Infantry Regiment of 73rd Infantry struck the 2nd Battalion of the 361st, which was led by Cpt. E. K. Ivashin. The German engineers led the attack, breaching the obstacle belt and creating a bridgehead at the cost of heavy losses. Using the cover of smoke grenades two battalions closed in on the Sovkhoz strongpoint, leading to close combat with flamethrowers and demolition charges used to destroy bunkers. Gradually the 2nd Battalion was wiped out piece by piece, with the strongpoint overrun after being bombed by Ju 88s. The attack cost the German regiment 770 casualties, including four company commanders.[11]
To the east the 1st Battalion of the 361st had held the 46th Infantry to minor gains and cost it 329 killed and wounded. Manstein had directed the 22nd Infantry Division and Leibstandarte to make diversionary actions at Chonhar and the Syvash, but Kuznetsov disregarded them. Correctly convinced that the true attack was being made at the Perekop he ordered the 106th Division to send its 442nd Rifle Regiment to replace the 156th's losses.[12]
The Tatar Wall
The attack resumed at dawn on September 25, as the 46th and 73rd Divisions mopped up the advance battalions of the 361st Regiment, and continued to suffer heavy casualties from Soviet artillery and machine gun fire on the flat terrain. They were now nearing the main defense line at the Tatar Wall, and Danilin decided to preempt this with an attack by his reserve 530th Rifle Regiment and 5th Tank Regiment. Major Baranov decided to commit only his light tanks, holding back his T-34s, and lost eight of these light vehicles to Panzerjäger fire. The counterattack was a failure, and while German casualties for the day were 322, the 156th had now lost about a third of its infantry.[13]
The assault on the Tatar Wall began on the morning of September 26 with a massive artillery preparation which expended most of the remaining large calibre ammunition, as well as dive bombing from Ju 87s. While the 46th and 73rd Infantry were both exhausted by two days of intense combat the 156th was also in poor shape. The main defense of the Wall fell on the 3rd Battalion of the 361st. Manstein provided reinforcements of engineers and artillery from Leibstandarte. Under cover of smoke and heavy weapons fire assault squads arrived at the ditch around 0900 hours and used boards to reach the top of the opposite side, which was covered with barbed wire. Riflemen of the 361st threw grenades from their trenches into the ditch, causing heavy casualties among the engineers; however, intense supporting fire kept their heads down and the assault troops gradually fought their way to the top. Despite spirited resistance, by 1030 the defense of the 3rd Battalion was collapsing, and soon broke completely west of Fort Perekop. German storm groups pushed through the gap, overran mortar and antitank positions, and reached as far as Armiansk where they began house-to-house fighting with remnants of the 156th which were dug in at a brick factory.[14]
By 1100 hours the two German divisions were over the Wall in strength. Kuznetsov now committed Group Batov of three rifle regiments to counterattack, and despite a lack of artillery support, forced the 46th Infantry back to the Wall, while the 73rd was forced out of Armiansk. At this point General Hansen replied with a battlegroup of 50th Infantry Division, recently arrived from Odesa. Along with timely air support this tipped the fighting in German favor. By dusk all of Armiansk was back in their hands, and while the eastern part of the Wall was still held by elements of the 156th, Kuznetsov had no further reserves and little to prevent Hansen from advancing on the reserve line at Ishun.[15]
The STAVKA had expected Kuznetsov to hold the Tatar Wall far longer, if not indefinitely, and ordered him to continue counterattacking. Group Batov retook most of Armiansk early on September 27, forcing the 73rd Infantry back to the brick factory where it held on the rest of the day. Meanwhile, German engineers, under costly artillery fire, were building a 16-tonne wooden bridge over the western part of the Tatar Ditch, allowing several StuGs to cross. These, in support of 50th Infantry and with Ju 87s overhead, retook most of Armiansk. Batov made a further effort at dawn the next day with Baranov's T-34s, some of which reached the Wall, while the riflemen again occupied the town. But Group Batov had now shot its bolt and late in the evening Armiansk changed hands yet again. Kuznetsov now pleaded for permission to pull back to Ishun, and while the STAVKA had grave, and justified, doubts about his leadership abilities it authorized the withdrawal, which was covered by Baranov's tankers over the next few days, with only one vehicle lost. While LIV Corps had taken considerable casualties, especially among its junior officers, and had a good deal of equipment destroyed, it claimed 10,019 prisoners taken, along with 32 tanks and 68 artillery pieces. As most of these were from the 156th, the division had been largely destroyed in the fighting.[16]
Battle of Ishun
51st Army now gained a reprieve as Manstein was forced to react to a crisis west of Melitopol. The STAVKA was also forced to react to the situation in the Crimea by abandoning Odesa, which it had been successfully holding. Kuznetsov soon received the 157th Rifle Division at Sevastopol, and by mid-October the Separate Coastal Army had been delivered by the Black Sea Fleet almost intact. Kuznetsov would need these forces to hold at Ishun; his Army still had some 50,000 personnel, but after deducting forces covering Chonhar and the Syvash only 15,000-20,000 were available, many being militiamen of 1st and 2nd Crimean Divisions. German reconnaissance was learning that the position at Ishun was nearly as formidable as that at the Perekop. The small town had three large salt lakes and the Black Sea on its flanks, leaving just three potential routes to the south, the widest of which, along the rail line, spanned just 1,300m. The landscape was equally barren and flat, as well as being marshy. This sector was assigned to what remained of the 361st Regiment, a battalion of 172nd Rifle Division, and a pair of naval infantry battalions. The remainder of the 156th was positioned between Lake Staroe and Lake Krasnoe, anchored on a stongpoint built in and around a bromide factory. The 106th and 271st Rifle Divisions held between Lake Krasnoe and the Syvash, as Kuznetsov continued to fear a crossing operation on this flank. Baranov still had nine T-34s operational, but artillery support was much reduced, consisting mostly of older 76mm guns. The Voykovets would soon be joined by the Smyert fashizmu armored train.[17]
References
Citations
↑ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 77
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