Airstrike unintentionally kills local official Jaber al-Shabwani
JSOC operations in Yemen halted until 2011
Casualties
3–4 killed, including Shabwani 1–2 injured
On 24 May 2010, a Harrier jump jet under the direction of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a United States special forces unit, launched an airstrike on a suspected meeting between members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the desert of Wadi Abida. The strike hit two vehicles and killed three to four people, including Jaber al-Shabwani, the deputy-governor of Marib Governorate in Yemen, along with injuring one or two others. Shabwani, a respected, pro-government and anti-AQAP local leader, had been attending the meeting in order to persuade locals militants to leave the group.
The strike had come as part of JSOC's covert military campaign against AQAP which began in 2009 with approval from the Yemeni government. Pressure to deliver results against the group were increased after a recent video release from AQAP-linked cleric Anwar al-Awlaki earlier in the month. Yemeni intelligence services, whom the US military was relying on for ground info instead of their American counterparts, informed JSOC of an imminent meeting of AQAP members which was set to take place in Marib.
Seeking revenge, enraged tribesmen began attacking state targets and infrastructure in Marib for several days, including the Marib–Ras Isa oil pipeline. President Ali Abdullah Saleh compensated Shabwani's father and tribal leader Ali al-Shabwani and announced an inquiry into the strike, though the government has been silent ever since. The Shabwani tribe restarted attacks on the pipeline and other energy infrastructure during the Yemeni revolution and continued through the next several years, costing the government an estimated $1 to $4 billion.
The killing of Shabwani tarnished the reputation of the Yemeni government in Marib, and gave AQAP an easier opening to the local tribes. Frustrated with JSOC's performance, the US government suspended the military campaign in Yemen after the strike, reinstating it a year later. US military leaders later suspected that the Yemeni government had intentionally facilitated the killing of Shabwani through faulty intelligence in order to eliminate a political enemy of Saleh's.
On 17 December 2009, the US began a clandestine military campaign in collaboration with the Yemeni government against AQAP. The campaign, led by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), involved targeted strikes by cruise missiles launched from Navy submarines as well as airstrikes by Harrier jump jets from the Marine Corps, all publicly claimed by the Yemeni Armed Forces as part of a secret agreement with the local government.[1] JSOC did not have an extensive human intelligence network in the country to verify targets, instead relying on Yemeni ground intelligence to feed them information.[2]
After a meeting between JSOC chief William H. McRaven and Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh on 2 January 2010, US forces would thereon incorporate fixed-wing aircraft and precision-guided munitions for military operations instead of cruise missile strikes, which produced significant civilian casualties.[3] After December, the next US strike took place on 14 March 2010 in Abyan Governorate. It proved more successful than previous operations, killing two militants including AQAP commander Jamil al-Anbari.[4][5]
Jaber al-Shabwani
Jaber al-Shabwani (born 1979) was an influential figure from the Shabwani sub-tribe, part of the larger Abidah tribe, and son to tribal leader Ali al-Shabwani.[6] The Shabwani family had historically collaborated with President Saleh, and fought in support of his regime during the Yemeni civil war of 1994.[2] Jaber received a bachelor's degree from the Faculty of Commerce and Economics at Sanaa University before founding and managing a local oil contracting company. He was also active in politics, serving as the head of the ruling-General People's Congress branch in his local district and being elected to the provincial council of Marib Governorate in 2006.[7] By 2010, he had been appointed the secretary-general of the council as well as the deputy-governor of Marib.[8]
Jaber was a distant cousin of Ayad al-Shabwani, a local commander of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Marib.[4] Ayad had been targeted by two US-supported Yemeni air raids in January, but survived both encounters. Family members and local tribal leaders maintained that Jaber was not a member or supporter of AQAP despite his connections.[2] In fact, the deputy-governor was a staunch ally for the government against AQAP, and dedicated much of his time towards mediation and expelling AQAP from Marib.[9] Numerous Yemeni officials retain relatives linked to AQAP, giving them a pathway to contact the group for mediation purposes.[10]
Prelude
On 22 May 2010, a 45-minute video of Yemeni-American jihadist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki was published by AQAP's media wing al-Malahem, in which he advocated for the killing of Americans. Analysts saw the release as a significant propaganda victory for AQAP, underscoring Awlaki's rising prowess in Islamist propaganda on a level comparable to Osama bin Laden, as well as the US government's lack of success in tracking down and assassinating him in Yemen, which it had decided to do after finding connections between him and the Fort Hood shooting and attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 the previous year.[11][4]
White House press secretary Robert Gibbs publicly responded to the video release on CBS talk show Face the Nation, highlighting the Obama administration's continued resolve in hunting down Awlaki.[11] Internally, US agencies including JSOC found themselves under more pressure to pinpoint and eliminate Awlaki. American intelligence managed to acquire a radio signal from a walkie-talkie linked to the cleric in Marib.[10] Yemeni intelligence delivered a precise report to the US military detailing an AQAP gathering set to take place in Marib.[2]
On 24 May 2010, Shabwani arranged a meeting with a fellow Abidah tribesman from the Hutaik sub-tribe, Mohammed Said bin Jameel, also known by the last name Jaradan.[13][14] The deputy-governor had been conducting informal mediations with local militants to convince them to leave AQAP.[2][15] The meeting with Jaradan was focused on securing the surrender of the man's brother, Ali bin Said bin Jameel, who was believed to be AQAP's regional emir in Marib.[13] Several AQAP members were set to participate in the meeting, including Shabwani's cousin, Ayad.[16]
The two men met with a small entourage of bodyguards later in the day at a remote area in the desert of Wadi Abida, Marib.[17][13] The meeting point was reportedly near an orange grove belonging to Ayad.[16] At around 8:00p.m. AST, minutes after they had first arrived, a Harrier jet under the command of JSOC[18] launched an airstrike on both of their vehicles.[13][16] Contradictory reports state that three[13][16] or four[19][15][4] people were killed in the strike, including Shabwani and two bodyguards accompanying him. Some sources describe the death of Shabwani's uncle Fahd,[4] though others claim that he was among the two injured in the strike, who were flown to Egypt for medical treatment.[16] JSOC reportedly targeted the vehicle convoy as it had emanated the walkie-talkie signal attributed to Awlaki.[10] Jaradan survived the airstrike unharmed, and arrived at his native village the next day.[13]
News regarding the airstrike, the death of Shabwani, and the responsibility of the US, spread throughout the region within hours.[13][20] The Abida tribe saw the airstrike as an intentional assassination against a prominent tribal leader of theirs, while the Shabwani sub-tribe was particularly infuriated as it was the third recent attack against one of their members.[13][6] The Supreme Security Committee, a body of top Yemeni security officials, released a statement mourning the death of Shabwani, but did not specify whether it was a Yemeni or American airstrike. A US official asked about their country's role directed queries to Yemen.[15]
As a response, the Abida and Shabwani tribes began targeting local infrastructure, government institutions and military facilities in Marib.[13][6] A section of the critical Marib–Ras Isa oil pipeline was bombed on 25 May[21] and again on 27 May, in addition to four transmission towers[22] and a local power station, cutting off energy to numerous areas in Yemen including the capital of Sanaa. The highway leading to the capital was occupied and blocked off by tribesmen. In Marib city, tribal gunmen shot at government buildings and the presidential palace, sparking clashes between local security forces.[23] The city's local air defense camp was also attacked.[21]
Fearing further losses to the nation's energy sector, President Saleh ordered an official panel including Abidah tribal leaders to launch an inquiry.[6][24] Mediations between tribal and government representatives led to a truce being announced on 26 May.[24] Further hostilities were avoided by the Yemeni government sending the tribe a compensation package including 200 machine guns, a replacement land cruiser, and 5 million Yemeni rials (approximately $22,830), as repair crews were permitted to access the pipeline.[25]
Despite public assurances from foreign minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi that the investigation would continue, no further results were heard of from the government.[26][27] Ali al-Shabwani, frustrated by the lack of action, defected to the opposition amid the Yemeni revolution and took advantage of the situation to resume the pressure campaign. Shabwani tribesmen bombed the pipeline once again in March 2011, attacked power stations, and cut off the road to Sanaa to block fuel transports. Ali demanded that he receives $5 million in blood money and a personal meeting and explanation for the airstrike from US ambassador Gerald M. Feierstein before the pipeline could be repaired.[17] An estimate in June reported the total cost of the pipeline shutdown being over $1 billion, and was continuing to rise.[28] Attacks continued throughout the next years and were increasingly utilized by other tribes as well as AQAP as a pressure tactic, ultimately costing the government over $4 billion.[29] A Yemeni journalist pinpointed the killing of Shabwani and the subsequent attacks as the root cause for the near-daily power outages occurring in Sanaa by 2014.[30] The frequent attacks were utilized by the Houthis as a propaganda tool to justify its invasion of Marib during the Yemeni civil war.[31]
Assessment
"[Shabwani's death] marked the point where the situation really started to deteriorate...This was someone liked and respected by all of Mareb; someone who resolved problems and helped maintain order. After the strike, everything was affected...and it still hasn’t really improved."
The airstrike "sent shock waves through the Saleh regime" as written by Middle East specialist Patrick Seale, damaging its reputation among both tribes and the general populace.[32][5] It had a significant effect on Marib, estranging its populace from the federal government and contributing to a rise of instability in the region.[33][19] It set a tone of unease and anxiousness among the civilian populace regarding drone strikes in the following years, many of whom began to fear that they would be mistakenly or intentionally killed in further airstrikes.[19][34]
The botched strike provided AQAP a "propaganda bananza" to attack the government,[5] and led to some Marib tribesmen becoming sympathizers to the group's members.[4] The organization released a statement after the strike appealing for local tribes to "defend your honor, land and homes" by rebelling against the government.[35]Shadi Hamid, deputy-director the Brookings Institution in Qatar, underscored increasing alienation between tribes and the government prior to it and AQAP's "indigenous character" leading to more appeal.[15] Analyst Gabriel Koehler-Derrick from the Combating Terrorism Center wrote: "The killing of a leading local politician who was asked to negotiate with militants on behalf of the state did not encourage confidence in Sanaa's or Washington's ability to protect the few remaining tribal leaders willing to work with either government."[13]
At first, personnel in JSOC believed that they had launched a successful operation, but eventually realized the strike hadn't gone to plan hours later, when tribesmen began attacking local infrastructure to avenge Shabwani.[4] US officials said that they had not known of Shabwani's dealings prior to the strike.[2] According to The New York Times, "The most widely accepted explanation is that Yemeni and American officials failed to fully communicate before the attack."[5] Some American officials have gone on record to defend the death of Shabwani, regardless of it being unintentional, due to him having relations with AQAP.[2][27]
National security advisor John Brennan was described as "pissed" by the results, ordering the military to investigate any mistakes during the operation to "take corrective actions and deal with the fallout appropriately".[2] After being given a briefing from Brennan,[4] President Obama was similarly angered, asking General Cartwright to explain the failure in what the latter called "a pretty good chest thumping from the commander-in-chief."[12]
Saleh expressed discontent to American officials but did not order an ending of US operations.[5] Regardless, with Obama's growing lack of confidence in the operations, JSOC's military campaign in Yemen was halted for the rest of the year as it and the Central Intelligence Agency bolstered their intelligence networks in the country.[4][2] Operations resumed in May 2011 amid the revolution, with the added usage of unmanned aerial vehicles.[2]
Yemeni misinformation allegations
On 28 December 2011, an article published by The Wall Street Journal revealed that several high-ranking figures from the US military believed they had intentionally been given faulty information by Yemeni intelligence services which led to the killing of Shabwani. An official found that intelligence report which allowed JSOC to set up the strike as suspicion, as it was extensive in all regards except for the fact that it didn't note Shabwani's presence at the meeting. Furthermore, they also described the presence of a Yemeni intelligence officer at the scene of the airstrike, who, according to the US, had died, but according to Shabwani's family had lived.[2]
While Yemeni officials claimed that Shabwani had gone on his own accord, Shabwani's father stated that he had been tasked to do so on the orders of the government. Immediately prior to then, Shabwani had came into conflict with key official figures in the family of President Saleh as he attempted to secure more funds for basic services in Marib.[2] According to political analyst Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, this had also included a "commercial dispute" with the chief of the National Security Bureau, a government intelligence organization.[36] This view was corroborated by Ibrahim Mothana, co-founder of the Watan Party.[9]
↑Al-Amqi, Omar (2 June 2010). ""المصدر أونلاين" في مأرب يستقصي حقيقة مقتل الشبواني"[Al-Masdar Online in Marib investigates the truth about Al-Shabwani's killing]. Almasdar Online (in Arabic). Retrieved 16 September 2025.
↑"Yemen: Cracking down under pressure". Amnesty International. 25 August 2010. p.33. Retrieved 18 September 2025. On 5 June, Yemen's Foreign Affairs Minister said the government would investigate whether drones were used in the attack, and if so, whether they were used by Yemeni security forces or others. He later confirmed that "others" could include the USA. No outcome from this investigation was known to have been disclosed by the end of June 2010.
↑Kalfood, Mohammed Ali (18 May 2015). "Marib: Yemen's perpetual front line". Yemen Peace Project. Retrieved 22 September 2025. The Houthis also used the phenomenon of attacks on oil and power installations to justify their invasion of Marib. Such attacks became common after the May 2010 killing of Marib's deputy governor, Jaber al-Shabwani.
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