2010 Marib airstrike

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2010 Marib airstrike
Part of US intervention in Yemen
United States Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier II hovering.jpg
A Harrier jump jet, the type of aircraft used in the strike
Location
Wadi Abidah, Marib Governorate, Yemen
Planned by
Target
DateMay 24, 2010;15 years ago (2010-05-24)
c. 8:00 p.m. (UTC+3)
Executed by Flag of the United States.svg Harrier jump jet assigned to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
Outcome
  • Airstrike kills local deputy-governor Jaber al-Shabwani
  • Military operations in Yemen halted until 2011
Casualties
  • 3–4 killed (including Shabwani)
  • 1–2 injured

On May 24, 2010, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) launched an airstrike in the desert of Wadi Abidah in Marib Governorate. The strike killed three to four people, including Jaber al-Shabwani, the deputy-governor of Marib. Shabwani, a respected pro-government leader in Marib, had been attending a meeting to persuade a group of local militants to abandon al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemeni intelligence services, whom the United States military was relying on to conduct strikes in the country, informed JSOC of an imminent meeting of AQAP members which was set to take place in Marib.

Contents

In response to the killing of Shabwani, enraged tribesmen began attacking state targets and infrastructure in Marib for days, including the Marib–Ras Isa oil pipeline. President Ali Abdullah Saleh compensated Shabwani's tribe and announced an inquiry into the strike, though the government was silent ever since. The tribe restarted attacks on the pipeline and other energy infrastructure during the Yemeni revolution and continued through the next several years, costing the government an estimated $1 to $4 billion.

The killing of Shabwani tarnished the reputation of the Yemeni government in Marib, and provided AQAP an easier opening to the local tribes. Frustrated with JSOC's performance, US President Barack Obama suspended the military campaign in Yemen for the rest of the year. US military leaders later suspected that the Yemeni government had intentionally facilitated the killing of Shabwani through faulty intelligence in order to eliminate a political rival.

Background

US intervention in Yemen

On December 17, 2009, the US began a covert military campaign against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) with approval from the Yemeni government. The campaign, led by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), involved cruise missiles strikes from Navy submarines as well as airstrikes by Harrier jump jets from the Marine Corps, all publicly claimed by the Yemeni Armed Forces as part of an agreement to maintain its secrecy. [1] JSOC did not have an extensive human intelligence network in the country to verify targets, instead relying on Yemeni ground intelligence to feed them information. [2] After the December strikes, the next US operation took place on March 14 in Abyan Governorate. It proved more successful than previous strikes, killing two militants including AQAP commander Jamil al-Anbari. [3] [4]

Jaber al-Shabwani

Jaber al-Shabwani was an influential figure from the Shabwani sub-tribe, part of the larger Abidah tribe, and son to tribal leader Ali al-Shabwani. [5] The Shabwani family had historically collaborated with President Saleh, and fought in support of his government during the Yemeni civil war of 1994. [2] Jaber received a bachelor's degree from the Faculty of Commerce and Economics at Sanaa University before founding and managing a local oil contracting company. He was also active in politics, serving as the head of the ruling-General People's Congress branch in his local district and being elected to the provincial council of Marib Governorate in 2006. [6] By 2010, he had been appointed the secretary-general of the council as well as the deputy-governor of Marib. [7]

Jaber was a distant cousin of Ayad al-Shabwani, a local commander of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Marib. [3] Ayad had been targeted by two US-supported Yemeni air raids in January, but survived both encounters. Family members and local tribal leaders maintained that Jaber was not a member or supporter of AQAP despite his connections. [2] In fact, the deputy-governor was a staunch ally for the government against AQAP, and dedicated much of his time towards mediation and expelling AQAP from Marib. [8] Numerous Yemeni officials retain relatives linked to AQAP, giving them a pathway to contact the group for mediation purposes. [9]

Prelude

On May 22, 2010, a 45-minute video of Yemeni-American jihadist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki was published by AQAP's media wing al-Malahem, in which he advocated for the killing of Americans. Analysts saw the release as a significant propaganda victory for AQAP, underscoring Awlaki's rising prowess in Islamist propaganda on a level comparable to Osama bin Laden, as well as the US government's lack of success in tracking down and assassinating him in Yemen, which it had decided to do after finding connections between him and the Fort Hood shooting and attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 the previous year. [10] [3]

White House press secretary Robert Gibbs publicly responded to the video release on CBS talk show Face the Nation , highlighting the Obama administration's continued resolve in hunting down Awlaki. [10] Internally, US agencies including JSOC found themselves under more pressure to pinpoint and eliminate Awlaki. American intelligence managed to acquire a radio signal from a walkie-talkie linked to the cleric in Marib. [9] Yemeni intelligence delivered a precise report to the US military detailing an AQAP gathering set to take place in Marib. [2]

Working with the information at hand, US military leaders as well as the American ambassador to Yemen approved an airstrike. [2] One or two days before it took place, General James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave a briefing to President Barack Obama informing him on a high-value target in Yemen which JSOC had acquired and was prepared to attack. Obama granted his personal approval for the mission. [11] [3]

Airstrike

On May 24, 2010, Shabwani arranged a meeting with a fellow Abidah tribesman from the Hutaik sub-tribe, Mohammed Said bin Jameel, also known by the last name Jaradan. [12] [13] The deputy-governor had been conducting informal mediations with local militants to convince them to leave AQAP. [2] [14] The meeting with Jaradan was focused on securing the surrender of the man's brother, Ali bin Said bin Jameel, who was believed to be AQAP's regional emir in Marib. [12] Several AQAP members were set to participate in the meeting, including Shabwani's cousin, Ayad. [15]

The two men met with a small entourage of bodyguards later in the day at a remote area in the desert of Wadi Abidah, Marib. [16] [12] The meeting point was reportedly near an orange grove belonging to Ayad. [15] At around 8:00 p.m. local time, minutes after they had first arrived, a Harrier jet under the command of JSOC [17] launched an airstrike on both of their vehicles. [12] [15]

Contradictory reports state that three [12] [15] or four [18] [14] [3] people were killed in the strike, including Shabwani and two bodyguards accompanying him. Some sources describe the death of Shabwani's uncle Fahd, [3] though others claim that he was among the two injured in the strike, who were flown to Egypt to receive medical treatment. [15] JSOC reportedly targeted the vehicle convoy as it had emanated the walkie-talkie signal attributed to Awlaki. [9] Jaradan survived the airstrike unharmed, and arrived at his native village the next day. [12]

Aftermath

News regarding the airstrike, the death of Shabwani, and the responsibility of the US, spread throughout the region within hours. [12] [19] The Abidah tribe saw the airstrike as an intentional assassination against a prominent tribal leader of theirs, while the Shabwani sub-tribe was particularly infuriated as it was the third recent operation targeting one of their members. [12] [5] The Supreme Security Committee, a body of top Yemeni security officials, released a statement mourning the death of Shabwani, but did not specify whether it was a Yemeni or American airstrike. An American official asked about the US government's role directed queries to Yemen. [14]

As a response, the Abidah and Shabwani tribes began targeting local infrastructure, government institutions and military facilities in Marib. [12] [5] A section of the critical Marib–Ras Isa oil pipeline was bombed on May 25 [20] and again on May 27, in addition to four transmission towers [21] and a local power station, cutting off energy to numerous areas in Yemen including the capital of Sanaa. The highway leading to the capital was occupied and blocked off by tribesmen. In Marib city, tribal gunmen shot at government buildings and the presidential palace, sparking clashes between local security forces. [22] The city's local air defense camp was also attacked. [20]

Fearing further losses to the nation's energy sector, President Saleh ordered an official panel including Abidah tribal leaders to launch an inquiry. [5] [23] Mediations between tribal and government representatives led to a truce being announced on May 26. [23] Further hostilities were avoided by the Yemeni government sending the tribe a compensation package including 200 machine guns, a replacement land cruiser, and 5 million Yemeni rials (approximately $22,830), as repair crews were permitted to access the pipeline. [24]

Despite public assurances from foreign minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi that the investigation would continue, no further results were heard of from the government. [25] [26] Sheikh Ali al-Shabwani, frustrated by the lack of action, defected to the opposition amid the Yemeni revolution and took advantage of the situation to resume the pressure campaign. Shabwani tribesmen bombed the pipeline once again in March 2011, attacked power stations, and cut off the road to Sanaa to block fuel transports. Ali demanded that he receives $5 million in blood money and a personal meeting and explanation for the airstrike from US ambassador Gerald M. Feierstein before the pipeline could be repaired. [16]

An estimate in June 2011 reported the total cost of the pipeline shutdown being over $1 billion, and was continuing to rise. [27] Attacks continued throughout the next years and were increasingly utilized by other tribes as well as AQAP as a pressure tactic, ultimately costing the government over $4 billion. [28] A Yemeni journalist pinpointed the killing of Shabwani and the subsequent attacks as the root cause for the near-daily power outages occurring in Sanaa by 2014. [29] The frequent attacks were utilized by the Houthis as a propaganda tool to justify its invasion of Marib during the Yemeni civil war. [30]

Assessment

"[Shabwani's death] marked the point where the situation really started to deteriorate...This was someone liked and respected by all of Mareb; someone who resolved problems and helped maintain order. After the strike, everything was affected... and it still hasn't really improved."

Nasser Muhtam, head of a local NGO [18]

The airstrike "sent shock waves through the Saleh regime" according to Middle East specialist Patrick Seale, damaging its reputation among both tribes and the general populace. [31] [4] It had a significant effect in Marib, estranging its populace from the federal government and contributing to a rise of instability in the region. [32] [18] It set a tone of unease and anxiousness among the civilian populace regarding drone strikes in the following years, many of whom began to fear that they would be mistakenly or intentionally killed in further airstrikes. [18] [33]

The botched strike provided AQAP a "propaganda bananza" to attack the government, [4] and led to some Marib tribesmen becoming sympathizers to the group's members. [3] The organization released a statement after the strike appealing for local tribes to "defend your honor, land and homes" by rebelling against the government. [34] Shadi Hamid, deputy-director the Brookings Institution in Qatar, underscored increasing alienation between tribes and the government prior to it and AQAP's "indigenous character" leading to more appeal. [14] Analyst Gabriel Koehler-Derrick from the Combating Terrorism Center wrote: "The killing of a leading local politician who was asked to negotiate with militants on behalf of the state did not encourage confidence in Sanaa's or Washington's ability to protect the few remaining tribal leaders willing to work with either government." [12]

At first, personnel in JSOC believed that they had launched a successful operation, but eventually realized the strike hadn't gone to plan hours later, when tribesmen began attacking local infrastructure to avenge Shabwani. [3] US officials said that they had not known of Shabwani's dealings prior to the strike. [2] According to The New York Times, "The most widely accepted explanation is that Yemeni and American officials failed to fully communicate before the attack." [4] Some American officials have gone on record to defend the death of Shabwani, regardless of it being unintentional, due to him having relations with AQAP. [2] [26]

National security advisor John Brennan was described as "pissed" by the results, ordering the military to investigate any mistakes during the operation to "take corrective actions and deal with the fallout appropriately". [2] After being given a briefing from Brennan, [3] President Obama was similarly angered, asking General Cartwright to explain the failure in what the latter called "a pretty good chest thumping from the commander-in-chief." [11]

Saleh expressed discontent to American officials regarding the strike, but did not order an end to US operations. [4] Regardless, with Obama's growing lack of confidence in the strikes, JSOC's military campaign in Yemen was halted for the rest of the year as it and the Central Intelligence Agency bolstered their intelligence networks in the country. [3] [2] Operations resumed in May 2011 amid the revolution, with the added usage of unmanned aerial vehicles. [2]

Yemeni misinformation allegations

In December 2011, an article published by The Wall Street Journal revealed that several high-ranking figures from the US military believed they had intentionally been given faulty information by Yemeni intelligence services which led to the killing of Shabwani. An official found that intelligence report which allowed JSOC to set up the strike as suspicion, as it was extensive in all regards except for the fact that it didn't note Shabwani's presence at the meeting. Furthermore, they also described the presence of a Yemeni intelligence officer at the scene of the airstrike, who, according to the US, had died, but according to Shabwani's family had lived. [2]

While Yemeni officials claimed that Shabwani had gone on his own accord, Shabwani's father stated that he had been tasked to do so on the orders of the government. Immediately prior to then, Shabwani had came into conflict with key official figures in the family of President Saleh as he attempted to secure more funds for basic services in Marib. [2] According to political analyst Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, this had also included a "commercial dispute" with the chief of the National Security Bureau, a government intelligence organization. [35] This view was corroborated by Ibrahim Mothana, co-founder of the Watan Party. [8]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Mazzetti, Mark (April 9, 2013). The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth. Penguin Random House. pp. 230, 234. ISBN   9781101617946.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Entous, Adam; Barnes, Julian E.; Coker, Margaret (December 29, 2011). "U.S. Doubts Intelligence That Led to Yemen Strike" . The Wall Street Journal . ISSN   0099-9660. Archived from the original on October 19, 2016. Retrieved September 14, 2025.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Scahill, Jeremy (2013). Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield. Nation Books. pp. 356–358. ISBN   9781568587271.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 Shane, Scott; Mazzetti, Mark; Worth, Robert F. (August 14, 2010). "Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents" . The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331. Archived from the original on January 16, 2025. Retrieved September 15, 2025.
  5. 1 2 3 4 McGregor, Andrew (July 10, 2010). "Tribal Resistance and al-Qaeda: Suspected U.S. Airstrike Ignites Tribes in Yemen's Ma'rib Governorate". Jamestown Foundation . Retrieved September 14, 2025.
  6. ↑ Al-Amqi, Omar (June 2, 2010). ""المصدر أونلاين" في مأرب يستقصي حقيقة مقتل الشبواني" [Al-Masdar Online in Marib investigates the truth about Al-Shabwani's killing]. Al-Masdar Online (in Arabic). Retrieved September 16, 2025.
  7. ↑ "Yemeni tribe hits pipeline to avenge wrongful death". Taipei Times . Agence France-Presse. May 26, 2010. Retrieved September 16, 2025.
  8. 1 2 Colvin, Mark (June 28, 2012). "Yemeni politician questions long-term consequences of drone strikes". PM . ABC News Australia . Retrieved September 16, 2025.
  9. 1 2 3 Shane, Scott (2016). Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone. Crown Publishing Group. pp. 227–228. ISBN   9780804140317.
  10. 1 2 Isikoff, Michael (May 23, 2010). "Awlaki: The New Bin Laden?". Newsweek . Retrieved September 14, 2025.
  11. 1 2 Klaidman, Daniel (2012). Kill Or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 255. ISBN   9780547547893.
  12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Koehler-Derrick, Gabriel (October 3, 2011). "A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen" (PDF). Combating Terrorism Center at West Point . pp. 107–108. Archived (PDF) from the original on June 4, 2024. Retrieved September 21, 2025.
  13. ↑ Roggio, Bill (May 25, 2010). "Yemeni airstrike kills deputy governor, al Qaeda operatives". FDD's Long War Journal . Retrieved September 16, 2025.
  14. 1 2 3 4 Ghobari, Mohammed; Sudam, Mohamed (May 25, 2010). "Air strike kills Yemen mediator". Reuters . Retrieved September 13, 2025.
  15. 1 2 3 4 5 "License to Kill: Why the American Drone War on Yemen Violates International Law". Alkarama . October 17, 2016. pp. 75–76. Retrieved September 20, 2025.
  16. 1 2 Raghavan, Sudarsan (July 1, 2011). "In Yemen, attacks fuel economic collapse" . The Washington Post . ISSN   0190-8286. Archived from the original on November 3, 2019. Retrieved September 17, 2025.
  17. ↑ Entous, Adam (December 29, 2011). "Yemen Leader's Death Caused by Bad Intelligence?". The Wall Street Journal (Video). Retrieved September 22, 2025.
  18. 1 2 3 4 Baron, Adam (July 17, 2013). "In Yemen, drones' ill effects linger long after dust settles" . The Christian Science Monitor . ISSN   0882-7729. Archived from the original on February 4, 2023. Retrieved September 16, 2025.
  19. ↑ Gross, Terry (April 6, 2011). "Why The Future Of Yemen Is So Important". Fresh Air . NPR . Retrieved September 22, 2025.
  20. 1 2 "Brief: Tribe Strikes Oil Pipeline In Yemen" . Stratfor . May 25, 2010. Archived from the original on September 22, 2025. Retrieved September 22, 2025.
  21. ↑ Ghobari, Mohammed (May 27, 2010). "Yemen tribe in new pipeline blast over airstrike". Reuters . Retrieved September 17, 2025.
  22. ↑ al-Asaadi, Mohammed; Slackman, Michael (May 25, 2010). "Kidnapped U.S. Tourists Are Released in Yemen" . The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331. Archived from the original on June 14, 2024. Retrieved September 19, 2025.
  23. 1 2 "Yemeni tribesmen agree to truce". Al Jazeera . May 26, 2010. Archived from the original on May 28, 2010. Retrieved September 17, 2025.
  24. ↑ "Yemen separatists kill 3 soldiers". Reuters . May 28, 2010. Retrieved September 17, 2025.
  25. ↑ "Yemen: Cracking down under pressure". Amnesty International . August 25, 2010. p. 33. Retrieved September 18, 2025. On 5 June, Yemen's Foreign Affairs Minister said the government would investigate whether drones were used in the attack, and if so, whether they were used by Yemeni security forces or others. He later confirmed that "others" could include the USA. No outcome from this investigation was known to have been disclosed by the end of June 2010.
  26. 1 2 Filkins, Dexter (April 4, 2011). "After the Uprising" . The New Yorker . ISSN   0028-792X. Archived from the original on April 16, 2021. Retrieved September 18, 2025.
  27. ↑ Boone, Jeb (June 17, 2011). "Yemen's trouble with drones". The Christian Science Monitor . ISSN   0882-7729. Archived from the original on October 17, 2024. Retrieved September 22, 2025.
  28. ↑ Gaston, Erica (2015). Justice and Security Dialogue in Yemen: Negotiating Local Sources of Conflict Amid National Transition. Building Peace No. 4. United States Institute of Peace. p. 15.
  29. ↑ al-Abbsi, Mohammed (April 23, 2014). "In Yemen, the Generator's Whine, a Country's Decay". As-Safir Al-Arabi. Retrieved September 22, 2025.
  30. ↑ Kalfood, Mohammed Ali (May 18, 2015). "Marib: Yemen's perpetual front line". Yemen Peace Project. Retrieved September 22, 2025. The Houthis also used the phenomenon of attacks on oil and power installations to justify their invasion of Marib. Such attacks became common after the May 2010 killing of Marib's deputy governor, Jaber al-Shabwani.
  31. ↑ Seale, Patrick (September 15, 2018). "America's Al Qaida obsession". Gulf News . Retrieved September 18, 2025.
  32. ↑ Green, Daniel (June 22, 2011). "The al-Qaeda Crescent in Yemen". The Washington Institute for Near East Policy . Retrieved September 18, 2025.
  33. ↑ Abdullah, Khaled (October 27, 2010). "Drones spur Yemenis' distrust of govt, U.S." Reuters . Retrieved September 17, 2025.
  34. ↑ Holmes, Oliver (July 9, 2010). "The War Against al-Qaeda in Yemen Heats Up". Time . ISSN   2169-1665 . Retrieved September 18, 2025.
  35. ↑ Bailey, Pam (June 20, 2013). "Report from Yemen: The innocent victims of the Obama drone wars". Mondoweiss . Retrieved September 22, 2025.
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