2009 United States attacks in Yemen

Last updated

Operation Copper Dune
Part of the war on terror and US intervention in Yemen
Yemen adm location map.svg
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Al-Majalah
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Arhab
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Rafd
Locations of attacks within Yemen
TypeMissile strikes, targeted killing
Location
Al-Majalah, Arhab and Rafd, Yemen
Planned byFlag of the United States.svg United States
Commanded by Barack Obama
William H. McRaven
Target
Date17–24 December 2009 (2009-12-17 2009-12-24)
Executed by
OutcomeTactical and strategic failure [1]
  • High-ranking AQAP leaders survive
  • Numerous civilians killed, granting AQAP a propaganda victory
Casualties63 killed (including 41 civilians)

On December 17, 2009, the United States conducted Operation Copper Dune, launching missile strikes on two separate targets in Yemen believed to be associated al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). An additional missile strike took place on December 24. The attacks, endorsed by the Yemeni government on part of the Obama administration's increasing concern with AQAP, were the first American military operations launched in Yemen since 2002, and marked the start of a prolonged campaign in the country.

Contents

After weeks of intelligence-gathering had pointed to imminent attacks on local American targets, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) proposed three targeted killings in an interagency teleconference to neutralize the threat, and settled on conducting two. The main target was Mohammed al-Kazemi, who was believed to be an AQAP commander in charge of a training camp in al-Majalah and leading a plan to attack the US embassy. The next morning, a US Navy submarine under the command of JSOC fired five Tomahawk missiles at al-Majalah, and simultaneously launched another strike on a safehouse in Arhab believed to be harboring AQAP commander Qasim al-Raymi, before Yemeni special forces coordinating with JSOC raided it. A week later, another teleconference approved a strike on a house in Rafd, where officials believed a meeting was taking place between AQAP leaders Nasir al-Wuhayshi and Said Ali al-Shihri, along with a potential presence of Anwar al-Awlaki.

An inquiry endorsed by the Yemeni government determined that 55 people were killed in the al-Majalah strike; 14 militants, including Kazemi, and 41 civilians, including nine women and 21 children. The Tomahawk missiles, loaded with cluster munitions, had destroyed the camp but also struck nearby collections of huts belonging to two Bedouin families. In Arhab, three militants were killed but Raymi had escaped, and in Rafd, Awlaki denied that a meeting ever took place, with only five low-level recruits dying. Several more people were later killed by unexploded ordnance in al-Majalah, while its residents were compensated by Yemen.

the Yemeni government initially took responsibility for the attacks in order to avoid local backlash against the US. In June 2010, Amnesty International released photographs of US-made bombs and missile components at al-Majalah, which were only in the American military's arsenal. A journalist who had previously visited al-Majalah and had been publicly attributing the strike to the US prior to then, Abdulelah Haider Shaye, was arrested a month later. On November 28, 2010, diplomatic cables disclosed by Wikileaks revealed a secret agreement between top officials in which Yemen would take responsibility for American operations in order to have them continue. The civilian deaths and cover-up scheme led to outrage in Yemen, and played into AQAP's propaganda narrative that Yemen was under attack from the US.

Background

Al-Qaeda resurgence in Yemen

Aftermath of the 2008 attack on the United States embassy in Yemen. Aftermath of the 2008 attack on the United States embassy in Sanaa.jpg
Aftermath of the 2008 attack on the United States embassy in Yemen.

In 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted a drone strike which killed al-Qaeda's head in Yemen, Abu Ali al-Harithi. It was the first drone strike conducted against al-Qaeda outside of Afghanistan: the Yemeni government urged the US to keep the operation a secret. When an American official leaked it regardless, it created significant damage in the counterterrorism partnership between the countries, with Yemen subsequently banning drones over its airspace. The killing of Harithi, along with crackdowns by local security forces, led to al-Qaeda being perceived as effectively neutralized in Yemen by 2004. [2] [3]

As the US became occupied with the Iraq war, it drew its attention away from counterterrorism in Yemen and cut foreign aid in many departments, leading to more poverty and a greater appeal in militancy. Al-Qaeda took the opportunity to revive itself, capitalizing off of a prison escape in 2006 which freed several militants, some of whom would become its central leaders. The al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen would proceed to launch numerous high-profile attacks over the next years, culminating in an assault on the US embassy in Sanaa in September 2008. [3] [4]

In January 2009, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was announced as a merger between the groups in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. It proceeded to perpetrate numerous attacks in the region, notably a bombing targeting a group of South Korean tourists in March and an assassination attempt on Saudi prince Muhammad bin Nayef in August. [4] American concern with AQAP was further exacerbated by the presence of Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Yemeni-American cleric who was suspected of influencing Maj. Nidal Hasan to conduct a mass shooting at Fort Hood, Texas on November 5, 2009, during which he killed 13 US Army soldiers. The US believed Awlaki to be a regional commander in AQAP, but Yemeni officials viewed him more so as having an ideological role within the group. [5]

Obama administration policy

US President Barack Obama, whose inauguration coincided with the formation of AQAP, immediately viewed the group as an emerging threat and began considering military action against it in Yemen. Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan became Obama's chief negotiator with Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh in regards to counterterrorism, with discussions initially focusing on military action in Yemen and training of local security forces. [6] Obama's doctrine on fighting AQAP was led by Central Command head David Petraeus, who was mainly occupied with "small wars" in the war on terror, and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) commander William McRaven, whose unit was the "lead force for covert action inside Yemen." [7]

Saleh proved to be more cooperative with the US over time: In May, CIA deputy director Steven Kappes noted that Saleh viewed AQAP as the primary threat to Yemen rather than other local factions during their meeting. In a July meeting with Petraeus, Saleh assured him that he would directly act against the group. A subsequent raid by Yemeni special forces the next month targeting an AQAP cell was a failure, but helped the US in portraying all action against AQAP as done by the Yemeni government. [8] By the time that Brennan had met with him again in September, Saleh said that he would grant the US authority to conduct unilateral counterterrorism operations in Yemen, with his only requirement being that he was to escape the blame for terrorist attacks by AQAP in response. [9] It was after this that the US started pursuing military action in Yemen. [10]

Petraeus approved a plan to expand American military presence in Yemen in April 2009, involving both the training of Yemeni forces and infrastructure for independent military action. [11] The latter half of 2009 saw an uptick in analysts and agents from the CIA as well as the military arriving at the Sanaa embassy to expand intelligence-gathering on AQAP. However, this also led to further difficulties and risks for agents operating in the country and attempting to infiltrate AQAP, resulting in US agencies relying more-so on Yemeni human intelligence, which was viewed as more inconsistent. Signals intelligence was therefore prioritized, with eavesdropping by the local Special Collection Service station playing a large role. [12]

Prelude

Admiral William H. McRaven led the planning of the attacks by his unit, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). ADM William H. McRaven 2012.jpg
Admiral William H. McRaven led the planning of the attacks by his unit, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

By early December 2009, the intelligence community in Yemen had acquired evidence that AQAP was in the final stages of preparing terrorist attacks on undetermined local Western targets. [13] According to National Counterterrorism Center head Michael Leiter, the US " surged resources for targeting in Yemen" in response, despite not knowing the specific threat. [14] A months-long JSOC search determined that near the remote Abyan village of al-Majalah, where locals had recently seen surveillance aircraft passing by, [15] AQAP commander Saleh Mohammed Ali al-Anbouri (also known as Mohammed al-Kazemi) [16] was in charge of a training camp for suicide bombers who were likely planning to attack the local US embassy. [17] A former Afghan Arab, Kazemi was arrested in 2005 by local authorities on charges related to terrorism, and was released in 2007. Afterwards, he and his family moved to al-Majalah and pledged to renounce jihadism. [18] American intelligence reports contradict this, instead claiming that Kazemi was an operational commander within AQAP, was previously involved in a 2007 car bombing in Marib which killed several tourists, and was nearly finished organizing the embassy attack. [19] With strong support from Petraeus albeit caution from national security advisor James Jones, who was skeptical of the quality of US intelligence in the region, Obama personally approved military action. [20]

On December 16, 2009, McRaven headed a military video conference which proposed a series of three targeted killings in Yemen which were to be conducted within 24 hours. [21] Under a top-secret special access program [22] with the name Operation Copper Dune, JSOC would launch strikes against three targets labeled code names based off various cities in Ohio. The primary target, Kazemi, was called Objective "Akron", and had been pinpointed at the training camp near al-Majalah, while Objectives "Toledo" and "Cleveland" were additionally located and open for attacking. [23] Petraeus hastily included Cleveland as a target based off newfound intelligence on their location. [14] State Department and Department of Defence legal advisor's Harold Koh and Jeh Johnson were given 45 minutes in advance to review the intel on the targets and approve them in regards to legal considerations. [24]

During the meeting, which involved around 75 security officials and lawyers, Johnson told deputy national security advisor Tom Donilon that he approved the strikes on Akron and Toledo, but advised against Cleveland due to a higher likelihood of civilian casualties. [25] [14] The meeting also discussed the method of attack for the operation: capturing the targets was not an option. It concluded that JSOC would utilize a US Navy submarine off the coast of Yemen armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles for the strikes. [24] Both Koh and Johnson believed they were given too little time to make an informed decision on the strikes, and were pressured by the military into approving them with "their ability to create an atmosphere of do-or-die urgency." [24] [26] Along with pressure to act hastily, the nearest US base in the region, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, only permitted the military to launch surveillance drones from its territory, while most Predator and Reaper drones were occupied in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [27] [28] Regardless, soon after the meeting concluded JSOC launched aerial surveillance to monitor the targets. Petraeus viewed live video feed from the locations at CENTCOM headquarters, [27] while Johnson saw it from a command center at the Pentagon's "E" ring. [25]

Strikes

BGM-109 Tomahawk A BGM-109 Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM) takes to the air after being launched from the battleship USS WISCONSIN (BB-64) during Operation Desert Storm - DPLA - 236f03496a24f3f379e4c85d071277fa.jpeg
BGM-109 Tomahawk

Al-Majalah

The strike on al-Majalah was described by a military official as a "JSOC operation with borrowed Navy subs, borrowed Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy surveillance aircraft and close coordination with CIA and DIA on the ground in Yemen. Counting the crew of the sub we’re talking 350–400 [people] in the loop." [29] Johnson recalled viewing live surveillance footage of militants running drills at the targeted training facility. [25] Several other American officials who viewed the surveillance corroborated the claim. [30]

At 6:00 a.m. local time on December 17, as many as five BGM-109D Tomahawk missiles were launched by a US submarine off the coast of Yemen at al-Majalah, hitting a rugged area on the edge of the village. [31] US surveillance captured the destruction of the training camp along with the deaths of the previously seen militants. [25] However, in addition to the camp, the bombings also encompassed two nearby settlements of civilian huts meters away, totaling 30 homes occupied by sleeping Bedouins. [32] [33] [34] [35] US officials questioned by Dexter Filkins of The New Yorker exclusively recalled seeing a training camp through the surveillance footage. He concluded that "the cameras missed the women and children." [30]

According to a Yemeni official, JSOC was supposed to strike a single encampment belonging to the militants but had targeted all encampments in the area, possibly due to faulty intelligence from Yemen. [36] The specific Tomahawk model used in the attack is intentionally designed for dispersing numerous cluster munitions over a wide region. Accounting for the 166 BLU-97A/B Combined Effects cluster bombs which are loaded in one missile, as many as 830 bomblets were estimated to have struck al-Majalah in a 1.5 kilometer radius. [37] Additionally, the bomblets carried nearly 200 pieces of metal shrapnel and spray out burning zirconium, which disperses an incendiary. [38] Of the 30 huts in the vicinity of the attack, 12 were completely destroyed while the rest were severely burned. [39] [38]

A Yemeni government-endorsed inquiry determined that 55 people had died in the al-Majalah strike. [30] The inquiry reported that local authorities believed 14 suspected militants were killed, though the number was unverifiable as the only militant who was definitively identified was Kazemi. [38] His death was confirmed by AQAP in a video released in May 2010. [40] Six newcomers to the village who were helping Kazemi dig a well twenty days prior were killed, their bodies being extracted from the site along with some other injured men by a group of masked gunmen shortly after the strike took place. [41] [15]

The majority of people killed in al-Majalah were civilians. The report listed a total 41 individuals killed in the strike from two extended families; 14 from the Haydara family and 27 from the Anbouri family. [15] Of those killed, nine were women, five of whom were pregnant, while 21 were children. [42] Kazemi's wife and four children were among them. [15] A leaked US cable described the civilians as "largely nomadic, Bedouin families who lived in tents near the AQAP training camp." [43] The villagers, described as one of the poorest tribes in the region, [44] were paid by the militants to provide shelter, food and laundry to the camp, but were likely not affiliated with AQAP otherwise. [45] One tribesman said that the locals had agreed to host the militants at their camp because they promised to dig them a well. [35] Survivors interviewed by Human Rights Watch were not aware of Kazemi's involvement in militant activities or the presence of a training camp. [46] Many local livestock were put out by the locals to graze at the time and were caught in the blast, [47] with up to 1,500 goats, sheeps, cows and donkeys possibly dying. [45]

Arhab

Youtube video from 26 September Net
Nuvola apps kaboodle.svg Video released by Yemeni government showing the CTU raiding a safehouse in Arhab on YouTube

Simultaneously with the al-Majalah strike, JSOC launched a separate missile attack on an AQAP safehouse in Arhab district on December 17. Shortly afterwards, ground forces from Yemen's Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU), in coordination with JSOC's Intelligence Support Activity, raided the premises. The main target of the operation was AQAP commander Qasim al-Raymi. [22] Officials said that the raid had disrupted an AQAP cell which was involved in a plot to bomb the British Embassy along with numerous other Western targets in Sanaa. [48]

Three would-be suicide bombers were killed, including former Guantanamo Bay detainee Hani Abdo Shaalan. [34] [49] Initial reports claimed the militants had died in a shootout with the CTU, [34] though an AQAP obituary posted in 2011 said Shaalan was struck and killed by a US missile. [50] Within the bombed-out compound, CTU forces captured another militant still wearing their suicide vest. [49] Raymi escaped the raid alongside veteran jihadist Hizam Mujali, though his brother Arif Mujali was captured. [34] [51] The Yemeni Embassy in Washington D.C. uploaded a seven-minute YouTube video of CTU forces conducting the raid. [52]

Rafd

Nearly a week after the first two strikes, another video conference was held to determine the legality of a third missile strike on a compound in Shabwah Governorate. Present in the meeting was the Pentagon's deputy general counsel, Robert Taylor, as well as Joint Chiefs of Staff general counsel James W. Crawford III. [14] US and Yemeni intelligence believed that the target building was the site of a meeting between AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi and his deputy Said Ali al-Shihri. [53] Wuhayshi and Shihri were possibly tracked after travelling to Abyan to mourn the death of Kazemi. [34] Among other sources, the interrogated would-be suicide bomber captured by the CTU during the Arhab raid also contributed towards the intelligence preceding the strike. [54]

Several sources have reported that Awlaki was also a target in the strike, though according to journalist Charlie Savage, none of the numerous officials involved in the operation that he interviewed recalled him being so. Savage claimed that the notion of Awlaki being a target was a misunderstanding of the Obama administration's policy of killing him at the time. The targets were still Wuhayshi and Shihri, but with there being a reasonable chance that Awlaki could have also been present during the meeting, US officials deemed it acceptable to launch a strike on the former two regardless and kill Awlaki, as he would be classified as an enemy combatant. [55]

On 24 December, a pre-dawn US Navy missile attack struck a stone house on a hillside in Rafd, a small remote village in Shabwah. [4] The strike killed five low-level recruits who were sleeping in the compound, [4] all identified as relatives from the Awlaki tribe. [34] [5] The group had given a public speech at a rally in al-Majalah days before the strike, possibly suggesting that they were tracked by the US prior to their killing. [56] However, no high-ranking AQAP leaders were killed, as Awlaki, Wuhayshi and Shihri were later believed to have left the site in two vehicles hours before it was bombed. [57] Awlaki himself denied reports of his death in a phone interview, citing that he did not attend the purported meeting and was two or three kilometers apart from the targeted compound. [58] [59] Residents noted "yellow-and-green military-style spotter balloons" surveilling the area three days before the strike, potentially tipping off the AQAP leaders that their meeting was compromised. [5] According to Morten Storm, an undercover Danish spy who infiltrated AQAP, Awlaki sent him a text message which wrote "Phew. Maaaaaan—that was close," after the bombing. [55] [60]

Aftermath and response

Survivors and other locals near al-Majalah washed the intact bodies of those killed and prepared them for burial. [21] A row of small gravestones were established along a highway leading to the village. [35] Some of the victims from the two families were buried in a mass grave as their remains were torn apart and indistinguishable from each other. [15] Animals remains were also buried alongside the victims for this reason. [45] Human Rights Watch reported that local authorities "failed to provide even the most basic rescue assistance such as transporting the wounded to hospitals, helping identify the dead and wounded, or securing the area." [61]

AQAP members giving a speech at the al-Majalah rally. AQAP members giving a speech, 2009.png
AQAP members giving a speech at the al-Majalah rally.

At a rally attended by thousands from across the country in al-Majalah on December 21, organized by tribal leader and politician Saleh bin Fareed to show international media that the strike was a civilian massacre perpetrated by the US, a group of AQAP members unexpectedly gave a speech condemning the American and Yemeni governments and vowing revenge for the deaths of civilians. A video of the speech was broadcast by Al Jazeera and distributed by international news outlets, resulting in the rally, which was meant to show that the victims of the attack were not militants, being seen as a pro-AQAP gathering. [21] [56]

A House of Representatives-commissioned inquiry into the al-Majalah bombing, officially titled the Republic of Yemen, Special Parliamentarian Investigating Committee Report On Security Events In the Province of Abyan, [62] was opened days after the attack. Headed by Himyar Abdullah al-Ahmar, a delegation of 15 members of parliament were sent to the village to survey al-Majalah, interview locals and gather eyewitness accounts. The investigation was complete and published on February 7, 2010, confirming the militant and civilian death toll along with identifying every civilian killed. [15] Investigators found the entire area to be burnt and destroyed upon their arrival as well as multiple unexploded bomblets. [38] The report upheld that Kazemi was an AQAP commander, and had transferred money to at least 20 Saudi, Emirati and Pakistani militants in Yemen. Interviews with various locals determined that he had been moving freely in the region and in places with multiple security checkpoints, making it possible for him to have been captured or eliminated in an alternative situation. [63] The Yemeni parliament approved the commission's findings in March 2010, and agreed that a judicial investigation be opened into the bombing to uphold those responsible. It also issued an official apology to the victims of the attack, labeling it a mistake and promising financial compensation. [15]

The cluster bomblets in al-Majalah which did not explode during the strike were burrowed within the terrain, forming an effective minefield of unexploded ordnance. [64] At least four people were recorded to have died through the handing of the bomblets. Two people were killed at al-Majalah during a December 21 rally, while one was killed later in the day as they attempted to remove a bomblet which they had collected at the site from their car. On January 24, 2012, a child who brought a bomblet to his home accidentally detonated it while throwing it away, injuring him and his brother and killing his father. The Yemeni government had offered to clear al-Majalah of remaining explosives but was rejected by the locals, who instead wanted assistance from an international organization out of fear that authorities would not sufficiently clear the area and would use the opportunity as a coverup. [65] By 2013, al-Majalah was still filled with unexploded bomblets, making the area uninhabitable. [33]

A US cable reported that the Yemeni government had originally allocated approximately $100,000 to the Governor of Abyan to split between the families of the al-Majalah victims. [66] The government later offered to increase the money to 5.5 million rials, equaling around $25,000 per civilian killed, and added 10 Toyota Hiluxes as a down payment, but the victims families instead wanted 10 billion rials, equalling to $51,000, as well a pledge for the government to hold the perpetrators of the attack responsible. The government refused to negotiate with the victims. Some families began accepting government compensation plans for property damage by mid-2013. A total of 37 million rials (around $170,000) was divided between 10 families, averaging $17,000 each. The sum had only covered the houses destroyed in the strike and not the killed civilians, nor other property such as livestock which were killed. [67] [33] On 22 October 2013, the Yemeni Embassy in Washington D.C. reported that all surviving families of the attack were compensated. [68]

Responsibility

An MiG-29 from the Yemeni Air Force, which the Yemeni government portrayed as conducting the attacks. Yemeni Air Force Mig-29 "Shafaq".jpg
An MiG-29 from the Yemeni Air Force, which the Yemeni government portrayed as conducting the attacks.

Both the Yemeni and US governments agreed to portray the strikes as Yemen's own doing. [69] Due to strong anti-American sentiment within the Yemeni public, admitting that the US had militarily intervened in their own country would likely have harmed the Saleh administration's reputation locally. [70] For the strikes on al-Majalah and Arhab, Yemeni officials claimed that the military had carried out a series of simultaneous raids and airstrikes which killed 34 militants and arrested 17. [71] MiG-29 fighter jets were ordered to fly over al-Majalah shortly after the US strike to depict a Yemeni Air Force operation. [45] Reports also claimed that Obama had called Saleh on the day of the strikes to congratulate him on the successful operations. [71] Later in January, state-ran Saba News Agency published an in-depth report of the operations, acknowledging civilian deaths as unavoidable and claiming that the US cluster munitions at the sites were mines planted by AQAP, allowing the government to ward off independent investigators. [72]

Despite the cover-up, by December 18 several anonymous American officials had spoken to news agencies contradicting the official story. The New York Times wrote that US firepower and intelligence among other types of support were utilized by the Yemeni military during the operations on request of the Saleh government. [73] ABC News was the first publication to report that the operations were conducted directly by the US under the orders of Obama. [74] On January 2, 2010, CBS News was told by Sebastian Gorka, an instructor at the Joint Special Operations University which is an official component of US Special Operations Command, that the raids were done via "cruise missile strikes in combination with military units on the ground," and were "very much something executed by the United States, but with heavy support by the Yemeni government." [75]

On 30 September 2010, during an interview with pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat , Yemeni foreign minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi admitted for the first time that the US had conducted the strikes. According to him, the strikes had ceased in December as the "Yemeni government ascertained they weren't achieving results." Upon being questioned, a Department of Defense spokesperson did not confirm Qirbi's statement. [76]

Investigations

Abdulelah Haider Shaye, a local independent journalist, travelled to al-Majalah shorty after the strike and took photographs of missile parts and bombs, some of which had the labels "Made in the United States" written on them. He distributed the photographs to various media outlets and human rights organizations. [22]

Shaye's work was corroborated by Amnesty International, [77] [78] which released a report on June 7, 2010 containing several photos of the remnants of US bombs and bomb parts in al-Majalah. The photos, which were obtained by the group earlier in March, showed various damaged components of a BGM-109D Tomahawk as well as an unexploded BLU-97A/B submunition traced to the Kansas Army Ammunition Plant. The report noted that the specific type of missile used was only known to be in the US military's arsenal and not Yemen's. [38] [79] The US government ignored Amnesty International's inquiry regarding its role in the attacks, though the Pentagon published a statement the day after the release of the report directing responsibility to the Yemeni government. [80]

In July 2010, Shaye was kidnapped and threatened by Yemeni intelligence agents who warned him not to further discuss the strikes and the US government's responsibility. After he did so regardless on an Al Jazeera interview while describing his detainment, his house was surrounded and raided by the CTU on August 16, 2010, and he was subsequently kept in solitary confinement for over a month. [81] Shaye was charged in September 2010 with being a member of al-Qaeda, and was sentenced in January 2011 to five years in prison. He was pardoned by Saleh weeks later due to pressure from tribal leaders, human rights organizations, and other journalists, but was re-imprisoned the next month following a call Saleh had with Obama in which the latter disproved of his release. On July 23, 2013, Shaye was released from prison and was permitted to serve the rest of his term under house arrest. [82]

Cables leak

Ali Abdullah Saleh assured that he would continue to claim American military operations as his government's doing, according to Wikileaks. Ali Abdullah Saleh - Putin meeting 2010-06-30 (cropped).jpg
Ali Abdullah Saleh assured that he would continue to claim American military operations as his government's doing, according to Wikileaks.

On November 28, 2010, Wikileaks began distributing and publishing collections of classified US government cables. Among them were several cables relating to the December strikes, which up until then was still unacknowledged by the US. [83] A cable dated to December 21, 2009, between the first and second round of strikes, recorded US ambassador Stephen Seche's concern with the Yemeni government's perceived indifference to reports of high civilian death tolls for the strikes and leaks of American involvement. Interior Minister Rashad al-Alimi told him that "any evidence of greater U.S. involvement such as fragments of U.S. munitions found at the sites—could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S." [54] The Saleh administration voiced its eagerness to maintain the disinformation campaign so that US operations could continue to take place. [84]

Another cable described a meeting in Sanaa between Saleh, Alimi and Petraeus on January 2, 2010. Petraeus praised the attacks and announced that US aid for Yemen would increase to $150 million during the year, which was followed by Saleh assuring him that "we'll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours". Alimi proceeded to joke that he had lied to parliament in telling it that the strikes were conducted by the Yemeni military with US-supplied weapons. [85] Saleh rebuffed a request by Petraeus for American ground forces to be deployed in the country, but agreed with a proposition that the US would thereon use fixed-wing aircraft and precision-guided munitions for strikes against AQAP. [84] While discussing the strikes themselves, Saleh lamented mistakes which led to civilian deaths in the al-Majalah attack, to which Petraeus responded by denying significant casualties and claiming that the only civilians who died were Kazemi's wife and two children. The cable wrote that Saleh proceeded to engage in a "lengthy and confusing aside" with other Yemeni officials at the meeting regarding the death count, commenting that "Saleh’s conversation on the civilian casualties suggests he has not been well briefed by his advisors on the strike in Abyan." Several investigations determining the civilian death toll of the strike revealed that "Saleh was right and Petraeus was shockingly misinformed." [85]

Assessment

The strikes, which were the start of a prolonged and ongoing camp gain in Yemen against AQAP, [86] have been described as a tactical and strategic failure for the US. [1] Although one of the objectives, killing Kazemi in al-Majalah, was achieved, all of the mains targets of the others strikes who formed AQAP's top leadership had survived. [34] AQAP's plan to have Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab detonate a bomb abroad Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, had proceeded regardless of the strikes and was not affected. [21] Above all, the massacre of civilians in al-Majalah immediately and permanently soured public opinion in Yemen on US military action. One writer stated that the US "yielded the moral high ground in Yemen" through incompetence demonstrated in the strike and the coverup after the fact. [87] Despite the planned misdirection, the Yemeni public widely assumed at the time that the strikes were conducted by the US. [66] The fact that the US did not ever officially acknowledge the strike led to further aggravation, making so that even by 2012, it remained in public consciousness. [88] [89] The US reportedly took hold of the situation weeks later: a White House aid recalled that "The president wasn’t happy with it, and so we went through a very long process led by Brennan to tighten up how we take lethal action in Yemen." [87]

AQAP exploited the al-Majalah strike, particularly the fact that it predominantly killed women and children, as a propaganda victory to justify its insurgency in Yemen. According to them, the strikes legitimized Yemen as a front for jihad in the same way that Iraq or Afghanistan was to Islamists at the time, as all three countries were now under attack from the US. [90] It was immediately utilized employed as justification to enact revenge in the group's claim for the Northwest Airlines Flight 253 bomb plot. [91] The cable leaks in November 2010 provided a further victory, as the notion of the Yemeni government lying to its people and covering up actions of the US would "fit seamlessly into a narrative that AQAP has been peddling in Yemen for years." [83] Months prior in a February 2010 interview, upon being asked if he believed the Yemeni government would assist in his targeted killing, Awlaki brought up the cover-up campaign for the strikes to show that it "sells its citizens to the United States, to earn the ill-gotten funds it begs the West for in return for their blood." [92] Strikes such as the one in al-Majalah were used extensively in AQAP media and propaganda in order to bolster recruitment, and were a major reason as to why AQAP had grown from around 300 members at the time of the strikes to above 1,000 by 2012. [88] In that year, a local official said regarding the al-Majalah strike that "all the residents of the area have joined al-Qaeda." [89]

See also

References

  1. 1 2 Woods 2015, p. 196.
  2. Woods 2015, p. 194.
  3. 1 2 Raghavan, Sudarsan (January 3, 2010). "Al-Qaeda benefits from missteps to become a threat in Yemen". The Dallas Morning News . The Washington Post . Retrieved September 1, 2025.
  4. 1 2 3 4 Worth, Robert F. (July 7, 2010). "Is Yemen the Next Afghanistan?". The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331. Archived from the original on April 23, 2023. Retrieved June 22, 2025.
  5. 1 2 3 Raghavan, Sudarsan; Shear, Michael D. (December 25, 2009). "U.S.-aided attack in Yemen thought to have killed Aulaqi, 2 al-Qaeda leaders". The Washington Post . ISSN   0190-8286 . Retrieved June 23, 2025.
  6. Scahill 2013, pp. 256–257.
  7. Scahill 2013, p. 261.
  8. Scahill 2013, p. 262.
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